ML19256F177
| ML19256F177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/31/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256F178 | List: |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-09.2.2, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-9.2.2, PSRP-9.2.2.R1, SRP-09.02.02, SRP-9.02.02, NUDOCS 7911210578 | |
| Download: ML19256F177 (10) | |
Text
PSRP-9.2.2(Rev. 1)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Office of Nuclear' Reactor
- R'gulation e
PROPOSED REVISION 1 STANDARD REVIEW PLAN SECTION 9.2.2 REACTOR AUXILIARY CGvLING WATER SYSTEMS A?
REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES f4 h" ~ h l*
Primary - Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB)
Secondary - Reactor Systems Branch (RSB)
A'i m Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (ICSB) g _;.[A l
Mechanical Engineering Branch (MEA)
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Structural Engineering Branch (SEB) f.,
Materials Engineering Branch (MTEB)
[' 3 y Power Systcms Branch (PSB)
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AREA 0F REVIEW
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y The ASB reviews reactor auxiliary cooling water systems (CWS) that argrequired for safe shutdown during l
normal,operationaltransient,andaccidentconditionsandfor.,mitjgatIngtheconsequencesofanaccidentor y.
preventing the occurrence of an accident. These include cidsed._ Icop' auxiliary cooling water systems for l
A reactor <,ystem components, reactor shutdown equipment, Nentilation equipment, and components of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS).
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33p The review of these systems includes components _of the; system, valves and piping, and points of connection or
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interfaces with other systems. Emphasis is placed on the CWS for safety-related components such as ECCS equip-J sw r,ent, ventilation equipment, and reactor shutdown equipment. The ASB reviews reactor auxiliary cooling water vs
- p systems to ensure conformance with the requirements 3f General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 44, 45, and 46.
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1.
Tre ASB reviews the capability ofsthe ausiliary cooling,ystems to provide adequate cooling water to safety-related ECCS components anbhEt'or auxiliary equipment for all planned operating conditions.
The review includes the following points:
h The functional p oTTance requirements of the system including the ability to withstand adverse a.
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environmental occurrences,, operability requirements for normal operation, and requirements for operat'on during andisubsequent to postulated accidents.
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b.
Multip)p performance functions (if required) assigned to the system and the necessity of each func-p
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tiorvfor, emergency core cooling and safe shutdown, kN%
-Lines indicate sutdt)ntive changes from previous version.
This proposed revision to the Standard Review Plan and the supporting value/ impact statement have not received a complete staff review and approval and oc not represent an official NRC staff position. Public comments are being solicited on both the revision and the value/irpact statement (including any implementa-tion schedule) prior t, a review by the Regulatory Requirements Review Committee and their recommendation as to whether this rev.sfon should be approved. Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear f.egulatr y Commission Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. All comments rece ved by nFC 9 R 1979 will be considered by the Committee. A summary of the meeting of the Committee at which this revision is considered, the Committee recommendations, and all of the associated documents and comments considered by the Committee will be made publicly available prior to a decision by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, on whether to implement this revision.
Proposed Fevision 1 Draft 1 October 1979 7911210
l c.
The capability of the system surge tank to perform its intended function.
l d.
The capability of the system to provide adequate cooling water during all operating conditions, e.
The sizing of the system for core cooling and decay heat loads and the associated design margin.
2.
The ASB review verifies that sys'em components and piping have sufficient physical separation or shield-ing to protect essential portions of the system from missiles and pipe whip or from jet impingement that may result from piping ca.cks or breaks.
3.
Other system aspects that are reviewed include:
a.
The use of design and fabrication codes consistent with the assigned quality group classification and seismic category, b.
The effects of non-seismic Category I component failures on the seismic Category I portion of the system.
c.
The provisions for detection, collection, and control of system leakage and the means provided to detect leakage of activity from one system to another and preclude its release to the environment.
l d.
The requirements for operational testing and inservice inspection of the syster.
The capability of the system to provide adequate cooling to the seals and bearings of all reactor e.
coolant pumps.
f.
