ML19241B241
| ML19241B241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002623 |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1979 |
| From: | Bostian R DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19241B218 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907130273 | |
| Download: ML19241B241 (14) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN
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l"f f BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING 30ARD
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In the Ibeter of
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DUKE POWER CCMPAT. l
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Docket No. 70-2623 (Amendment to Materials License i
SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station
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Spent Fuel Transportation and Storage
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at McGuire Nuclear Station)
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TESTIMONY OF RALPH W. BOSTIAN My name is Ralph W. 3ostian.
I am the Manager of the System Results and Fuel Management Group of the Steam Production Department of Duke Power Ccmpany.
I graduated frco North Carolina State College in 1949 with a Bachelor's Degree in Mechanical Engineering.
After a short period of employment in a power piant of the Springs Cotton Mills in Lancaster, South Carolina, I was employed by Duke Power Ccmpany in October, 1950 and assigned to the Cliffside Steam Station near Clif fside, North Carolina.
In January, 1951 I was transferred to the 3uck Steam Station near Spencer, North Carolina.
In August, 1951 I was pr:moted to Teu Engineer at Buck; this being my first supervisory assignment.
It was in this role that I first participated in the ecnstruction, check-cut and start-up of a new generating unit, Buck No. 5.
In December, 1956 I was transferred to the Allen Steam Station, then under construction, near 3elsent, just a few miles west of Charlotte.
Here, first as Plant Engineer, then as Assistant Superintendent and finally as Superintendent I became involved in all aspects of power plant operatica and maintenance.
.ni Noorino; ) W Ob
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Utility Waste Management Group 6.
Nuclear Transportation Group It is the contention of several intervenors in this proceeding that the modification of the existing pools at Oconee is preferable to the proposed shipping campaign as a way to handle the spent fuel storage requirements of Oconee. An economic comparison of these alternatives does not show this to be the case.
This co=parison is set forth in Table 1, Page 4.
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. These figures by themselves indicate the value of shipment as opposed to reracking the existing pools in that the cost to the rate payer is much less.
It should be noted that regardless of which of the above alternatives is selected, additional spent fuel storage space for Cconee spent fuel will be necessary.
It should also be noted that Cconee fuel could be shipped to other Duke nuclear facilities.
Duke has determined that such a course of action would give Oconee, as well as the other stations involved, full core reserve capability until 1991 and would cost S4 - $4. 5 million, including the esti-mated cost of the newly established NRC transportation safegua-is program.
A further contention of some of the intervening part; 2s is that the developmenc of an ISFSF at the Oconee site is preferable to shipment.
On the basis of cost, this again can be shown to be incorrect.
An independent storage facility at Oconee has been esti=ated to cost St.4 million (1976 dollars) and it has recently been estimated that it vill take about five years to desir,n, license and construct the facility.
In today's economy this type of facility could be expected to cost =uch more. The cost of shipment has seen estimated at S2,C00 per transfer (1978 dollars).
Even with the new NRC security requirements for spent nuclear fuel shipments, we do not expect this cost to exceed $2,300 per transfer.
It is evident that this is the preferred econc=ic method of handling the increasing quantity of spent fuel until reprocessing, government s:crare, or govern =ent disposal facilities are provided.
It should use be noted that design, licensing and construction of an ISFSF at Oconee cost likely could not be cc=pleted prior to the date the station would run out of storage space as presently planned.
It would require the installation of poison racks (which would most likely require shipment) at the Oconee
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. pools to provide Duke with sufficient onsite storage to hold all spent fuel generated by the station until the new facility was completed and ready to accept fuel.
Mr. Hager's testimony addresses the physical expansion of the pools.
Radiation doses resulting frem the various alternatives is addressed by Mr. Lewis.
A contention stnilar to the one just described has also been presented.
It is the belief of the intervenors that an ISFSF away frcs the Oconee site is preferable to shipment. Once again, I would disagree with this on economic grounds. The cost of such a facility if built anywhere on the Duke system other than Oconze would be at least $44 million (1976 dollarsj.
