ML19257B574
| ML19257B574 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1979 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001170667 | |
| Download: ML19257B574 (95) | |
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. e.:.n res::nsible for renradicio:"cf. enviro.en::1 on'torin; u..-'
" ~:- 22. *en she was reassigned to rrdiological.
Her only radiologica; rsi '
.eas tne 3-hour Met Ed course 'n Orde" to cain acce to the station -
.: ::; ses cr other training.
On Wedr.escay..'*. :he 2Sth she ";as instru:ted to stop her nonradiological nonitoring, and on Friday she took over radiciogical e rc and on Friday she took over radic1cgical environmental monitorinc
ichael Burinc - she did no ore than cataloging and logcing results.
- rocrc-froT Tnis interview is useful only for polnting out lack of training, and also for tne use of nonradiological - type pecole for radiological envirenrcental monitoring duties.
O 2.
Tape No. 283. John J. 'llen - Supplies of routine ecuicT,ent for radiation protection and health nhysics area.
' lien called Cred Hu;te, station H forensn, on Thursday March 29 at 10-11 a.n.
- - rects.
On.'esnesda:.
-e 22 he ans. cerea cuestions and co ents to of#er Scott 'i on 0::t teiechone co.runications.
On the 29:n he sucoliec 100 resciratcrs and 2^2 ::r. ridges - fu'.1 face T.:.shs for rr.di ic:.ine removal.
The order also
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. s:c :. rile of equiprent
^q trailers snould be stored, ready 'er use b any u:- ' ':y for accidents.
This intervie'..* is interesting and irfor ative secut H cictning and protection.
^
Tape I;o. 219. David C. Carl, !!et Ed Envircnmer.:ai Scientist.
Carl has a S. S. in meteorology.
He spent l' arch 28-30th in corporate office in Reading, as the liaison to Pickard, Lo'.le and Garrick.
Carl received met data and forwarded it to the island (no interpretation).
No familiarity with any emergency procedures for dose cale's.
He had no contact with any federal agencies.
There is no mechanism for getting cnsite data in Peading frcr the site - youv'e got to go through Pickard and Lowe.
He coments there shculd be closer contact between the site and the corporate technical staff.
4.
Tace *;o. 87. !dichael Buring, Tech. Analyst, Senior 1, HP Surinc worked cut of the corporate office, with responsibility for rad-waste (tankage, trucks, shielding), getting consultants ir year.
He supplied inf t.
.. tion to J. " dge, nis immediate suservisor.
Coring has now left Met Ed,
';;..s for Pennsyl vania Fo..er & Light.
He was res=nsible for environmental sa.:les
.; hen, ho.. Erecuent.
He iroiemented daily milk and surface water sa
'. e s..ith TLD and air samoles every : Sys.
Surinn went on site Saturday
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zicai en',1rcr er.tal roni:crirc crogram.?s se y effective for the accicer:
' '.: -ino progra also.
There is no c qer useful information in this interviev.
fe
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Th p' }U m g60 dn d]
D ut 1915 c W
- r.; =195. Crazier L. Bren:on, '.' ice : eride-: c' Radia. ion Managemen:
-:moraticn.
DiC provided whole body counting services, sa. cling analysis and resoirator testing. Whole-body surveys began Thurscay at 5 p.m. (truck alreacy on-site cue to Unit i refuelir.g), but 150 samples sho.;ed some iodine, out r.ostly negligible.
Results are discussed in or'y general terns.
R'iC also analyzed charcoal cartridges and the particulate orefilters from control roon air,.nplant air saroles, and soecial offsite sanoles.
Results were supolied by hard-copy to the Observation Center, who distributed to the aorropriate individuals on-site.
C.
Ta:Es 205 & 200. Kenneth E. Surkholder, "et Ed Radiation Chemistry Tecnnician
'J:en reporting to tork '.-lednesday, the 28th, he was put on survey tea 1 M cha, and took on-site.easurements with SA'i-2, although he didn't kno.v how to use it (he had requested such training after a drill in 1973, but never received any).
Cn Thursday, he escorted people into auxiliary building for various jobs, teurg eletector readings for Dick Duciel.
Burknoicer received no fornal e~ercency-type training, and progressed from Junior to Senior technician with w
no test or other der.onstration of excertise.
All racia; ion readings were
- lose:.indo.,ru:.e does'r.- Er.c'
.-.: tas :ne re:ords (tur;e: over to next s r. " ~ ~.
!' f.: 19.h ne receiesd 43:
. : JI 703 n'^
a; :-F.e ' tines - El se.1EC a i ::e to:/ ccunt, but never got results.
-:e cc en s na: his decar: rent
- e:
co ru:n '..ork and needs rcre peorie; he is a a:F. of all traces and e n c.w. -
a 21' l
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~ms i g9, 200. Tho. mas E. Davis, Jr., Me: Ed Fadiation Cneristry
-en.iciar er.
- avis <.as on duty at 4:00 am on the 22th, at the tire o# the turbine trip.
"e arc Dave Zie:er took the low baron samples of 700 then 400 : m.
He took vadou; air samsies throughout tne day, but the interview is disjointed here and not that useful.
On Thursday Davis took air samples and escorted oersonnel ir.to auxiliary building; received 400-500 mr with anti-C's and Scott Air Packs.
On 29th he set up HP and decon area in observation center's men's room.
As cnly HP, he did the "best he could," radwaste (minimal) wet t dcwn sink.
Some contaminated clothes just lying around.
No logs kept "was a complete shambles over there." Davis is fairly critical of Met Ed; not enougn training, especially en samoling eauicment; training weeks scheduled were not training, but more G
e rrii cuties; no training for new or changed precedur2s; peoMe enter FJG
- eas without FJ.lPs; HP is a " lackadaisical run decartment."
5.
Tapes 264, 255, 280, 251, 282.
1-l alter E. Deimler, Met Ed : tad Cher
- :" Jr., and for training - also Thomas E. Pyke, Met Ed 9ad Chem Te:r Jr.
Dc -ler ";as ex:osed to IP on Thursday the 29th by trying t; put poly-w a:1,, : c sheets Over liquid in auxiliary building c keec gaseous activity at Cr.'lednesdy the 28th he did a.inir.1 an: c.: of c ffsite n:ni oring.
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en: :: rs 5:D., station tc surve: rersc-el rs: : n:a-d.ation
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sin s le;s.
There was no record ken; of :nese conta,ination levels.
- :'i':'.as.a:Gr in auxiliary building Cani fr;~ OVer#loWinC the su~.:s.
. '. s "ows Of n0 10: M doses received durin0 auxili3"y Duilding er.tries.
He O
15 0 i
5-AlF-c?.:s not believe "c Ed vias prs:ared fcr an e erpency u' pe:cie
- i ct c' tire.
"I thinks rare trainir.: is e:essar;. ar d :Ne '
rcus
" f: - e ceople.
A #eeling of rustration is evice.:, whicr 2.;;cesedij is
- 2: a : d; also there is no morale.
lencthy discussion of training and training records is included.
Scth n
06inier and Pyke reviewed their training forms, which are definitely not accurate.
Specific requests to management for training were continually brushed off.
Training on SAM-2 listed, but never received.
Assignments for drills were given the day before the drill, even for unannounced drills, simply to lock goc
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y 1915 052
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.o r i tor reading ex rer.ely high 20 thousand R/hr range (corrected i e ;inc. including a :enusticn factor of 100).
(u251, p. 4)
Dubiel did not cisos:cr a survey tean to Unit 2 'ux. Building shortly e.
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(*ke Janouski surveyed Aux. Bldg. on his own initiative.)
(p. 5, =251) r, 9:s,3 Entr;ency olan coes not deal with in-piant nigh-level radiation, scecifically, but does recuire H.P. teens.
(p. E, *251 ) '
D:e n't consider high-level a rborne, either.
(:. 13, =25l)
?.::rr entation Avai'.ecility.
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inst" scents evaliacie vor emergen:3 1 0.
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1915 053 D00 0
M, t,r,p" e
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full #a e
'<! carticulate filter (p. 15, =251).
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'ad about 200 Scott's available at beginning of refueling outage.
" Consumed" about 50 of these during outage.
Have a few MSA masks. too.
Did not have any GY.R, MASA, or Scott iodine removal :anasters before accident.
Dubiel believed that Unit 2 control rron was dire: ting all events going on in the Aux. Building.
(p. 18, *251)
(p. 21,=252)
He believed that he knew everybody going into A x. Building and he had a cart in planning it.
(p. 32, #251 ).
Tried to give them guidelines on which dose rates to turn back from.
(p. 34, =251)
Debriefed at each exit.
(p. 34, *251 ).
Briefing map of Aux. Suilding was lost between first and second day of accident.
Had to make a new one.
(p. 35, =251)
G Not aware that Aux. coerators entered Aux. Eldg. without instruments.
(o. 7. =252).
Got relatively no support from outside control room (p. 35, =253).
Dubiel's "THREE GOALS":
1.
Establish ccmmunications with ococle vf-site - Get informatien from monitoring teams.
2.
Support personnel making entries into Aux. Building - Briefing people on levels.
2.
Advise operating cersonnel of plant cer.ditions via radiation onitoring eouitrent a-d crovice advice.
(ro.18,19, =251 ).
d 1915 054
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.. clina sarale QC Orogram (p. 25, =251; a.ar nad a boron re:uction in cooling system.
30::ium Hycroxide in HPI sc
.sd u: 5:mples.
Cr.am Techs didn't realize.
(O. 29, =251' Ec:sure Criteria Did not fall back to exposure criteria of 25 rem, and 100 rem.
(pp. 32, 33 *251).
Dab'el's criteria was 1.5 rem for each individual entry.
(pp. 31, =251) to provide 1.5 rem pad (p. 3, #252).
Eniries into Aux, Bldg. not made under RWP.
(c. 35, *251)
(p.1, 4252).
L-
!!o One assigned to keep track of personnel exoosure for first days of accident.
(p. 1, #252)
Relied on individuals to keep track of their own exacsure (p. 2, *252).
Pcd. Protection Techs assistea in dressing out entering individuais in cc.: ci room (p. 35. =251).
RWPs reestablished morning o# 3/31.
tio RWP's from 3/25 to 3/31 (p.
?., #252).
t:0 one stationed at entrv to Aux. Building during emergency.
'o. c. c232).
' ary ocerators entere: A u,.
Building w/ o survey Durisi not s'. care aux-instruments.
(p. 7, =252) or HP consultation (c. 9, =252) (p. 10, 7252).
'r
'gh radiation areas (100 r/h-) (p. 17, =252) r hrer overexposure.
u E:" ' not fully ware of any sir.gle individual entries d'cring #irst ::-y c
- .:, tu:..as a..are cf caveral one man ert. en:.:es '.:ter.
(p. E, =222).
Eur:'.e of Entry v;itn Gross ;roblems.
22/79, approx, 11:00 am.
Decay heat s;r:y vaive in.':20 area Aux. Bldg.
3u:ked his nask collapsed.
(Sae pp. 9, 10 of =252).
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~.Joiel ceiicvec training crogram tncrough.
(p 22, =251'.
No formalized retraining program for Hp types (p. 13,5253) 9---
training for supervisors hit or miss (,p.,i*, =moa)
.,3 n-No assessment of training effectiveness (p. 15, e253)
=7:- )
,,ot aware c;. tecn soec recu1 ring retraining (c.10, o
P.eL: tor Coolant Samole 3/28/79 (See e253, pp.1, 2, 3, 4)
';ot in decision process to take sample, did not brief samplers.
.nnecessary excosure of Ed Houser and Pete-Veiez.
No urgency to get samole.
Took over 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to make uo minds.
(See c. 5, =253).
- ' consultaticn of F.ad Cnemist supervisor (p. 5, =253).
9
'ot aware of kind of resoiratory protection used in sample processing t' n.
C
=_907) r 2M--12, in sampling room, not operational since a/7e.
(c. 12, =253).
H? viciations.
?rocessed approximately 20 in 1978.
(p. 24. d253)
Tyoicallj, violations by ranagement.
(c. 25, =253).
- ntirids:ica of Pr foreren writing uc manage,ent for 40 viciations.
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D^. does TI uptai:e calculations for dose deter-instion. routirely.
1915 057 ogjD
}
6 IreTERVIEW - Mulleavy, #73 9
- p. 6 Environmental monitoring review on site minimal. Apparently reading office does most of the work.
Emergency planning, drills and training.
p.7 Er.S center established prior tc tis arrival at 7:40 or 7:45.
Attempted to establish communications with control room 1 and 2 and with offsite teams.
Trouble with communications with control room 2.
Lack of coranunication.
- p. 9 High radiation levels in ECS. Time 7 correspond to PC sample Evacuate control access and monitor.
- p. 10 Send out monitoring teams - 1 onsite, 2 offsite. Time (?)
p.19-20 Auxiliary building surveyed about 8:30 am
- p. 20-21 control room very crowded,
- p. 25 Did Dubiel have overall HP control and cognizance?
- p. 25 Lack of inplant survey team in chart but says only an onsite one Hs formed.
- p. 28 no samples requested?
- p. 30 Confusion of onsite monitoring teams - unaware of auxiliary building survey.
- p. 31 up and down readings.
- p. 32 source of activity a mystery to crew.
- p. 33 Elevation 231 water covered - source of activity and through aixiliary building ventilation systems.
- p. 34 Unit 2 control room activity up.
- p. 35 Unit 1 control room activity up
- p. 38 Air unstable under recirculation?
- p. 40 Question of plant design - any conrection between ventilating systems of Units 1 and 2 or nature of release being brought.into the two control rooms in the same manner?
- p. 41-43 Short lived Xe-138 or Kr-88?
g 1915 058
- p. 45 People in !; orth Condifence - where is it, how did they get in?
Indicate lack of knowledge of security guards in an cr.ergency situation - Very low radiation levels.
Seems to conflict with tabs of high levels (transitory?) at florth
- p. 45 Is fiRC letdown sa:rple sarre as RM A-57
- p. 55 fio iodine seen in the environment? Sensitivity will be very poor.
General question as to who was cirecting the efforts.
H.P. pulled in many directions.
O 1915 db9 O
Interview, Pulleavey, #74
- p. 3/4 predetermined offsite monitoring locations, sampling procedures pre-established.
