ML19247B574

Forwards Addl Info Requested in Re IE Bulletin 79-08.Operability of Redundant safety-related Components & Sys Presently Verified by Surveillance Testing

ML19247B574
Person / Time
Site:	Humboldt Bay
Issue date:	08/06/1979
From:	Crane P PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7908100175
Download: ML19247B574 (12)

Text

.

PAC I F'I C G-A S AND E LE C T RI C C O M PANY

__W-1 77 BE ALE STR EET, 31S T FLOO R. SAN F R AN CISC O, C ALI FO R NI A 94106 (415) 781 4211

1. E JOsN C. Mo R RI S SE Y g7,ell,g,, all se

• *-*;;,f,;c a.p.

August 6, 1979

.,y,,,.,.,..;;.,

,; ;-f,7,,,,,

. c..es,oc e..o 2c.,c..t eo v 3et

.t.?

• :::*:

u aeeo L u n. pu a e u s s

.....m.....

,ty

i't tt:f*,,*,,,,,,g.,

1* L;!*.t..

.. oc.ru u.a..tcw..e6 C H A R L E s T. V A N o E U 9 5 e4

.::::. := : '- -

2. ::: ::::n'~

-,w...c.,~..s..

in:pg{t.:,,,

i:lds./;.9;;.

- ~

s4..<.~v.

g.-,

f,.',;l. a

-,';c;3......

son ~ e aieao~

,., eff,-.

r

..=f.*inprf-4=vsuat -i e t u a ~. s n.

aoee av oneaac n

.* y.; *-

n.~.-f.;*.

*..

cnseuea w.rm,ssnuu

.;

y

':' * *.~c :.*:.'.....

• !*/.1 * :::.'....

i:/1.?"~

• t'.....

o a ~i a e e. aie so ~

,,,,,.r.

a. ;.;.. ;;;.

.......n....

.m Mr. Thomas A.

Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Re:

Docket No. 50-133 License No. DPR-7

Dear Mr. Ippolito:

Enclosed is Attachment A which contains the additional information requested in your letter dated July 20, 1979, concerning IE Bulletin 79-08.

Very truly yours, l,

l l i

M J

Alcachment CC w/ attachment:

Mr.

R. H. Engelken, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region P

\\k U58322 7908100 I7?"

A EACHMENT A Response to Request for Additialal Information Related to 1E Bulletin 79-08 Introduction A number of itecs in the request for additional information concern the schedule for action.

Our original response states that "Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit No. 3 has been out of service for seismic modifications and resolutico of seismic and geologic issues.

The changes in design and operating procedures discussed in tbis response will be completed prior to the time the Unit is returned to service." This represents the cost definitive schedule commitment that can be made at this time.

Item No. 2 1.

We have reviewed all applicable operating and emergency operating procedures and have confirmed that containment isolation exists via a) normally closed valves or b) is automatically initiated by engineered safeguards actuation or c) is manually initiated.

This is true for all lines except those needed for safety features or cooling capability and the closed cooling water lines to the drywell air coolers which were identified as requiring manual isolation in previous submittal.

(Refer to attached Table III-1, III-2 from our Technical Specifications. )

2.

As discussed in the Introduction, we have not prepared nor imple-rented the procedure chance requiring the manual isolation of the closed cooling water lines to the drywell air coolers.

3 No other iters related to Item No. 2 require action.

Iter No. h 1.

Tne Humboldt Bay reactor has two types of level instrumentation; on e system is canufactured by Yarway and the other by Bailey. The Yarway reactor water level instrumentation is utilized to initiate a reactor trip and reactor isolation upon reactor low water level signal. If reactor pressure is less than 150 psig, the reactor low water level signal also activaten the core spray and low pressure core flooding systems. With coincident signals from high drywell pressure and loss of feedwater flow, low reactor water level will also initiate the reactor depressurizatica system (vent valves).