This has been shown to greatl-aceed the cost of shipment.
The dose to the workers would be similer to that presented for the shipcent of Cconee fuel offsite or to an AFR at Oconee. The dose to the driver would depend upon the location and distance traveled.
The dose to the public for spent fuel shipments, whether they be to an ISFSF away from Cconee or to McGuire, has been found to be very small, thus no ratter if the fuel is kept onsite at an ISFSF at its own pool, shipped to an offsite ISFSF, or shipped to a spent fuel pool away frcm the site where that spent fuel assembly was produced, the incremental does to the public is negligible.
It should be noted tha: :his option would require shipment and reracking of the Oconee pools with poison racks to enable Oconee to continue full power operation.
Another contention in this hearing is that transportation of spent fuel will result in an increased radiation dose to the persons living in the vicinity of the transportation routes.
tr. Lewis presents the dose data in his testimony.
I would point out that the planned route is as described in the Environmental Impact Appraisal developed by the NRC staff. This rcute has been chosen to provide the safest avenue for the GC 7/n 108/
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IT O fuel to travel; it minimizes trhvel over two lane highways, intersections and railroad grade crossings.
The number of people described in the EIA and those located in the factories, schools and hospitals indicated in that report are subjected to an insignificant level of radiation from the shipments in normal, delay, or accident situations. Within the staff's EIA and Mr. Lewis 's testimony the dose to persons traveling over the trans-portation routes concurrently with the spent fuel ship =ents is evaluated.
Once again, the dose is shown to be neglible regardless of the route taken.
Finally, the dose to those persons in the vicinity of an accident or exposed to a delay in transit are evaluated in the staff's EIA and in Mr.
Lewis's testimony. The probability of the accident case is sufficiently low to label the risk of such an event as small. The case of a delay in transit would produce doses well within those established as safe by the EC.
Alternate routes using two lane non-interstate, non-limited access type roads have been examined and while the net population along the route may be somewhat less than that over the proposed route, the dose in this case is still negligible. Thus, a comparison of shipping on rural two lane roads passing through numerous smaller towns and the associated schools, factories and hospitals versus shipments on the limited access interstate highways would show an insignificant difference in dose to the public.
However, I believe that the shipments of spent fuel can be made in a safer sanner by transporting them on the limited access interstate highways, I-85 and I-77.
One of the contentions is that the proposed action cannot be approved until completion of various generic environmental impact statements.
I would choose not to speak to the legality of this point but I would note out that transportation h'.s been found to be the most cost effective nethod hkk
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. of providing storage for spent fuel a* Duke until reprocessing, government storage, or government disposal is made available.
The use of this method of providing storage does not rule out the modification of existing pools or development of interim spent fuel stcrage facilities (ISFSF) on the Duke system but rather has been found at this point to be the least burdensome method in terms of cost to our rate payers and at a negligible environmental impact to a'.1 ccncerned.
The use of the transfer scheme will provide Duke with the flexibility it needs to continue to provide reliable electric service to its customer:
Another contention, similar to ones di; cussed above, is that Duke has failed to consider several alternatives to shipment.
As previously stated, Duke has examined a number of ways to increase the storage capacity at its pools.
These include, but are not limited to, reracking of the existing pools with poison racks, use of pin storage, and design, licensing and construction of an ISFSF at or away from Oconee but on the Duke system.
In 1976 Duke decided to utilize high density non-poison racks at each of its spent fuel pools then under construction or design.
Scheduling problems have prevented us from using poison racks ar Cconee so f ar but we are evaluating their use for the near future.
It should be noted that with poison racks installed at Cconee, full ccre reserve srcrage is estimated to be available only until sometime in 1933.
Thus, to provide full core reserve storage thereafter would require the design, licensing and construction of an ISFSF or shipment.
The cost of an ISFSF has been estimated at S44 million (1976 dollars) with a 1979 dollar cost of $34,500 per space.
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. The timing of these alternatives is of importance in planning for spent fuel storage as well.