- p. 5 Iso.lats and dose calculations being done in #2 control room where are the results?
Isoplots in Unit 1.
- p. 9 Samples sent to state - from where? No I
- p. 12 low wind - plume kept coming back to plant.
p.15/16 Instruments PIC-6 (Eberline), the R0-2. 3 man survey team.
Emergency off site monitoring procedures #16-70.6, Rev. 2 11/16/78.
- p. 25 Sorre positive air sample results.
- p. 29 3 emergency kits available - one cut of service.
- p. 31 SAM-2 Kit - about 75% working.
- p. 32 Air samples went out - another SAM-2 conked out (replaced with one from Sid Porter.)
Many low level dosimeters - no shortage - all in Unit 1 ccntrol room.
O
- p. 33 Began to run short when people did not return them.
Began to use them only at Units 1 and 2 control points,
- p. 39 Belief that evacuation is foolish
- p. 42/43 Started recovery operations as of the 25th,
- p. 48 Another RAD group being established. Then Mulleavy unaware of -
Electric Boat? They took over off-site monitoring - Mulleavy went to Unit 2 control.
This is a ridiculous state of aff airs.
1915 060 0
Summary of I&E Interview 114 Furst, Harry W.
Meyers, Karl L.
Pelen, Margaret A.
fiOTE:
2nd half tape unintelligible Expertise:
Furst - H. S. 28 years w/ Met Ed., Two v;eeks of Rdckville Environment Health Meyers - H. S. 8 years in flaval fluclear Rad Chem Tech - fluc Machinist & ELT
/
VEPC0 Ro'ad Chem Tec, r'D Pelen - M.. B. S.y Health - Physical Education Rad Chem Tech - Bio Science.
Furst and Pelen went at about 8:00 a.m. 3/28/79 to Harrisburg to monitor trains.
Trains departed prior to their arrival.
Station master contacted. (see page 5 of #114) (E-520 & Wipes).
f40TE:
OK'd to monitor trains by Mcleavy or Dubiel; these trains were passing TMI at about the time of the release (see p. 9 of #114).
0930-0945, 3/28/79 Airborne activity at Unit 2 control room. Also in fiorth 9Auditoriumsohightheycouldn'tmonitorpeopicinnorthauditorium(seep.7of
- 114).
Problem with closing vent in Unit 2 control room (see p.14 of #114). ~ 1015, 3/28/79 1915 061
Sunnary_of ISE Interview 113 SonaldB. Evans Senior Rad Chem Tech Expertise:
H. S.
- College, 1 year Incomplete B&W Water Chem School Training:
Virtually no training on a " training week."
Lots of complaints but no training.
- j Under staffed, no time for training. (See p. 3y #113)
Sam-2 Training (
2 hrs) 1-1/2 years ago.
(see alos p. 9, #113)
Lack of HP training (p. 42, #113).
Poor equipment availability - anti C's, respiratory equipment (see p. 4, #113)
(See p. 15, #113) Hair contam (no hoods) (see p. 26, #113).
Lack of Direction in Sample Collection (Aux Bldg). (See p.11, #113) (See p.16, #113).
Outside augmentation for off-site monitor,ing (see p.12, #113).
4/
Aux Bldg. reentry, evening ~ 800-900 MR exp. for 3.5-5.5 min.
3/28/79 (no RWP No survey data review.
tJo access control Particulate fiiter missing, HPR 219 9 confusion in sample control lack of appreciation of cont'act exposure ratics on samples (see pp. 20-21 and 28 #113) tio Hot Line Control from Aux Bldg. Surveyed for Personnel contam in Control Room, Unit 1 (see p. 26, #113)
Control Room (Air' borne) contamination (see p. 28, 29 #113) 15 mF/hr open window.
Improper. respiratory protection (particulate) (see p. 32, #113)
Malfunctioning or contaminated survey instruments - offsite monitoring (see p. 35-36 #113)
Xe gas difussion Offsite monitoring.
Differing instruments /different people - no consolidation (see p. 37, #113)
Design contributions to radiation exposure (see p. 38, p. 40 #113)
Lack of management concern for filling HP positions when vacant. (see p. 42 #113).
1915 062 g
t O
Tape #112 Summary of Interviews Joseph E. Hipple, Jr., Sr. Rad Chem Tech.
E. Gordon Rider, Jr., Rad Chem Tech.
Rider: At TMI two years 6-8 weeks training by Ralph Jacobs from Rad Services.
Two weeks chemistry school in Ohio - the rest on the job training.
Hipple - Started in Chemistry (- 1972), Junior Tech. Three or four month schooling - math, chemistry HP and chemistry were combined - became: Senior Technician, HP and Chemistry. The first two years had no Health Physics training. Later went through an 8 weeks HP course - but due to work require-ments, missed part of it.
B2 W radiochemistry course and on the job training.
P. 7 Rider - arrived at work 3:00 p.m. 3/28 - Assigned to offsite monitoring Team Bravo. Took air samples - analyzed with SAM 2.
P. 13 11:00 p.m. 3/28 Went to Aux. Bldg. to take water sample from floor (280 foot elevation). Most difficulty finding Scott Air Packs - had no pre-early survey of Aux. Bldg. - Rider and Evans (who changed a charcoal filter at the same time) were the first in the Aux. Bldg., according to him.
P. 14 They (Rider and Evans) wore wet suits, Scott air packs, several pair of boots. Hold TLD, low and high dosimeter, an E520 and detector.
P. 15 2 R/hr at control point - there was no access control.
P. 17 E520 pagged at HPR227.
P. 18 Has no extremity monitoring.
P. 21 Found his hair contaminated - Successfully washed away - pocket dosimeter 700 mr.
P. 23 3:00 a.m.
3/31 - Scheduled release at activity. We're monitoring along persi-meter routes. Highest reading 40 mr/hr.
9Hipple 1915 063 P. 25, 3/38 3:00 p.m.
Onsite Team Alpha - Recorded reading of up 60 mr/hr. However the dose rates changed rapidly in the same area - suggesting movements of cloud.
26
'W t O At the north end of the warehouse obtained reading up 250 mr/hr at the fence.
P. 27, Accompanied electricians to aux bldg.
Properly suited with Scott air packs.
28 At the door 5-7 r/hr.
Elevation 328 reading of 20 r/hr reaching 100 r/hr.
Did not wear hoods - highly contaminated their heads - 35 mr/hr reading from the head on E520.
Decontamination by showering successfull.
P. 28 The job was not finished. Refused to reenter - received 1.8 r, electrician 1.6 r.
P. 30, No RWP for this job.
31 P. 24 The dose rate readings taken were recounted on tabled paper and also phoned in.
P. 30 They had also record of the previous team, but no instructions to keep records, and what to do with them.
P Rider had a whole body count and gave a urine sample to a General Dyramics employee who collected samples from volunteers - particularly those who rec':ived over 1 r.
Did not receive urine analysis results whole body count negative.
Hipple -
whole body count - traces of I-131.
P. 37 Initially following the accident the distribution and readout of TLD's was organized.
P. 39 Rider had to initiate action to get his exposure entered on Form 5.
1915 064 g
Ora f t : 7/10/79 OLynch:ah 9
e u...
- 0... -
~..
- Een5n, Feaitn Physics erec an r
,,-10
._;,r
'.c e;' vie not very informative.
Deman got contaminated from airborne Xe just by vialking in Auxiliary-
- St,ilding, 20 mR/hr. on clothing.
(ME-13. p.3).
O
/
O 1915 005
s n s., r... n.. - r n r.,.....
7.f
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--...... = -. - - - - - - -.
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~
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9..,,,
- t., _c. ;.,
..;;'e;
. --. e...
.=.
- y==
___ - _irst cay Con rei Roar operation.
costly f Seelinc.er forc.et his TLD the morninc. of ererc.ency and nad to c.o back and rs,.3 go a,
i..r -
).
- c..
4.+..
g 3-.
""'ler ran control rear emergency team like his drills -- he talked only to a, or c. senior starr, no others.
(Dage /, m:-
)
,,at i."ica tion Chronol ogy ( pp. 8, 9, 10, F.E-
)
g, -..,-
I h e
a-sl.e tmerc.ency Declared v::v u
C7:2 Unable to contact PA Civil Defense Duty Officer O
veJu h,RC (L,ine or, russia) noti +1ed -- no one there but.zecretary
--n to beer cuty officer.
C705 (approx.) Attempted to notify Jack Hercein (GPU VF).
..e -.e-:c acain calleg ulvil ca,.ense. to oersonally ta,. k r.
.o c /.- -
m to n,evin.a,i133 u f u,r
- xu,
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_ l. T 1915 ao6
~ ~ 7, a ;; rc>..
Atte ::ed :: ::":a ct Z:
7-General energent:. ceclarec.
30 (approx.) Called caci the RAP team, they will be discatching a te3~ to the site.
- 7?O (approx.)
Contacted State Police to notify of general emergency.
C735 lacprox.)
Notified ANI, no one there except for operator; left r.essage for them to call TM:, that it was important.
0732 Recalled Radiation Management Corp. at Phila. Electric to tell them of general emergency; forward message.
C 40 (approx.)
NRC (.:egicn I) returned call; they will be dispatching a team to the site; the phone was held open so they could be in constant co=unication with us (TMI).
0743 3RH called back.
Kept open line.
0?30 (approx.) ANI returned phone call and were notified of general emergency.
Did not keep logs (see p. 11, ME-
)
':s te :
They ("et Ed) recognized that the other emergency agencies kept logs, e:c., but "they're not like us."
" iller met with his staff every 40 minutes cnd addressed where they were going to go.
(c. 13, ME-
).
.: iller followec en.ergency procedure stec by step (=i670.2)
(3ee p.15, ME- )
concucted emergency not m.. cation yril,is yeariy.
(p. l.a, cc-
).
Duciel had no confidence in SA"-2 readina (in Goldsboro) because of
,- -.m.
e n t.
( c. '. E-
- -e'iq ar indicated that ("et Ed) had acccur.tarili ; and assently for t
.. a ryb c.cy.
(c. 21. ".E-1
' iller got permissior to cool dot..n Unit 1 (r.idr.ight. 3-2S?) and they did 50 ur. der a mancower cermitted basis the ne>,t day, (p. 22,
E -
).
- # :'o that both steam generators camaged because cf cr:ssed sa oling a.,..
\\>.
/, v.:.
\\.
j O
1915 007
D-aft: 7/10/79 0 Lynch:ah 9
-.,,.... y,,..; n.
_s.
2
'T;:) Donnacnie, Sr. ~.2d :r.c ~ec. TMI m.
o
, c..,..:.
c'-
.. =
.1
, m60, c. 3 o-Ex:ertise Hig" School College - 2 yrs., Penn State U.
Pad Chem Tech, Jr.
2 years Sr. Rad Chem Tech, 3 years Mike Janouski contaminated: ^3/28/79, Resampling HPR-227.
ater in lines contaminated ~ hands.
(#214, p. 4)
Er :le lines ouickly rose frcm 40 mR/nr tc approx. 1 R/hr.
7:00 a.m.
3/25/79.
(d214, p. 5)
Donnachie contaminated during HFR-227 sample evolution to 10,000-15,000 cpm, s
(=-,,,,
- p. /j.
r - i O/ m - i s, v.no i e bcc.y and c,;othes.
c Sciit Unit 2 RC letdown samele reading il R/hr into 5 equal porticns res:ing 1 mR/hr.
Diluted initial samole by 100 Put split >amples in O
Unit 1 safe, told Sid Porter, who recuested it.
- = 214. pc. 8, 23, 24, 25).
.5 A mask with G'iR D :ssed in coveralls espirater, hcod, boots.
' 214, p. 26).
rc:iciodine cannister.
=
Nr cry run before solittinc.
=215.
l'.
Ir.struments used during s:.tinc
- :. = v-. V :. -
i-L-na ex remit. monitorinc use:. (=-,
, pp. 1, 2,,,,,, o, 63,
.0 Contaminated self solitting samole
(=215, p. 8).
,~,tec :n sc' un e wonnel extasure circ syste to assist in controlling
- ,..:..a-...
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High readings.
s=214. p. 14).
'i
.' I C ~ :0 D -^"i c's C C " E r g.: pres sure on ~3kgg;- ;3nk gy3;g-
,c,,~m'
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1915 068
s
_2_
O iss leagage from monitor HPR-227 3/2Cf 79, approxiTately 7:15 a..
. = 7. ~?.
. o
\\,.
e
_u nac nc control over anybody's personal exposure unless at Unit 2.
i a/ au,/ i r j
(=,lo, p.,.0).
Healtn,hys1cs program very slack on air samp,ilng.
(=210, p.,il.).
Last internal audit by I'US in Jan, Feb 79.
-,g H i rJ i ts.,e Training haphazard and nil (#215, p. 11).
Only on-the-jcb training (#215, p.12)
Dubiel ltoo ousy with paperwork to train personnel.
(#215,p. 12)
-Training week " abandoned" (5215, p.12)
Just"oroduction HP"
(=215, p. 12)
Lack of people to work and train at same time (=215, p.13).
"ess apathy (=215, p. 18).
Training always big issue between Union and Managc.;eit (4215, p. 21).
G r isi#ication of training, records (#215, pp. 23, 2a, 25, 26) a Vince Hamlin j
Tom Pykie
'No training but records say training.
o vuzz Diamond Pat Donnachie s
Tom Mulleavy was aware of situation.
In nurry to get Unit 2 on line so training dropped (=215, p. 6).
,o for.nal training on 10 C.:R 19, 20, Tech Spec. (#215, p. 27).
?recedures -
Skin contamination procedure unclear.
(=215, p. 13)
(=ceo, p.
i/)
Out of date, unchanged, igncred
(=215, c. 19) 1915 069 m','c.ad conta~inate: cecF: to g: ncmc.
2: evaporator tani valve chance ircicent COS~ A: CIDE"T.
= _v
, e. 1=.'~.
z =_ =_
io
- c...-. 3,. 5, v., m R ppsu 1;I()3t) cc accrovec by "alleav. after refused by c'ce 06: ann and Donnachie.
2'~
- isclaticn en oice x.ere valve was to be solaced.