Instrumentation and control features necessary to accomplish design functions, including isolation of components to deal with leakage or me.,' functions and actuation requirements for redundant equipment.
4.
The applicant's proposed technical specifications will be reviewed for operating license applications as they relate to areas covered in this Standard Review Plan (SRP) section.
Secondary reviens are performed by other branches and the ASB uses the results of these reviews to complete the overall review of the systems. The NSB will ideqtify engineered safety f Iture components associated with the reactor coolant system and the emergency core cooling systems that are require 1 for operation during normal operations, transients, and accident conditions. RSB will establish cooling load functional require-ments and minimum time intervals associated with safety related components. The SEB will determine the acceptability of the design analyses, r ocedures, and $riteria used to establish the ability of Category I structures that house the system and supporting systems to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), the probable maximum flood (PMF), and tornado missiles. The MEB will review the design, including the seismic qualification of components, and confirm that the system satisfies the acceptance criteria of SRP Sections 3.9 and 3.10.
The MTEB will verify that inservice inspection require-ments are met for system components and, upon request, will verify the compatibility of the materials of con-struction with service conditions. The ICSB and PSB will determine the adequacy of the design, installation, inspection, and testing of all essential electrical components, system controls, and instrumentation required for proper operation.
9.2.2-2 1.$/8 Jl9
II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Acceptability of the designs of cooling water systems as described in the applicant's Safety Analysis Report (SAR), i..cludlag related sections of Chaptars 2 and 3 of the SAR, is based on specific generd design criteria and regulatory guides, and on independent calculations and staff judgments with respect to system functions and component selection. The design of a CWS is acceptable if the integrated system design is it, accordance with the following requirements and recommendations:
1.
General Design Criterion 2, as related to structures housing the system and the system itself being cap-able of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and fioods.
2.
General Design Criterion 4, with respect to structures housing the system and the aystem itself being capable of withstanding the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
3.
General Design Criterion 5, as related to shared systems and components important to safety being capable of performing r9 uired safety functions.
4.
General Design Criterion 44, to include:
a The capability to transfer heat loads from safety-related structures, systems, and components to a heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions.
b.
Component redundancy so that safety functions can be performed assuming a single active component failure coincident with the loss of offsite power.
c.
The capability to isolate components, systems, or piping, if required, so that the system safety function will not be compromised.
5.
General Design Criterion <5, as related to the design provisions to permit inservice inspection of safety-related components and equipment.
6.
General Design Criterion 46, as related to the design provisions to permit operational functional testing of safety-related systems or components to e*sure:
a.
Structural integrity and system leak tightness.
b.
Operability and adequate performance of active system components.
c.
Capability of the integrated system to perform required functions during normal, shutdown, and acci-dent situations.
7.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, as related to the quality group classification of systems and components.
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, as related to the seismic design classification of system components.
9.
Regulatory Guide 1.102, as related to the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of flooding.
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10.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, as related to the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of tornadu missiles.
11.
drsnch Technical Position ASB 3-1, as related to high-energy breats and moderate-energy cracks in piping systems outside containment.
12.
A single failure in the CWS does not result in fuel damag? nr reactor coolant leakage in excess of normal coolant-makeup capability. Single failure includes but is not limited to operator error, spurious activation of a valve operator, and loss of a cooling water pump.
A moderate-energy leakage crack or an accident that is initiated freas a f ailure in the CWS piping does not result in excessive fuel damage or reactor coolant leakage in excess of normal coolant-makeup capability. A single active failure is considered when evaluating the consequences of this accident.
Moderate leakage cracks are determined in accordance with the guidelines of Uranch Technical Position ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Failures in a Final System Outside Containment."
It has been demonstrated by testing that the reactor coolant pumps will withstand a complete loss of cooling water for 20 minutes, and instrumentation in accordance with IEEE 279 that afirms in the control room is provided to detect a loss of cooling water to ensure a period of 20 minutes is available so that the operator would have sufficient time to initiate manual protection of the plant. Alternatively, if it is not demonstrated by the necessa*y pump testing that the reactor coolant pumps will operate for 20 minutes without operator ccrrective action:
a.
