ML19249F158
| ML19249F158 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1973 |
| From: | Barker R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19249F153 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910100554 | |
| Download: ML19249F158 (3) | |
Text
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October 26, 1973 Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-289 Supplemental Testimony on Industrial Security Program by Robert F. Barker Contention 3. The facility must be so protected as to conform with the safety cuides of the Atomic Enerev Commission to avoid sabotare at the facility itself and for all transportation of fuel and waste products to and from the facility. It is contended that the aoulicant has not orovided for sufficient watchmen and electronic surveillance. particularly with reference to trans-portation of the fuel and waste materials to and f rom the f acility. 4 (Emphasis added)
My testimony will be limited to the underlined portions of the contention above, the remainder to be provided by C. Richard Van Niel.
The AEC has no regulations or safety guides to which the Three Mile Island facility must conform to avoid sabotage in the transportation of fuel and waste products to and from the f acility.
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The fresh or unirradiated fuel is enriched to only 4%
U-235--which is below the 20% enrichment value which activates the special " safeguards" provisions.1/ Irradiated fuel is exempted from " safeguards" because of the relatively high associated radiation levels. The waste products from the power reactor contain no special nuclear material and, therefore, are not subject to " safeguard" requirements. There are criminal laws which protect agains t acts of theft and sabotage by making such acts both illegal and punishable in the courts.
Theft, diversion and sabotage of fuel or waste are not addressed in the Final Environmental Statement (FES). Neither the fuel nor the waste are useful for nuclear weapons and the negative value of the waste, the weight of the shipping containers for the fuel, and the relatively high radiation levels associated with the irradiated fuel make theft or diversion unattractive and highly unlikely. Therefore, special precautions such as additional guards or electronic survei,ance are not necessary. Both the nature and form of the materials and the designs of containers in which the fuel and waste are shipped militate against accidental releases of racioactive material due to acts of violence or sabotage.
The consequences of releases would not be significantly different from releases f rom transportation accidents which have been 1
10 CFR Part 73 1411 183
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evaluated in the FES. The regulations of both AEC and DOT require that theft or loss of radioactive materials be reported to the respective Agency and there has been no case in which there has been thef t or loss of nuclear fuel or vastes of the type used in Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1.
For these reasons, I believe the probability of successful theft, diversion or sabotage of fuel or wastes to be so small as to not require discussion in the FES.
Consideration has been givea the effects of rifle fire and explosives associated with acts of sabotage on the structural integrity of irradiatad fuel casks. The matter was discussed with the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board, the Army's demolition experts, and representatives of AEC contractors who have had broad experience in the effects of explosives and I believe it is highly unlikely that either rifle fire or ex-plosives would cause releases.
Other deliberate illegal acts, including thef t or planned sabotage involving intentional opening of containers, would require an appreciable amount of time, elaborate planning, and shielding and handling facilities and equipeent which =111tates against clandestine accomplishment. 1411 184