.'leavy ras a tendenc,- to agree wi th oce ations and everybody
' e and us (Rac Cnem Techs and Oac Prot. Ic ce) den't get tnat s
);\\.
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Daca (Dj:F7l T."mcall scalded his hand and was ccntaminated in groin 9 h' t i tn r.ot wa ter.
20 mR/nr (E-520)
- 5ee =215. p. 15, 16;.
Tv'o days later KimDall,zas still contaminated.
Got thru friskers on
=
o l o.,p.
it,.
'r c:; cr contar'nat'.on Could not be enole bod. counted too hot.
D:roacnie read cu*."
i:Je DeV. ann a:aat it and tnrestened to go to IP,C Ie215, D.
.. 9
' iritz, NRC, was a.sare of initial contarina:icn (=215, p.
16).
5acksiidir.g to old HP program (=215, c. 17).
Union vs. "anagement situation on write up cf HP viciations.
(=215, p. 15).
Lcst control. fo Instrumentation issue - No sign cut of portable inst.
in last 3 years.
(=215, p. 19)
Lack of control results in lost survey instruments ( 215, c. 20).
%' : DY-39 Part 19 action
^
2-3 years ago.
Pete Gallex Ed Hauser Cvmolaint to NRC about lack of training.
(#215, p. 21) s.
~ CuToing contaminated water without H analysis.
Unit 1.
aste evap. stcrage tanks.
O During first days of emergency (-216, po. 3, 4).
Mulleavy authorized this dumoing.
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Supv. of Ops, Unit 1 - Supv. of Ops, Unit 2 Day of Accident was in Ljnchburg, VA
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- simulator training; tried to set up accident on simulator, know they taltec Tues Trom simulator run (pp 1,c =c-,/,j 9
nac....
Ccn:r lled Bubbleby Spraying the Pressurizer and venting it and the letcc'.in spg a s i,,,,
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7:30 a.m. 3-30-79 (p. C 1255)
Reason for doa.ginc MUV-;3 rather than continuous t.as to reduce leakage and a
release (p. 15,
=9 o_),
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=7 o-,;
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-s e;* ion 2.
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'nterview 15 mOStly reaC Cr Operat ons, not rele&Se re'eate;.
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".nemi::, Jr. Trainee E-3-79 lin 'i'^"*:'
_..;cr:ine 25 - Eiciogy 1965 Sc;a.. TM: empicynent 3-12-79.
edical Secretary 3 years.
Infonnal Training (p.3, =104)
(On tne job)
};g g {h! !tyd;ue D
I week HP D };
D 7
i t.eek Rad Chem Met Ed has book on HPs (black book)
Detected contaminated vehicle Deccnr.ed by " decay" Xenon (p.7, =104)
G Training in frisking Limits 100 cmp R-14 + HP-210 - Abv. brg.
O
- 9 Ys
9 TMI INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
Edward C. Egen der, Radiation Chemistry Tech., Sr., Met Ed.
5-8-79 Interviews 180 & 181 EXPERTISE High School Some College - Chemistry, pre-Vetrenarian, Penn. State University H.P. - on job LACK OF DIRECTION & COMMUNICATION During early stages of accident (3-28-79, Approx. 7:00 am)
(See p. 3 of # 180)
(See p. 5 of # 180 5:00 pm. 3-28-79)
PLUME TRACKING & INTERCEPTION Goldsboro-Turnpike Bridge, morning of 3-28-79 (See p. 4 of # 180)
Outside of Village of Shopes Gardens, evening of 3-28-79 13 m R/hr. PIC-6 & E-520 (See p. 28, # 180)
LACK 0F CONFIDENCE IN INSTRUMENTATION SAM-2 (See p. 4, # 180)
(See p. 17, # 180)
Abandoned SAM-2 (See p.19, # 180) gave sr.mples to other agencies to analyze.
Teletectors - No faith unless calibrated himself (p.1, #181)
HELICOPTER MONITORING, PLUME TRACKING f(See. p'.6.of # 180) 3 R/hr., Stack Unit 2 +' 10 feet' E-520, RM-14, R02 Digital meter (See p. 37 & p.39, # 180)
RADIATION AREA CONTROL -
" Waiver" on posting signs (p. 7, #181) 1915 080
9 INSTRUMENT AVAILABILITY During Accident - Inadequate (p. 8, #181)
Pre-accident - Instrument people Not concerned with up keep (p(p. 8, # 181).43 & 44, ill81)
Lack of Repair, Inventory
"" Waivers" grante'd to enter reactor building because no.
instruments.(p.45,'# 181)
PWR H.P. PRACTICE EAllowed into high radiation. area without instruments (p.8, # 181)
\\
. or H.P. escort ~- (p.9, #181) (p.21, #181)
~
Allow operators to provide their own H.P. coverage (p.26, # 181) or wrong. instrument (p.10, # ~181)
~ Many entries into Unit 2 at power (p.10, # 131)
-4.oop not kept during routine operai. ion. Violations not reported
- b..y (p.15, # 181) No enforcement of HP viciations (p.16 # 181)
Lack of timely surveys (p.22, # 181)
Dry-Labbing Surveys Post Accident (p. 27, # 181)
PRESSURIZER, LEAKAGE, UNIT 2 - COMMON (p.9, # 181)
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS - POST ACCIDENT Operators in radiation area without RWP (See p.15,16, # 180)
HPs affraid to cite operators
,, r -
ALTERNATE COUNTING ( ANALYSIS) CAPABILITY,BY STATE Because TMI GELI System out, high backgr' und o
(See p.20, # 180)
SAMPLE ANALYSIS RESULTS NOT COORDINATED (See p.22, # 180)
RESPIRATORY PROTECTI T I:i ;^.1 TROL ROOM (See p.24, # 180)
Iodine Cartridges provided by evening of 3-28-79 (See p.26, # 180) g 1915 081 m
~ ~ ~ '
AIR MONITORING SYSTEM, UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM 9
Lack of knowledge (See p.25, # 180)
No utilization late on 28 of data (See p.27, # 180)
Air Monitoring System, Unit 2, lack of knowledge of intakes (p.18, # 181)
RESPIRATORY PROTECTION - NRC, IMPROPER USE OF HALF-FACE RESPIRATORS (see p.26, # 180) p p (-c w UNNECESSARY PERSONNEL EXPOSURE Unit 1 sample taken in high exposure rate area, when alternate location available (See p.32, # 180)
Lack of concern - pre accident (p.ll, # 181)
Accumulation of exposure during weekly surveys of reactor of no concern to TMI management (during normal operation) until j
high neutron exposure realized (p.ll,12, # 181).
Mismanagement of reactor building surveys. Possible cover-up (see p.13, #181)
TLD PERSONNEL 00SIMETRY A1ALYSIS Ch33dT&' Undermanned (See p.7,_# 180) (p.41-45, #.180)
Plume dose of non-issued TLDs 400 MR (See p.7, # 180)
Potential problem with TLD dose assessment (See p.8, # 180)
G Lack of TLD issue control & several people on same badge Same Dose assigned to all-(See p.47 of #.180).
- Dosimetry irregulatities, false entrys_ (see p.34, #181)
Failure' to wear dosimeters in Rad. areas (see p.34, '# 181)
Bernie Smith, Tex Acker examples (p 37, #181)
EMERGENCY KIT AVAILABILITY Of 4 kits, only 2 checked out (See p.9, # 180)
Issued one bad one anyway (Bad SAM-2) (see p.11, # 180) to "C" team Charlie Team's instruments crapped out (see p.16, # 180)
COMMANDERED VEHICLE TO COLLECT SAMPLES (see p.15, # 180) g 1915 082
- ~
9 RAINIrlG IfiADEQUATE T
SAM-2, (see p.17, # 180)
Greater than 2 years ago (see p.18, # 180)
Atmospheric Monitors - no training (see p.25, # 180)
Drills, only one mod drill, w/RMC (p.48, # 180)
" Training Shift" meanin less (p.50, # 180)
No Unit 2 HP training p.51, # 180) (p.4, # 181)
No training in current procuiidFes (p.2, # 181)
Drill attitude poor (p.5, # 181) 4 ci+c Critiques attended only by foremerg, not subordinates (p.51-52, # 181 )
O ms us
Tape #173
SUMMARY
OF INTERVIEW Richard L. BENNER - Rad Chem Tech 2 Larry KUHN - Rad Chem Tech Jr.
BENNER employed since September 1977 - eight weeks HP school on-the-job training.
Two weeks chemistry training.
I KUHN employed since May 1977 - eight to 10 weeks HP training by Ralph Jacobs of R__ Services and two weeks chemistry training.
BENNER was sent by Dick Dubiel on March 28, 7 a.m. to survey Unit 2 Auxiliary Building. Was wearing s closer and.h_i_d a R0 2 survey instrument.
Took readings - reported them - does not know if record was made. Came out highly contaminated 1 closing reading 30 mr/hr.
Contamination of his body came down in a shower easily.
March 29 - p 16-18 Accompanied an operator who had to work on a valve close to the primary neutralizer tank. There was an BWP filled out for this job. Received Had TLD, pocket dosimeter,teletector.
Dressed in wet suit, 9
85-95 mr.
scott air pack - several pairs of booties and gloves - no personal contamina-tion.
p 40 Administrative procedures required that exposures to personnel be equalized -
this was not implemented. Many instruments were not operable.
Fewer operable instruments than technicians - not sufficient to do the job.
It appears that this interview has been continued on another tape.
1915 084 g
R. P.c l i my 6/1 5/79 ItalERVIEW SUMMARIES 1.
Group Interview No. 99 on Emergency Planning This interview is a taped conversation between Long, Oubiel, Hilbish and Miller, concerned with who declared the site and gencral emergencies.
It is not an 1&E conducted interview, and comments are not indicated as to who is talkina.
The interview does not appear useful to our subtask.
2.
Interview No. 165 with J. M. Dupes, Radiation Chemist Two very junior radiation technicians, Dupes and Keesler were interviewed.
These gentlemen had no formal radiation training.
During the emergency, they performed off-site measurements.
They both mentioned being nervous and not remembering details, and that significant time was spent with no specific assignment.
They also did not know who their Notes of interest-supervisor was - Ed Egenrider took all measurements.
SAM 2's were not checked out prior to the incident; there were three off-site teams in radio contact. While in helicopter, a PIC 6A was used for y
mh readings. Maximum air m6 was 80 mrsover Unit 2 Reactor Building, other-wisereadingswere1to2mh.
Dupes took an electrician into the Auxiliary Building on March 29 without a RWP, even though readings were reported to be 40-100 R.
Dupes s
only measured 2-3 R.
His dosimeter pegged, and he guessed exposure at
/
mR Keesler changed HPR-219 in Auxiliary Building charcoal canister 200-300 Wednesday morning, wearing a full-face particulate mask-iodine protection His TLD reading was 395 nk.
Keesler also sur-not available until Friday.
9 veyed workers leaving Auxiliary Building Wednesday morning and found highly contaminated clothing.
Air samples inside buildings showed gross beta /
gamma levels all less than 3X10-10 ((/ml.
Keesler concludes there was much 1915 085
confusion and equipment problems (monitors, radios, vehicles) and comm-
~
Also, both complained of lack of training, even O
munications were poor.
during designated training weeks.
3.. Interview fio.155 with Cline, fluclear Consultant J. E. Cline;of Science Applications; indicated that he took and counted a few auxiliary building air samples, and liquid samples of the industrial waste treatment system.
Minimum detectable I-131 stated as 2X10-hf((/mlliquid.
This interview contains no useful basic data.
4.
Group Interview fio. 178 on Training This interview deals with CR0 training.
At Met-Ed, each potential CR0 undergoes 9 months training (12 written, 6 oral exams), and simulator training before he can take the f1RC exam.
For the CR0's on duty at the time of the accident, part of the 9 month training had been wained due to completion of the flaval fluclear Power program.
5.
Interviews 70, 71, 72 and 97 with Joseph H. DeMan - Health Physics Foreman Mr. DeMan performed area surveys Wednesday morning, which varied from background to R/hr readings. He entered the Auxiliary Building at 8:00 a.m., went through 3" water in street clothes, and received no contamina.-
Laterreadingsofthewaterwere1R{Therewerenohighairdose tion.
rates in the Auxiliary Building at the time - by 9:30 a.m.,
all readings started to climb.
He remained in Unit I control room, mainly organizing J
data collection, and more particulate.respiratorf for 5-6 hours.
DeMan 7
s 2
1915 i)86
recalls problems of letdown sample line - it is over 300 ft. and has 90 bends - crud bursts have been experienced.
The' letdown s' ele taken is
' described in great detail.
It was 1000 R/hr for 100 ml its a 1 liter poly bottle. The dose received when the sample was taken is also detailed.
In addition, it appears 'a one mhJ sample was lost.
DeMan also took Auxiliary Bldg Unit 2 air samples, and was contaminated to20mfVhr..
His decontamination procedures are explained.
Security _was not good.
Once past the north gate, you had essentially I
" free /un of the plant." This continued through the 30th - no guards, no t
monitors, no. locked gates past the north gate.
This interview contains a good description of HP procedures - or lack of No extremity monitoring, no RWP, simply because of time constraints err M them.
the crisis atmosphere.
6.
Interviews 68,69,80,175,176 with Richard Dubiel, Supervisor of Radiation Protection and Chemistry Mr. Dubiel reports to Gary Miller through Len Landry.
This interview outlines the HP organization and appears quite useful.
Names and job titles are included. With the sheets Al Gibson promised us, we could fill in all slots.
He admits the radwaste systems are not flexible, do not have adequate capacity.
There are 24 rad chem-techs in his department.
He received a call at home at 5:00 a.m.11ednesday and was in the Unit 2 control room by 5:45 a.m.
He hel/ ped attempt to take a containment air sample, but water ("a tremendous amount") spurted out the line.
Not contaminated.
O 1915 087
_4-At about 6:30 a.m., Boron levels were 400 ppm, and they started to plan to enter reactor building.
Hot machine shop alarm in Unit i stopped them.
They entered this room, dose rate went from 100 m to 600 to 1 R - from primary coolant sample lines - he believes severe fuel degradation. He ran to Unit 2, saw high alarm in vacuum pump - primary to secondary' leak.
Dome monitor rising.
He then went to Unit 2 control room, where Gary Miller took charge. By 7:40 A.M. a helicopter was in the air.
