ML19257D870
| ML19257D870 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1980 |
| From: | Baer R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Stampley N MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257D871 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002060657 | |
| Download: ML19257D870 (9) | |
Text
s Distribution NRC PDR TMurphy JAN 2 21980 28Elft Qle MErnst P
ELD LWR #2 File R0enise DFRoss IE(3)
DBVassallo NSIC Cocket fas. 50-416 SAVarga TIC and 50-417 FJWilliams ACRS(16)
RL8aer TCHoughton JLee Pr f!. L. Starapley, Vice President RMattson
. reduccicn and Engineerint SHanauer Mississippi Powr and Light Company JKnight P. O..ox 1640 RTedesco Jackson 11ssissippi 39205 RDeYoung VMoore Cear Mr. Stapley:
WKreger
SUBJECT:
RECUESTS FrP. A00! TION /L IFFCPVATICN (Grand Culf Nclear Otaticn, Units 1 and 2)
As a result of our review of the informtion :.:ctat. aa :q :nc Final Dfety Analysis Report for the Grarc Culf Fuclear :tati,,c, Lnits 1 anc 2, uc have develoced the enclosed requests for additional infomation. Included are cuestions on the Fire ?rctection Program frcm the Quality.'ssurance 2 ranch and the Auxiliary Systems Branch, a staff position concerning full 1 cad testing of 4160-480 volt transfoners from tne yuality Assurance Branch, and electrical and :nechanical questions fecm the Fowr Systems Eranch.
We request that you amend your Final Safety Analysis Report to reflect your responses to the enclosed requests by April 20,19E0. If you cannot teet this cate, please acvise us of the cate ycu can r.ect as soon as possicle so that we may consider the need to revise our review schedule.
Please contact us if you desire any ciscussion or clarificat'en :< tN enciesed requests.
Si ncerely, p
,rt.e -.1 e8.-m 4 9 v
'letert L. # " r, O' M
\\9 Light Later Factor, c:nc. : o. E 9
.oiisicn cf.rej.t.
.e r-n Erclosurs:
Recuests for Aoditional Infomatfun 1927 229 ces w/er. closure:
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Mac Pomu sts (e rs: Nacu o24o Cu.s. covenmucNr selNTING CPFICE: 1979 249 369 8002 06 0 (Ci 7
Mr. N. L. Stampiey JM 2 2 iC80 Mr. N. L. Stampley Vice President - Production Mississippi Power and Light Company P. O. B ox 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 ces: Mr. Robert B. McGehee, Attorney Wise, Carter, Child, Steen and Caraway P. O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
Conner, Moore and Corber 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20006 Mr. Adrian Zaccaria, Project Engineer Grand Gul f Nuclear Station Bechtel Power Corporation Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760 1927 230
01 3.1 GENERAL You state in your Fire Hazards Analysis how various safety-related caole
' trays, conduit and equipment are separated by distance from its redun-dant counterpart, and the criteria that were used to establish barriers between these redundant trains. However, it is essential that your fire hazards analysis also include the effects of costulated exposure fires involving permanent and/or transient combustibles (exposure fires) on systems, circuit cable trays or equipment required for safe plant cold shutdown which are separated only by distance (no fire barriers and with redundant trains 20 ft. or less from each other, as you listed in page 9A-21 of the FHA).
Redundant trains within 20 ft. of each other, as a minimum, will be required to be protected by a hal f hour fire rated barrier as well as area automatic sprinklers.
This does not mean that in some instances, redundant trains separated by more than 20 ft. will not require additional protection. In the fire hazards analysis your need to demonstrate assuming, failure of the primary suppression system, a fire on installed or transient combustibles will not result in the loss of capability to achieve safe cold failure of the primary suppression system, a fire on installed or transient combustib'es will not result in the loss of capability to achieve safe cold shutdown Where this cannot be demonstrated, an alternate means of assuning safe plant shutdown (cold shutdown) should be provided. Alternate shutdown will most likely be required for areas such as the upper and lower cable spreading rooms, and rooms 0C 205 and OC 208.
e' 1927 231 mom
. '. Demonstrate:
(1 ) Safe shutdown from the main control room where a fire disables any remote shutdown panels, or any safe shutdown equipment inclucin; conduf t/ cable trays controlled frcm remote locations.
(2) Safe shutdown from remote locations wnen tne main control rcom is uninhabitable due to a fire or when fire disables safe shutdown equipment or cables in the cable spreading areas or rooms listed on your FHA page 9A-21.
Alternate shutdown capability need only be orovided for the essential instrumentation, controls and ecuipment necessary to bring the :lan: to a hot standby condition.
Fire damage to systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shu:down should be limited so that repairs can be made an: cold snu:c:wn c:ndition achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Attached (Enc 1:sure 1; are our guidelines for alternate shutdown systems.
013.2-Page ?A-II, 3.0 Scope You state that only areas in seismic Category I structures were reviewed,
Shcw that any -ire (:ransformer fire, hycrogen fire,10: rage fire, at:,;
Outside of :nese seismic Category I structures will not prevent the plant fr:m achieving safe cold shutdown.
01 3. 3.
Fage !A-59, I:em 7.2.2,1Q It is our position as stated in Section C.6.g of 37P AFCSB 1.5-1 that the loss of :ne ventilation sy. item to any safety-related battery roca should
- s alarmec ar.d annunciated in the con:rol rcom.