The Bailey reactor water level instrumentation is utils ad to automatically or manually control the reactor wster level via feedwater regulation during power operation.

The Bailey system is not utilized for automatic actuation of the engineered safety systems.

The Yarvay and Bailey level columns are attached to stilling wells which in turn are attached to the reactor vessel. The Bailey primary sensors are saturated level columns since the reference leg is maintained at saturation conditions by locating it inside the variable leg and insulating the entire column. The Yarway level sensors are designed to operate with the reference leg subcooled since the reference leg is designed to operate at drywell ambient

conditions (approximately 175 F) plus 56% of the dif ference between the drywell ambient and reactor saturation (563 F) temperatures.

Since the Yarway system reference leg operates below saturation, i.e., subcooled, the reactor pressure could decrease to less than 250 psig before affecting the Yarway reference leg.

The output from both the Bailey and Yarway level sensors is a differential pressure which is a direct function of the difference in height of the variable (reactor water level) and reference (constant) legs.

The Bailey output is electronic and is converted to a pneumatic signal for use in the feedwater controls; therefore, all of the readouts for reactor water 1cvel (two indicators and one recorcer),

are dependent upon an electrical as well as pneumatic supply. The Yarways, which are completely electronic, are supplied with emergency power for reliability and have two separate control room reactor water level readouts.

2.

Changes in reactor coolant inventory due to leaks would be detected by various autcmatically actuated signals and instrumentation.

There are only three places where primary system lines are routed; these are the reactor drywell, the refueling building and the pipe tunnel.

If a primary system leak occurred in the drywell, it would be detected by an increase in the containment (drywell) pressure and temperature. The change in temperature would be detected by resistance temperature detectors whose readout is recorded in the control room and by thermocouples whose readout is indicated and alarmed in the control room. The increase in pressure would be indicated and alarmed in the control room and would result in a reactor trip and isolation if it reached the 2 psig setpoint. A primary system leak would also be detected by an increase in the drywell sump level.

This sump is monitored by local instrumentation that is read each shift by the operator on his round.

If the level increases by 50 gallons, it initiates two indepr.ndent control room level alarm annunciators and must be manually drained by the operator using a low level interlocked,2eadman" switch. The frequency of sump draining is recorded and monitored by the operators and our operating procedures require that plant management be notified a) of any change in the rate of accumulation or b) if rate of accumulation exceeds 50 gallons per month, i.e,. one draining per month.

If primary system line or valve leakage were to occur in the pipe tunnel, it would be noticed by an increase in the area radiation, as indicated and alarmed by the pipe tunnel area radiation monitor, and by an increase in the temperature as noted by the mainsteam line break sensors which would trip and isolate the reactor following an increase of 300F above normal ambient.

658324 _ _ _ _

If primary system leakage were to occur in the refueling building or access shaft, the steam released would be detected by one or all of the follcaing:

1) one of the eight radiation monitors in the refueling building and access shaft due to the radioactivity level increase, 2) by the toisture detec. >r in the access shaft instrument vault, and/or 3) by actuation of the refueling building high differential pressure protection system which would isolate the isolation (esergency) condenser and the cleanup system.

In addition to the above described instrumentation, the reactcr pressure, in conjunction with other indicators, can indicate a loss of reactor inventory.

Our reactor safety valves and reactor vent valve discharge lines are monitored by temperature detectors to assist the operator in determining if leakage or actuation has occurred.

Ite: No. 5 1.

See discussion in Introduction.

Ite No. 6 1.

In our present Cold Shutdtwn mode of operation, there are n a require-ments for valve align =ent of engineered safety features. As dis-cussed in the Introduction, we will conduct our Startup, Sealed Valve and Critical Sensor Check Lists prior to returning to power operation following our present outage.

2.