At 7:20 a.m., dome monitor
~
passed 8 R/hr, giving general emergency.
Note that reactor building pressure was low - no leak paths.
. Interview No. 69 is not available, it covers Dubiel from 7:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. Wednesday, and I believe would be very beneficial.
At 11:00 a.m., Dubiel worried about auxiliary bldg entries - keeping them at a minimum, and practicing ALARA. He admits to suspending normal RWP No log maintained of entries, names, times, exposures, until g cedures. -
sometime Thursday.
Dubiel recommends NRC develop " Emergency Health Physics,"
and also require the log books.
He also wants more teletectors and Scott-Air packs, and high range instrumentation designated and set aside for emergency use only (0 to 1000 R){
~
(Hr I
Jdwaste capacity _of.. tanks _i_s_ highlighted as a big problem.
The reactor coolant bleed tank room in Unit 1 was plugged, water transferred from Unit 2.
This was pre-accident radwaste.
Philosophy is overflow tanks with_ less activity to make room for higher radioactive liquids.
Dubiel believes rad-waste system was designed with poor assumptions for component availability -
evapora tors.
1915 088
. 9 Gaseous releases through steam dump secured on Jack Herbein orders at 1 to 2 p.m. on the 29th.
Releases were continued through condenser off-gas (unfiltered), but you couldn't see them!
5 g, Note that 53 sample lines were mislabeled ( A and B should have been
~
reversed).
Dubiel claims no modifications were made to the ventilation systems, save for blanking off ohe auxiliary bldg bypass, since it leaked significantly.\\
There is no tech spec for testing these filters, they were only tested during startup.
Also, ventilation flows in Unit 2 were never balanced - this would j
i He indicates fuel and auxiliary
'j explain different filter system performance.
buildings are not separate ventilation wise, but is not more specific.
i l' s;S A letdown sample -(primary coolant) taken by' Houser and Velez highly
('
contaminated these'individ9als - 3 rem range. This was 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> on the 29th.
4, Decontamination procedures discussed.
(
, his interview contains very useful HP info that should be reviewed'in 7
T
,',Q -
..... ~ _
/
great-detail.
s qs
- 1:
%a y.
?
uF u
1915 089 O
e 0 Lynch:ah Draft: 7/10/79 INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
TM1 STAFF INTERVIEW, April 12, 1979 R. W. Dubiel (ME-1, 217?)
G. Miller J. Seelinger Mostly first day Control Room operation.
Seelinger forgot his TLD the morning of emergency and had to go back and get it.
(page 3, ME-
).
Miller ran control room emergency team like his drills -- he talked only to 3 or 4 senior staff, no others.
(page 7, ME-
)
Notification Chronology (pp. 8, 9,10, ME-
)
TIME EVENT 0650 Site Emergency Declared 0702 Unable to contact PA Civil Defense Duty Officer 0704 NRC (King of Prussia) notified -- no one there but Secretary to beep duty officer.
0705 (approx.) Attempted to notify Jack Herbein (GPU VP).
0707 Met-Ed again called Civil Defense, to personally talk to Kevin Malloy.
0709 ERDA-RAP notified.
0709 (approx.) Attempted to notify L Lawyer.
0710 Notified R. Klingamin at Met Ed.
0713 Called Radiation Management Corp. at the Philadelphia Electric number. Answering service will forward number.
0715 Notified Dauphin Co. Civil Defense 0715 (approx.) Notified PA Bureau of Health 0717 York Haven monitor on.
0718 Notified PA State Police.
1915 090
. 0 0720 (approx.)
Attempted to contact ANI.
0724 General emergency declared.
0730 (approx.) Called back the RAP team, they will be dispatching a team to the site.
0730 (approx.) Contacted State Police to notify of general emergency.
0735 (approx.)
Notified ANI, no one there except for operator; left message for them to call TMI, that it was important.
0738 Recalled Radiation Management Corp. at Phila. Electric to tell them of general emergency; forward message.
0740(approx.)
NRC (Region I) returned call; they will be dispatching a team to the site; the phone was held open so they could be in constant communication with us (TMI).
0740 BRH called back.
Kept open line.
0930 (approx.) ANI returned phone call and were notified of general emergency.
Did not keep logs (see p.11, ME-
)
Note: They (Met Ed) recognized that the other emergency agencies kept logs, etc., but "they're not like us."
Miller met with his staff every 40 minutes and addressed where they were going to go.
(p.13, ME-
).
Miller followed emergency procedure step by step (#1670.2)
(See p.15, ME- )
Conducted emergency notification drills yearly.
(p. 15, ME-
).
Dubiel had no confidence in SAM-2 reading (in Goldsboro) because of instrument.
(p. 18, ME-
).
Seelinger indicated that (Met Ed) had accountability and assenbly for everybody.
(p. 21, ME-
).
Miller got permission to cool down Unit 1 (midnight, 3-28?) and they did so under a manpower permitted basis the next day, (p. 22, ME-
).
Confusion that both steam generators damaged because of crossed sampling lines.
(p. 27, ME-
).
1915 091
Draft: 7/10/79 0 Lynch:ah IfiTERVIEW
SUMMARY
Joe Deman, Health Physics Foreman 4/25/79 ME-13 Interview not very informative.
Deman got contaminated from airborne Xe just by walking in Auxiliary Building, 20 mR/hr. on clothing.
(ME-13, p.3).
I i
O 1915 092
t s
Draft: 7/10/79 0 Lynch:ah O
INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
John P. (Pat) Donnachie, Sr. Rad Chem Tech, TMI
- s 214, 215, 216 May 17,1979 Expertise High School College - 2 yrs., Penn State U.
Rad Chem Tech, Jr.
2 years Sr. Rad Chem Tech, 3 years Mike Janouski c.ontaminated:
3/28/79, Resampling HPR-227.
Water in lines contaminated hands.
(#214, p. 4)
Sample lines quickly rose from 40 mR/hr to approx. 1 R/hr.
7:00 a.m.
3/28/79.
(f214, p. 5)
Donnachie contaminated during HPR-227 sample evolution to 10,000-15,000 cpm, HP-210/RM-14, whole body and clothes.
(#214, p. 7).
into 5 equal portions Split Unit 2 RC letdown sample reading 11 R/hr reading 1 mR/hr. Diluted initial sample by 10g Put split samples in 9
Unit 1 safe, told Sid Porter, who requested it.
(#214, pp. 8, 23, 24, 25).
Dressed in coveralls, respirator, hood, boots.
MSA mask with GMR radiciodine cannister.
(#214, p. 26).
No dry run before splitting.
(#215, p.1).
Instruments used during splitting TELETECTOR No extremity monitoring used (#215, pp.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
Contaminated self splitting sample (#215, p. 8).
Attempted to set up personnel exposure card system to assist in controlling exposures, Friday, 3/30/79.
(#214, p. 9)
(#215, p.10)
Nuclear sampling room airborne activity monitor out of service.
(#214,p.12)
Sample lines for Units 1 & 2 not shielded. High readings.
(#214, p.14).
Hydrogen? Used to provide cover gas pressure on makeup tank system (not nitrogen??)
(#214, p. 18) 0 1915 093
., O Gas leakage from monitor HPR-227 3/28/79, approximately 7:15 a.m.
(#214, p. 22).
Had no control over anybody's personal exposure unless at Unit 2.
(3/30/79)
(#215, p. 10).
Health Physics program very slack on air sampling.
(#215, p.11).
Last internal audit by NUS in Jan, Feb 79.
T(2 G e sJ ikh '
Training haphazard and nil (#215, p.11).
Only on-the-job training (#215, p.12)
Dubiel too busy with paperwork to train personnel.
(#215, p.12)
Training week " abandoned"
(#215, p.12)
Just" production HP"
(#215, p. 12)
Lack of people to work and train at same time (#215, p.13).
Mass apathy (#215, p. 18).
Training always big issue between Union and Management (#215, p. 21).
O Falsification of training records (#215, pp. 23, 24, 25, 26)
Vince Hamlin No training but records say training.
z ond Pat Donnachie Tom Mulleavy was aware of situation.
In hurry to get Unit 2 on line so training dropped (#215, p. 6).
No formal training on 10 CFR 19, 20, Tech Spec. (#215, p. 27).
Procedures -
Skin contamination procedure unclear.
(#215,p.13) 101r 30A
(#215,p.17)
I/IJ U17 Out of date, unchanged, ignored (#215,p.19) d Allowed contaminated people to go home.
O(v'-
RC evaporator tank valve change incident - POST ACCIDENT.
. \\D See #215, pp.13-17.
Sometime in May? h fn{ [ ik RWPapprovedby'Mulleavyafter'refu/
sed by Joe DeMann and Donnachie.
No isolation on pipe where valve was to be replaced.
"Mulleavy has a tendency to agree with operations and everybody
(
else and we (Rad Chem Techs and Rad Prot. Force) don't get that 3
much support if we have a legitimate reason to bitch."
(#215, p.14).
When valve was popped, it blew over to next vault.
3-inch stream of g
water (fire hose), 2000F, 3R/hr. blew out.
3 Dave (Dick?) Kimball scalded his hand and was contaminated in groin f
with hot water.
40 mR/hr (E-520)
(See #215, p.15,16).
k Two days later Kimball was still contaminated.
Got thru friskers on day of contamination.
(#215, p. 16).
Could not be whole body counted too hot.
Donnachie " read out" Joe DeMann a, bout it and threatened to go to NRC (#215, p.17).
-. O flimitz, NRC, was aware of initial contamination (#215, p.16).
Backsliding to old HP program (#215, p.17).
Union vs. Management situation on write up of HP violations.
(#215, p.18).
Lost control [fh Instrumentation issue - fio sign out of portable inst.
in last 3 years.
(#215, p.19)
Lack of control results in lost survey instruments (#215, p. 20).
N Part 19 action 2-3 years ago.
Pete Gallex 4
Ed Hauser i
h Complaint to NRC about lack of training.
(#215, p. 21)
Dumping contaminated water without H analysis.
Unit 1.
Waste evap. storage tanks.
During first days of emergency (#216, pp. 3, 4).
Mulleavy authorized this dumping.
1915 095 0
o s
I '. :
i~
s Su=ary of I&E Interview 77, B and 79 Interview of April 25, 1979 of Mr. Thomas K. Thompson, former employee of Met. Ed.,
Radiation Chemistry Senior.
Mr. Thompson is a college graduate with a degree in phychology (~ 30 credits in chemistry).
Started at TMI in December 1973.
Some formal chemistry training while at Met. Ed.
On-the-job training for health physics.
Reported to site 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />, 3/28/79, went to ECS.
Was to be on off-site team but equipment in emergency kit (1 of 4) not functional, returned to ECS indicated no training given for SAM-2.
Assisted in personnel decontamination (most of early contamination geseous).
At approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> was requested to gei.,nrimary coolant sample.
Egpressed reservations, but did proceed.
Sample panel read 200 R/hr.
Suited up (Scott Mr pack) and took sample.
Expressed view that air monitor in sampling area not operational.
There was history of problems with that monitor (RMA-12).
Also hood ventilation had problems in past.
primary sampling always resulted in increased activity in area and control room.
At time of sampling had TLD and low range dosimeter (no extremity monitoring).
Received 200 mr. Accompanied by M. Janouski during sampling.
No detailed discussion with supervisor on manner and procedures for obtaining coolant samples.
Expressed his reservations to his management.
Indicated sample was taken in rushed manner (~ 50ml in 1 1. poly bottle left inhood) and sample was probably G not representative.
Subsequent to sampling, the ECS was evacuated.
Air samplers were indicating Co-58 above MPC.
Left ECS and went to Unit 2 Control Rpom. Approximately 50 people were Unit 2 Control Room.
Shortage of portable survey instruments was indicated. Mr. Thompson implies shortage of instruments existcd prior to accident.
High activity in control room air, everyone in respirators (primarily MSA full face-paper filters).
Mr. Thompson, was at control station for access to Aux. Bldg.
No logs were main-tained for exposures or surveys.
Mr. Thompson checked that individuals had proper protective gear and dosimeters.
No apparent coordination between Maintenance and Health Physics for these entries.
March 29, 1979, Mr. Thompson reported for work 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />.
Initial efforts were at process center establishing inventory of respirators and protective clothing.
Mr. Thompson expressed concern re observed radiation levels.
March 31, 1979, 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br />, Mr. Thompson reported for work and was stationed in Unit 2 control room.
On the ev ning of March 30, Mr. Thompson decided to resign his position with Met. Ed.
He expressed concern about his potential for additional exposure and his confidence in his supervisory personnel.
191509h
- N
SUMMARY
OF IE INTERVIEW 62, 63 AtlD 64 Interview of Mr. P. O. Velez, Radiation Protection Foreman taktn on April 23, 1979.
Mr. Velez is a high school graduate.
Six years in Navy nuclear power program.
He was a mechanical operator and engineering lab technician in Navy.
Approx-imately 8 years with Pet Ed, 3 years as aux. operator, 3 years as radiation protection technician and almost 2 years as radiation protection foreman.
0630 hrs, 3/28/79 reported for work. Onsite emergency declared assisted in deploying on-and off-site teams.
Set up team at observation center to relay off-site team information to control room.
Engaged in this activity for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
At approximately 0900 hrs radiation levels at fence started to increase.
Inidcated that f our emergency kits were available, however one kit incomplete in that SAM-2 down for repairs (had been down for approximately 3 months). Also indicated that past experience with SAM-2 was less than satisf actory (timers did not function properly and calibration was difficult).
Indicated that one of the 3 operational monitors broke down on first day.
Also f actors of 10 to 100 in results were experienced. Teams were directed f rom on-site. His team was relay point only.
Mr. Velez stated view that 6 to 8 emergency kits would be preferable to the four.
1300 hrs, 3/28/79 report to Unit 2 control room.
Indicated that there were 9
30-40 people in control room.
He felt that many did not belong there. His impression was that at 1300 hrs Mr. Seelinger was functioning as emergency director.
His function in control room was to assist R. Dubiel.
Indicated that opera-tions personnel did not appreciate severity of rad levels in plant. Operations wanted to charge seal in Iectionfilters. These filters were in 1000R/hr field, Mr. Velez said no to fit;er change.