Instrumentation in accordance with IEEE 279 is provided consistent with the criteria for the protec-tion system to initiate automatic protection of toe plant upon loss of cooling water to a pump.
For this case, the component cooling water supply to the seal and bearing of the pump may be designed to non-seismic Category I requirements and Quality Group D, or b.
The component cooling water supply to each pump is designed to be capable of withstanding a single active failure and a moderate-energy line crack as defined in Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1 and to seismic Category I, Quality Group C, and ASME Section III, Class 3 requiremen's.
For those areas of review identified in Subsection I of this 5RP section as being the r?soonsibility of other branches, the acceptance cliteria given in Subsection II and their methods of application are contained in the SRP sections corresponding to those branches.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The procedures set forth below are used during the construction permit (CP) application review to determine that the design criteria and bases and the preliminary design as set forth in the preliminary safety analysis report meet the acceptance criteria given in Subsection II.
For the review of operating license (OL) applica-tions, the review procedures and acceptance criteria givan in Subsection II will be used to verify that the initial design criteria and bases have been appropriately implemented in the final design as set forth in the final safety analysis report.
The procedures for OL reviews include a determination that the content of the technical specifications pre-pared by the applicant are in agreement with the requirements for system testing, minimum performance, and surveillance developed as a result of the staff's review.
9.2.2-4
One of the main objectives in the review of a CWS is to determine its function with regard to safety. Some cooling systems are designed as safety-related systems in their entirety, others have only portions of the system that are safety-related, and others are classified as non-safety-related because they do not perform any safety funct'on. To determine the safety category of a CWS, the ASB will evaluate its necessity for achieving safe reactor shutdown conditions or for accident prevention or accident mitigation functions. The safety functions to De performed by these systems in all designs are essentially the same, however, the method used varies from plant to plant depending upon the individual designer.
Upon request from the primary reviewer, the secondary review branches will provide input for the areas of review stated in Subsection I.
The primary reviewer obtains and uses such input as required to ensure that this review procedure is complete.
In viaw of the various designs provided, the procedures set forth below are for a typical CWS designed entirely as a safety-related system. Any variance of the review procedures to take account of a proposed unique design will be,,uch as to ensure that the system meets the criteria of Subsection II.
The reviewer will select and emphasize material from this review plan, as may be appropriate for a particular case.
1.
The information provided in the SAR perta ning to the design bases and design criteria, and the system description section are reviewed to verify that the equipment used and the minimum system heat transfer and flow requirements for normal plant operations are identified. A review of the system piping and instrumentation diagrams (PI&Ds) will show which components of the system are used to:
a.
Remove heat from the reactor primary coolant system necessary to achieve a safe reactor shutdown.
b.
Provide essential cooling fcr containment components or systems such as the sprays, ventilatio7 coolers, or sump equipment.
c.
Provide cooling for decay heat removal equipment.
d.
Provide cooling for emergency core cooling pump bearings or other emergency core cooling equipment racessary to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident.
2.
The system performance requirements section is reviewed to determine that it describes allowable com-ponent operational degradation (e.g., pump leakage) and describes the procedures that will be followed to detect and correct these conditions when degradation becomes excessive.
3.
The reviewer, using the results of failure-modes and effects analyses, determines that the system is capable of sustaining the loss of any active component and, on the basis of previously approved systems or independent calculations, that the minimum system requirements (cooling load and flow) are met for these failtre conditions. The system D& ids, layout drawings, and comp.;nent descriptions and character-istics are then reviewed for the following points:
a.
Essential portions of the CWS are correctly identified and are isolable from the nonessential por-tions of the system. The P& ids are reviewed to serify that they clearly indicate the physical division between each portion and indicate required classification changes. System drawings are reviewed to see that they show the means for accomplishing isolation and the SAR description is reviewed to identify minimum performance of the isolation valves. The drawings and description are reviewed to verify that automatically operated isolation valves separate nonessential portions and components from the essential portions.
9.2.2-5 15/8 m
b.
