ML19241B221
| ML19241B221 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002623 |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1979 |
| From: | Rosalyn Jones DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19241B218 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907130223 | |
| Download: ML19241B221 (15) | |
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D usNE-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Og $ N3 ?,;;i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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In the Matter of
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IXJKE POWER COMPANY
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(Amendment to Material License
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Docket No. 70-2623 SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear
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Station Spent Fuel Transportation
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and Storage at McGuire Nuclear
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Station)
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TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H.
JONES My name is Robert H.
Jones.
I am the Manager of Transportation Systems, Spent Fuel Services Cperation, General Electric Company, with offices at 175 Curtner Avenue, San Jose, California 95125.
I was graduated from San Jose State University, San Jose, California in 1966 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering.
I obtained a Masters degree in Business Administration (MBA) frca Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California in 1969.
I an a registered Mechanical Engineer and a Registered Nuclear Engineer in the State of California holding Registration Numbers 14364 and 0876 respectively.
I have been employed by General Electric since 1966.
My first three years were at General Electric's Vallecitos Nuclear Center where as a Program Engineer and later as a Design Engineer I worked in areas of reactor cperaticas, radiation protection, nuclear safety and reactor fuel performance testing.
For the last ten years I have been in the Spent Fuel Services Operation specifically associated with the conceptualization,,
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. design, analysis, licensing, fabrication, testing and operation of the General Electric IF-300 Irradiated Fuel Shipping Cask.
I have maintained and have enlarged my knowledge of nuclear fuel and waste packaging and transportation by participating in numerous industry activities including American National Standards Institutr; (ANSI) subcommittees ad hoc advisory committees to the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE), and subcommittees of the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF).
I have been involvec in numerous national meetings and international symposia relating to the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials, both as a speaker and a session coordinator.
I have presented oral and written testimony on spent fuel shipping equipment, safety and logistics to the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Oregon Energy Facilities Siting Counsel.
My current responsibilities require me to keep abreast of developments in nuclear fuel and waste systems such that I have maintained good working knowledge of the equipment which is being proposed or currently used to transport spent nuclear fuel and waste.
These systems include censideratien of the follcwing:
o Packaging design & technology o
Package testing
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o Transportation mode technology o
System logistics & economics o
Fabricaticn & Quality P.ssurance Sli9'~ u y 6 o
Regulatory requirements 1e o
Generic industry developments b) r IIO
. General Discussion Regarding packaging, the casks used to transport spent fuel and high level wastes are among the best designed and probably the most accident resistant of all hazardous material containers.
This can be illustrated by a series of full-scale vehicle tests, highway and rail, conducted by Sandia where representative casks were subjected to severe acci' dents under controlled and monitored conditions.
The test radioactive material containers survived the simulated accidents without loss of primary con-tainment functioning.III This accident resistant characteristic of shipping casks can be attributed to both the stringent design criteria con-tained in those Federal Regulations which pertain to packaging and transportation of radioactive materials, 49 CFR 171-177 (DOT) and 10 CFR 71 (NRC), and the quality of packaging design, fabrication, testing and in-service maintenance.
The efforts of industry and govern =ent to provide a safe system for the transportation of radioactive materials have been successful.
The final environmental statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes, NURIG-0170, estimates that risk of early fatality 2.2 radio-active causes as a result of nuclear material transportation is 100,000 times less likely than being struck by lightning.
- Surely, this is an acceptable risk considering tne benefits provided by nuclear-electric power.
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n, n-7W (1) Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Packaging &
Transportation of Radioactive Materials, May 7-12, 1978 - Las Vegas, Nev.,
U.S.A.,
pgs. 463-471.
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Packaging Reculations In this country the design criteria for spent fuel shipping casks are entablished by Federal Regulations, NRC and DOT.
Conditions of normal transport and accident con-ditions are defined by law, as well as acceptable normal and post-accident package behavior.
It is encumbent upon a licensee to demonstrate to the NRC's satisfaction package compliance with the applicable regulations, both initially and throughout the useful life of the package.
I will not spend time reciting the regulations in detail, but let me summarize the two evaluction conditions:
Normal transport for large casks (10 CFR 71, Appendix A) involves thermal conditions ranging from -40*F shaded to +130 F in full sunlight; a reduced pressure (1/2 atmospheric), expected in-transit vibrations and water spray; a free drop (generally 1 foot for spent fuel casks) onto an unyielding surface; and, a steel bar penetration test.