During eacb refueling outage, eacn valve in the plant engineered safety sy= oems is exercised to verify that it is functional and is not in need of maintenance. Additionally, systems are cleared for other testing or maintenance. As a consequence, the Sealed Valve and Critical Sensor Check Lists are utili?sa just prior to return-ing to power operation to insure proper availcbility and operation of an e.d neered safeguards feature or reactor safety system by i

physically verifying that all of the subject valves are in proper align =ent and then sealing them in the required position.

3 See response to Iten 6.1 above.

358325 Item No. 7 1.

Refer to attached Table I.

2.

Resetting of the engineered safety features instrumentation will not result in inadvertent transfer of radioactive gases and liquids outside of containment since none of the isolation or system valves, except those listed below, change position automatically upon resetting (by either manual or automatic methods).

A.

Scram Dump Tank Drain Valve - Any reactor trip will close the drain valve.

This valve cannot be re-opened unless:

1) the reactor trip signal resets and 2) the control room operator manually resets the reactor safety system.

The second action is prevented administratively until a complete evaluation of the cause of the trip is conducted.

Once reset, the scram dump tank drains to the reactor equipment drain tank (REDT) which is located inside the refueling building (secondary containment).

Once released to the REDT, the liquid could be automatically pumped to the radwaste facility which is outside secondary containment since the REDT pumps are automatically started by high REDT level. An alternate flow path, such as proposed for the emergency condenser vent in our previous submittal, is not required because:

1) manual action is required to cause the transfer, 2) if the transfer were initiated, the operator can shut down the REDT pumps from the control room if excessive radioactivity is detected from the radiation monitors near the tank or located in the radwaste facility which indicate and alarm in the control room.

B.

Suppression Pool Cooler Recirculation Valve If operating in the recirculation mode, any automatic actuation of the core spray system would cause closure of the valve.

Manual resetting of the engineered safeguards initiation controls would cause the valve to return to the recirculation mode.

This action would only cause a recirculation of radioactive liquid from the suppression chamber through the cooler and then back to the chamber so long as the core spray pumps continue to run.

C.

Suppression Chamber Relief Line Isolation Valve - This valve closes when drywell pressure increases to 2 psig.

Once dryt211 pressure decays, the valve would re-open.

This would not cause a transfer of radioactive gases because the vacuum relief valves would still be closed preventing a release to the refueling building.

3.

In all cases, continued operability of the features designed to prevent inadvertent transfer of radioactive liquid or gases is assured by administrative controls, visual inspection during operator rounds, surveillance tests or some combination of these methods.

558326

_b_

4.

As discussed in the Introduction, we will install the alternate vent path for the emergency condenser prior to our return to Power Operation.f the modification is determined to be desirable.

During our evaluatica of the alternate vent path, consideration will be given to high radiation interlocks, containment isolation signal desircbility and the method for assuring continued operability.

Ite No. 8 S it 1.

Operability of redundant safety-related components or cyste:

presently verified by surveillance testing conducted at the time of redundant system removal. If testing is not appropriate or is not deemed necessary, a visual inspection is conducted prior to clearance of the redundant component or system to assure operability of the remaining camponent ur system.

Our Technical Specifications and maintenance an d operating procedures also require a J' nonstration of acceptable performance following any caintenance tecting activity if the function of the component or system could have been impaired.

2.

Our procedurec require that the shift reactor operational pers onnel not leave their posts until they have provided the on-coming personnel with a full report on station conditions.

This includes, as appro-priate:

a) jobs or tests in progrees, b) bypasced or jumpered fea-turec, c) cleared equipment, d) work planned for the upcoming shift, and e) any other unusual conditions.

In addition, the relie ving personnel are not permitted to take over their watch until they are fully aware of plant conditions.

To aid the Shift Foreman during waten turnover, a " Shift Turnover Sheet" has been provided to remind tne on-coming Shift Fereman of the various routine review requirements.

