ML19257D872

Safe Shutdown Capability

ML19257D872
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	01/22/1980
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19257D871	List: ML19257D870 ML19257D872
References
NUDOCS 8002060665
Download: ML19257D872 (27)

Text

fr ea._ 2 STAFF POSITION SAFE SHUTCCWN CAPABILITY O

Staf' C:ncem Curing One sta#s evaluation cf fire pretacticn r: grams at c:erating :lants, cne er =cre specific :lant areas may be identified in anica =e s:aff =es not have adecuata assannca cat a cstula:ad

'irt will not damage botn redundant divisiens of shutdcwn systems.

Bis lacx of assurance in safe snute:wn cacabili y nas resul*.ad

?-:m cne er bem cf =e f:llcwing situatiens:

Case A: The licensee. bas not adecua:aly i:entified the sys: ems arid== cnents recuired for safe shu :cwn and tneir lccatien in scecific fire areas.

Case 3: The licensee has nct derx:nstnted ina: the fi re protecticn f:r s:ecific : Tan: areas will :revent damage :: bon redundant divisiens Of safe shu::cwn c:m:cnen 3 f esntified in these areas.

Or Casa A. Se staf' has recuired

• Mat an acacuate safe scutdewn analysis te :e'# rtec.

Sis evaluation incluces re icenti'ica-i n Of =e sys:ams required #:r safe snutd:wn anc te 1: cati:n Of =e sys am c:::cnents in ne : lam. '4here it is de amined by.his avalua:icn ma: safe snu ::wn c:mecnents of dem recundan: civisiens art 1:ca ad in ne same 'f re arta, the licansee is recuirec :: cem:ns n :a ma a :: s.ula:ad fire will not damage bo= :ivisi:ns _:r ;r:vice titama:a

~

snu:::wn n=acili y as in Case 3.

- )....L.

For Case 3, te staf# mayQave required : hat an altamate snutdewn ca:acilir/ be :revided h is ince:encent

1. m e area

1. ::ncarn

'%f or ce licansee may have :r :csed s;ca a :aca:ilir/ in lieu of Ne Q certain addi ti:nal fire :r::acticn :neci'ica i:ns in =e a ta.

W s:ecific =cdificatiens asscciated with me area Of ::ncem alcng wita Of =e area form =e g

Over systams and acui: ment alreacy ince:encen:

. Or eacn :lan:, =e cci #ica:ims eeced anc al:a m ata snu :can :a:a:ili y.

ce== ina icns Of sys ams enien Oravi:e =e snute:wn functions ay :e u

uni:ue #:r eacn critical a ta; newever, me snu; dean functions :revicec g

snculc rain ui

lan: :anre ars winin me :cunes of me limi:ing safety cosecuences teemed accactacle f:r.he :esign basis event.

Qa h

5:af' ::si:icn Q

Safe snu::enn :acacili y snould te cemens: rated (Case A) cc al ama.a shu-denn :a:acili'y ;2reviced (Case 3) in ac=rdance wi-n ne guidelines :cevicee :el:d:

/

1. :esien Basis Even:

he :esign : asis event' for ensidering me need for altama e shu:=wn is a :cstulated # ire in a s:ecific fire area entaining scuncant safe saut:can cacies/ecui: cent in close ;reximir/ wnere c..

4 it nas :een cate'.:inec ma: fi rt Oratacticn eans cannet assurs

na: safe shu:: wn :1:acility will be ;rtserved. Tec :ases shculd te censidered: (1) Offsi*a ;cwer is availacle; and (2) Offsite

cwar is nct available.

8 0 0 2 06 0 6 >-

2-

2. t.imitinc Safety Consecuences and Recuiree Shutdewn Functicns 2.1 No fissien pr: duct boundarf intagri ty snali be af'ec:ad:

a.

No fuel clad danage; b.

No rupture of any primarf c=lan :cundary; c.

No ructure of.he c:ntainmen-boundary, 2.2 3e reac:ce c:olan: systam r: cess variables shall be within

=cse predictad f:r a loss of ner ai ac pcwer.

2.3 The altarnate shutdcwn capabili y snail be acte to acnieve and mainain succritical c:ndi:icns in :ne reac:ce, maintain reac ce coolan inventerf, acniave and maintain hot stanchy' =ndi:icns (hc: shu dewn' for a SWR) for an extended

eried of time, achieve cold shutd:wn' =ndi:1cns within 72 ncurs and maintain c:Id snutacwn concitiens thertafter.

As defined in =e 5:ancard Tecnnical Icecifica:icns.

3.

tr30r ance Ocals 3.1 Tne tactivity :=:S functi:n shall be :1:acie of achieving anc main afning ::10 shu::cwn reachity =nci:icns.

3.2 Tne tac r =cian: makeuc 'unc-icn scall be ca:a:le Of maintaining me reac::r c:olant level accve.t.e ::: of :he c:rt for 3WR's anc in =e pressuri:sr for PWR's.