Our planned reracking of Oconee 1, 2 with the high density, non-poison racks is scheduled for completion by late 1979.
As the award date for this project was December 1, 1978, the total project time is about one year.
This includes an abbreviated licensing review by the NRC.
The poison rack option is estimated to require additional time in that a lengthier licensing time is expected, more rack locations must be fabricated, and the production and testing requirements on these extremely close spaced racks are more stringent.
We esti -
.pproximately 2 years from award date to completion of installation for this option.
- Finally, the design, licensing and construction of an ISFSF is estimated to take five years to complete.
As no facility built specifi-cally for this purpose has been developed in the United States there is scarce experience to draw on.
It is important to analyze the storage capacity afforded by these options.
The following Table 2 describes the storage available with thu storage options discussed above assuming no transshipment between plants.
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TAlil.E 2 - SPENT FUEI. STORACE ltack Plant Deseth)tlose Rack Spacing Rack Spaces Total Date Plant I.oses FCR*
Oconee 1, 2 Original 21" 336 532 10/77**
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- Rack, 21" 216 FicGuire 1 liigli 15.5" 500 1000 1987 2
Density 15.5" 500 Ca tawlea 1 liigli 13.5" 1418 2836 2004 2
Density 13.5" 1418 l
Oconee 1, 2 liigli 13.75 750 1224 1982 g
3 Denalty 14.09 474 ticGuire 1 Poison
.10.50" 1200
~2400 1999 2
Racks 10.50"
~1200 lb Catawlia 1 Poison 10.25"
~2800
~5600 past 2005 CN q
2 Itacks 10.25" 2800 Oconee 1, 2
Poison 10.5
~1250
-2000 1988***
e_r5 3
Racks 10.5
~750 I
h No offsite f ue l stilpu.ent s--no t ransslii.) men t.
If Ocinee 3 lunt not licen reracked in 1976 to 474 spaces, Oconee w id liave lost station FCR on this date.
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- Tliis indicates tinit we maintain FCR through 1987 inic lose it someti:..e in 1988.
The storage capacity afforded by these options is important in the analysis of which option is best.
The following Table 2 describes the storage available with the storage options discussed above assuming no transshipment between plants.
The technical problems Duke is aware of at this time on alternatives to shipment are varied.
Scme of the major problems involved in backfittin plants today with additional spent fuel storage space include, but are not limited u,
keeping radiation doses to divers in underwater projects low, removal r.d disposal of the old racks, leveling methods, and backfitting the cooling capacities of the existing pool.
Poison racks are being imple=ented by utilities as seme of the problems with earlier designs are corrected.
Offgassing hydrogen and the chility of the poison materials to withstand the ef fects of water and/or r idiation are still of some concern, however we feel that in time this " maximum" type capacity will be available at a lower risk. Also, poison racks require a more lengthy technical review which adds scue uncertainty to scheduling.
It is also asserted that Duke has not adequataly considered utilizing existing space to its maximum capacity and also that the justification provided for not expanding the Unit 1, 2 pool is insufficient.
I would once again disagree on these points for several reascns.
The scheduling problems were the primary reason for deciding to rerack the Oconee 1, 2 pool with non-poison rather than poison racks. McVever, it should be noted that when the present reracking is completed, Duke vill have spent approximately $6 million in adding 672 spaces to the inir.ial capacity.
We are, at this time, once again reviewing the cost and feasibility of re-racking Oconee pools with poison racks.
'4e have evaluated the costs and environmental ef fects of shipment versus reracking and find shipment to 93 m, ; a.
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e be justified by the lower costs and negligible environmental effects of this method of providing storage on the Duke system.
The last contention proposed is that Duke should be bound by its full core reserve (FCR) standard or demonstrate that this capability is more valuable than the costs of shipment offsite of one core of spent fuel.
Duke is f a:niliar with needing full core reserve space to accccmodate the fu.1 discharge required for a vessel inspection.
Oconee 2 required defueling frem February 20, 1974 to April 5, 1974 to remove loose parts.
