ML19253C171
| ML19253C171 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1979 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Hancock J FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| IEB-79-26, NUDOCS 7911300089 | |
| Download: ML19253C171 (2) | |
Text
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'o UNITED STATES I" 1)()f,,n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
.E REGION 11 i'
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101 MARIETTA ST N.W., SUITE 3100 4
ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303 NOV 2 01979 In Reply Refer To:
RII EQ 0-302)
Florida Power Corporation Attn:
J. A.11ancock, Director Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 14042, tbil Stop C-4 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 79-26 is forwarded to you for information. No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Ng[
James P. O'Reilly Director
Enclosures:
1.
List of IE Bulletins Issued In The Last Six Months 1443 275 07'9 Q 70113 00
NOV 2 01979 Florida Power Corporation t cc w/ enc 1:
G. P. Beatty, Jr.
Nuclear Plant Superintendent Post Office Box 1240 Crystal River, Florida 32629 b
3443 ??6
t UNITED STATES SSINS:
6820 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Accession No.:
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 7910250475 WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 November 20, 1979 IE Bulletin No. 79-26 BORON LOSS FROM BWR CONTROL BLADES Description of Circumstances:
The General Electric Company (GE) has informed us of a failure mode for control blades which can cause a loss of boron poison material. Hot cell examinations of both foreign and domestic blades have revealed cracks near the upper cnd of stainless steel tubing and loss of boron from the tubes.
The cracks and boron loss have so far been confined to locations in the poison tubes with more than 50 percent Boron-10 (B10) local depletion. Observed crack sizes range from a quarter to a half inch in Ir.ngth and from one to two mils in width.
GE has postulated that the cracking is due to stress corrosion induced by solidification of boron carbide (B C) particles and swelling of the compacted 4
B C as helium and lithium concentrations grow. Once primary coolant penetrates 4
the cladding (i.e., the cracking has progressed through the cladding v111 and the helium-lithium pressures are sufficient to open the crack), boron is leached out of the tube at locations with more than 50 percent B10 local depletion (local depletion is considered to be twice the average depletion).
It was further found with similar cracking but with less than 50 percent local depletion of B10, that leaching did not occur even though primary coolant had penetrated the cladding.
The cracking and boron loss shorten the design life of the control blade.
According to the GE criteria the end of design life is reached when the reactivity worth of the blade is reduced by 10 percent, which corresponds to 42 percent B10 depletion averaged over the top quarter of the control blade.
Because r I the leaching mechanism, GE has reduced the allowance for B10 depletion avenged over the top quart'r of the control blade from the 42 percent value to 34 percent.
The safety significance of boron loss is its impact on shutdown capability and scram reactivity. Although shutdown capability is demonstrated by shutdown margin tests after refueling, the calculated control blade worths used in the tests are based on the assumption that no boron loss has occurred. Reduction in scram reactivity due to boron loss could increase the severity of Critical Power Ratio (CPR) reductions during the plant transients and could increase the consequences of control rod drop accid Because the locations of limiting Line Average Planar LHGR (APLHGR) are not i DUPLICATEDOCUMENT]
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7 ~/ 7 monitoring is not affected by boron lo Entire document previously entered into system under:
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