When subiected to these conditions, a package must remain essentially undamaged.
No releases of contents or coolant are permitt A.
No reduction in shieldinc or criticality control effectiveness is permitted.
Accident conditions (10 CFR 71, Appendix B) involve the sequential application of a 30-fcot free drop onto an unyielding surface, a 40-inch free drop onto the circular end of a 6-inch diameter bar, exposure to a 1475 F thermal environment for 30 minutes and immersion in 3 feet of water for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
The drop and pur.cture tests are applied with the package oriented to _
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produce the maximum damage.
When subjected to these accident conditions the package must retain its contents but is per-mitted to release contaminated coolant of limited activity and certain quant. ties of fission gas.
The dose rate exterior to the cask is permitted to increase somewhat over normal conditions but no reduction in criticality control effectiveness is permitted.
Cask Design, Fabrication and Use A cask designer has a fundamental goal which is to produce the safest package in full compliance with the applicable regulations.
This goal is pursued under a strict quality assurance program (10 CFR 71, Appendix E). The designer utilizes state-of-the-art methods, material and technology to achieve his goal.
Not only are sophisticated computer codes employed, but material testing, component testing, scale modeling and full size testing programs are often used to assist the designer.
The fabrication of a cask follows national codes and standards for nuclear service equipment.
The quality assurance program utilized for design is continued through the f abrication cycle.
NRC performs periodic inspections and audits of fabrica-tion to provide an independent view of that operation.
All casks undergo significant non-destructive testing of materials and processes during fabrication, and then are subj ect to rigorous acceptance tests folicwing fabrication.
Completed casks are subjected to a hydrostatic test of the cavity, seal, piping and valves at a pressure which is 501 greater than the design pressure.
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. Cask shielding continuity is confirmed by gamma scanning, that is, placing a radioactive source within the cavity and meascring the exterior dose rate.
Cask heat dissipation capability is measured by placing electric heaters within the cavity to simulate the spent fuel and recording the resultant temperatures.
Thermal test measurements are compared to the computer design code predictions.
Cask lifting devices are load tested at 150%
to 200% of the cask weight.
The entire shipping system is given a complete handling demonstration which includes remote re= oval /
replacement of the head, baskets and lif ting device from the cask as well as performing the transporter loading / unloading operations.
T'ie net result is a high quality package which fully ccmplies with the design and the appropriate regulations.
Finally, throughout its life a cask must ccmply with its design bases.
To achieve this, cask users follow detailed operating and maintenance plans which are produced by the cask supplier.
These plans are periedicall,y revised as operational data are accumulated.
Cask suppliers have skilled field service organizations whose function is to train users in the safe cperation of the package.
Loaded casks are carefully examined and tested prior to shipping.
Before each shipment casks are leak checked, tested for external contamination, checked for heat content, measured for external dose rate and examined for mechanical functioning.
The tran ort vehicles are also examined and tested for proper functioning period!cally and prior to each shipment.
As in the case of design and manufacturing, cask bb
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. operations are performed in accordance with an approved quality assurance program and are audited by NRC inspectors.
All of the above mentioned phases of cask supply and usage are conducted with exacting attention to safety and in full compliance with applicable laws.
The nuclear fuel shipping industry recognizes that it is involved in moving a hazardous commodity and takas that responsibility quite seriously.
The excellent safety record of spent fuel shipping discussed later is testimony to the care taken by suppliers, users and carriers.
Cask Details Spent fuel shipping casks come in a variety of sizes and configurations.
There are, however, a number of ccamon charac-teristics.
All current generation casks are about the same length, approximately 18 feet.
They are lcaded and unloaded from one end while standing vertically in a deep pool of water.
Cavity closures are remotely removable and spent fuel is positioned in the cask with scme type.of interior structure.
All casks are transported horizontally and raised to the vertical for leading and unloading through the use of a yoke mounted to the facility crane, and they are equipped with impact energy absorbing devices of one kind or another.
Of course, they all cceply with NRC and DCT regulations as evidenced by a Cartificate of Compliance issued by the NRC.
Casks fall into three categories based on transport mode:
legal weight truck, overweight truck and rail.
The following table shows the available and near-available casks for shipping current generation LWR r;ent fuel.
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TABLE 1 CASK DATA Cask Transport Spent Fuel Desicnation Sucolier Mode Caoacity, MTU NFS-4/NAC-1
[NuclearFuelServices L. Wt.' Truck 0.5
( Nuclear Assurar.ce Corp.