3.3 The reactor heat remeval functicn snali be capacle Of acnieving and maintaining cecay hea: removal.

3.4 he rocass meni= ring functi:n snail be ca:acie Of Or:viding direct readings Of :he :r cass varia:Ies necessary

erd:m anc =ntrol =e a:cve func-icns.

3.5 Se sa=crting functien snali be :1:a:ie Of :revicing me

recess =aling, lucrica:icn, e :. 9ecessa y = :emi:

ce operatien of =e equi: men asec #:r safa snut:cwn by

=e systa.:s icentified in 3.1 - 3.a.

.3.5 De acui: men: anc systems usec : acnieve and maintain hc:

s ancby =nci icns (hc snJt=wn #:r a iWR) snculd te (1) '-te Of 'i t damage; (2) ca:able Of maintaining suen conditicns f:r an extended time :erted lenger : nan 72 5 curs if :ne equi: ment recuired to acnieve and maintain c:ld shu :cwn is no: available due :: fire camage; and (3)

=cwered by an :nsite ewgency : wer system.

3.7 3 e ecui: ment anc systams used.: acnieve and main ain coic snu::cwn =ndi;icns shcuid :e ei:ner free Of 'f re damage Or ce #irt tamage to sucn systems sncuid be limitad sucn da: rt airs can be made and =lc snut cwn c:ncitions acnievec wi:nin 72 hcurs. Sui: rent and systams used rice :s 72 neurs after =e firt snould :e :cwered :y an ensi:e c. ergency acwer systam; =cse usec aftar 72 neurs gay be ;cwered by 1927 239 og@o BNub

3-cffsits ;cwer.

3.3 I,ese systams need net be designed to (1) seismic :atagery !

criteria; (2) single failure cri:eria; cr (3) coce witn cuer plan; accidents sucn as pipe reaks or stuck' valves

. Accendix A 377 9.5-1), excect mese :cr.icns of these

'.sys:sms wnica inter ace witn or imcac: exis:ing safety systems.

3

a. :'4R E:ui:.en 3enerally Necessarv 0r Wet Standbv_

~

t (1) Eeac-ivi:v Centrol Reac.cr trip cacability (scrim). Scrati:n cacacili ty e.g.,

enarging :: ump, takeup.;u=c or hign pressure injectica pumo

aking succion fr:m c:ncan: rated bcrstad water succif es, and leccwn system if recuired.

(2) :eac:cr C: clan: Makeum Reac:ce c:c: ant makeuc :1:acility, e.g., enarging :u=s

r :ne ni;n ressure injecti:n rums.

wer = era:ed eif ef valves may be recuired to recuce pressure to tilow use of :Me

-ign :ressure injecti:n u=s.

2) ;eac= r ::cian: 5vstam essure C:n -el teac=r :ressure c:ntrol ca:acility, e.g., cnarging :r:s

r pressuri:er heaters and use of ne 1e :cwn systarn i# recui-ed.

(a)

ecav 2 eat Removal

ecay heat -emeval cacactit:y, e.g., :cwer cerated relief valves 'staam genertur) er safety relief valves for nea:

erevai 4131 wa ar su:Oly and trergency or auxiliary

'eecwa:ar u=s f:r takeu: c -he s aam ;enertur. Service

ner :u=s may :e recuired = :r0vice natar #:r auxiliary datar :P

'eed :u. : sucticn if ne =ncensata surage tank ca::acity is c; acecua:a for ~2 hcurs.

!!)

- cass 'deni t:rine !ns:-ren zti:n

~0csss : nit: ring :2:abi:i y e.g., Oressuri:er Oressure and Ievel, staam gener2=r ievel.

(5) Su::ce..

21e ecui: ment requind to su=cr. ::eratien of the abcve

escribec sautdcwn ecui: ment e.g., ::=cnen: eccling na:er sani:2 natar, etc. anc :nsita :cwer sources (AC, OC) wim neir asscciated i:lectrical :is ri:utien systam.

1927 240 o 00R 0 BM

5. :'4R Ecui::nent Generally Necessary Fer Cold shutecwn*

(1)

React:r Ccclant Svstem Pressure Reductien Residual Heat 1

Removat Syscam tRhR) Cacactitty React:r c:clant system pressure reducti:n by ::alcewn using steard generator pcwer Ocerated relief /alves or a.mespneric dumo valves.

(2) Cecay Heat Removal Cecay heat removal ca: ability e.g., residual neat mmoval system, c:ccenent cooling wa:er sys:am arrd ser/ ice water 1d snu:: wn.

sys.am' to removal heat and maintain 0:

(3) Suceert Sue:crt capability e.g., ensite cwer scurtas ( AC 1 C) ce cffsita after 72 hcurs and :ne associated electrical distributicn system :: su:cly One a:cve equi: rent.

hui: rent necessary in additien :

.9a* already reviced aintain ot stancty.

5. 3'4R Icui: ent Generally Necessarv Fer Het Shute:wn Reactivi:V C:n *01 Reac ce trip cacability (scram).

(2) Reacter C: clan-Makeue React:r c:ciant invent:ry makeu: ca:acility e.g., reac:ce ::re isolatien :aling sys am (RCIC) or ne nign pressure :: clan infecticn system (HFCI).