He indicated his highest range instrument only went to 1000R/hr. To his knowledge higher range instruments were still not available.
Mr. Velez indicated no formal survey data available. He started mapping and logghg of survey data (location of paper now unknown).
Only htlf-f ace respirators were available, paper filters: Mr. Velez ordere i 60-75 fi;11-f aced particulate filters (Scott) to be brought to control rocm.
Mr. Velel indicates that operations coordination with health physics appeared to be unsatisf actory.
At 1500 hrs, Mr. Velez left control room to set up monitoring station off-site to check out per sonnel leaving site.
Area used (500 Ky sub-station) was not equipped with water or showers. After setting up off-site release point.
Returned to observation center for rest of day.
O 1915 097
.-,9 0700 hrs, 3/29/79, request for primary coolant sample.
Mr. Velez and Mr.
Houser, Chemistry foreman, decided to it themselves.
I;o detailed instructions Houser and Velez I anned the manner in which were givcn by upper management.
sample should be drawn.
They suited up and drew sartple (100 ml in 1-1 poly bottle). Sample was 1000 R/hr on contact, 400 R/hr at 1 foot and 15 R/hr at 3 f ee t. Velez received 900 mrem and Houser received 3-1 Rem.
fio extremety monitors wert v.orn, none available.
fio lapel air samplers used none available.
Velez had contamination on his forearm (
36 hrs before deconned to below 200 counts / min, initial reading was 30 to 40 mr.
Velez did submit Wine sample and had whole body count.
Mr. Velez indicated that additional health physics support through their con-tractor (fluclear Support Services) was available on Thursday. Mr. W lez notes no one knew who was in charge.
0700, 3/30/79, Mr. Velez reports to work.
Stationed the observation center.
Mr. Velez indicates that he still had little information on plant status.
Based on this interview, it appears to indicate that the traditional conflict between operations (production) and Fealth physics (service group) existed at TMI prior to the accident.
O O
1915 098
.. t SU.:%RY OF IE II;TERVIEW 140 Arid 141 Interview of D. Zeiter, Radiation Chemist Technician, Sr. of liay 5,1979.
l.:r. Zeiter was Rad. Tech. on shif t at time of turbine and reactor trip. Ran routine chemistry.
Boron analysis appeared to be low.
First indication of high activity in coolant based on 0600 hrs sample - first thoughts of f ailed fuel.
for. Zeiter did routine activities and sampling subsequent to site emergency being declared.
Last portion of interview 141 gives some view of H. P. program (p.18 at seq.)
fir. Zeiter expressed H. P. did not have sufficient clout.
Recounts several events which occurred in recent past which indicates this. There is also some interesting discussion of neutron dcsimetry and exposures.
O 1915 099
Interview - Sid Porter Tape #85
- p. 4 Gertz called Porter 8:30 a.m. on the 30th to tell him that no off-site results were in excess of approximately 10 mr. All on and water iodine results were negative, also results give (11:00 a.m.) to Bob Bores, l4RC Region I.
- p. 10 Decision to take TLD's and water samples on the 29th made by Met Ed.
(Dr. James Mudgrin's group) and Gertz. l'et Ed did not want more people on site on the 28th.
- p. 12-13 Reported data continually to the State - particularly on a water levels.
(started 3/29)
- p. 14 EPA joined the meeting on 4/2.
- p. 17-18 f4RC reps saw folders labelled RMC Early Sample Results - or something similar - inplant samples control romi air etc. and several offsite sample da?a results.
- p. 19-20 Three to four sampling teams out from site - inside fence - along perimeter - one on east shore, cae on west shore and a helicopter team. About 90% of the data from portable instrumnts.
Charcoal filter sample data went to RMC then SAI - early ones to B&W.
Op.2C-21 Alot of data not really looked at - though he said it was continually evaluated.
Results negative or below MDA.
- p. 22 Conf usion as to role in operation.
- p. 36 Porter thinks that Gra r never got involved with off-site monitoring team direction - but' was in charge of the Health Physics Manpower pool - ternJ it operational llP and worried about manpower and replace-nients on a timely basis.
- p. 43-44 Corrected statement that the E520B was an ion chainber - now he knows it is a C~M - 200% response window open to 81 Kev, 92% under closed relative toCS-137.
Also used R02A ion chamber 100% - 81 Kev response window open.
105% 81 Kev response closed window.
PIC-6A 120% and 100% respectively.
1915 100 0
Interview with T. Potter and K. Woodard Tape No. 143 S
- p. 5 GPU notified Pickard, Lowe and Garrick about 8:00 am on the 28th,
- p. 7 Used their capability to use the Fet tower data to compute X/Q.
- p. 10 Their role was as a backup to the Reading Met data and calculations.
PLEG telecopied Fet data to the Reading office from the data being computer fed to PL&G.
- p. 12-14 Brief description of f acilities (0111e and Lew have seen their capabilities),
- p. 14 Analyzing X/Q data in Washington.
- p. 14-18 Further system description and their evaluating ARAC to give the computer and obtain the data.
- p. 20 At the end of the day they telecopied the weather data on an hourly basis and some X/Q data to Met Ed
- p. 23 Did not know about the reactor problem until 10:00 - 11:00 am, but they did not know of off-site releases - but suspected dangered fuel.
. 25-27 Description of some of the data supplied.
- p. 30 By the second day they were using 15 min. X/Q values and were determining where planes would go.
- p. 33 Lowe left for site and Woodard and Potter were on standby to calculate doses and remained in DC to calculate isopleths.
- p. 35 Performed some calculations regarding hy rogen in containment.
j
- p. 42-43 Control room procedure used to calculate isopleths etc. from information probably supplied by Woodard.
- p. 47 Releases assumed to be from a ground release, therefore results were conservative.
1915 101
t Interview with Mr. S. Porter
~
Tape #65
- p. 5 Believes TMI always put in a lot of effort in emergency planning -
have many drills and try to solve any problem areas that arise.
- p. 6-8 Porter wrote the emergency planning portion of the FSAR then helped them plan the drills and procedures. Hedged in involvement - mostly reviewed and pointed out areas that he felt need improvement. Acted as an interf ace with State and local authorities.
- p. 9 Limited effort also in planning off-site dose assessnent procedures.
- p. 10-12 Porter called by Met Ed around 8:00 a.m. 3/28 - to institute off-site radiological emergency monitoring plan (REMP).
His partner Gertz responsible for this - contacted Ronald Laughler - who picks up samples.
Program consists of changing TLD's either monthly or quarterly and take milk samples. Take and composite downstream water samples -
change program to do this every day or two or three instead.
- p. 13 Started on the changed program on the second or third day. Taking daily samples of ' drinking water and daily milk samples and every three days - 20 TLD locations.
- p. 15 Actually started sampling on the 29th.
- p. 19 Two sets of samp'es - one for QC.
- p. 22 Sid Porter on standby for HP work at plant.
- p. 24 Called Porter to site from Salem. Arrived on-site at 7:00 p.m. -
but before that requestdHP service help from Salem. Also brought respiraters and cartridges from Salem,
- p. 27 Also got a SAM-2 from State of New Jersey and two SAM-2's from Salem,
- p. 28 Dave Lemroth (Dubiel's bnss) asked Sid to help out wherever he could and got a pass to go or. and off the Island - went to Unit 1.
- p. 31 Either Dubiel or Mulleavy in Unit 2 Control Room - asked Porter to follow general HP program.
- p. 32 Lynn Landry following off-site monitoring program.
- p. 33 Porter spoke to Cary Horner - sort of acting chemist - about getting samples - and told person in charge (Emergency Director) of Unit 1 Control Room (Lemroth).
1915 102
Interview with Sid Porter 9
Tapes #66, 67 Porter believes his role to be advisory to Radiation Protection Supervisor in ECS.
- p. 3 Was to assess radioeffluent releases. Also attempted to insure that relief teams arrived and were sent out where needed.
- p. 4 Was aware that people had been in the Auxiliary Building - anybody with more than 100 mr was to be whole body counted.
- p. 5 Also checked on those who had pocket dosimeterreadup greater than 100 mr.
"tto surprises" in whole body counting.
- p. 6 Believes there was one RCS sample taken in first three days - had chemist whole body counted (Ed. Houser)
- p. 8 Discussed procedure and preparation to take second RCS sample.
- p. 9 With help from SALEM HP - prepared procedure to spread the dose.
Salenger sent to write RWP for the taking of a second sample.
- p. 10 Idea of spreading dose - adopted.
- p. 12 Jack Donoghue of tiRR reviewed and approved the procedure on 4/10.
Also discussed with B&W re possible releases during sampling.
- p. 13 Obtained lead glass shield and personnel made several practice runs.
- p. 14 Valkers also involved in first sampling but he was not contaminated.
Houser was - some would not come off - Porter asked to assess Houser's exposure.
- p. 17 Results of TLD's etc telephoned to Porter at plant - felt that many of the results were almost instantaneous (neglecting sampling and travel time).
- p. 19 On the 29th began getting positive iodines because of the Xenon Moved Ge(Li) from plant into circ water pump house in that it was "more usable."
- p. 20 Had the charcoal cartridges combined by tiRC - the few positive,
- p. 21 All off-site counting showed no pos. iodine.
- p. 22-23 Also took some by helicopter in the plume and some on an hourly basis.
All results negative - from control room on the 28th.
Iodine samples taken frequently at the downwind direction.
O 1915 i.03
" Xenon background was around" ahen he tried to count many of 9 25 these samples on the SAM-2.
- p. 26 Off and on background of Xenon in control room,
- p. 27 Went on respirators when Xenon activity went up.
Charcoal filters on intake were not showing higher activity.
- p. 28 NRC did not detect iodine - the somewhat positive ckrcoal filter samples -
but using a mter, they showed activity.
- p. 32 Felt could use silver zeolites
- p. 35 flow rate through stack 89,000 cfm. Very steady first 3 or 4 days,
- p. 38 Effluent monitors at 106 (full scale) except for I - meant "no real problem with high exposure off-site."
- p. 40 Someone had taken a reading around the monitors 300 or 400 mr/hr.
Determined efficiency for 1 filters at 96%.
- p. 41 Attributed high readup to the pressure of Xenon.
. 41 Several days later - wrote up RWP to leave charcoal out, filter - leave pump off and then close shield to determine levels - levels did not drop at all - for days,
- p. 42 2-3 weeks af ter the event - went in and decontaminated (decreased) the surface and level dropped significantly, but after restarting the pumps - went right back up.
- p. 44 Back to HPR-219 - iodine and gas channel detectors are Nal, about 1/2 inch from the f ace of the activated charcoal cartridge (SAI 100).
ga nitor - scintillator looking at 2-41 of gas. Calibrated for Xe
- p. 46 States that except for iodines, noble gases released can be estimated using "well calibrated survey meters."
- p. 47 Manitored radiciodine release by continually replacing charcoal in iodine train and counting off-site on a Ge (Li).
- p. 48 All of the I data part of Met Ed's records and logs - all in the saruple coordinator's records.
Don Hepridge, supervisor.
g 1915 104
9 50 Porter requested changeover of charcoal sample cartridge within 8-16 hours,
- p. 52-53 B&W may have set up some of the counting for the charcoal cartridges.
- p. 55 Suddenly it is no surprise that there were lots of Xenon around -
survey meters told him that.
P. 56 Small amounts of halogens released from the plant. Environmental (milk) samples confirred this hypothesis since milk samples were quite low, 3
- p. 57 Air iodines about 0.02 pC1/m,
- p. 57-60 State, PHS etc saw no significant radioi6 dine.
- p. 61 Early TLD data - he states showed very little exposure.
- p. 63 Heard about government consideration for protective action in the 30 or 31st. Count not understand why.
- p. 67 110 one could understand why the protective action was ordered. Felt only that civil authorities should be at full alert.
- p. 70 Felt that there would be plenty of time to take corrective action if things got worse.
- p. 75 State guidelines for EPA - 10% of low guideline - never reached.
- p. 76 Porter's trigger point for the environment and population exposure 50-100 mrem. Then let the State know - also let the state know on a continual basis.
- p. 82 Using E520's in the environment that greatly :over respond to 81 Kev.
Also TLD's overrespond by 200% to 220% for unshielded TLD's.
- p. 83 Used catalog info to confirm his memory re overresponse of, instrument.
"We didn't use many GM tubes at all. We usedQadetectorsy F520 is an ion chamber,2not a GM Porter states.
e es ion chambers p.
,__that is-why-they are'in the Kits.
/
/
- p. 86 He interviewed team members and noticed the instruments - ion chambers -
maybe a few GM.
//
(
<r dC d
s-4/q #
m1/u
!s o-i V
L' l' (C C) r l78
{ll 1915 105 q sA g
g mm h p "y s eJo,
h Ir4TERVIEW 9 - Karl L. Myers and David W. Etheridge TAPE #191 RE:
Environmental monitoring and sample collection - air samples and general monitoiing on the Island Sent to predetermine { sites on Island and neglected a " hot-spot" of about 10 n[/hr.
- p. 4 Around 8:00 a.m., 3/30/79 - Myers reported the 1.2R/hr reading from the helicopter (Instrument R02 - open window measurement) a transitory measurement - could never repeat it.
- p. 5-6 They were not given any instructions as to which instrument to use -
therefore primarily used, Tater, the E520. About 13:30 hours (3/30) -
dose rates at 700 to ll6D feet varied from 2.3 - 10 mr/hr - essentially is plume - they were told to monitor the li to I;W quadrants,
- p. 7-8 Data recorded on tablets - no idea as to the disposition of the sheets,
- p. 10 Felt HP program ran smoothly.
Etheridge also felt HP was ok - moni-toring and instrumentation were under control but that they did not have any idea of the total situation.
- p. 11 Knew that ECS had been moved - but no reasons given and sene communica-tions problems.
O.11-13 Etheridge did not believe, even before the accident, that there were p
sufficient high range survey instruments, only eight were available.
Myers agreed - repair seemed to be slow. There had been talk of farming out the repair work.
- p. 14 HP training - only emergency drill training to the past two years.
Training recorded - but they could not remember any formal training.
- p. 15 Perhaps it was chemistry training - systems and diagrams.
- p. 16-17 Perhaps some chemistry lectures - not HP training.
