ML19241B231
| ML19241B231 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002623 |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1979 |
| From: | Elliott J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
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| NUDOCS 7907130244 | |
| Download: ML19241B231 (19) | |
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N-UNICCD STATES OF AMERICA JUN o 1979 > :-
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mn!
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N In the Matter of
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
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(Amendment to Material Liccnse
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Docket No. 70-2623
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SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear
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Station Spent Puel Transportation and Storage at McGuire Nuclear
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Station)
TESTIMONY OF J. MARK ELLIOTT Personal Background and Experience I.
Education and General Experience Mechanical Engineering, University of Houston B.S.
(1966)
Mechanical Engineering, Auburn MS (1968), PhD '1970),
University Assistant Professor, Mechanical Engineering, 1970-1973:
Auburn University and University of South Alabama; teaching and research.
Member Technical Staff, TRW Systems 1973-1975:
Group, London U.K. and McLean, VA:
and cchmand developed crisis management and control systems for U.S. Navy.
Fuel Sabotace/
Specific Excerience Related to Spent Nuclear Terrorism bb)
Contingency Safeguards Systems Analyst, 1975-1976:
Planning Branch,
'1.5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC; responsible 7007130?'/V
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for developme'st of NRC Headquarters Safeguards Contingency Plan for dealing with threats, theft and sabotage d rected at licensed nuclear materials and faci-lities.
Throughly familiar with various studies, repocts and activities concerned with potential terrorist acts against nuclear facilities, including the history of terrorist activities, capabilities of terrorist groups, tactics, etc.
1976-1978:
Chief, Reactor Safeguards Development Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wasiling ton, DC; managed activities of Branch responsible for the detailed development and review of the Commission's program for safeguar<'..ng nuclear reactors against sabotage and theft of nuclear materials.
Continued responsibilities in analysis of terrorist activities.
Additional activities while at NRC included:
o Appointment by Chairman, NRC to serve as member of Task Force on Allegations of James Conran, con-cerning NRC's safeguards program.
o Appointment by Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to be Office representative on a three man NRC team charged with evaluating threats against NRC licensed f acilities.
o NRC representative to the President's Cabinet Committee to Combat Cerrorism.
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1978-Fresent:
Senior Consultant, International Energy Associates Limited, Washington, DC; Manage IEAL's domestic safen" _-3s projects.
Current activities include support to the Department of Energy's program for safeguards technology research and development.
Also a member, Atomic Industrial Forum's Committae on Domestic Safeguards.
Knowledge of Applicable Regulations From my cxperience and continuing work and interests in the nuclear safeguards field, I am knowledgeable of current and proposed NRC *?gulations (10 CFR 73) and DOT regulaticns (49 CFR 170-189) that apply to spent fuel trar.sportation.
Knowledce of Applicable Reports, Studies, Etc.
From my experience and continuing work and interests in the nuclear safeguards field, I am knowledgeable of numerous reports, studies, analyses, etc., related to terrorism in general and the possibility of nuclear terrorism in particular.
In addition, I have attended numerous neetings, briefings and discussions on the subject.
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II.
Spent Fuel Shipment His to ry Summary The available information concerning history of spent fuel shipments in the United States can be divided into two categories--civil and military.
Civil shipments, or those from commercial power reactors, comprise the la r?*" percentage-of all spent fuel shipments.
Table I indicates the approximate number of spent fuel shipments that have occurred through 1978 and that are estimated for 10/9, and includes an estimation of total shipping miles for eas5 year.
Civil Data for civil shipments have been obtained from two NRC (1. 2 )
studies.
The exac number of shipments are available for 1972 cumulative, 1975, as well as estimates for 1979, and are broken down according to mode of transport.
The majority of shipments are made by truck (approximately 83%),
followed by rail (approximately 16%) and the smallest number by barge (approximately 1%).
The known number of civil shipments made in the United States to date is 3,435 (1972 cumulative, plus 1975).
Further, the NRC expects 222 such shipmants of spent fuel to occur in 1979 (216 by 3fr9'~
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truck, 6 by rail) and travel a total of 156,000 miles.