I'

eact:r := essure C:ntr:1 anc ecav '-ea: :emeval Oe:rtssuri:stien system valves :r saft:y et11ef valves far

um: :: One su::ressicn :ccl. Tne esicual heat esmcval systam in steam ::ndensing mcde, and sertice natar system may IIs: te asec ':r nea; mecvai :: ne uiti a:a heat sink.

(1) Suceression :cci Ccoline Residual heat removal system (in su oressien :cci c: cling ecce) servies water system :: maintain het shutdown. 1927 241

(-)

7-: cess venit:rine Fr:cass scnit: ring cacacility e.g., eac :r vessei level anc :rtssure and su:ortssien ::ci am:erature.

4.

ogBg

5-7

.. ' +

(6) Sue:ce:

.i.

Su::cr: capability e.g., ensita cwer scures (AC 1 OC) and meir associated distributien systems u :rovide f:r :ne shutdcwn equi; ment.

7 WR Ecui: ment Genenlly.*Iecessarv Fer C:ld Shu-Ocwn' A: :nis ;cint the ecui: ment necessary far not snutscwn has reduced

=e :rimary systam Ortssure and tem:erature Oc wnem.Me RHR sys am may be placec in service in ER c: cling mace.

(1)

Cecav usa: :emoval Residual heat receval' system in ce ER c: cling mcde, service water system.

(2) See:cre Onsite scurtes ( AC & CC) er offsite after 72 icurs and ceir associnad distributi:n systams u :rovi:e

!:r snut:cwn acui: ment.

Qui: men: provided in acci-icn u =a: for acnieving not shu:=wn.

' ~

3. *nfor a:icn :ecui red ::r S taf' "teview w

(a)

Cescricti:n of te systems or crtiens :nereof used.a Or: vide the snu:dcwn ca: ability anc.mccifications recuired

acnieve ce altarnata snutacwn ca acili:y if recuired.

(b)

System design by drawings wnich sacw qcr-al and altarnate snunewn c:n:r:1 anc ;cwer :ircuits, loca:icn Of ccm:enents, and Ona: wiMng whicn is in.he area anc :ne wiMng wnica is Out Of.ne ama ma recuirec :ne alternate system.

() 7erifica:icn ina: =anges :: safety sys ams will n0:

e; race saft:y sys:ams.

(e.g., new iscia:1:n swi res an: entrol swi =es snculo mee: cesign criteM a anc suncares in FIAR for electrical ecui:: en: in me system na: ne switen is :: be ins alled; :acinets ma: ce swi =es are : be Scun ad in sncuid als: mee c e sa.e criteria (.:5AR) as :=er safety elatad : :ine:s and

acels; to aveid inacver:an: isolati:n

1. - m te ::nt ci

-:cm, ce isolati:n swi:=es shculd be keyi:ckec, or alar ud in ce =n: ci - cm if in :ne *1 cal

• Or is:la:ec" :csi:icn.

eHccic =ecks sncule be mace :: verify swi:.n is in ne r::er :csiticn for nornal : ers:i:n; and a single transfer switen er ciner new cevi:a sncuid not te a scur:e f r 1 single failure :: :ause 10ss O' ecuncant safety systams).

(:) VeMficaticn :na: wiring, inclucing :cwer scur:es f r One entrol circuit and equi: ment ccention f:r me altamate snut:cwn me: Mod, is ince:encen: Of ecui: ment wiM ng in

=e area = te avoiced.

192/ 942 4

s (a) Verification :na: altarnna shutscwn :cwer scurces, including ai! Oreakers, have isciation devices en entrei cir:uits

=t are routed througn 130 ar2a s te avoiced, even i? - e treaker is :s te c; era:ad manually.

( ')

Verifica:icn ma: licensee precacurt(s) have been develeced wnica describe One tasks to te :arfor ed s effect the shutdcwn e acd. A sumary of rese r :acures shculd :e reviewed uf.

..A s.1. a..

.s (g) VeHficatien ba: s:are fusas are available fer ::ntrol circui.s wnert =ese fuses may :e recuirsc in su:clying

cwer

= c:ntrol circui.s usec for ne snu:d:wn e.hed and may be bicwn by de effect Of a casle s: reading re:m fire. Be s: art fases shculd be Iccated =nvenien

= ne existing fuses. Be shu:down precedurs shculd inform =e

ernce :o =eck :nese fuses.

(h) Veri'denicn ra; de an: wer tcuirtd = :erf -n ce scutd wn functi:ns using me Or:cacurts of (#' as nell

's u :r: vide

'd t Ori; ace em:ers

"' ;n- -.e #' re i s availa: e as requirsc by =e fire Ori; ace :acnni:li s:eci 'i cni:ns.

7eri:nh

a: adacuna ac:e:nnca :as:s art :e ':r ed.

ase sncula veri'y =a : acui:ren: :: era.as fr:e ne 10:11 c:n:rci s.a:icn wnen ce :ransfer :P iscla:icn swi :n

's ci :ad in :ne iccal" =csiti:n and =a: =t ecui: men:

annc. te :erated fr:m tne c:n:r:1 reem; and ma: ecuia-en: :ernas f-em =e c:n:rel cm tu: cannet be Ocerated 4: =e iccal ::ntrol s ni:n wnen me ransfer :r isolation swi = is in te "remeta ;csition.