It is also a convenient place for the off-going Shift Foreman to note the status of special operations; i.e., cocpleted, in progrect, or planned, which he feels are important enough to be reviewed by the next Shift Foreman. To assist the reactor operational personnel in determining the status of equipment, we are using an inoperable equipment log and a tagging system to insure that:

1) the OPERABILITi status of all equipment and any pending ACT CG requirements are clearly understood, readily available to the shift operators and accurately transferred from shift to shift, 2) prior to a change in OPERATIQUd CWDITION, the required equiptent is demonstrated to be OPERABIZ by performing the surveillance requirecents, and that once demonstrated OPERABLE, the equipment retains OPERABLE, and 3) equipment which becomes II;0PERABLE is properly demonctrated to be OPERABII after corrective actions are complete.

358327

_5_

Item No. 9 1.

Ac described in the Introduction, our supplement to the existing reporting procedures for NRC notification will be revised prior to returning to Power Operation. Tae supple =ent will state that NRC notification is required "wii.iiin one hour of the time the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation."

bh8328 TAP,LE I Systems Designed To Transfer Radioactive Cases Or Liquids Outside Of Containment System Isolation Remarks

1. Main Steam Line3 Automatic Isolationl 3

2. Emergency Condenser Automatic Isolation 2 A closed system that returns condensed steam to the reactor following high pressure initiation.

Vent used as continuous bleed to remove non-condensible gases.

3. Clean Up Auto Isolation 1 2 3

A closed system that returns demineralized water to the reactor vessel. Continuous sample system that bleeds to main condenser.

4. Shutdown 3 Normally Isolated A closed low pressure system used for decay heat removal during outages.

Inlet valves opened on isolation scram with reactor pressure less than 150 psig to initiate Low Pressure Core Flooding.

5. Suppression Chamber Normally Open A closed low pressure system that takes suction Core Spray Suction on the suppression chamber and sprays water into the reactor vessel through normally closed motor operated valve. Pumps start, core spray valve opens, and recirc. valve closes on isolation scram with reactor pressure less than 150 psig.

6. Control Rod Drive Scram 3 Automatic Isolation by all trips Refer to Item 7.2.A.

7. Drywell Purge No rmally Isolated System can be used to vent excess pressure off through normally closed remote manually operated solenoid valves to the gas treatment system.

C'

8. Suppression Chamber Normally Isolated System can be used to vent excess pressurc

$j Gas Treatment Suction off through normally closed remote manually ta operated solenoid valves to the gas treatment r3 system.

b)

Table I (Cont'd)

System Isolation demarks

9. Drywell Lower Head Drain Normally Isolated Fifty gallons can be drained from 300 gallon sump to reactor equipment drain tank by opening manual valve solenoid valve operated by a local deadman pushbutton. Solenoid valve closes when released or when low level set-point is reached.

NOTE: 1 Automatic Isolation eccurs following initiation of any of the following sensors: 1) Reactor Water Low Level, 2) Drywell High Pressure, 3) Main Steam Line Break (in pipe tunnel), 4) Loss of Potential to the 115 volt A-C preferred busses, 5) Remote Manual Scram.

NOTE: 2 Automatic Isolation occurs if refueling building differential pressure increases to 3.023 inches of water.

NOTE: 3 These liquid systems have normally closed and CO sealed vents and drains that can be utilized CN for transfer of contaminated liquids to the IO radwaste facility.

"'J CJ GD

e e

Ill l4 t

'e hl1 111-1 i7WTLL pTTYN TlM e.e ii 6 m.e i.e peas t r a t t re Fweette*

IM181 Dimater Tew of tiss,re and last gewer fyrretire it) 1 14 tech Two 12 inc h est er epe r a t e d t e e t e t t ee Open all ILele eteen llee weleen Emersemey seedeoeer steen supply Itae 1

le tech M 6 lach eeter operated leelettee Opee il) weleen Emergene, esadesser genere llae I

ll toch

.be 4 toch meter operated and ens 4 tech Cleoed to,. e e,t, es te e t l y se ebeeb toelet te* Talve high seeggpo y,see,ye) ())gg)