Using actual data to approximate the nurber of shipments and miles traveled in the years lacking hard data (1973, 74, 76-78), then approximately 4,000 shipments will have occurred by the end of 1979, and traveled a total of approximately 3 million miles.
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Military Certain military spent fuel shipments are classified.
However, some information on unclassified shipments was obtained through informal contacts with DOE which gave estimates of 182 shipments, all by rail.
Of that group, approximately 96 have traveled from Savannah River, South Carolina to Idaho, 40 from Richland, Washington to West Valley, New York, 5 from Chalk River, Ontario to Richland, and 41 from Chalk River to Savannah River.
The estimated total distance traveled by unclassified military spent fuel is 360,000 miles.
Malevolent Acts Acainst Spent Fuel To the best of my knowledge, no civil or military spent fuel shipment has ever been lost, misrouted, or the subject of serious malevolent acts.
Spent fuel shipments to date have neither been sabotaged nor placed public health and well-being in jeopardy.
This conclusion is based on my knowledge and experience, discussions with NRC and DOE staff, and NRC's Safeguards (3)
Summary Event List.
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8.
III.
Potential for Sabotage of Spent Puel During Transportation I would like to briefly discuss the sequence of actions that a hypothetical terrorist (or group of terrorists) would have to success fully complete in order to have any realistic chance of endangering *he public health and safety by sabotaging a spent fuel shipment.
In general, malevolent acts against any type of objective may be broken down into four phases:
1.
Decision to act 2.
Preparation 3.
The act itself Each of these phases will be discussed in turn.
Decision to Act A combination of factors will influence the decision to attempt the sabotage of spent fuel in transport.
The factors include:
motivation, attractiveness of the target, resources required, and risks involved.
1.
Motivation - In the case of spent fuel transportation, motivation to sabotage would most probably be to dis-credit the utility or Federal government as a result of opposition to nuclear power, or to endanger public health and safety through a release of radioactive t.
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material.
Other motives, such as the reprocessing of spent fuel to obtain special nuclear material, must be ruled out as unrealistic.
The two mort likely motives may have many facets, for example a terrorist might desire to steal the spent fuel cask (with its spent fuel) and then to extort money or other concessions by threatening to open or breach the cask.
2.
Attractiveness of the Tarcet - In the context of motivation, our potential terrorist must assess the attractiveness of the targot.
If he wishes to discredit the utility or Federal government, perhaps spent fuel might seem attractive.
(Acts which would only discredit the utility or Federal government will not be discussed further since they would pose no danger to the public health and safety.)
However, if the motive were to be to irjure or kill members of the local population, spent fuel would be much less attractive than other nuclear and non-nuclear targets.
3.
Resources Required - A terrorist must assess the availability of the resources necessary to accomplish the sabotage of spent fuel during transportation, including:
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o Tools and equipment o
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Imagination and ingenuity Terrorists will typically acquire whatever resources are believed necessary to accomplish their objective.
In addition, sophisticated equipment can' be obtained by terrorist organizations, although not without consider-able difficulty.
For spent fuel cask sabotage, our terrorists would need either an extremely large amount (several thousand pounds) of high explosive or fairly sophisticated shaped charges, in addition to routinely obtainable equipment such as weapons, automobiles,.
trucks, communications gear, etc.
4.
Perceived Risk - The terrorist, before making a decision to proceed, must make his own " cost /
benefit" analysis and answer the following questions.
"After the expenditure of the needed resources,
.will I be able to achieve my objective?"
and "What risks will I be taking?'
In the case of spent fuel, clearly the required resources will be people, large amounts or very sophisticated explosives, and careful planning.
The objective would be public harm.
The risks would be injury or death, possibl.e failure, capture and incarceration, and extreme hostile public reaction.
Should our terrorist decide that the " cost / benefit" analysis was in his favor, he would then proceed to the second phase.
