ML19241A638

Transcript of 790530 Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Status of 790502 Event at Facility.Pp 1-32.Documentation Encl

ML19241A638
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	05/30/1979
From:	Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:
References
REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7907090019
Download: ML19241A638 (48)

Text

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NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION r

s IN THE MATTER OF:

STATUS OF MAY 2 EVENT AT OYSTER CREEK

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Place - Washington, D. C.

1 - 32 Date.

Wednesday, May 30, 1979 Pages 311 036 r.,. _..

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(202)347-3700 ACE - TEDERAI, REFORTERS, DiC.

Official Esporters

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.ua Ner n C::itel Street

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q Weshingten. 0.C. 20001 Q\\,V, NATICNWICE COVERAGE - D All 907090

$7

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n DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States May 30, 1979 in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Wednesday, Commissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N.W.,

Washington, D. C.

The This transcript meeting was open to public attendance and observation.

has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.

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The transcript is intended solely for general informational As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal purposes.

or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.

Expressions of opinion in this transef1pu av act nccessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.

No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.

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1 UNITED STATES OF AM. ERICA cm 507' 1i i

h :iman NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION ieri 2]

i j

5.TATUS OF MAY 2 EVENT AT OYSTER CREEK

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4' j

Recm 1130 5

1717 H S treet, N.W.

Washington, D. C.

6 7!

Wednesday, May 30, 1979 s

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The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m.

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9l BEFORE:

1 10 i DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman 11 VICTOR GILINSKY, Ccmmissioner j

I 12 '

RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner I

I f

13 '

PETER A. BRADFO RD, Commissioner 1

l 14.

ALSO PRESENT:

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I 15 j H. Denton 16 l D. Eisenhut I

17 L. Gossick 18 E. Jordan I?

J. Davis i

20 Mr. Moseley 21 Mr. Check i

n ni 2.1 223.;a:ersi necemrs. rne..

311 038 25

Zi CR 50h8 l

HOFFMAN t-8 mte 1 l !

CHAIRMAN HENDRII:

Now let's see.

If the staff

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i 2

members will come up to the table.

I invite C thers to come, l

g 3'

go and stretch, or whatever suits.

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4{

MR. DENTON:

We have a two-part presentation planned i

5; on the abnormal occurrence at Cyster Creek on May 2nd.

We 6l talked to Commissioner Gilinsky about this several days ago.

i 7'

The first part will be by I&E, who will discuss those aspects 8

related to the response of the applicant to the NRC's official 9

notification.

We'll discuss the technical evaluation of the 10 occurrence itself, the tech spec changes we have required as 11 !

a result of the occurrence and procedure changes in the l

12 operator training aspects.

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Based on our technical review, we conclude that it 13 14 is safe to permit the license 9 to resume operation.

1 15 Let me turn it over to John.

I I

16 MR. DAVIS:

Ed Jordan, who discussed this originally i

17 down here on May 3, will be our principal spckesman.

It's 18 like going tc the Hill.

You bring 100 copies with you.

I 1

19 l (Laughter.)

20 MR. JORDAN :

Could I have the Slide II-2, please?

21 '

(Slide.)

22 Great.

23 '

The facts of the May 2nd event were established by 24 an inter-of fice team assembled at the site on May 3rd.

The

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ac -.c.r.

n. corms. inc. q 25 j team censisted of 11 NRC enployees, the Region 1 regicnal 311 039

3 mee' 2 i

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director, three reactor inspectors, health physicists, a radi I 1'I 2l ation environmental specialist, four NRR specialists and a i

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public affairs representative.

n 4 'i The inspection consisted of reviews of the circum-5; stances surrounding the event, a review of the procedures I

6 used by the licensee, and interviews with the operating staff.

7l Based on the results of this review, the inspectors concluded i

I 8j that the procedures lid not give sufficient specific cat. tion t

9l on recirculation loop isolation to the operators, and that the i

operator training had not been sufficient to ensure the 10 I

i proper awareness of instrument sensing locations and the 11 i

potential for level difference indication between the core and 12 I

the annulus regicns.