I S SDeh T*e I tes h shoc k teelet ten valves Closed (open deries pelea*

Ligvid pelsen tejeetten time tejectsam Sydroelle e=pply pop der lies 5

6 tarh M 1 toch eheck teelet ten velvee op,,

Centrol red lesh.ef f llee 1

6 tech The I tu h e hec k t ee t e t t un velvv e Cleeed (opee 4., s eg e ent,eq es,

' neweest )

feedvetes llee 1

70 las h Coe 8 tach meter operated and me 8 toen Ope n theek teelet ten volve Seerter heed fleese inner east lesh deteettee 1

6 twh One I toch eeneel and twe l? tech seleeste etenve t.. opes Se teme ti f eelet tee selves we l.

ese e t eo ed, en, Ilse s

open (5)

Caeleet

• lese., sepely llee 1

8 tarh M 3 seen meter operated teeletten velvee 0,em 18 ) ( $)

Ceeleet s teen., estete i tse i

10 loch cae I tech eetes operated med one I tern Coen (2) ())

eheck toeletten velve Caet sel red hydrowlts lines le toch Sited fleese end geeket Closed legere fles oestler tellbretten thLables 1

6 gern light elesed n'agebles and a sheek walve Closed (Osce d..et,s itse wt re to the dry well terateete to a fleage t reedt et a an) plate et the pene t r es sen. A & tarh meauel teelet tee we ave to nowted on flease. A 8 /2 l oc k maave l t e s t ve l ve s eenec t s t o t he body of the f eeletion selve he rwee. t he velve gate and the fleage me ter.ete, e ie ii e

test..ameeti.e

.le

,.e I s ee, ee nwe i, sel e, t e... l.e e se e. h me_si.el.es

,e e..

i. e,ea.

Stee Che line esote me e l/2 (Mn solemeld aes t les t o e'e r s ys t e e open.

e we l,,

w 6lc h g enner t e g o the s ee r rel red by.

Sele **I d se l ve em reer t e, pree-e drevlts systee preenwre senatet line e*d a eure eeos tes line open fl).

l/2 inch desdoen soleneld we ave which rea-thradaan eele* eld welees opes der eerte se e rees ter net e e-,l e s t e t t en er tag e sep t pg ee te e t tes to ehe le. p.e e..re t saaes t ien o f t he deve-s eem s eenome t e r. The setend line containe Meawel vetwee to fotwee wee llee e 1/2 loch deedmen solenetd velee whten een elseed.

seets to the high peeenere eenneet ten of t he dams one r ese eme t e r. The rees t e t ag two linea e'e for f twee one.

Assees opensas, top i

14 feet Flem rd and d%hle *P" s tag esel Cleoed o

Beester vest selve teatrel line 1

4 twh Me sie evyply itees, ee eti with a 1/2 Hee el volwee en att evpply tech esmaeal and a t /2 nach l-ay solenoid Itaes epen.

seleesid ee twee operated f eelet tee wolee. A I 1/2 loch eleted ($). Memwel selves te st t enmee t ion wi t h a l I/I toc h eemeel te teet ce**eette*e fleeed.

te l e=

end esp. and a l #6 toch test ese*

eettlee wit h a 1/4 two valoo and e st s aaees t tot e the 4 tarh line toes ter estemetee teen ever flow 1

4 ser k Sited flenge Cleoed feefphosal acetret red bydrawlte Itase t

$4 tach hielded sete pipe esp Clac ed Dry well porge ot r e3pply Inne 1

3 terb Two 8 loch esevel toelet tee velves Closed (4)

Ntdeve seeltog awpplF line 1

18 t oc h M A Inen metoe opereted teelet tesi Clos =d (fseas estamat t e elli f f valve s low pr ee...e s ere f laed d et to lett seted whee pressere le be te=

e ISO reis) to)

Sheade== teeltog setort line

• 1 la terb one e seen e,et er opereted and one 9 loch Cleoed (4) ties h t estet ten valve Reetter peeeawre seateel Itae 1

6 toch one I tuk eenuet end one 1/2 = h Opee (l)

Selenetd operated loclettee velse las t r ument linee secoettias to t e reestee 8

6 toch one i noch e awal ead one l/2 tach Open (l) h eeesel celeeeld operated toelet ten volve **

?

t

n. :.,

• h e f,

t u.

n r

e!

v

+

m

. - j e

i g

[~

b a, o.