- p. 18 Possibility that every time someone spoke to them it was logged as training. They vere not aware of any of this,
- p. 19-20 Have a fdrm to document HP violation.
However, it is never followed -
since management never follows through, Myers - never felt the need. Etheridge know of one instance - areas
- p. 21 of greater than 1.2 are locked - shif t supervisor entered and returned contaminated and refused to talk to the HP 'nd "it was a total neglect of any SP rules."
- p. 23 Etheridge feels that total lack of training is widespread.
1915 106
Sounds like sor.ie confusion.
Op.34
- p. 36-37 Porter's role was to be more of an oversight responsibility.
O 1915 107 9
Ir4TERVID.' - I'ycrs, #114 9
Does not appear to add any significant informati: n except for the stuck vent in control room #2.
O 1915 108 9
Tape #102 9
Robert D. McCann - Radiation Protection Foreman Summary of Interview With Met-Ed at TMI since 1969, no prior experience.
42 weeks of initial training.
Attended radiological health training school (?) in Rockville, MD.
Two weeks of training at the U. of Michigan.
Foreman since 1974.
Generally does not remember much - what and when, nor who else was at any given place -
appears that he either does not want to talk or was not doing much.
p.18 At the 500 KV sub station a monitoring and decontamination check point was established.
All individuals and vehicles were frisked.
Contamination was found on individuals, however no record was kept and no follow-up was done.
p.13 According to emergency drills he says that he should have been in th e ECS instead was frisking at the 500 KV substation.
p.15 &
Had knowledge of high contamination of two employees Houser and Veles 16 resulting from sample failure, fio action beyond showering were taken nor were the extent or magnitude of the contamination recorded.
p.18 At the finishing frisking station they had no procedures for collecting bioassay samples, sorting people for whole body counting or testing thyroid Some of the personnel at the frisking station were inexperienced.
9 measurements.
TMI routinely read their own TLD; are using a Marshaw dual TLD.
- p. ~
p.21 Badges are coded to individuals. TLD reader operates a teletype and punch-tape the later fed into computer.
All the technicians routinely operate the TLD reader.
p.22 Generally the TLD results correlate colsely with pocket dosimeter readings however usually the TLD readings are slightly lower.
1915 109 9
Tapes #107 and 108 Interview of Thomas John Leach, Radiation Chemistry Technician Junior No longer employed by Met. Ed. Started to work for Met. Ed in 1974 -
no previous experience in nuclear industry.
Training in water chemistry and H.P. by B&W and Met. Ed. employees - some class instruction but mostly on the job training.
3/28 Participated in an offsite monitoring team. hent to Goldsboro SN4-2 7:30 am Unit would not operate.
No readings recorded on Pick-6 and on self-p.8 reading dosimeters, p.24 The only offsite reading about 4 to 5 mr/hr at Steins Landing - end of morning.
p.26 Surveyed people at the 500 KV substation.
Found contamination (5-10,000 cpm) mostly on trousers, some were contaminated all over.
Did not take measurements of the thyroid and was not aware that this should have been done.
p.32 No records of personnel contamination were maintained, they were only trying to get people to wash and get them through as quickly as possible.
p.33 No steps were taken to assure that people leaving the site would pass through the frisking station.
Tape #108 p.39 Training was not adequate p.40 People not responsive to radiation pmtection requirements however no formal complaints were filed in cases of non-compliance because "didn't w,nt to create negative feeling."
1915 110 0
l' a
- 7 Janouski 10 lack of training, requests for training 15 c :ncern over instrumentation, equipment
- 100 8 possible exposure (but I think it proved negative) 9 radiation in the hot machine shop 10 boron sample - very low 11 ECS set up/cvacuate the aux bldg 12 get everybody out of aux bldg 14 early sample for gross iodine 16 describes getting contaminated when taking sample 18 air monitor in nuclear sample room wasn't working and hadn't been for some time (may have been turned off intentior ally) 9 22 readings of 500 mr to 1.5 r; confusion as to sample lines; report to Unit 1 instead of 'Jnion 2 27 surveyed aux bldg floor water in basement - no significant change in rad level 30 surveyed aux b1dg - did not tell anybody he was going, went alone, had no radio, but did have dosimetry 31 readings of 1.5 to 2 r in hallways of aux bldg; 3-4r around door 35 He and Tom Thompson drew reactor coolant sample (200 r at 6 inches), but evidently got little exposure 38 lost ECS 915 ii1 40 told people no entry to Unit 2 aux b1dg 47 went into hot area for about one hour 40 minutes without TLD; estimated dose by using dosimeter reading (270 mr); it took some time to get it onto the exposure printout 50-57 readings in aux bldg - water 50-60 mr ; door to bleed tank closed 40 r; with door open 300 r; seal injection floor - 600 r; B makeup pump - 100 r; four or five areas above 100 r.
58 had requested that a bad monitor be required - never was 60 Bob Marshall wanted an RWP to go into hot area and chek the RC drain tank rupture disk - Janouski refused
~
60 the HP. program ". sucks" - no. training in seven years 71 lack of training of both HPs and ops has been a problem for years e
- 101 5 inadequate equipment and instruments; management refuses to have repaired or replaced O
191si12
'i 9
- \\ /
Sumary Interview: Michael Janot/ ski, Senior Rad Chem Technician Tape #7 Sevenq qA vs with the Company.
Started as janitor.
Seven days basic instruction in math, chemistry.
Additional training in use of radiation survey equipment, use of Ge(Li) and NaI. The rest on the job training.
States that did not have adequate training and even scheduled " training weeks" were not held due to work pressure. His requests for additional training were not honored.
In his opinion the instruments were poorly maintained, the H.P. foreman are not well qualified and the technicians are not receiving adequate professional guidance.
p.18 Arrived work 3/27 11:00 pm.
Performed routine background and efficiency checks on instruments and isotopic energy calibration on Ge(Li) detector.
Tape #101 p.8 While attempting to remove the charcoal holder on reactor building monitor HPR-227 the holder flew into his hand under pressure and water contaminated his hand and pants (see tape 101 p.16) p.9 Using R02 surveyed hot machine shop 0.5 - 1.5 r/hr. (Unit 1). Was unaware that there was a " reactor problem".
Determined that the source of radiation 9
were Unit 2 sample lines.
p.
Airborne activity in Auxiliary Bldg.
He ordered evacuation p.19 Air monitor in the nuclear sample room was turned off, most likely because it " continually goes off" p.20 The reason for the monitor going off appears to be inadequate flow through the hood.
This situa^ Ion persisted for about 2 years.
p.24 Emergency announced in Unit 1, due to high radiation levels well before Unit 2.
p.26 Survey of Aux Bldg. No ed-C cic$ ting, having respirator cartridge type
- 3/28 Survey instrument - Telector.
8-9 am p.28 Found water on the floor, states that Unit 2 floor drains back up every time the tanks were drained - so it was " normal." However found more water on the floor than expected.
Obtained no reading on the telector from' the water at this time.
1915 113 9
_2_
99-33 Before noon made an entry into Aux Bldg wearing PC's and Scott Air 3 dosimeters (o-200 mr, 0-500mr, 0-5 R).
Had no TLD, carried a telector.
Basement area 1.5-2.0 R/hr, other areas also high and missin6 rising.
Wrote up survey on scratch paper - no forn;al report.
p.35 Took 0 or 100 mi sample of primary coolant 6" from sample dose rate 200 hr.
p.37 The sample bottle remained in sink - possibly 2 or 3 days.
p.38 Airborne acjtivity apparent in Unit 1 ECS.
They knew it was Xenon llam Source uncertain - Model room open could be originating in either unit.
p.43 Unit I went on respirators before Unit 2.
p.45 Entered Aux Bldg during the first day several times without instruction.
Made surveys - filled out foms. Had no TLD p.48 Kept his_ own record of exposure (pocket dosimeter) - and this is recorded.
p.57 Monitor 227 did not work long time several work rcquests were put.
p.59 Received about 1200 mr in the first few days.
p.61 Was aware that the electromagnetic release valve had been leaking for some time prior to the accident.
e5 No training or exams in H.P. in the last 5 years.
p.68 In answers to questions shows poor knowledge in radiation physics'.
_ Tape 101 p.5 Claims that for two years requests have been made for additional H.P.
equipment - avai?able was not adequate.
p.6 Majority of av iiable equipment was not operable.
p.8 Even prior to acc Lat H.P. instruments would not operate inside Unit 2 reactor b1dg due to hiah humidity.
1915 114
Oliver D. Lynch, Jr.
6/20/79 G
INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
Fred M. Huwe, Radiation Protection Foreman, TMI 4/20/79
- 5 30, 31 and 52 Experience:
12 years, USN, with Rad. Health Physics background in Navy.
Emergency Kit:
4 ea.
Radios Air sampler SAM 2 (Eberline 2 channel analyzer)
PIC 6A Dosimeters Other equipment Emergency Control Center - TMI-2 Control Room
- Emergency Control Station - TMI-l H.P. Lab.
- This is also the secondary ECS.
From approx. 7:20 a.m. on 3/28/79:
Huwe was essentially rur.ning the on-site and off-site radiological program, reporting to Tom Mulleavy or Dick Dubid, who were in EC Center advising the Emergency Director.
Prior to 7:30 am on 3/28/79, there was apparently no direction of HP program. Approx. 10:00 am, Mulleavy assumed control of H.P.
program from Huwe.
Dick Dubie(- Supervisor of Radiation Protection and Chemistry Tom Mulleavy - Radiation Protection Supervisor Emergency Director Unit 1, Supt.
Jim Seelinger Unit 2, Supt.
Joe Logan Site Supt.
Gary Miller Lead Engineer Bill Potts Huwe indicates he sent Janovski to make initial survey of Aux. Building.
Janovski says he received no direction to do this survey and did it on his own.
Dose rates went up about 7:00 am.
Prior to that time no problems.
h 191.5 i15
9 O Counting room capability was lost when dose rates went up due to L.ed design about 7:00 am 3/28/79.
Sample turnaround was 12-16 hours with max of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> because RMC and NRC were providing this service.
Environmei.tal samples normally counted by RMC (Radiation fianagement Center) vendor.
Ron Lantham Emergency respirators (particulate filters) about 15 available in Unit 2 control room.
Instrumentation Availability -
Inadequate (see p. 14 of #31)
Instruments lost when H. Parga in Unit 2 evacuated.
North Auditorium used as first holding area for incoming personnel.
(Since 8:00, 3/28/79).
H.P. personnel sent in at 10:00 am, 3/28/79.
Non-essential personnel were admitted to site after declaration of emergency and kept in North Auditorium.
Pocket Dosimeters not adequately available (See p. 24-27 of #31).
Discussion indicates lack of control in issue and recovery of personnel O
dosimetry resulted in pilfering of pocket dosimeters on the order of 500-600 per outage.
(See esp. page 27 of #31.)
Instrument Maintenance Emergency Equipment
- OK Regular Equipment
- Bad (See p. 38 of #31.)
Training Conflicting information (a)
See p. 31 of #31 - team training (b) pg 33 of #31 - emergency drills (We
- uld check training records.)
(c)
Drills done just before NRC observed drill, not much rest of year.
(See p. 37, #31.)
(d) Emergency training in progress.
(See p. 40 of #31.)
contradicts page 31 of #31 (e)
(Seealsop.42of#31-cNEel t Janovski)
(f)
(See also, p. 35 of #52.)
1915 116
.i.
.ii.i.i...
- Survey Records during TMI incident.
(See pg. 41 of #31.)
Rept. on "little pieces of paper."
Charcoal cartridges pulled 7:00 pm 3/30/79 HPR 219, 221A, 221B, 228 (See p. 2g of #52.)
Chain of comand - Indefinite (See p. 3g #52)
Outsiders directing too.
(See p. 5 of #52.)
Lack of Personnel Exposure Consideration (Exposure buildup)
(See pg. 6-7 of # 52.)
Leading to unnecessary exposure See Potts incident Fuhrer's exposure pp. 19-20 of #52 pp. 27 & 28.
Lack of HP involvement in high exposure activity planning (See p. 14g #52.)
Exposure Control (See p. 23 of #52.)
For 1st 2 nights did not keep track of personnel exposures.
Stop Work Authority of HP Techs.
See p. 26 of #52.
Huwe says don't have.
Can be overridden by O&M.
Operation and Maintenance vs. Health Physics Conflict.
See pp. 33-34 of #52.
3 Bureau of Rad Health error in H sample Unnecessary respiratory protection in control room.
See p. 31 of #52.
TLD turn around time.
Complicated because reader had to be moved to off island.
See pp. 33 of #52.
1915 117 9
Interview Summary
- 163, #164 Oliver D. T Lynch, Jr.
Ms. Beverly A. Good, Environmental Scientist 2, Met Ed, Reading 5/7/79 Expertise:
BS - Environmental Health MS - Bionucleonics Student Trainee, TMI Summer, 1977 Met Ed Reading offices aware of lack of HP personnel to do normal job.
(p. 4, #163)
Many changes on ECS location during emergency due to contamination Unit-1 HP Lab to
)
Unit-2 Control Room to )
(p. 6, #163)
Unit-1 Control Room
)
Crawford (Howie) and Benson (Mike) in charge of map, directing onsite and offsite TMI teams.
(p. 12, #163) or Procedure 1670.4, estimation of L and dose offsite used at TMI control room during emergency (p. 17, #163)
Request augmentation or TMI instrumentation from sister utilities, Eberline, etc.
(p. 18, #163)
Survey Data reported on slips, not forms.
In control room 1, in milk carton, plastic bags.
(p. 26, #163)
Training Drills at TMI participated as observor from Reading 3-4 drills.
(p. 30, #163)
Big drill of 10/78 observed by NRC.
Problem with Radio communications and SAM-2.
(pp. 32, 33, #163)
Participated in Critique.
(p. 35, #163)
Procedure 1670.6, offsite emergency surveys.
(p. 39, #163)
Section 7-1-15 wanted to change procedure to allow off-site TLDS to be road at plant (p. 1, #164)
No Extra TLDS for environmental issue.
Had enough to change at specified (US
) locations (p. 3, #164)
Kept in lead pig in observation center.
