ML19248D412
| ML19248D412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19248D409 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908150753 | |
| Download: ML19248D412 (8) | |
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Docket No. 50-346 Metropolitan Edison Company, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 ORDER AND NOTICE OF HEARING The Metropolitan Edison Company (the licensee) is holder of Facility Operating I.
License No. DRR-50 which authorizes the operation of 'the nuclear power reacto-Khown as Three Mile Island. Nuclear Station, Unit No.1 (the facility or TMI-1),
at steady state power levels not in excess of 2535 megawatts thernai (ra' tid power). The facility is a Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) designed pressurized -ater reactor (PWR) located at the licensee's site ten miles southeast of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
On July 2,1979, the Commission ordered that the facility.emain in a cold II.
shutdown condition until further order of the Comnission and stated that a hearing will be conducted prior to any restar; of the facility.
The Cormission herein the basis for its con'cerns and the procedures tc govern
' specifies further proceedings in this matter.
For the reasons later set forth, che Com-mission has determined that satisfactory completion of certain actions and resolut,
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of.various concerns described herein are required to provide reasonat ' assurance that the facility can be operated without endangering the health and safety of The Commission has determined that certain additional long-term the public.
actions are, for the reasons given below, required to be completed as promptly as practicable in order to provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated safely over the long term. This Order and notice of earing.urther establishes procedures for a hearing and decision on the particular issue:
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n identified in Section IV of this Order. The Comission has determined that hearing and decision (with review thereof) on the issues relating to the actions required prior to restart of the facility must be completed prior to any Com-tr.is? ion Order lif ting the suspension of operation.
Accordingly, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board designated to conduct this proceeding should give priority to consideration of those issues which are related directly to suspension of operation.
To the extent feasible, the Board should defer on the issues related to the longer-term actions until after the
, er.dering of a partial initial decision regarding the suspension-related issues.
The Commission's July 2,'1973 Order recited that "the Commission presently lacks the requisite reasonable assurance that the... Licensee's Three Mile Island Unit No.1 Facility... can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public." The bases for that conclusion (which remains valid) are:
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In the course of its evaluation to date of the accident a. the three 5
Mile Island Unit No. 2 facility, which tr.ill:es a B&W designed M., the
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Nuclear reg'alatery Co.rt.ission staff has ar>certai.ved tr.at B&W designM reactors appear to be unusually sensitive to ca.tain eff-nom.sl transient t
. conditions cricimting in the M endcry syste c..
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Edi de.aic n th:t centribra to this ceasitivity ; re:
t '. ) 6: sign of ;'.2 p23= g c.erators to ep2:ztc with relst.vely m21 lic.id voit.tr in t'n g
see:r,ds.y sider (2) tne lack of d!rcet initiation at accror trip upa
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the cer.:rrence of off-ncrmal corditicr.s in ::.2 'e M.'..e r sys t = : C) re-.
I liance on an integrated control systern (ICS) to sate. atically rey late L
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. feedvater flow; (4) actstion before reactor trip of a pilotNparated relief VC.lVC Cn t.h? pr}rlary 373ter prerdurl:E r (d*. i c '., i f U 2 Va lv,,
OticP.s opan, can t gyravate, the event); ard (5) a low steso generator elcVation (relative to the reactor vessel) which provide.s a caller drivirg head for natural circulation.
Because of these features, B&W designed reactors place z=cre ruliance on the reliability ard performance characteristi:S of the atr.4111er/ fced-veter sys-tem, the integrated control syntet.., 3rd :.he cargercf core cool--
ing s) ste:?. (m) porfor=.ince to recover fre.. f reqten: Enticip0tcd transients, such a., loss of offsite power ard less of cornal feedater, than do other PnB designs.
This, in turn, places a large burdan co the plant operators in the event of off-norral syste bc~..wior during such anticipated transients.
As a result of a preliminary review of the Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 accident chrcnology, the NRC staff initially identified several human errors that occurred during the accident and contributed significantly to its severity. All holders of operating licenses, except Metropolitan Edison, whose plants were already shutdown, were subsequently instructed to take a number of immediate actions to avoid repetition of errors, in accordance with bulletins issued by the Commissics Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE).
In addition, the NRC staff be, an immediate reevaluation of the design features of B&W reactors to detennine whether additional safety corrections or improvements were necessary with respect to these reactors. This evaluation involved numerous meetings with B&W and certain of the affected licensees.
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he~ evaluation identified design features as discussed cbove which indi-cated that BrM designed reactors are unusu=11y sensitive to certain off-nor:cl transient conditions origircting in the sex >nd.iry system. As s result, an additional bulletin was issued by IE which instru:ted holdera r
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of op3 rating licenS25 for B&W designed ret ctors to td.2 further c. tiens, incittling iLocdicto cha.ngas to decrease the reactor higt2 pressure trip point and increase the pressuri:er pilot-operated rulita valve setting.
Also, as a result of this evaluation, the !GC staff icbatificd cort. in
- - - other safety concerns tMt warrented additional short-term design
- and pecedural changes at operating facilitics h:.ving IMW designed mactors.
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Toese were identified as iter.s (a) through (e) on page 1-7 of the office
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of N:/.:: lear Reactor Regulation Status Report to the Ccc:.nission of April 25 1979.