(d e=ni:a1 S:ecifient:ns :f ne surveillance tcui trents at: I'-'-'ng ::nci:i:ns 3:e =ernien #:r =n e':ui:een:

1: tacy ::vertc by existin; ecn. 3:ecs.

exam:le, i' new isola:icn and c: : 1 swi:=es are ac:ac = a sartica wa:ar sysum, -he exts ing ecn. 5:ec. surieitlanca scuire-ents :n =e sertice water sys:am sncule acc a su arent s'milar = =e f:liewing:

'Iver/ nied :ums :ast sacu c aisc /eM'y :na: =e :uma sn s "r m Oe ai ama a snu=:wn sutien a'*ar cving at serii:e na ar systar 'scini:n swi =es :: Ze lccal

ntrol :csiticn.*

(i) Veri'i: nien =a: ce sys ams availa' te are acecua a :s :er#:rm

=e necassary snute:wn 'unc:icns.

'.ne func:icns recuirac sn:uid be :asec :n prev :Us analyses, i' =cssible (e.g.,

in =e :iAR), suen as a I:ss Of F ai 1.c. Ocwer er snut::wn Or a Grou ! i sci a ti:n 'i'aR). De ecui::en recui red #:r =e 1 :arna s n:acii' y Sn:uid te = e same er e:uivalent :3 "A

=a: relied :n in me a:cve analysis.

] [

ogBD 0

e 1927 243

r i

- a.

(1) 'leri fica:icn that repair precatres ':e cold sr.

systa s am cevel ced and.a:arial for m:af M ts main a

n si a.

O 6

0 1927 244 f@0I

421.0 Cuality Assurance 421.1 The Quality Assurance (QA) pr:gran for fire protection should (App.9A) be under the management control of the QA organization. This control consists of (1) formu'.ating or verifying that a fire protection QA program incorporates suitable requirements and is acceptable to management rasoonsible for fire protection; and (2) verifying the effectiveness of the QA program for fire protection through review, surveillance, and audit.

Revise Section C of Table 9A-1 in Appendix 9A to clarify that the QA program for fire protection is under the management control of QA, or provide an alternative position for the staff's evaluation.

421.2 Mr. Vassallo's letter of August 29, 1977 on fire protection

( App. !A) provides supplemental guidance on QA. Modify Section C of Table 9A-1 in Appendix 9A to te responsive to the latest supplemental guidance on QA f:r fire protec" ion or provide an alternative for the staff's evaluation.

!e note that if the fire protection QA progra criteria are met as part of the QA prograu dercribed in ::;ical ce: ort Mpt-TCP-1A, " Operational QA Manual," which meets Appencix 5 to 10 CFR 50, i' is not necessary to submit a detailed description for NRC review.

d

• D 1927 245

422.0 Condu:t of Operations 422.16 Identify the upper level offsite management position (s) which (App.9A) has overall responsibility for the formulation, implementation, and assessment of the effectiveness of the station fire protection program.

422.17 While the Plant Manager is generally responsible for all activities (App.9A) at the facility, describe any further delegation of these responsi-bilities for the fire protection program such as training, maintenance of fire protection systems, testing of fire protection equipment, fire safety inspections, fire fighting procedures, and fire drills.

422.18 Describe the authority of your Shift Fire Chief relative to that (App. 9A)~

of your Shift Supervisors.

422.19 Describe the composition cf your shift fire brigade in terms of (App.9A) numbers and job titles.

\\

1927 246

423.38 It has come to our attention that although some applicants had committed to Regulatory Guide 1.68, they did not intend to conduct full-load tests of some 4160-480 volt transformers supplying power to vital buses. Your test description in FSAR Chapter 14 does not contain suf ficient detail for us to detemine if you intend to conduct such a test.

It is our position that full-load tests of vital buses must be conducted including all sources of power supplies to the buses.

Iiodify your test description to indicate that this testing will be conducted in accordance with Regulatory Lide 1.68.

1927 247

040.80 Section 8.1.4.1.b of the FSAR says that there are three (3) physically (3.1) independent circuits from the 500XV switchyard to the onsite electrical distribution system. Figure 8.2-3 indicates that there are only two (2) circuits from the 5000/ switchyard. Clarify.

040.81 In the first paragraph of FSAR Section 8.1.4.3 a " spare set of BOP trans-(8.1) formers" are mentioned. Are these in addition to those shown in Figure 8.1-1 or do you mean that these are included in the four BOP transformers shown (such as 30P XPtRS !12A and 123)?

20.22 In FSAR See:fon 3.1.4.2.3.f it is stated that " provision is made for con-( 3.1 )

trol (of the HPCS pcwsr system) frem the control rcom and another locatiol external to the contr:1 reca".

Identify the other location.