13,

i The two major contributor s to this event appear to ja i

be the f ailure to modify a procedure. folicwing the plant nodi 15 ficaticn, and t".e failure to folicw a procedu. e 'h.ich prchibited clcsure of theKM h:cticn and discharce val'.us cf a55 recilm :la'lcn lecps si.:ulta: ecus:

i 17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Are you going to explain that?

18,

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MR. JORDAN:

I can.

But I'11 wait and follow through 19 20 the sequence of events in detail for you.

In fact, this is a gcod tine to break to that.

CHAIRMAN '-IENDRIE:

I'd just as socn have a laying 2:

23 cut of the event for those--:.f -here are any in the audience 24 who are pu:: led, I will remark that cn May 2r.d Cyster Creek se,-<ecera, seconm. s ee.

chrough a series of water level matters in the vessel.

25 went 311 040

4 I

=te' 3 F

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And I look forward with great interest to seeing aat we think

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f happened and why this stuf f slashed around the way it did.

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MR. DESTON: CmaxilEisenhut and Paul Check will discuss

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l that.

4; l

5l MR. CHECK:

I'm Paul Check, Reactor Safety Branch, t

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6l Director of Ccerating Feacters. With me today are members of the t

I brancr, also the Plant Systems Faranch, the DOR, as well as the 7

-DOR project manager and his chief.

8 Mr. Chairman, I had planned on introducing remarks j

9 i

i describing the event with a little description of the plant.

jo 11 We could skip that, if you wish, and go right to the event.

I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I think some brief comment about 7

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13 the plant is likely to be useful to all assembled.

I MR. CHECK:

Let me focus us in Slide 1, then, on the 14 15 purpose of our portion of the presentation.

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16 (Slide.)

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Which is to descrite the plant, the event at the 17 -

13 plant, en May 2nd, discuss the safety censiderations I ? lated 19 I thereto, anc describe the actions taken as a result.

l As a brief bit of backgrounc a Slide 2, we shcw 20 sece:hing of the biblicgraphy of Cyster Creek.

21 i

(Slide.)

22 33 The.clant is owned and cperated bv. Je rs ev. Central I

24 Power & Light Ccmpany, a subsiciary of the General Public Asmu a.cocen, inc.

25 ] Utilities.

It's located in New Jersey apprcximately 35 miles 1

1 31i 041 3

o mte' 4 I

north of Atlantic City.

1 I l

The reactor is a General Electric BWR 2.

It's one 2l l

of 11 plants under review in the systematic evaluation program. l, l

3 i

m l

4!

The plant went into power operation. in mid ' 69.

Currently, it 5'

is loaded with fuel manuf actured by Exxon. Over the past several t

years, it's bad an availability of about 75 percent.

6 (Slide.)

7l s!

Although this gets a little bit ahead of the story, 9,

I want to distinguish at this point between Oyster Creek and i

l 10 l p lants like it, for which this event has implications, and the i

I 11]

reason f or doing chis ic, I think, going to become apparent 12,

quickly.

The purpose is to allow us to proceed as efficiently J

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13 as possible in taking whatever prompt regulatory actions are i

14 l required.

15 Okay, on Slide 4 --

t 16 I (Slide.)

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l 17 l

-- we show a typical boiling water reactor, a GE l

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direct cycle 1930-=egawatt boiling water reactor, which i

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19 Cyster Creek is.

During operation, steam is produced in the i

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20 reactor, ficws to the steam lines.

It expands to the turbine,

21 which drives the generater.

22 Spent steam is then ccndensed in the main condenser,

23 returned through the reactor feedwater system.

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24 The containment you see there includes the drywell Acs-ace,v Reoorters, Inc.

I 25 which hcuses the reacter, and the suppressicn chanher corus.

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3i1 042 1

6 f

mee 5 i

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l' Steam released in the drywell is vented to the torus end l

i 2l condensed as the torus water.

3' Slide 5, we get a little closer now to what this l

4' reactor looks like, 5

(Slide.)

i l

6' The steam supply system.

The reactor, with five i

7 recirculation loops.

