ML19249F174
| ML19249F174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1973 |
| From: | Hulman L US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19249F153 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910100581 | |
| Download: ML19249F174 (3) | |
Text
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10/26/73 THREE MILE ISLAUD NUCLEAR STATION - DOCKET NO. 50-289 Supplement *_ Testimony on Flooding
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By Lewis G. Hulman Contention 8 It is contended that the dikes for the facility have not been constructed for the probable maximum flood.
It is contended that there is not adequate protection in the event of flooding for the facility.
The Regulatory staff has reviewed the flood protection for the plant and has concluded that the dikes for the facility have not
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been designed for the probable maximum flood. The dikes have, however, been designed to exclude flood flows of up to about 1,100,003 cubic feet per second (cfs) from the plant area.
For reference, the maximum river flow produced by tropical storm Agnes in 1972 was about 900,000 cfs; the previcus flood of record (1936) since 1891 was 740,000 cfs; and the estimated probable maximum flood at the site is 1,645,000 cfs.
The dikes are designed such that water flows greater than 1,100,000 cis will back into the plant area from the dcwnstream end of the levee system. The applicant has developed E=ergency Procedure
- 1202-32, Revision 0, Flood Control to implement cncillary flood 7910100
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2-i protection measures prior to such an event. This procedure provices for the initiation of flood protection action when forecasts of flood flows 350,000 cfs or greater are issued by the Federal-State River Forecast Center, and includes procedures for protecting the plant based upon river levels at the intake structure regardless of whether river forecasts are available.
Forecasted flows of 640,000 cfs would result in calling up personnel to move flood panels to placement locations and preparing o*.her flood protection material. At a forecasted flow of 940,000 cfs, all available personnel would be called out to place stop logs and erect other flood protection facilities.
If the river stage reaches elevation 302 feet (corresponding to a flow of 1,000,000 cfs), a shutdown order is to be given.
The levee concept and use of emergency procedures are considered sufficient under Position 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.59.
In general, the position provides for the flood protection of all safety-related structures, systems, and components necessary to maintain safe shutdown from the worst flood reasonably possible at the site, provided sufficient warning time is shown to be available to shut the plant down* and implement adequate emergency procedures. The staff has reviewed the emergency procedures and finds that in the limiting case (the PMF) a minimum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is available from
- Project Manager, R. Bernero, provided advice on shutdown time requirements.
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commencement of shutdown
- to flooding of the site.
In addition, we have required expansion of the procedures outlined to provide additional assurances of safety. Examples of the requirements include levee patrols, removal of trash accumulations from the access bridge, and the addition of plastic sheeting and sand bags to stop logged accesses to minimize leakage.
The combined levee system and emergency flood procedures have been reviewed by the staff and in our opinion provide adequate assutsnees that the plant will be safely protected in the event of severe floods up to and including the probable maximun flood.
- Project Manager, R. Bernero, provided advice on shutdown time requirements.
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