040.83 SRP Section 8.1, III, 5, Revision 1, requires that criteria applicable to (3.1) the design snould be identified and the degree of confor nance defined.

SRP Table 8-1 lists apolicability of criteria to eacn FSAR section.

Each section of your FSAR Chacter 3 should m.e.:fon conformance (or exception)

all of the criteria cf SFJ Tatie 3-1.

This T.ay :e tone by a single coccrenensive table ir. FSAR 5ection 3.1 wnien would be referenced by the sucsequent secticas.

4nere exce;:: tens, relative : One electrical power systems, are taken, t.ese snould be s:ecifically noted and referenced to a de: ailed explanatien.

1927 248

a 040.84 In the table of centents of Appendix 3A, RG 1.93 is noted as "not (3.1)

App. 3A addressed in FSAR...." and RG 1.32 is noted as N/A (page 3A-4). Mcwever, in FSAR Section 3.1.4.4.1 and 3A/1.32-1, compliance with Regulatory Guides 1.93 and 1.32 is stated. Correct Accendix 3A accordingly.

040.85 GDC-17 states that the safety function for each of the offsite systems (3.1)

(assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capabili y to assure that: (a) specified accep-table fuel design limits and design conditions for the reactor coolant pres-sure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (b) tne core is cooled and containment integrity and otner vital functions are maintained in the event of the costulated accidents.

We require that the adecuacy of ne transfor ers (service and ESF) be verified by the voltage analysis at transien and steady state. This is in order to assure that the transfor ners are cacable of starting and operat-ing the loads with the worst combined condition (the mihicum expected griIf voltage and the maximum combined loads).

03C.26 SRP Sec-icn 3.1, III, I states that FSAR grid

... descriptions shoul:

,:.:i state wnetner facilities are existing or planned; if planned, the respec-tive c:moletion dates shculd be orovided." Provide the ccmoletion status of tne 500KV and ll5KV overnead lines.

040.37 Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 3, Section 3.2.2 specifies that the appli-(3.2) cant should " provide infomation and a discussion of grid availability, including the frequency, duratica and cause of cutages". Fce the cutage statistics given in FSAR Table 8.2-1, furnish the following information:

a) cause of each outage b) duration of each outage 927 249 c) update the table to the present time

. In FSAR Section 8.2.1.2 and Section 8.2.1.4 the acronym "NAPSIC" is used.

040.38 (3.2)

Explain the meaning and the function of NAPSIC.

Explain how you comply with Regulatory Guide 1.9, revision 1, paragraph 040.39 (8.3)

C.9 with respect to first out alann indicaticn.

The chosen voltage setpoint and time delay asscciated with the :ndervoltage C40.90 (3.3) protection must assure that the safety related equipment is not subjected to a voltage below that recomended by the manufacturer and ANSI C84.1-1973 for a period of time long enough to cause malfunction and/or thennal y

We require information regarding startingand operating characteristics, damage.

and thenral capability of the safety related equipment in tenns of the voltage current and time.

Ca0.91 In the FSAR paragrapn 5.3.1.1.4.2.10 it indicates that generator dif-(3.3) ferential current and engine overspeed are the only emergency protective devices for the HFCS diesel. Figure 8.3-8 of the FSAR shows that lube oil pressure low (2 of 3 logic) and case pressure high (2 of 3 logic) also operate protective interlocks during an emergency for division I and II.

If this logic diagram also applies to tne HPCS ciesel explain the discrepancy or provice t.e logic diagram for the HPCS diesel.

040. 92 FSAR Section 3.3.1.1.5.1 in describing the R?S power supply states that (3.3)

...the power feeds to inde:endent divisions are pnysically separated and feed four redundant buses." FSAR Figure 8.3-11 snows only two buses,

• A' and "S".

Correct tne contracietion.

1927 250

. G40.93 In FSAR Table 8.2-3 " Load Flow Studies" and Table 8.2-4 " Stability (8.2)

Studies", the results of analysis of contingencies and faults are stated as "no problem" and " stable". Define these tems more explicitly so as to provide greater assurance of the results of the analysis. Provide mini-mum or maximum voltage, transient duraticns, and other quantitative values to substantiate the conclusions drawn in Table 8.2-3 and 8.2-4.

040.94 Clarify the description in FSAR Section 8.2.1.2, regarding alarms for the (8.2) various problems that could occur involving the switchyard auxiliary sys-tems.

Identify the alam indication and its location.

10. 95 In Section 3.2.1.1 on page 3.2-2, it is stated that "The 115XV line does

'. 3. 2 )

not cross over or under any of the 5C0KV offsite pcwer supply lines...".

However, from Figure 5.2-2, it s;; pears tnat the 500KV line from Franklin to Grand Gulf dces cross over the ll5XV line between Natchez ".E.S.

and Port Gibson. Confirm that it does or does not cross. Provide further infomation on grid stability at Grand Gulf if the above mentioned 500KY line fell on top of the 115KV line.

10. 96 FSAR Secticn 3.3.1.1.1.1 : age 3.3-11 prcvides information on ::ntrols for s3.3) diesel generators. Clarify the statement ::ncerning the nuccer and loca-tion of the local control stations for each diesel generator.