'4.J j h]

e 141 15 3 912 111 1 peY vnt FTWTTsAflev$ (Cest.)

peettien th=rtna tenetrerlee Anetten Pebe r pie =eter Tm of Closure end Seel e,.er N erett e (11 pry well water level top (west pipe elevatten) 3 2 tach he level tastrunests Cleoed gyete.

Dyy well, seeltag water lines 0

1 1/2 inch Dee 2 tack att operated testatten valve opee (3) s e evpply and return headers. One i spch menval w lve es each Itaa.

Arseas opeetag. bottom 1

4 feet Flassed and deshle *0" rtag seal Closed l

Cantieveva leek este manttoring syntes penetralLee (Nitgegee fill line) 1 3/4 inch One 3/4 inch manual and one 3/4 loch Manuel valve spen. Air opersies air operated valve valve opene om, dry well low presswee.

Caet tavows leek rear menttertog syetes pressere 1

1/2 inch One 1/2 toch menual valve. One 1/2 inch Deadmen selenen d end eenval eenetas line deathmaa seleoeld p1ve one 1/2 tech neovel valve in senar,eter Itse e tened velve in manameter line, presevre t rans-estept when taking reedtage mitter se other branch se closed system.

Seester esfety wolves wat lines to 4

10 inch gefety valves evppressica peel Dry well paeasure tap 1

1 tech Fressure in troent Closed eyene.

Core spray and post tacident reeltog supply line 1

8 toch h 3 inch meter operated see one,3 inch Closed (ooene out matically if shock toelattee valve teve sprey to inttleted) (6)

Taeven breaker line te suppresstem chamber 1

20 inch he 14 inch vacum breakars to parettel to the line Fry well vest times to suppresster poel 4

40 tach Dry well sit space sample time 1

1/2 inch one 1/2 loch manual teolatten valve end Closed (0 pen durina dry well pipe cap ett space an pling)

Br ester base flenge outer coal lash detecter l

t/2 inch One 1/2 toch eenval and one 1/2 inch Closed (5) lies solenetd operated f eelet tee valve ewell pee.e euttlen and wating lines 1

8 toch he 8 loch manual toelattee estvee, and 8 inch estves: Ctened t4) ene I inch manual end two 2 inch solenoid I inc h manuel welwe : Open operated toelet ten velves se bypass line 2 inch e6ieneld talves! Cleaed (0 pen during dry wil ventias)

Dry well lower head drate line and dry well 2

2 toch ho 1 inch emanual and one 1 inch solenend Drein line wolves sleeed (Open le=er head water level indleaters operated valve se drale lies. Three level during dry well dretning (8) teatruments.

Closed eretsa Electrical leade S

24 tach 311n4 flange and gasket Closed lafety velve discharge line vacu.am breakere 1

I inch Three I toch shech volves to parallet Betear (1) Iseletten vaives which are listed e elesed may be opened under the conditions noted, leetatten valves which ar#e listed as open may be sleeed under certain eenditions.

(2) Automatic cleevra en resetor low water level, dry well high pressure, meta steam lies bresh, or le= voltese en ll) went preferred e e busses (esfety system power empply).

(3) Automette fleevre se Refueltog Bulldtag high dif fereettal pressure.

(4) Can be opened manually dvrtas reacter " cool da=T." when pressere is belev 120 pets. avtomette sleevre when reetter prenevre eesches 135 pets.