.1927 232
3-013.4 Page 9A-60, Item 7.2.2.11 You state in your FdA that, "the complete operative loss of the emergency remote shutdown panels due to a pcssible fire could impair safe-shutdown ca pabili ty.
- It is our position that safety-related circuits in the control room and remote shutdown panels be isolated from each other such that the complete loss of one set of panels will not prevent from achieving safe shutdown.
Show how you will comply with this position in all affected areas of the plant.
013.5 page 9A-73, Item 7.2.2.53 (a) Provide details on the type and number of mrtable Class A anc Class C fire extinguishers in the control roem comolex.
(b)
It is our position that you compiy with Section F.2 of ST? APC58 9.5-1, Apoendix A, in that the concealed ceiling space should have fixed automatic total flooding Halon protection.
(c) 'lerify that the outside air intake (s) for the contrei roem ventila-tion system are provided with smoke det uwa capability to alarm in the control room to enable manual isolation of the control room ventilatien system and thus prevent smoke from entering the control room.
1927 233
4-013.5 Page 9A-74 Power Generation Control Complex (?GCC)
Verify that you comply with the inteface recuirements of NECO 10a65,
" Power Generation Control Complex adgn Criteria and Safety Evaluation."
013.7 page 9A-82, Item 7.2.3.2 Provide an automatic sprinkler system and a fire detection system to pro-tect each reactor coolant pump. Verify that an adequate drainage system will be provided for all the runoff water.
013.8 Table 9A-1, Sheet 5, Item 0.1 (a)
It is our position that you com;Ty with Section C.5.a.1 of 3T? APCSS 9.5-1 in that area fire detection systems should be provided for all areas that contain safety related equipment.
Show how you will c moly with this position.
(b)
It is our position that you c:rcly with Secticn E.1.a of 37? APCS 3 9.5-1, Appendix A, in that eedi fire detection system should bit equip;ed with an audible and sdsual alarm and annuncia:e in the centrol r:om.
Local audible alarms shot 1d also be provided.
Show how you will ccmcly with this position.
013.9-Table 9A-1, Sheet 6, Item D.l(j)
~
Su:stantiate tne fire resistance capability of -he following items as
- ney :ertain to safety-related areas er high ha: arc areas by verifying na: their ccnstructicn is in accordance with a particular design :na: has
- een fire tested.
Identify the design, the test method used and the ac:e::ance criteria :
1927 234
5-(1 )
Rated fire barriers, including floor and ceiling construction and their supports, (2)
Fire dampers and fire doors, as well as how they are installed in the ventilation ducts that penetrate rated fire barriers of safety-related areas; and (3)
Fire barrier penetration seals around ducts, pipes, cables, cable trays and in other openings (e.g. concrete joints sealers and fillers).
Verify that all seals are of the thickness specified in the tests, and that cables and cable trays are supported in a manner similar to supporting arrangements used in any tests.
013.10
-Table 9A-1, Sheet 7, Iten 0.3(c)
You state that water spraying onto cable trays would cause electrical faults at the cable termination points.
It is our position that you comply with Section D.3.c of STP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, in nat cable trays should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water witnaut electrical faulting (i.e. use weathercroof terminal boxes or cabinets, if necessary).
013.11 Table 9A.1, Sheet 13, Item 0.5 It is our position that you comply with Section 0.5(a) of STp APCSS 9.5-1, Accendix A, in that s fixed emergency ligncing system consisting of sealed beam units with individual (3-hour minimum) battery ;ower suoplies be installed in all areas rec'Sred for safe shutdown operations, including access and egress routes. 'lerify that you will comply with our position.
1927 235
. Oi3'.12 Table 9A.1, Sheet 14, Item E.l(d)
Cemonstrate that primary and secondary power for the alarm system can be maintained by:
Using normal offsite power as the rimary sucoly, with a 4-hour battery a.
supply as the secondary source.
b.
Having the capability for manual connec-ion to the Class lE emergency power bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of' loss of offsite power.
013:13 Table 9A.1, Sheet 14 Item E.2(e)
Verify that the fire pumps can provide, in acc:rdance with 37F 9.5-1 Section 5.b.5, the larges: firewater flow and pressure (based on 500 g;m for manual hose streams plus the largest design demand of any sorinkler or deluge system as determined in accordance with ';FpA 13 or NFPA 15) with the largest fire pump out of service.
013.14 Table 9A.1, Sheet 16, Items E.4 and E.5 For all Halon and CO suppression systems provide One concentration anc 2
soak time.
013.15 Table.9A.1, Sheet.19, Item F.14 Verify that the racwaste building is ;..aratec f~:m other areas of the plant by fire barriers naving at leat; three-hour fire ratings.
1927 236
i 6
7-013.16 Fire Protection Program Procedures - General Verify that the plant fire brigade:
(1) Consists of five members during all shifts.
(2)
Confins that the fire brigade provides for local fire department participation in drills at least annually.
013.17 Page 93-24, Item 2.9.4,b.1 Two spare air bottles for each breathing unit are insufficient.
It is our position that you comply with Section D.4.h of BTP APCSS 9.51, Appendix A, in that, in addition to the two spare air bottles, an onsite six hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to ;ermit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned.
If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units a;oroved for breathing air should be used, compressor s;. auld be operable assuming a loss of offsite power.
Special care must be taken to loca e the compressor in areas free of dust and containments.
Indicate how yc will comply with this position.
1927 237
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