0a0.97 Describe the actions and operations you take to assure that a diesel generat:r (5.3) will respond to an autcmatic start signal after completion of and during a periodic test. Address the following:

Governor control settings Monit: ring of Diesel Generat:r Sync-5:eed setting 1927 251

' C40.102 n FSAR section 8.3.1.1.4.1.1.a.2 page 8.3-12, it appear: that the resistive (8.3) load was omitted frem the tabulated data in test 2; clarify. Also, provide the analytical method for obtaining the cumulative loads.

040.103 3e load shedding and sequencing reset operation is mentioned in Section (8.3) 2.3.1.1.3 page 8.3-5.

Regarding restoring of motors and valve operations following loss of offsite power, clarify and expand the description regard-ing reset operation since you state that, " reset is not a function of the

resence or absence of bus voltage".

040.104

• n Table 3.3-5 of FSAR, it is stated that the diesel generator start (3.3) signal is given at time 3 seconds foilewing LCCA.

In Table 6.3-1 the diesel generator start signal is given a- -i e O seconcs. Correct this discrepancy.

040. 105 Cperating experience at certain nuclear power plants which have two (9.3; RSP cycle turbocharged diesel engines =anufactured by the Electrcmetive Oivision (ED) of General Mot:rs driving e.mergency genera: Ors have ex:erienced a significant number of turbocharger mechanical gear drive fail urts. The failures have occurred as the result of running the emergency diesel genera: Ors at no I:ad er light load conditiens f:r extended :eriods. No load or light load operati:n ::uld occur during periodic ecuipment testing or during accident c:nditions with availability of o ffsite power. iihen this equipment is 0:erated under no lead c:nditions insufficient exhaust gas volume is generated :: operate the turbocharger.

As a result the turbocharger is driven mechanically ' rom a gear crive in order is supply enough combusion air to the engine to maintain rated

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, 010.'i02 In FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.4.1.1.a.2 page 8.3-11, it a::ea : taat tr.e resistive (8.J) load was emitted from the tabulated data in :es: 2; clarify. Also, previde the analytical method for obtaining the :umulative loads.

040.103 The lead shedding and sequencing reset c:eration is mentioned in Secticn (3.3) 8.3.1.1.3 page 8.3-5.

Regarding restoring of motors and valve operatiens following loss of offsite power, clarify and expand the description regard-Ing reset cperation since you state tha, " reset is not a function of the presence or absence of bus voitage".

040.104 In Table 8.3-5 of FSAR, it is stated that tne diesel generator start (3.3) signal is given at time a secones follcwing '. CA.

In Table 6.3-1 the diesel generator start signal is given at time O seconds. Correct this discrepancy.

040. 105 Cperating ex;erience at certain nuclear power plants wnich have two

( 3. 3.1 RSP cycle turbocharged diesel engines manufactured by the Electrem ive Division (EMD) of General Mot:rs driving e.tergency geners rs have ex:erienced a significant number Of :ur:ccharge-re:hani:a* gear drive fail ures. The failures have Oc:urred as the result of running the emergency diesel genera:ces at no load :r lign: 1 cad ::ndi-i:ns f:r extended periods. Ne lead Or light load c: era: ten :cuid oc:ur during periodic equipment testing er during ac:iden: ::nditions with availability of Offsite pcwer. When this ecui: ment is c:erated uncer no lead c:nditi:ns insufficient exhaust gas volume is generated :: ::erate the tur:cenarger.

As a result the turbecharger is driven :echanically 'r:m a ; car : rive in order to su; ply enough ::=busion air :: the engine is maintain rated

. speed. The turbocharger and mechanical drive gear normally sup: lied with these engines are not designed for standby service encountered in nuclear power plant application where the equipment may be called upon to operate at no lead or light load :endition and full rated speed for a prolonged period. The F.D equipment was originally designed for loc:cetive service where no lead speeds for the engine and generator are much lower than full Icad speeds. The loco:notive turbocharged diesel hardly ever runs at full s:eed except at full load. The 9.D has str:ngly rec:mmended to users of this diesel engine design against coeratien at no load or lignt Icad conditions at full rated speed f:r extended periods because of the short life expectancy of the turboc.arger mechanical gear drive unit normally urnished. No load or light *. cad operation also causes general d

deterioration in any diesel engine.

To cope with the se' dre service the equipment is nor. ally subjected to and in the interest of reducing dailures and increasing the availability of their ecut; ment ED has devel: ped a heavy duty turbocharger drive gear unit that :an reolace existt ; equi;een:. ~his is available as a

-e:lacemen: kit, or engines can be or ered with the heavy duty tur:o-charger drive gear assembly.

To assurt :::imum availattiity :" eme gency diesel generat:rs en demand, A::licant's wne have on order :r intend :: ceder emergency generators driven by two cycle diesel engines marufactured by ED should be provided sith the heavy duty turbocnarger macht.nical drive gear assembly as re::c= ended by ED for the class f service enc:untered in nuclear power plants. 2nfirm your c:m:liance with this re:uirement.