All three Oconee units required full core discharges in 1976 for re= oval of specimen holder tubes. Oconee 1 was down from April 18 to May 31 for its work, Oconee 2 was down from April 7 to July 12, and Oconee 3 was down from Leptember 18 to Nove=ber 11.
Fortunately, in each of these four (4) defuelings full core storage space was available, thus there was no added cost incurred because of the Lack of FCR.
In each of these four defuelings there would not have been a ha:atd to the public health and safety had the FCR not been available.
Had the FCR not been available, the fuel would have re=ained in the core with the unit out of service until the FCR was restored in the pool or sufficient storage space secured elsewhere. Thus, in these four defuelings the question of FCR or lack thereof is simply one of cost, not reactor safety.
Indeed, it is difficult to envision FCR as anytaing other than a question of cost.
From a cost standpoint it beccmes one of replacement power cos - what does it cost to generate the power lost from having an Cconee unit idle because of the lack of FCR.
This added production cost will depend upon where the replacement power is generated or purchased.
Mr. Sterrett will address this in detail.
As a general planning tool our Production if l
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- Engineers are using $165,000 per day as the replacement power cost of an Oconee unit - when it is available within the Duke system.
As another general rule, an additional 8000 tons of coal will be burned each day an Oconee unit is idle - that is if there is sufficient coal-fired capacity in reserve.
If not and purchase power is unavailable, it is then necessary to operate oil-fired combustion turbines. Duke's twenty-four combustion turbines consume 930,000 gallons of No. 2 fuel oil per day when operated at f ull load. Neither alternative is attractive.
Pickard Lowe and Garrick has recently conducted a Full Core Removal Study for the Edison Electric Institute. The Draft Report, issued May, 1979, rem that a light water reactor has a rean KR occurrence frequency (occurrences per reactor-year) of.145 - or once every seven years.
Based on our experience, the results of the Pickard Love and Garrick study and cost considerations we believe our plan to maintain a single FCR if possibic is good operating practice.
On May 22 the Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission announced it is amending 10 CFR Part 73 providing additional physical protection of spent fuel in transit. The April 18, 1979 memorandum from Mr. William J. Dircks, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, to the Commissioners proposing the amend =ent notes that implementation guidance vill be furnished on a case-by-case basis. Internal planning has already been initiated to assure that Duke can comply with the regulations when shipments cc==ence.
Since the route proposed for the Oconee-McGuire shipments lies within the Duke Power Company service area we forsee no dif ficulty in assuring that law enforcement agencias are ready to respond to emergencies or enlis for assistance.
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. Charlotte is identified in the NRC Interim Guidance for imple=enting these security regulations as a city of over one hundred thousand popu-lation which should be avoided by shipments of spent nuclear fuel. The guidelines does indicate that shipments can transit such areas under certain conditions with additional security precautions. We believe the I-85/I-77 route to be the safest and preferred route.
The short distance (170 miles) to be traveled should permit the shipments to be scheduled without overnight stops.
Large truck stops are spaced at appropriate intervals along the r~ te which should be appropriate for meal and rest stops. We are investigating safe havens along the route for use in event they are needed.
Tri-State Motor Transit, Inc. of Joplin, Missouri has been selected as the carrier for this initial movement. Tri-State is a nationally knavn hauler of hazardous =aterials. Procedures for coping with threats and safeguards e=ergencies will be developed in conjunction with Tri-State.
Tri-State has vehicle t=nobilization procedures to be followed in the event certain of its shipments are jeopardized.
Driver and escort training is being planned to include route infor-nation and emergency procedures. The escort will be provided with a Duke
? wer Ceepany two-way radio operating on established assigned frequencies.
It has been der sined that continuous contact over the entire route can be =aintained through base stations ar Oconee, Spartanburg Cgerating Center and the Central Operating Cente. in Charlotte. Overall training of driver and escorts will be coordinated through the Training and Safety Services Group in the Steam Production Department.
We foresee no difficulty in meeting these new security requirements.
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