In addition to the items identified for the other B&W reactors, the unique circumstances at TMI require that additional safety concerns identified by the NRC staff be resolved. These concerns result from (1) potential inter-action between Unit 1 and the damaged Unit 2, (2) the impact of the Unit 2 accident on the management and technical resources of Metrcpolitan Edison, (3) the operations necessary to decontaminate the Unit 2 facility, and (4) recognized deficiencies in emergency plans and station operating procedures.
Assurance must be provided that these items,1-4, which could have an impact on the,afety of operating Unit 1 in addition to the technical features already identified for the other B&W plants, be resolved prior to restart.
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Based on the above, the Commission's Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-(NRR) has recommended tnat the following actions (the "short-tem actions")
be required of.the licensee to resolve the concerns stated herein and pemit a finding of reasonable assurance that the facility can safely resume operation.
1.
The licensee shall take the following actions with respect to TMI-1:
(a) Upgrade the timeliness and reliability of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system by perfoming the items specified in Enclosure 1 of the licensees June 28, 1979 letter. Changes in design will be submitted to the NRC staff for review.
(b)
Develop and irrplement operating procedures for initiating and controlling EFW independent of Integrated Control System (ICS) control.
(c)
Install a hard-wired control grade reactor trip on loss of main feedwater and/or on turbine trip.
(d)
Complete analyses for potential small breaks and develop and implement operating instructions to define operator action.
(e)
Augment the retraining of all Reactor Operators ano Senior Reactor dperators assigned to the control room including training in the areas of natural circulation and small break loss of coolant accidents includ-ing revised procedures and the TMI-2 accident. All aperators will also rec.eive training at the B&W simulator on the TMI-2 accident and the licensee will conduct a 100 percent reexamination of all operators in NRC will administer complete examinations to all licensed these areas.
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6-2.
The licensee shall provide for NRC review and approval all applicable actions specified in IE Bulletins79-05A and 79-05B.
3.
The licensee shall improve his emergency preparedness in accordance with the following:
(a) Upgrade emergency plans to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.101 with special attention to action level criteria based on plant parmaters.
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(b) Establish an Emergency Operations Center for Federal, State and Local Officials and designate a location and an alternate location and provide communications to plant.
(c) Upgrade offsite monitoring capability, including additional thermo-luminescent dosimeters or equivalent.
(d) Assess the relationship of State / Local plans to the licensce plans so as to assure the capability to take emergency actions.
(e)
Conduct test exercise.
4.
The licensee shall take actions required to demonstrate that planned decon-tamination and/or restoration operations at TMI-2 will not hoact safe operations at TMI-1. The licensee shall provide separation and/or isolation of TMI 1/2 radioactive liquid transfer lines, fuel handling areas, ventila-tion systems, and sampling lines. Effluent monitoring instruments shall have the capability of discriminating between effluents resulting from Unit 1 or Unit 2 operations.
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~ _. The licensee shall demonstrate that the waste management capability, includ-5.
ing storagt 1d processing, for solid, liquid, and gaseous wastes is adequate to assure safe operation of THI-1, and that THI-1 waste handling capability is not relied on by operations at TMI-2.
C.
The licensee sha'l demonstrate his managerial capability and resources to operate Unit I whila maintaining Unit 2 in a safe configuration and carrying out planned decontamination and/or restoration activities.
Issues to be addressed include the adequacy of groups providing safety review and operational advice, the management and technical capability and training of operations staff, the adequacy of the operational Quality Assurance program and the facility procedures, and the capability of.important support organiza Monc such as nealth Physics and Plant Maintenance.
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7.
The licensee shall demonstrate his financial capability to operate TMI-l at the TMI 1/2 complex.
8.
The licensee shall comply with the Category A recomendations as specified in Table B-1 of NUREG-0578.
The Commission has additional concerns, which, though they need not be resolved prior to resumption of operation at Three Mile Island Unit 1, must be satisfactorily addressed in a timely manner. The Cor"nission's Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) has recommended that the following actions (the "long-tenn actions")
be required of the licensee to resclve these concerns and permit a finding of reasonable assurance of the safety of long-term operation. These are:
1.
subn t a failure mode and effects an ~'vsis of the ICS to the NRC staff as soon 'js practicable; 2.
give continued attention to transient analysis and procedures for management of small breaks by a formal program set up to assure timely action of these f
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matters; 3.
comply with the Category B recommendations as specified in Table 8-1 of NUREG-0578; and, 4.
improve emergency preparedr. css in accordance with the following:
(a) modify emergency plans to address changing capabilities of plant instrumentation, (b) extend the capability tc take appropriate emergency actions for the population around the site to a distance of ten miles.
In addition, the licensee shall also provice, out not prior to restart, timely response and implementation of longer term recommendations which may result from the Lessons Learned Task Force as well as recommendations that may arise from the Presidential Commission, the NRC's ongoing investigations, and other studies unless such recom-mendations are determined by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to be required prior to restart.
III. Accordingly, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, a..d the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 C.F.R., it is hereby ordered that:
the licensee shall maintain TMI-l in a cold shutdown condition until satisfactory resolu-tion of the concerns, identified above, which led the Commission to suspend the licensee's authority to operate.
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