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0:0.106 Provide a detail discussion (or plan) of the 1e-el of training pr posed (3.1) for your operators, =aintenance crew, quality assurance, and supervisory personnel responsible for the' operation and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators. Identify the number and type of personnel that will be dedicated to the operations and matntenance of the emergency diesel generators and the number and type that will be asstgned from your general plant operations and maintenance groups to assist den needed.

In your discussion identtfy the amcunt and *(ind of training that will be received by each of the above categories and tne ty;e of :ngeing training program planned to assure optimum availability of the emergency generatcrs.

Also discuss the level of educatien and minimum experience requirements for the various categories of operations and maintenance personr.41 associated with the emergency diesel genera: cts.

NO.107 Periccic testing and tes: leading of an emergency diesel generater

'3.3'

2; in a nuclear power plan: is a necessary functi:n to dem:nstrata :ne Operability, capabiltty and availability of the uni: On cemanc. Periccic testing c:upled with gecd preventive maintenance practices will assure c::imum equipment readiness and avafiahflity :n demand. 313 is the desired geal.

To achieve this optimum equi; ment readiness status :ne One following recuirements should be met:

1 9 2 7 2 9'

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1.

The equipment should be tested with a minimum loading of 25 percent of rated Icad. No load or light load operation will cause incemplete combustion of fuel resulting in the for ation of gum and varnish deposits on the cylinder walls, intake and exhaust valves, pistons and piston rings, etc., and accumulatten of unburned fuel in the turbocharger and exhaust system. The c:nse uences of no load or light load operation are potential ecui; men: failure due to the gum and varnish deposits and fire in the engine exhaus system.

2 Periodic surveillance testing sneuld :e perfer ed in ac:crdance with the a:plicable NAC guidelines (A.g.1.lC3), and with the recomencations of the engine manufacturte. Ccn'iicts between any such rec:mendations and the NRC guidelines, :articularly with res;ect is test frecuency, leading and duratien, s: uld be identified and justified, 3.

Preventive maintenance shculd go beyond the normal routine adjest-cents, servicing and repair of c:mocnents wnen a malfunction occurs.

Preventive maintenance shcult encom: ass investi;ative testing of com:enents which have a ".ist:ry of Pt:ea ec al functioning and require constant attentica and re: air.

n such cases consideration should be given Oc reslacement of those c:m;cnents with other

reducts wnich have a re

Ord of demnstra:ec reliability, rat:1Er inan rt;etitive recair and maintenance cf the existing ccm:enents. Testing of the unit after adjus=ents r re:ates have been made only c:nfi-ms ina: the equipment is c:erable and does not necessarily mean tha: the rec: cause of the roblem has beer eliminated

• alleviatad.

4 Upon c:maleti:n of re; airs er maintenance and price to an actual start, run, and lead test a finai equipment check should be made to J'

d i

assure that all electrical circuits are inctional, t.e., fuses are in place, switches and circuit breakers are in their ;r:;er pcsiti:n, no loose wires, all test leads have been rt.rved, and all valves are in the proper posi fon to permit a manual s:r: c' the equipment, After the unit has been satisfact:rily started ad 1:ad tested, return the unit to ready' aut matic standby service and uncer the c:ntrol of the control room operater.

Hvide a discussion of hew the above reesirements have been isolemented in the emergency diesel generater system cesign and how they will be c:nsidered when the plant is in ::mercia! 0;erstien, i.e.. by wna: means will :ne above requirements be enforced.

010.108

ne availability en demand of an emer,en:J diesel generator is (3.3)

RSP dependent upen, among other things, the ;re;ev functioning of fis c:ntrols and monit: ring instrumentation. This ecut; ment is generally

anel mounted and in some instancas the ;mels are mounted dire

ly

n the diesel genartser skid. Major diese? engfne dama;e has :::urrtd at seme operating plants from Yibratica in=ced wear On skid Zunted c:ntrol and monit: ring instru=entation. This sensitive ins: neenta:1cn is not mace to withstand and function a::u tte*y f:r pr:ionged ;eriods under continuous vibrational stresses acemaily encountered with interna *

mbustion engines. Operation of senstive instrumentati n under this environmen rapidly deteriorates calibratics,, ac:uracy and c:ntrol signal cut;u,

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Therefore, except for sensors and other equipment that must be directly mounted on the engine or associated piping, the controls and monitoring instrumentation should be installed on a free standing ficer mounted panel separate from the engine skids, and located on a vibration free f1cer area or equipped with vibration mounts.

Confirm your compliance with th'e above requirement or provide justification for noncomoliance.

40.109 Excand your discussien in paragripn 3.5.4 to include the following (9.5.4) information for eacn tyoe of engine:

1.

Useable capacity of tne fuel oil storage tank 2.

Minimum capacity of the fuel oil storage tanks for post LOCA load demands.

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, MO.110 Tne diesel generators are required to start automatically on loss of

'(9.5.5) all offsite power and in the event of a LOCA. Tne diesel generator sets should be capable of operation at less than full load for extended Should a periods without degradatton of performance or reliability.