O 1915 118
Sugnary of I&E Interview 105 and 106 Interview of May 3,1979 of Department of Environmental Resources, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania personnel:
Thomas M. Gerusky - Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection Margret A. Reilly - Chief, Division of Environmental Radiation William P. Dornsite - fluclear Engineer, Department of Environmental Resources These personnel stated no knowledge of outstanding issues re TMI emergency plan prior to accident (p. 4).
First call to state re site emergency received at 7:05 a.m. on March 28, 1979 from Civil Defense.
State called control room, things sounded confused but no concern re PORV was expressed and no uff-sites releases were being detected by TMI teams.
At 7:25 a.m., 3/28/79, Gerusky was advised that dome monitor was reading 800 r/hr and plant was projecting at 10 r/hr noble gas plume at goldsborough.
0800-off-site team at Goldsborough not detecting any radiation.
u
-8 Late morning, 3/28/79, Met Ed reported west shore codine sample of 10 InCi/cc (sample sent to State for confirmatory analysis).
5 tate did not request BriL help until late af ternoon.
The State did not have any 9 portable monitoring equipment for iodine.
BTIL arrived at 1800-1900 hours with iodine detectors.
floon, 3/29/79 Reilly received call frc.i site re releases of industrial waste water with noble gases (xenon) adinixed.
This water when diluted with blowdown from cooling towers would be below MRC in proposed Tech Specs.
Site indicated need to dump to provide additional storage.
State appears to have given verbal OK.
Dumping stopped per f1RC directive.
Morning, 3/30/79 plume reading 600 f t above stack 1.2 r/hr.
fio discussion prior to release with State (p 34).
Releases not planned but expected.
Communications between parties unclear, evacuation recommendations were not in consultation with State (p 43).
State personnel appeared to believe utility met its obligations under emergency plan.
EPA protective action guidelines were not approached.
E 1915 119 O
t 4
Oliver Lynch 6/21/79 INTERVIEW SUB'MRY State of Pennsylvania 5/3/79
- 105 1.
Thomas M. Gerusky, Dir. Bur of Rad. Prot.
2.
Margaret A. Reilly, Chief, Div. of Environ. Rad.
3.
William P. Dornsife, Nuc. Engineer, Dept. of Environ. Resources Penn Emergency Plan rewritten in 1977 to accommodate EPA dose projection.
PHE guidance and PAGs "PA Pike-pipe."
Adopted by TMI (p. 3, #105)
Penn invited to TMI drills (and observed them).
(p. 3, #105)
Dornsife received initial call from State Council, From Civil Defense 372W7f 7:00 am.
(p. 6, #105)
When he made contact with control room, he didn't write down name, etc.
(p. 6, #105) e Penn people didn't keep good records during initial notification.
Didn't have emergency plan home (p. 11, #105)
Questionable Attitude of State toward HP and Feds.
(See p. 11, #105)
T% P 1.
Were disappointed that they didn't have a dairy problem, ie radiciodine.
3s3d 2.
Forgot NRC was involved.
(p. 24, #105) 3.
" Don't trust a Fed with flammables."
(p. 27, #105) Reilly
. p'e ?3 4.
" Nitwit from NIOSH" (p. 34, #105) 3 44 l 's d 7 Off-site Dose Predictions based on dome monitor and assumed leak rate of
, a_74 0.2% per day of containment.
(p. 13, #105)
" Penn Civil Defense activated. Alerted to possible evacuation of West
-1 5m side of river, because of dome monitor readings.
Before 8:00 am, 3/28/79.
fd (See p.13, J b $'-
Helicopter survey negative, Goldsborough evacuation called off.
- 105).
4 &'1 y,
Penn augments TMI analysis counted samples for TMI.
(p.15,#105) sy P.
y 4; but did not feed back analysis (see p. 20, #105) (p. 29, #105).
4 Penn environmental TLDs not changed right away (p.18, #105) although field man wanted to do so.
Brookhaven (BNL) offers assistance.
Accepted offer later.
(p.18,#105).
O 1915 120
5 e
s O Penn officials give conflicting statements to Lt. Gov. and Press.
(see p. 20, #105) a.
to Lt. Gov. Nothing detectable offsite.
b.
to press - detected radiciodine.
Penn confused as to presence of radiciodine.
(p. 22, #105)
BNL analysis shows no radiciodine.
(p. 22, #105)
Steam venting influenced Penn on radiciodine decision.
(p. 23, #105)
Could not understand lack of iodine. Reilly, p. 25, #105.
Xe contamination of Cutie Pie recognized.
(p. 27, #105)
Penn lacks field radio capability.
(p. 28, #105)
Penn Gov. controls (prohibits) discharges from plant.
NPDES problem.
(p. 31, #105)
Confusion over discharge of IWTS (p. 34, #105)
Much time spent briefing and explaining to high state officials.
Interfered with job.
(p. 31, #105)
O 1915 121 O
Oliver D. T. Lynch, Jr.
Interview Summary
- 154 Michael K. Gabner, Radio Chem Tech, Jr.
5-7-79 Expertise:
High School - chemistry Navy training on Nuclear Weapons Emergency Procedures 5 years as Rad Chem Tech, TMI Used SAM-2 in emergency drills only No problems encountered in its use (p. 7, #154)
Didn't know who was directing training in offsite monitoring.
(p. 10, #154)
Attempted personnel monitoring in high background area.
(p. 12, #154)
Didn't use (consult) in-place air sampler in control room 1, even though available.
Used SAM-2 instead.
(p. 18, #154),
cD Insufficient HP personnel to do job and still sevr training.
No training during training week for past 4 years.
(p. 21, #154)
Training Program not followed (p. 22, #154)
No formal training on TLD reading (p. 23, #154)
Only 0JT
)
H. P. Practices very seldom deviate from procedures.
(p. 32, #154) 1915 122 g
O 25! and 252
- r.:er " e.
L O
.,:e r e,; o #
.::a s E.
,.c " '..:
er E. Diebler, oc:n
-- diatico Cne~ t stry tecnnicians '.Jr. a; et Ed conducted 6 'le'79.
Intervia." was 4 th regard :r trair q; received oy both individuals
.o Tade staterents tnat thev have not received adequate training.
s.
Ovke indicates he did r.:: -e:ei ve 'Jeit 2 HP and startup training nor training cn use of SA"-2 instrument.
- p. 3-4 Deinier - Makes similar co m ents.
- p. 4-5 Pete '!s'en indicated that rad che:" techs had received training.
3:re confusion re OJT vs. formal training.
Neither individual signed raining forn.
Tne forn was accurate as to OJT, but 'coth techs maintain training G
..as not accurate.
Both :intain no training in SAM-2 (p. 20-2a).
Techs did not particicate in critiques of emergency drills (p. 24-25).
Indications of pre-assignment and instruction prelininary to NRC-ebserved drill (p. 15-21/281).
Discussion of various training in emergency procedures.
9 1915 123
.. O Interview Sumary e271 and 72 Interview of Karl E. Plumlee and Ronald L. Nimitz, Radiation Specialists, R0-I conducted May 30, 1979.
Sumarizes events of March 28.
2 O
Air conc in Unit 2 aux bldg 2x10-7 ci/ce. )
q)
At 1100 attempting to restart aux fule handling bldgs ventilation (p. 7).
Primary coolant sample at 1025 indicated 130 Ci/ml.
Conducted on-site survey 1130, 5 mr/hr along east fence, 20 mr/hr west fence. (p. 8)
Discussed results with Seelinger Unit 1 supt. and indicated potential for increase airborne in bldgs. as outside air entered ventilator intakes.
Conducted off-site surveys (E-120) 1400, 0.5 to 1 mr/hr in Middletown.
1800, '<et Ed reported 100 mr/hr at the north gate (p.12).
Open vs. closed window readings discussed (p.12-14).
Plumlee indicated licensee surveys at selected locations (not plume chasing)
( o.18 ).
Nimitz summarizes his activities on March 28 (p. 22-24).
Com'unication problems discussed (p. 25).
r ried of 0130 to 0700 of " arch 29.: Off-:ite survey data (p. 2E-27),
e f0ata called ~ into R0-I, Plumlee indicates he did not know hat RC-I used data for (p. 28-29).
In-clant exposure control discussed (c. 30-32).
- iscussion of ventilation (272, p. 2-3).
1915 124 9
.. G Ieterview Sumary =271 and 72 (contd)
.:ho approved coening of doors and susoer.sior of R'.Gs (c. 2-F)
-ct ar.swered.
Discrepancies between NRC and Met Ed TLD's (p. 6-7) a factor of 3.
Extremity dosimeters (p. 7).
Opns. vs. H.P. discussed (p. 8-9).
Discussion of liquid effluents (p.13-14).
O 1915 125 O
--:erviev Summary v267 and 268 Intervie., of S.
'd. Porter, Consultar.: to "et Ed ccnducted May 24, 1973.
Follow-up to interviews conductec on April 24 and 26.
Provided assistance for in-plan H. P. program.
Arranged for v hole-body counter (p. 3).
Arrunged for Geli detectors.
Talked w/ State (p. 4).
Recounts activity he v.as in'/olved in during March 23 and 29.
Discussion of 5 Rem emergency dose (c. 20-22),
Only guidance 3 Rem /atr.
Indicates he outlined primary sample procedure.
Discussed with J.
Collins not used for first primary coolant sample.
(p. 24).
Skin contamination and resultant doses discussed (p. 28-30).
Bioassay samples (p. 31-32).
Discussion of Xenon releases (p. 35-37).
Survey data indicating 27 mr/fr at North 'iate at 0425 hrs on 3/29.
D's:Ussion of nign survey results (anc~alies?' vii:n no apparent
-cve,-i fi c ti on (p. 22-48).
~.:"':'edi e releases (L 54-55).
c ce nt:~i na ti cr. c f G" t ro:e:
57-::
s 1915 126
9
- 7 3rview Summary *E03 and 20' Ir.terview of Thomas E. Pyke (Pike), 0;ad. C:..:. Tech - Lr of '.et Ec e
ccnducted on :'.ay 16, 1976.
Pyke. ith Met Ed since 1969 as line.
Care to TMI in 1974 as Utility Worker.
Bid to Chem Tech Junior in 1977.
Trained in H.P. by Rad Services, consultant to Met Ed.
Also went :: E&W Analytical Cnemistry School.
High School grad., 1 year college.
Came to work on 3-29-791500 to 2300 shift.
Worked until 1103 riday.
Did dilution of pre-drawn letdown sample.
Friday on-and off-site surveys.
Procedure used for sanale splitting discussed (p. 20-25).
iio e:.:remity monitors used.
Particulate respirators.
Received 830 er beta dose, 250 nr ganma dose.
Contaminated clothes and left wrist 14000 com on RM-14.
Discuss H.P. progran p. JO on.
1915 127 O
- terviev. S m ary =202 9
Irterview of George Smith, Br. Chief, RO-ccccuctec on May 17, 1079
- etails nis involycment fron 3/28/79 to 3. 20'79.
Details on t ater releases (p. 6 and 8-10).
Details on gaseous releases (p. 6-8) and p.10-11).
Discussion of evacuation order (p.11).
Mode of operation (I&E) changed 1600 on March 30 (p.12).
Working
.0 Orgar.iration established at TMI.
Organization described (p.14-15).
In-Flant ji.P. directing licensee 2::ivities.
Use of respiratory equipment (p.15 and 16, ; 20).
Bill Fisher R0-I inplant.
Pnil Stohr RO-I environmental.
1915 128 9
- tc d e; 5.rr a r.v. 2259
- ntsrvie.. J. P. Stohr of R0-1 conducte: c
- '2 22, '.979.
Stone in charge of P.0-I mooile lad.
Left Mi istone it CS3'.,
arrived TMI at 1930.
Stohr.as "in charge" of TMI. Group.
v Took initial survey readings near Pa. turnoike, less than 0.5 mr/hr.
At Olmstead Shopping Center 10-15 mr/hr.
Stationed lab at Observation Center and indicated to licensee they
.cere available to assist.
Primary activity noted Xe-133.
Essig cuestion Storh re anomalous survey data reported by licensee (p. 12-15).
Stchr ccrr.ents on lessons learned (p. 17) o range of ef fluent monitors o guidance on field monitoring technicues
-- differentiate nobles from iodine
.0dify inscetticr. olan in area of emerger.cy plan-ing c
discusses evacuation recommencation and need for better info in decisionmaking.
'\\ 0 \\ E
- vieci Su-iry =303 Fcilcw-up int.erview or Peter 'lelez, Racia:icr. crutec: ion ro recc r.
_v.cacted on June 7, 1979.
Discussion cf eloca:icn of TLD reacer c :serva 4cr Center
. :-ai.
Discussion of on-site health physics beina cr:anized by Bill Graber i..
w. - -o.
" through OC).
Discussion of training and dccumenta. ion (10.
/
m Discussion of RWP procedures and proclems witn operations (p. 29
- r.rcugh 33).
ComT.ents On H. P. progra:n (p. 39 on).
O O
1915 130
'r n.cic.. Su=5rj =19' Intervisa of 'or. Eric D. Yochhei., Senior Engineer, BL'.
cor.cuctec
'My 15,1979.
Mr. Yochheim was sent to site by B&'r.' on 3/30/79 to act as consultant on radiation chemistry.
14 0 information pertinent to Group 3 is contained in this interviea.
O 1915 131 0
6
,e*
Oliver Lynch 6/21/79 9
INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
Charles (Chick) 0. Gallina, NRC Investigator
- 147 and 9148 (5/ 7/ 79)
Expertise:
BS-Chem 1 yr grad work - Nuc. Chem.
MS-HP 1 yr grad work - Nuc. Eng.
PhD - Environ. & Rad. Science
- Biophysics Region I Alternate emergency planning officer Served as Emergency Planning Officer / Investigator for NRC Region I at TMI during accident response.
Accompanied to site by:
Don Neely Carl Plumlee Ron Nimitz James Higgins (p. 3 #147)
NRC inspectors had to evacuate Unit 1 control room because of lack of 9
respirators.
(p. 5, #147)
Attempted to curb release from Aux. Bldg. (off gassing from water on floor) by securing Unit 1 and Unit 2 ventilation systems, but airborne levels rose in Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms when this was done.
(p. 7, #147)
Release of personnel from site difficult due to Xe contamination of polyester clothing.
(p. 11, #147)
Method of decon was by decay.