(5) Resete saaval eteevre.

(6) Valve evening annunciated in the eestrel rees.

(2) If esople systees ese added in future, e rewte meeval solenetd valve will be added. Talves will then be open during esopling.

(8) Seleneti valve opened from leest poskhutten station. Talve automattently closes to metatste water seal ta drate line

.r w~ e - shbuttee to reie.re..

e r n a B S c E 3 J, 2

.. m y wa

.,3,tw;

.c

,r

,a n m

. q 6

l & :4, )%

. ? {.i r J

6 l

11 Y

yh D

t r

{

WL )1) y

.2

^

e III. or TAstt lif.t SU'Fef'stou Cowere Prwtf astfees F,eet t lee thes t os M er pipeeter Tr,e o f Cleevre ead se et m,

eg, r e g i, e Pene t u t t e. Pv=e t t ee 3

30 loch Fleeged med double seeketed moeheles glese.

assese seeel.g.

6 60 leth Dvy well veet lines to the e eprees ten akenhe e 10 lash Ssfety valvee teet tet eefety volse discharge line s 3

20 t ec h Two le toch vesvwe breshere to pe,ellel Teeeves treeter itse from dry eell to the itse

> l-b 0.o.

..h -.wei..i.e me

,s.i Le t e e,e

...e,,w.e o.e t t iinee

> i-b

~. :-h -si.ei-Op.e

,o.i re.

..r e e,..,,.m. e en ile.

3 2 tac k Idvel teatsumente Cleesd speteo feel ester level Amstrument,8tese I lach Pressere teatrument Closed egetee Cheeben preecere toetsumeet line 1

4 tach M 4 inch menuel teeletten wolves, and 4 tu b set.es ; etened Cheeber see treeteret swettee time one 1 1/3 tuk esevel and two 1 1/2 lock I.4 /2 tae n mea.et vo lve : s een solesend operated toelet ten vetees se 1 8/2 toen e lemete valves elesed (spee aveleg vesting) bytese line.

1 6 lash One 6 Loch air operated leetettee volve str operated estee open Dember ve4.um relie f llee followed by tee 6 loch wetens sallef (eleses en high* dry we s t valves preenere)

I toch Two I inch eheth toelet toe selves, one Cle.e 4 tcpen.ke, dr a g e t,g 56.t deve eyetes disto Isras I toch mensat selve shut d own eesteel Peel water mehe ep eed supereseles eeele's 1

3 toch Stenwel toeletten velve to oesh of the hke wp tenee men.el selves three Itaes whtth **tet thee Itae-Att s lesed (e-s e enen eedseg retore time eterated wolve to seeler retors llee.

er s t e r t o paol l. Caeler set ern lie, on e opet et e d welve sleeed tarea when seeltog peel weter!

Caettawews lash sete eenitoring eyeese 1

3/4 (och One 3/4 inch man el and one 3/4 teek havel es t ve eeee, a i r

( r pe ne est operated velve, ope t eted selve e ls e e r penetrettee (Wissesce fill Idee) en t e=, at ra ***lt' M"'

teree te)

Coet t svews te st vote semitering systee I

l/2 toch One 1/2 6-k menest velee. One 1/2 Deedmen solenedd eed esevel IMh sesenen soleneti plus one 1/2 ealee la eeamme t e r lice pressere seesteg Itce luk eenwel velve la menemeter line elesed enrept whe n s e k t rig Fressere tressettter le other breech to s eed tag e sleeed eyetse Peel tempetetere inetevnent line 1

1 toch he rme=e l l Cleaed systee 1

6 loch Welded sep Closef Space 1

3 inth Welded sep Ctesed Space 1

3 lock helded cop Closed Spare we, rete e,e.ee.e. -.

i

i. t.r b

. i t.d

,1.

e.

Ci.ee,

(

g o

h;.<(

i.

\\. ',,

I 4

g h,

~.

m. _,

,o lb

\\

.