Preparation The sequence of events involved in preparing for the sabotage of a spent fuel shipment would be:
recruiting and training, acquisition of resources, reconnaissance and intelligence, and security.
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1.
Recruiting and training - Our terrorist must recruit the necessary personnel to carry out this act.*
These individuals would either have to share the same dedication as their leader, would have to be indoctrinated with such dedication or would have to be paid, the latter considered to be extremely unlikely, in this case.
In addition, the team must possess the ne issary talents and skills to carry out the act.
Recruiting and indoc-trinating capable and reliable specialists, especially in terrorist activities, is a problem.
Specialized tr aining can be accomplished but it enlarges the scope of the operation, can endanger the team physically (e.g., weapons and explosives training), and increasms significantly the chance of discovery.
2.
Acquisition of Resources - It is possible for terrorists to acquire very powerful and sophisticated arms and equipment.
However, these items must be obtained at considerable cost either in terms of dollars, if equipment is purchased (usual]y on the black mcrket),
or in terms of risk of discovery, capture, injury or death, if equipment is stolen (e.g.,
from military sources.)
3.
Reconnaissance and Intelligence - For the operation to have any reasonable chance of success, it must be carefully p,lanned with as much detailed inf,ormation as possible on the cask, shipping plans, procedures, schedules and routes.
The terrorist group may perform their Wr58
- It is my judgment that at Jeast two and probably as many as five individuals would be required to attempt a spent fuel sabotage act.
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own reconnaissance from direct observation of activities er may rely on information from an
" insider,"
i.e.,
someone connected with the transportation activities in some way.
The preferred method, of course, would be to have inside assistance, but this presenta problems unless the insider was a member of the group beforehand or shares the same motives of the group.
Otherwise, the terrorist must recruit the insider with the clear danger that the latter may report such advances to authorities.
There are, of course, other ways of obtaining this inside information, but it is important to keep in mind that rarely does one individual, in any organization, have access to all the information on a large project or effort.
There fore, the use fulness of this inside information may not be suf ficient to enhance the success of the operation.
4.
Security - The terrorist group must maintain a con-siderable amount of secrecy to avoid detection prior to the operation.
The group's inte: ual security can be compromised during acquisition of resources, recruiting and training, reconnaissance and intelligence 3fs i t o'.
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gathering, or as a result of defection of a member of the group.
The terrorist will try to keep his group size to the absolute minimum to enhance security, and he will try to execute his plan as quickly as possible.
In summarizing the preparation phase, the important point is that everything must occur as planned or the terrorist will usually not proceed with a " risk / benefit" balance that has changed against him.
Especially significant is the very real possibi.lity that his plans may be discovered and his actions thwarted.
The Act itself our hypothetical terror ists, assuming all has gone well in their preparation and that nothing has deterred them from their mission, will now proceed to attempt to carry out the act itself.
Of interest here are:
tactics, possibility of failure or achievement of limited objectives, possibility of defeat.
1.
Tactics - Study of terrorist activities shows that they are capable of very sophisticated operations, ranging from very elaborats schemes involving deceit and subterfuge to direct, violent attacks using surprise and brute force.
Spent fuel sabotage scenarios are limitless, but in order to produce any significant danger to the public health and safety, the following elements would probably be present:
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o Cask breached in high-density population zone o
Cask breached during favorable weather conditions o
Prevention of short term mitigation actions to.
limit release (2,4)
Recent studies, indicate that a i ent fuel shipping cask might realistically be breached only through (1) detonation of thousands of pounds of high explosive in very close proximity to the cask (in witich case the air blast might cause the cask closure mechanism to fail, thus exposing some of the spent tuel. elements),
(2) precise empicyment of large amounts of high explosives in an attempt to disrupt cask integrity, or (3) the use of lesser amounts of high explosive fabricated int.o a shaped charge which could be used to blow a small hole completely through the cask with resultant damage to some fuel elements, and release of radioactive material.
Use of any of these approaches would require significant expertise in application of explosives, especially for the shaped charge, and would expose the terrorist to considerable personal danger.