(Several hours.)
(p.12, #147)
Meteorology from tower run by Pickard, Lowe# and Garrick, read directly in control room.
(p.16, #147)
Penn Lt. Gov toured Aux. bldg.
Had to suit up. Was he rad-con trained?
Doubtful.
(p.18, #147)
Uncontrolled Release - Friday, before 8:00 am.
Relief Valve opened.
(p. 26, #147)
NRC orders off site evacuation without consultation or notification of on-site personnel.
(p. 27, #147) On-site personnel saw no reason to evacuate.
Approx.10:00 am, Friday.
O 1915}32
. 0 NRC HQ called Penn Civil Defense and recommended evacuation.
(p. 29, #147).
Harold Collins, State Programs (p. 30, #147)
Chairman Hendrie reconmended evac. of women, pregnant women and children. No need.
(p. 32, #147)
Applicant upset with NRC action which provided unnecessary pressure on operation.
(p. 33, #147)
PAGS for consider. evac.
1,000 mR; Evac at 5,000 mR (p. 34, #147) 1200 mR/hr indication... Vent reading,10:00 am Friday Puff.
(p. 30, #147) also~ helicopter reading at 600 ft. (p. 31, #147)
Break in NRC chain of command NRR interference with I&E Control of situation at site. (p. 37, #147)
Headquarters interference causing pressure to depressurize when not necessary (p. 13, #148).
NRR became controlling entity.
(p. 15, #148)
Miscommunications resulted in evacuation order.
(p. 38, #147)
Hydrogen bubble eliminated by controlled operation.
(p. 40, #147)
Hot Line control Inadequate.
No step off pads.
(p. 2, #148)
Contaminated individuals in Unit 1 control room.
(p. 3, #148)
O Counting Hot samples in Unit 1 control room (p. 3, #148)
Health Physics staff at TMI overwhelmed by situation.
Not prepared for On-site problems.
(p. 16, #148)
No constant air monitors in control rooms.
(p. 16, #148)
No backup counting facilities.
(p. 16, #148) 1915 133 Health Physics neglected by TMI in emergency planning and actions (p.17, #148)
Procedures not followed during accident response (p. 32, #148)
Difference in NRC vs. Met Ed philosophy.
NRC - HP practices applicable during emergency Met Ed - HP practices inapplicable during emergency (p. 32, #148)
HP program went to zero.
(p. 33, #148)
Lack-of-HP~ program resulte__d_in over exposure (p. 33, #148)'
TM1 does not have emergency HP~ program.(p. 33, #148) y e
gNNRC lost control of TMI HP program (p. 34',..#148).
)
\\
Instrumentatioh^raii~l, insufficient for effluent monitoring (p.19, #148) g Offsite data recorded in Log. (p. 22, #148)
Offsite dose predictions used overlays (p.17, #148) but used dome monitor roading rather than actual release data.
Lack of analysis as plume confused decisions.
i.e. Xe vs. I. (p. 23, #148)
. O Penn State prohibited any released included industrial waste treatment system.
(p. 27, #148)
Could not even use toilets.
O 1915 134 9
6/20/79 Gruup 3 Summary of Interview James C. Higgins, NRC Inspector Arrived in TMI at 10:00 a.m. 3/28/79; found confusion at the gate.
p.3 Picked up his badge - no dosimeters.
p.5 He realized that a serious occurrence has happened since normal procedures re health physics practice, security, etc. were not being followed.
p.6 Unit 2 control room.
Everybody was in masks-this created difficulty in communications.
He followed the system and plant operation, Don Neely (another NRC inspector) concentrated on the radiological aspects.
p.7 Had difficulty in communicating with NRC during the first day.
p.18 Had difficulty while conmunicating to Region I since these people were changing and were not briefed.
Also technical difficulties in communication.
p.22 There was a loss of power to instrumentation - the area radiation monitoring panels were out for about half an hour.
O.26 p
Only on Friday, 3/30, did the plant management (and himself) realize that there was a pressure spike.
p.31 Don Neely was involved in discussions re: deliberate overexposures of personnel in order to manually operate valves.
p.37 3/28 - 8:00 p.m.
Confusion in the observation center.
Frisking was done there. They were frisked for the first time. Some contamination found.
p.50 Off-site radiation doses.
70 mr/hr at the north gate,100 mr/hr at 3 pm the exterior service bldg.
3/28? There was a lot of confusion with these readings. Apparently shortly thereafter they were down to less than 1 mr/hr.
1915 135 9
Interview with Donald R. Tieeley, fiRC Sr. Inspector 9
Tape #98
- p. 1-2 Were notified at 8:15 of the site emergency - formed an emergency team, left for site about 8:30-8:40 am and arrived at TMI at 10:10 (5 people).
Took 10-15 minutes to get through the gate. Reported to Jim Seelinger -
Emergency Control Center in Unit 1.
- p. 3 tieely and J. Higgin went to Unit 2 control room - briefed by Dubiel.
riotes that there was a lot of confusion in the control room and they were on respiratory masks part of the time. Governor's office called to interview liRC inspectors.
- p. 4 Equipment tiRC people brought on-site - from emergency kits, survey meters, air samplers, decon-protective clothes. Air samples were AC operated -
could not use - no communication from the vehicle with Regior. I.
- p. 5 Does not remember being given a dosimeter by the guard at the gate,
- p. 6 Told to report to process center - no one there.
Went directly to Unit I control room - direct access - no security.
Key locks disarmed.
- p. 7-8 Knew no one in the control. room. About 20 people. Was not informed that a general radiation emergency had been declared.
Did see people whc were in contact with field survey teams. Were then 9
told to stand back from plotting board,
- p. 9-10 About twenty minutes elapsed before they were told of the conditions in Unit 2 - and only that they were experiencing off-site releases.
I get the impression that tieeley was put out by his being brushed aside.
- p. 10 As rep. of Region I - he was having difficulty finding out what was going on - was not aware that there was telephone contact between U. nits 1 and 2.
- p. 12 Instructed fiRC team to masure off-site radiation levels around the building. They were not allowed into the operating area of the Unit I control room, Given full-f ace respirators c nd escorted to Unit 2 control room - with
- p. 13 a
particulate cannisters,
- p. 14 Knew of airborne activity - but had not done any counting as yet.
Unit 2 control room only had ability to collect particulate samples - no iodine, no charcoal. Unit 2 control room very busy - door continuously being opened and left open.
1HS1%
. Op. 15 Mr. Logan in charge of control room Unit 2.
Met with Gary Miller as to status of the plant and Dick Dubiel as to conditions in aux. and fuel building and control room - B&W people there also.
- p. 16 Dome monitor at 60 R/hr.
- p. 17 Knew of radiation levels in excess of 1000 R/hr in aux. building tank area, excessive air concentrations and that people entering aux. building were using Scott Air Packs. Asked Dubiel to change vent monitor samples for aux. building and was told that a man would receive 700 mr/hr.
fio one in control of each entry to aux, building.
- p. 18 fio control point or guard stationed to restrict access to Unit 2 Aux.
building and no logging of people going to aux. building. Not aware of supply of high range pocket dosimeters or instruments for people going to aux building.
P. 19 Licensee not docurenting survey results. Radiation Protection Manager working with operations staff regarding valve lineups.
- p. 20 Dubiel spent a lot of time on the telephone and directing technicians directly.
Did not know of anyone sending anyone into high radiation areas.
4.21 Licensee directed to take advice (from who?) Gary Miller 7)
Next night (29th?) called in Dave Linroth and expressed their concerns-also advised Dubiel to do a half-life experiment on the material in the control room,
- p. 22-23 Believed it to be RG people take off masks. Control room air monitors were reading high on all channels (5-10 nr/hr). Door continuously propped open,
- p. 24 Could not say that control room recirc. was working properly.
- p. 25 Only a low volume particulate air sample - the control room,
- p. 26-27 Did not see any of the instruments assigned to technicians nor were they frisking people in the control room - whether or not they had protective clothing on.
Difficulty in communicating with others with masks on.
Masks only had particulate filters. Radio in control room told of off-site releases.
- p. 28 Told to leave plant to see foreman - felt it was political and did not want to go - did not go because of 500-600 cpm contamination on his trousers - did not go.
O 1915 137
. G.29-30Unit 1 control room state of conf usion - survey team "high levels of activity out there"
- p. 31 His ability to mcve around the plant hindered by his being tied.
f4RC mobile van arrived on-site and early morning they were told to take vegetation samples and do environmental surveys.
- p. 34 Next morning stay 2d on phone - f or most of day.
Plant wanted to release water from the industrial waste treatment tank.
Created a problem re tech spec limits.
Neeley by himself - could not verify licensee's statements.
- p. 35 Did not relay any messages re sampling.
- p. 36 Other NRC HP's on site doing environmental surveys.
In plant HP totally neglected and no time to tour plant and ascertain situation, procedures or licensee reports.
- p. 38 Only frisking in Unit I control room - because of NRC insistence. Some individuals protective clothing as high as 10 mrem /hr - wanted everyone to remove his clothing in aux. building not control room.
Was not aware of them taking reactor coolant sample on the 29th.
939 Process center unmanned.
North gate very busy - did not know if people were being sent to the 500 KV station for monitoring. No monitoring at North Gate.
- p. 40 People could leave the site without being monitored.
- p. 41 Spoke to Seelinger about personnel monitoring for those leaving site.
- p. 42 Called Lemroth on the 29th to express concerns about people coming ~into control room without being monitored, lack of RWP's, no control of high radiation areas, no documentation of surveys and people eating in con-trol room while others were in contamination clothes.
- p. 43 Only action taken, apparently, was to stop people from eating in control room 2.
- p. 44 On the night of the 30th entourage showed up - could now verify what the licensee was doing - felt this should have been done earlier,
" Radiation Protection Manager seemed more interested in what was happening in the control room."
1915 138
. G47 Felt licensee was unprepared.
Felt licensee's program inadequate and disorganized. People trought in from other places - strong technically, but insufficient manpower inside plant to control the program.
- p. 48 Not in compliance with 10 CFR 20,19 or tech specs.
Felt tiRC mission was to assist licensee to get his program together, identify problems and get the program'back into a state prior to the accident".
O 1915 139 9
Interview with Donald Geely Tape #142
- p. 4 Contacted Dui,iel, people a?1 over including artic.
- p. 5-7 Process monitors offscale at about 11 Water pumped from containment sump or aux building floor about 4" deep -
some places a foot deep,
- p. 7 Could not get sump pumps running.
- p. 8 Were in masks in the control room within first three hours, then.off until about 3 or 4 o' clock.
- p. 9 B&W people making recommendation as to operational corrections,
- p. 11 Kept that core was uncovere State of FA wanted to shut d
down ventilation system.
- p. 13 Belief in control room was that activity was degassing from the water,
- p. 14 Door to control room continually being opened. Once people were in respirators communication was bad.
- p. 15-16 Several people coming back from aix building to change let down flow exposure of personnel a consideration. He requested that they chanp out the vent samples and station vent - but was informed that it would G
entail a 500-700 mrem /hr exposure,
- p. 18 Could not understand why there was activity in Unit I and 2 control rooms.
- p. 19 His clothing apparently picked up activity and he could not be released to brief the state.
1915 140 0
SUMMARY
OF IE IllTERVIEW 143 AND 144 Interview of Messrs T. Potter and K. Woodward of Pickard, Lowe and Garrick on May E, 1979.
3/39/79 Potter not involved on second day. Woodward involved primary with generation of X/Q data for Met Ed. Made plots of plume.
3/30/79 Potter no significant involvement on third day.
Involved on-site from 3/31/79 on.
Woodward continued supphing met data and plume plots to Met Ed.
Involved in some estimates of hydrogbn concentration in containment.
Some discussion of emergency ilan re use of isopleths (p. 42).
Emergency procedure 1670.4 - Off-site Dose Calculations.
Potter indicated Met Ed appeared to be using the isopleths properly (p. 3/144).
ARAC calculations not made available to Woodward (p. 5/144).
No emergency power to met tower (p. 6).
Isopleths were not used to estimate dose but to direct survey teams for purposes of making reasurements.
Meander conditions existed during the major part of the first three days (p 8).
Prevalent meandering patterns existed at this site.
Discussion of 40R/hr prediction for Goldsboro (p 13).
Discussion of doses (p 18).
Discussion of use of helicopters as opposed to fixed station monitors (p.19).
Discussion of 1.2R/hr release on 3/30/79. Point measurement. Potential for use of integrating instruments.
The 1.2 rad /hr reading at 600 f t are 3 readings in one minute,150mr, 1.2R and 100 mr. (p 20).
Indicates puff release.
Discussion of use of dose rate data (p 22).
4j G
Sunmary_of I&E Interview 112 Interview of liay 3,1979, of E. Gordon Rider, Junior Radiation Chemistry Technician.
fir. Rider is high graduate and is assigned to present position approximately two years ago.
Received 6-8 weeks of training from Rad Services and 2 weeks of chemistry training.
Rest of training was on-the-job.
Reported to work 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> on 28 !4 arch was assigned to Team Bravo for off-site monitoring.
Took three air samples and many dose rate readings.
Reported 20 mr/hr at meat packing plant.
Soil samples counted on a Sam-II.
Called back to plant.
Entry to plant via north gate sent co observation center.
fio pocket dosimeters or TLDs.
Issued a temporary TLD.
Upon entry to process center no detectors were in operation..nor was guard on station.
Proceeded to ECS and assisted fir. Evans in obtaining water sample from Aux Bldg.
Had difficulty in locating gear for entry.
Had TLD and two dosimeters.
Entered bldg with a lir. Evans.
Rider had E520 survey meter, Evans a telector.
Approximate time of entry 0000 hrs, 29 f4 arch.
Rad level at control point 2r/hr, no access control.
Evans and Rider split up after entry.
Rider going downstairs (281 elevation) to collect water sample.
Survey meter (E520 pegged).
One-hundred milliliter sample in a 1 1. poly bottle read approx 40 mr/hr.
tio extremity monitors were wore.
Contaminated hair, showered.
Approximate exposure 700 mr.
9Onliarch30, 1979, assigned to monitor perimeter.
Egected release occured at 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> on 31 fiarch.
Highest perimeter level 40 mr/hr.
MIS 142 O