Essential erthrs of the CWS, including the isolation valves separating seismic Category I por-tions from the non-seismic portions, are Quality Group C and seismic Category I.
System design bases a-d criteria, and the component classification tables are reviewed to verify that the heat exchangers, pumps, valves, and piping of essential portions of the system will be designed to seismic Category I requirements in accordance with the applicable criteria, c.
The system is designed to provide water-makeup as necessary. Cooling water systems that are closed loop systems are reviewed to ensure that the, surge tanks have sufficient capacity to accommodate expected leakage from the system for seven days.
lhe surge tank and connecting piping are reviewed to ensure that makeup water can be supplied to either header in a split headar system. Redundant surge tanks (one to each header) or a divided surge tank design are acceptab e to ensure that in the event o' a header rupture, the loss of the entire contents of the surge tank will not occur.
d.
The equipment is placed in a way that provides adequate cooling water during all conditions, including conditions of extreme low water levels.
The system is designed for removal of heat loads during normal operation and of emergency core e.
cooling heat loads during accident conditions, with appropriate design margins to ensure adequate operation. A comparative analysis is made of the system flow rates, heat levels, maximum tempera-ture, and heat removal capabilities with similar designs previously found acceptable. To verify performance characteristics of the system, an independent analysis may be made.
f.
Design provisions are made that permit appropriate inservice inspection and functional testing of l
system components important to safety. The applicant should ensure that the SAR information delineates e testing and inspection program and the system drawings show the necessary test recirculation loops around pumps or isolation valves necessary for this program.
g.
Essential portions of the system are protected from the effects of high-energy and moderate-energy line breaks. The system description and layout drawings will be reviewed to ensure that no high-or maderate-energy piping systems are close to essential portions of the CWS or that protection from the effects of failure will be provided. The means of providing such protection will be given in Section 3.6 of the SAR, and the procedures for reviewing this information are given in the corresponding SRP sections.
h.
Essential components and subsystems (i.e., those necessary for safe shutdown) can function as l
required in the event of a loss of offsite power and instrument air systems. The system design will be acceptable in this regard if the essential portions of the CWS meet minimum system requirements as stated in the SAR assuming a concurrent failure of a single active component, including a single failure of any auxiliary electric power source. The SAR is reviewed to deter-mine that for each CWS component or subsystem affected by the loss of offsite power or instrument air systeris, system flow and heat transfer capability exceed minimum requirements. The results of failure-modes and -effects analyses are consider-d in ensuring that the system meets these require-ments. This will be an acceptable verification of system functional reliability.
4.
The system design information and drawings are analyzed to ensure that the following features will be incorporated.
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A leakage detection system is provided to detect component or system leakage. An adequate means a.
for implementing this criterion is to provide sumps or drains with adequate capacity and appro-pricte alarms in the immediate area of the system.
b.
Components and headers of the system are designed to provide individual isolation capabilities to ensure system functfon, control system leakage, and allow system maintenance.
Design provisions are made to ensure the capability to detect leakage of radioactivity or chemical c.
contamination from one system to another. Radioactivity monitors and conductivity monitors should l be located in the system component discharge lines to detect leakage. An alternative means is to prevent leakage from occurring by operating the system et higher pressure to ensure that leakage is in the preferred direction.
d.
The system is designed to provide cooling to the reactor coolant pump seals and bearings during normal plant operating conditions, anticipated transients, and following postulated accidents.
Instrumentation in accordance with IEEE 279 with alarms in the control room should be provided to detect a loss of cooling water in order to ensure that a period of 20 minutes is available to the operator to initiate manual protection of the plant, if necessary. It has been demonstrated by testing that the reactor coolant pumps could potentially operate with loss of cooling water for 20 minutes without the need for operator action.
As an alternative to pump testing, the reviewer verifies that:
(1) Instrumentation in accorriance with IEEE 279 is provided consistent with the criteria for the protection system to initiate automatic protection of the plant upon loss of water to a pump.