NLI 1/2 N.L. Industries L. Wt. Truck 0.5 TN-8/TN-9 Transnuclear, Inc.
O. Wt. Truck 1.5 IF-300 General Electric Rail 3.5 NLI 10/24 N.L. Industries Rail 4.7 TN-12 Transnuclear Rail 5.5 NAC-3 Nuclear Assurance Corp.
Rail 5.5
- Undergoing NRC evaluation The variations among cask designs are due to designer's preferencer and intended service.
Ga.:ma shielding. materials include steel, lead and depleted uranium; neutron shielding includes water, borated water and solid resin.
Cask surfaces, interior and e x. t e r i o r, are generally stainless steel or stainless steel-clad carben stecl; these materials are chosen for their mechanical properties and corrosion resistance.
The inner cavity,with its closure, forms the primary containment barrier and is usually the pressure boundary.
Surrounding the inner containment is the gamma shielding medium, usually heavy metal such as lead or depleted uranium.
Ex.terior to the gamma shielding is a secondary
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. steel containment which provides protection from puncture and containment of the gamma shielding medium.
There are several cask designs where the primary containment, secondary containment and gamma shielding are combined into a single thick-walled all-steel vessel.
Exterior to the secondary con-tainment is the neutron shielding, liquid or aolid.
The liquid shields are retained by a third steel containment.
The exterior of the.1.arger casks have fins or other extended surfaces to facilitate heat dissipation.
Casks are equipped with some type of energy absorbing structure, metal or clad-wood which limit the forces on the structure during accident conditions.
In some designs these structures are removable for in plant handling while others are permanently attached.
The cask closures are held with high-strength fasteners and sealed with ela stcmeric or metallic pressure retaining rings.
Seal materials are chosen for their durability and resistance to thermal, mechanical and radiation conditions.
All cask cavity penetrations are protected from the effects of fire and mechanical damage; valves are of nuclear quality.
Casks must dissipate heat from the contained fuel.
The coolants within the cask cavities include air, helium and water.
With the exception of the TN-3 and TN-9 casks, all units have the capability of shipping 3WR or PWR fuel assem lies, through the use of removable cavity structures.
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. The legal weight truck casks weigh about 25 tons and move with a gross vehicle weight (GVW) of about 73,000' pounds.
The over-weight casks weigh about 40 tons and move with a GVW of approxi-mately 105,000 pounds.
Rail casks are in two categories based on the number of axles on the rail car.
A four-axle car will carry a cask of 70 or 80 tons, plus its supporting equipment, with a gross weight on the rail of about 260,000 pounds.
A six-axle car will carry a 100 ton cask plus supporting equipment and weighs about 330,000 pounds on the rail.
All casks comply with DOT regulations for radiation dose-rates under normal transport conditions, and NRC and DOT regu-lations for accident dose rates.
Table 2 shews these regulatory limits as applied to spent fuel casks.
TABLE 2 DOSE-RATE LIMITS Max.
Condition Position Dose Rate Normal Package or vehicle surface 200 mR/hr Normal B' frem vehicle surface 10 mR/hr Accident 3' from package surface 1000 mR/hr M6
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. In actual practice, casks designed to these limits are well below them due to factors considered in the calculations which cause them to overestimate the dose-rate and the fact that fuel being shipped is generally of lower source strength than the fuel assumed for shield-sizing purposes (e.g. lower exposure or longer cooling times).
Although there are design dif ferences between cask types, the greatest common characteristic is that these are among the highest quality, most accident-resistant containers designed for the movement of hazardous materials.
Sandia Crash Tests Discussion My familiarity with the Sandia Full Scale Vehicle Testing (FSVT) program comes from my participation on an ad hoc advisory committee to Sandia.
All of the truck-mounted casks were formerly cwned by General Electric, one was donated to Sandia as a demonstration of GE's support of the program.
The FSVT program was conducted with two objectives, 1) to assess the ability of current analytical and scale modeling metheds to predict the behavior of full-size systems under accident conditions and 2) to gain quantitative knowledge of the extreme acciden: environment by measuring the response of full-size hardware.
These tests were not intended to validate current regulatory standards for casks although it is pcssible to make scoe comparisons and reach certain conclusions about the relative severities.
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. The Sandia tests may be summarized as follow.3:
The first two full scale vehicle tests involved the head-on collision of a tractor-trailer rig carrying a 25-ton cask into a reinforced concrete wall backed by compacted earth.