LO".A occur with availabiltty of offsite power, discuss the design previsions and other parameters that have kin considered in the selection of the diesel generators to enable them to run unleaded (on standby) for extended periods without degradation of engine performance or reliability.

Ex:and your PSAR/F3AR to include and explicitly define the capability of yc;r design with regart to this requirement for the HPCS ciesel generator.

(SRF 9.5.5, Part III, Item 7).

-* %.. 3)

Pnvious question 040.55, part 3, asked for your provision for removing

..e 3

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3 moisture in the HPCS diesel generator air starting system. Since tnis gt.estion was asked, a stucy by the University of Dayton has shown that a::;nuia-fon of water in the starting air system has been one of the most 3

en

causes of diesel engine failure : start on demand. Concensation

" antrained moisture in c0maressed air lines leacing to ::ntrol and starting a' e valves, air start ters, and condensation or cof sture on the working

. # aces of tnese coc:enents has caused rust, scale and water itself to

.i'.c as and score anc jam -he internal working parts of nese vital ccm-

rents there:y preventing starting of the diesel generators.

1927 259 J

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. In the event of less of offsite power the diesel generators must function since they are vital to the safe shutdown of the etactor(s). Failure of the diesel engines to start from the effects of moisture cond, cation in air starting systems and from other causes have lowered their o;:erational reliability to substantially less than the desired reliability of 0.99 as specified in 3 ranch Technical Position IC55 (PS3) 2 " Diesel Generator Reliability Testing" and Regulatory Guide 1.108 " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants."

In an effort toward im; roving diesel' engine starting reliability we require tnat comoressed air starting system designs include air dryers for the removal of entrained moisture. The two # air dryers most co=nenly used are the dessicant and refrigerant types. Of these two types, the re rigerant type is the one most suited for this application and therefort 1: pre-fer-ad. Starting air should be dried to a dew point of not more than 500F when installed in a nor, ally controlled 700F environment, otherwise the 3 arting air dew point should be controlled to at least 100F less than the lowes expected ambten: temperature.

Revise your design of the diesel engine air starting system accordingly, describe this feature of y:ur design.

1927 260

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i 040.112 Several fires have occurred at some operating plants in the area of (9.5.7)

RSP the diesel engine exhaust mant fold and inside the turbocharger housing which have resulted in equt; ment unavailability. The fires were started from lube oil leaking and accumulating on the engine exhaust manifold and accumulating and igniting inside the turbocharger housing.

Accumulation of lube oil in these areas, on some engines, is apparently caused from an excessively long prelube period, generally longer than five minutes, prior to manual starting of a diesel generator. This condition does not occur on an emergency start since the prelube period is minical.

When manually starting the diesel generators for any reason, to minimi:e na potential fire hazarc and to improve souf:een; availability, the prelube period should be limited to a maxt=um of three to five minutes unless otherwise etcomended by the diesel engine manufacturer. Confirm your compliance with this requirement or provide your justification for eteuf ring a longer prelube time interval peri:r to manual starting of

ne diesel generators. P ovi:e the ;rt!ube :tme interval ycur ciesel engine wiii be exposed to ;rior to manual start.

1927 261

040.113 An emergency diesel generat: unit in a nuclear power plant is ner. ally (9.5.7)

RSP in the ready standby mode unless there is a loss of offsite power, an accident, or the diesel generator is under test. Long periods en standby have a tendency to drain or nearly escty the engine lube oil piping system. On an emergency start of the engine as much as 5 to 14 or more seconds =ay elapse from the start of cranking until full lute ef1 pressure is attained even though full engine speed is generally reached in about five sec:nds. With an essentially dry engine, the momentary lack of lubri:ation at the various ::eving parts may damage bearing surfaces pro-ducing incipient or actual ccm:enent failure wi-h resultant equipment unavailability.

1" e emergency c:ndition of readiness requires this ecuipment tc attain full rated speed and enable automatic sequencing of electric load within ten seconds. For this reason, and to improve upon the ava.iabiltty of this equipment on demand, it is necessary to establish as quickly as cessible an oil film in the wearing : arts of the diesel engine. Lubricating oil is nor ally celivered.o the engine wearing : arts by :ne or more engine driven

um:(s). During the starting cycle the pump (s) accelerates slowly with the engine and may not sucoly the required cuantity of lubricating oil wnere needed fast enough. To remedy this concitten, as a minimum, an electrically driven lubricating oil pum:, powered from a reliable CC power su:cly, should be installed in the lube Oil system s ccerate in parallel with the engine 1927 262

.L,

. driven =ain lube pump. The electric dr4(en preluce pump should c;erate only during the engine cranking cycle or until satisfactory lube oil pressure is established in the engine main late distributten header.

The installation of this prelube pump should be ::cedtnated with the respective engine manufacturer, Scme diesel engines include a lube oil circulating pump as an intregal part of the luce oil preheating system which is in use while the diesel engine is in the sundby mode.

In this case an additional prelube oil pump ay not be needed.

Confirm your c:=;liance witn the above requirement or provide your justificati:n f:r not installing an electric preluce oil pump.

0 1927 263