For tnis case, the component cooling water supply to the seal and bearing of the pump may be designed to non-seismic Category I requirements and Quality Group D, or (2) The component cooling water supply to each pump is designed to be capable of withstanding a single active failure or a moderate-energy line crack as defined in Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1 and to seismic Category I, quality Group C, and ASME Section III, Class 3 requirements.
5.
The reviewer verifies that the system has been designed so that system functions will be maintained, as required, in the event of adverse environmental phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods. The reviewer evaluates the system using engineering judgment and the re i ts of failure-modes and -effects a7alyses to determine the following:
a.
The failure of portions of the system or of other systems not designed to seismic Category I standards and located close to essential portions of the system, or of non seismic Catgory I structures that house, support, or are close to esse'tial portions of the CWS, will not preclude essential functions. The review will identify these non-seismic category components or piping and ensure that appropriate criteria are incorporated te provide isolation capabilities en the event of failure. Reference to SAR Chapter 2, describing site features, and the general arrangement and layout drawings will be necessary as well as the SAR tabulation of seismic design classifications for structures and systems.
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b.
The essential portions of the CWS are protected from the effects of floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and internally or externally generated missiles. Flood protection and missile protection criteria are discussed and evaluated in detail under the SRP sections for Chapter 3 of the SAR. The reviewer will use the procedures identified in these review plans to ensure that the analyses presented are valid. A statement to the effect that the system is located in a seismic Category I structure that is tornado missile and flood protected or that components of tha system will be located in indi-vidual cubicles or rooms that will withstand the effects of both flooding and missiles is acceptable.
The location and design of the system, structures, and pump rooms (cubicles) are reviewed to deter-mine that the degree of protection prosided is adequate.
6.
The descriptive information, P& ids, CWS drawings, and failure-modes and effects analyses in the SAR are reviewed to ensure that essential portions of the system will function following design basis accidents assuming a coricurrent single, active component f ailure. The reviewer evaluates the information presented in the SAR to determine the ability of required components to function, traces the availability of these components on system drawings, and checks that the SAR information contains verification that minimum system flow and heat transfer requirements are met for each accident situation for the required time spans. For each case, the design will be acceptable if minimum system requirements are met.
IV.
EVALUATION FINDINGS The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided and his review supports conclusions of the following type to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report:
"The reactor auxiliary cooling water systems include pumps, heat exchangers, valves and piping, expan-sion tanks, makeup piping, and the points of connection or interfaces with other systems. Based on the review of the applicant's proposed design criteria, design bases, and safety classification for the reactor auxiliary cooling water systems with regard to t:1e requirements for providing adequate cooling water for the safety-related ECCS components and reactor auxiliary equipment for all conditions of plant operation, the staff concludes that the design of the reactor auxiliary cooling water systems 15 in con-formance with the Commission's regulations as set forth in General Design Criterion 2, ' Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena,' General Design Criteria 4, ' Environmental and Missile Design Bases,' General Design Criterion 5, ' Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components,' General Design Criterion 44, ' Cooling Water,' General Design Criterion 45, ' Inspection of Cooling Water System,'
General Design Criterion 46, ' Testing of Cocling Water Systems,' and meets the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.26, ' Quality Group Classification and Standards for Water, Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants,' Regulatory Guide 1.29, 'Seiemic Design Classification,'
Regulatory Guide 1.102, ' Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants,' Regulatory Guide 1.117, ' Tornado Design Classification,' and Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1, ' Protection Against a stulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment,' and therefore is acceptable."
V.
REFERENCES 1.
General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
2.
General Design Criterion 4 "Enifronmental and Missile Design Bases," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
3.
General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
9.2.2-8
4.
General Design C.iterion 44, " Cooling Water, of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
5.
General Design Criterion 45, " Inspection of Cooling Water System," of Appendh A to 10 CFR Part 50.
6.
General Design Criterion 46, " Testing of Cooling Water System," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
7.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water, Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants."
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."
9.
Regulatory Guide 1.102, " Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants."
10.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification."
11.
Branch Technical Position APCSB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failure in Fluid Systems Gutside Containment," attached to SRP Section 3.6.1.
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