Impact speeds wer; 100 km/h (62 mph), and 135 km/hr (84 mph).
In both tes' the cask remained intact and the contents were retained.
It is interesting to note that the cask used in the 100 km/hr test was so undamaged that it was subsequently used in the higher speed test.
The third test was a simulated grade-crossing accident where a cask-bearing tractor trailer rig was struck by a diesel locomotive traveling at 130 km/hr (81 mph).
The locomotive was literally destroyed but the cask sustained relatively minor damage, retaining its contents and integrity.
The fourth test was the impacting of a 100 ton rail car transported cask into the concrete /
earth wall at a velocity of 130 km/hr (81 mph).
As in the preceding tests the cask sustained minor damage.
The last test involved subjecting the crashed rail cask to a pool fire.
The fire ranged to 1150*C (1796*F to 2102*F) and lasted 100 minutes.
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u At this time a slight lead leak developed but the cask integrity was not ccmprcmised.
The program of course, was more than full-scale testing.
As a matter of fact, the crash tests, were the last phase.
Computer sim 11ations and scale model studies were performed prior to the ful) -sized test sequence.
In each instance the impact effects on the ful.-scale system were accurately predicted by io' the analytical and modeling techniques.
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. One of the studies condtcrea by Sandia in support of the FSVT program was an assessment of the probabilities of the various accident scenarios.
The following table shows that the likelihood of the least severe test scenario (100 km/hr impact) is once in 70 years.
As noted above the cask involved in this test was so undamaged that it was also used in the 135 km/hr impact test.
The other tested scenarios are significantly less likely.
Table 3 Accident Probabilities Aporeximate Interval
- Accident Scenarios (averags nu=ber of years butveen accidents) 70 100 b/h Truck I= pact 130 b/h Truck I= pact 1C00 130 h/h Grade Crossing 4500 115 k=/h Special Railcar I= pact 5900 130 km/h Special Railcar I= pact 18000 Combined 130 b/h Special Railcar 6
I= pact and 120 minute Fire 10 30 minute Railersk Fire, No I= pact 120 60 minute Railcask rire, No Impact 350 90 minute Railcask Fire, No I= pact 450 120 minute Railcask Fire, No I= pact 700 0
As sumtng 11 x 10 km transport distance per year.
The Sandia project nanager concluded ( }
the folicwing abcut the FS'7T programl (2) Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on the Transportation and Packaging of Radioactive Materials, Page 470, May 7-12, 1978, Las Vegas, Nevada.
(3) Ibid.
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"...the tests demonstrated that (1) scale modeling (impact only) and analytical techniques can re-liably predict the response of spent fuel cask systems in severe impact and fire environments, and (2) spent fuel casks can be expected to retain their radioactive contents even after being in-volved in extremely severe transportation accidents....
In addition, much information has been gained on the behavior of the cask and transport system in extreme environments."
I would add that although not a program goal, the FSVT generally demonstrated the ir.herent ruggedness of spent fuel chipping casks designed to Federal regulations.
Historv of Spent Fuel Shipments Over two million packages of radioactive materials are shipped annually by air, rail and truck.
These shipments include radiopharmaceuticals, power reactor fuels, and radio-active wastes.
Transportation of these materials has bee.n safe and secure.
To date, there have been no fatalities or serious injuries due to the radioactive nature of these materials.
Spent fuel shipping casks have been involved in verv few in-transit accidents, none of which have damaged the transported (4) NURIG-0170, FES on Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes, December, 1977.
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General Electric Company's Morris (Illinois) Facilley has received approximately 500 shipments of irradiated fuel, mostly by highway cask.
The total highway distance traveled is about 2 million kilometers (1.24 million miles) and this was accomplished without an accident.
Based on an overall accident rate for hazardous
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materials motor carriers of 1.06 x 10 accidents / kilometer, there should have been two incidents rather than none.
The reasons for this better-than-average safety record are greater attention to safety in the inspection and securing of the load and vehicle, and the skills level and training of the drivers.
Most casks are moved by carriers specialized in hauling these commodities.
The low accident probability coupled with both the care taken in rransit and the accident resistant nature of the cask, makes the shipment of irradiated fuel anong the safest of any hazardous commodity.
This conclusion is supported by the record.
Concidsien In light of the above I find no technical or institutional reasons why spent flel shipping shculd not be viewed as an acceptable activity.
(5)
Ibid.
Dated:
June 4, 1979 b\\4
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