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To achieve significant public consequences, the cask and fuel elements would have to be breached in a high-density population zone.
This presents significant tactical problems to the terrorist since use of the massive attack will be very difficult while the cask is underway, and the shaped charge attack will not prevent the cask from being mcved to a less populated location.
In order to maximi =e the consequences, the terrorist must consider the weather.
This means being continually prepared until the weather for the limited number of locations is adequate.
Finally, unless the terrorist prevents short-term mitigation, e g.,
moving the cask to less densely populated area, plugging the holes in the cask, evacuation, etc., it is unlikely that significant consequences could be generatc9 In summary, a potential terrorist will be faced with formidable dif ficulty in carrying out the required tactics to produce a release of dangerous radioactive material.
That is, the operation required to accomplish the objective will require a high degree of dedication, planning, and sophistication.
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Possibility of Failure or Achievement of Limited Objectives -
The chance of failure due to haman
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authorities.
This is particularly true for terrorist activities where the entire group typically has no previous exporience in what they are doing.
Examin-ation and analysia of terrorist activities shows numerous examples of these types of failures.
So in the case of spent fuel, even if an attempt at sabotage is made, there will be a significant chance of failure or that the operation will achieve only limited results, e.g.,
cask damage but no release of radioactive material.
3.
Possibili _y of defeat - On top of all of the other problers facing our hypothetical terrorist, he must finally have to deal with the e:cpected response from the utility and responsible authority.
Drivers may not stop during a hijacking, response forces may engage and defeat the terrorist group before any cask damage is done, etc.
The utility and state and local law enforcement agencies have significantly more depth and resources than even the most sophisticated terrorist group and the only way in which spent fuel sabotage can succeed is for everything to go perfectly well for the terrorist and nothing to work for the utility or authorities.
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IV.
Summary and Conclusions Terrorism, including the possibility of nuclear terrorism, is and should be of concern to us all.
Clearly, there are activities in our society, including nuclear activities, that present opportunities for malevolent acts that could result in a danger to public health and safety:
Commercial air travel, large gatherings of people, industrial operations involvinc.azardous materials, common sources of food and water, to name a few.
While no reasonable individual can conclude that it is impossible for someone or some group to int ntionally breach a spent fuel cask for the purpose of releasing dangerous radioactive material to the environ-ment, the following observations are in order:
o The act of intentionally breaching a spent fuel cask for the purpose of endangering the public health and safety during transportation involves a sequence of actions which, individually and collectively, involve considerable danger to the perpetrator and whose outcome is very uncertain, due to the dif ficulty of the actions and the ability of company and/or law enforcement personnel to thwart these actions.
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o Should the perpetrator be successful in breaching the cask, the consequences are also very uncertain. It is possible that no fuel would be damaged; it is also possible that fuel could be damaged and radioactive materials released.
If the latter were to occur, the consequences to the public health and safety would depend on the degree of fuel damage, the amount of cask integrity damage, the environmental conditions, population density, length of exposure to the released material, mitigating actions of authorities, etc.
o The history of spent fuel (and other dangerous radioactive wastes) transportation in both commercial and defense nuclear programs is devoid of incidents that would suggest, even remotely, that spent fuel transportation presents a risk to the public health I
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and safety due to possible sabotage.
In closing, it is my opinion that the transfer of spent fuel from Oconee station to McGuire station can be executed with negligible risk to public health and safety due to sabotage or other malevolent acts.
Dated:
June 4, 1979
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REFERENCES 1.
Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials To and From Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1238, U.A. AEC, December 1972.
2.
Environmental Statement on The Transoortation Of Radioactive Material by Air and Other bbdes, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, NUREG-0170, 1977.
3.
" Safeguards Summary Event List (Pre-NRC through December 31, 1978," U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Tafety and Safeguards, Division of Safeguards, December 31, 1978.
4.
Generic Environmental Assessment on Transoortation of Radioactive Materials Near or Throuch a Larce Densely Poculated Area, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission /Sandia f
Laboratories, SAND 77-1927 (Interim Report), May 1978.
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