Only one is shown explicitly here.

It's 8;

typical, of course.

There are four others.

There is main i

9 steam piping and there is feedwater piping.

I 10 l The system is also equipped with an isolation ecoling i

11 !. system, consisting of circulation piping and condensers, I

12 '

designed to previde for heat removal from the reactor via, r

13 natural circulation.

The main steam piping is equipped with I

la relief valves inside the drywell.

It can be operated either i

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15 l autcmatically or manually to relieve excess pressure and to

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l 16 cepressurize tne system.

17 Each of the two steam lines is also equipped with an l

l 18 isolat?.on valve to isolate the pressure vessel either auto-19 l1 matically or manually.

The feedwater piping delivers water The 20 to the annular regicn er dcwncccer of the reactor.

21 feedwater mixes in this annular regicn with recirculaticn 1

22 water and 's then rcuted cc che core thrcugh the recirculacion locps.

4-

• 4 The variable speed recirculation pumps take sucticn 2c, s,cers a oomn, ice.

e he e n the 25 frcm the annular region of che pressure vs

7 ste 6 1

t

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1 vessel wall and the core shroud, through a normally open i

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2 suction valve and discharge water through a discharge valve i

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equipped with a two-inch bypass line, into the bottem of the l

l 4l pressure vessel.

There are five such recirculation Iceps, as i

f 5

I said before, for Oyster Creek.

And all sucticn, discharge 6,

and bypass valves are normally open during operation.

l 7'

At the time of the May 2nd event, one of these 8,

recirculation loops, Loop D, was out of service awaiting 9

replacement parts for a pump seal.

Two of the recirculation 10 loops, A anci E, have ten-inch connections on the suction side 11 !

of the recirculation pump, upstream of the isolation valve.

12 These connections are the return lines frcm the isolation

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13 condensers.

14 There are two isolation condensers.

These are i

15 connected to the reactor vessel steam region on the suction 16 side of the recirculation loops, A and E, as I mentioned a i

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17 mcment ago.

These isolation condensers provide a loop for la natural circulation through the reactor core.

19 When operating, the system receives steam from the 20 i reac:cr vessel, the steam is condensed and returns as water 21 to the recirculation lcep.

The system 13 actuated auncmaticall 22 cn detection of a persistent signal by either high reacecr 23 pressure or icw icw reactor water level.

The system v.ay 24 also be actuated manually be the cc.erator.

s A CS E *JC tf ti Rt00r'tr1,Inc.

25 Slide 6, please.

311 044

S mte 7 j

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l i (Slide.)

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2l As I said earlier, steam from the reactor drives the !

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main turbine generator.

It's then condensed and returned to i

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the reactor via one-third capacity condensate pumps and three 4

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I one-third capacity feed pumps.

The condensate feedwater and 1

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1 recirculation pumps are powered normally in operation frcm the i

6 l

station and nonvital 4160 Volt buses A, lA and 13 of electri-7 3

city, as conveniently shown in red.

During normal operation, f

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9l these buses receive power f rom the auxiliary trans former, t

10 l connected directly to the generator.

Start-up transformers SA and SB provide power to 11 i

i buses LA and 13 during plant shutdown.

Condensate pump 1A, 12 ;

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13 feed pump 1A, recirculation pumps A, C and E all receive power 14 from nonvital bus lA.

Condensate pumps 13 and C, feedwater I

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pumps 13 and C, and recirculation pumps B and D receive power l

l h5,

from bus 13.

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i 17 The point here is that at the time of the May 2nd i

I ja event, start-up transformer S3 was out of service, as permitted 1

19 !

by technical specifications, to perform a routine inspection of its associated 4160 Volt cabling.

This point may have 20 21 been the subject of some confusien at the previous briefing.

22 I want to make the point here that that transformer was cut 23 per technical specifications, for routine surveillance.

I 24 had been cut for apprcximately two hours befcre the even.

2 4 4.e.rv w rin.inc.)

,e -

CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Two hcurs?

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311 045 i

9 i

i mte 8 i

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I MR. CHECK:

Two hours, ves, sir.

It is cermitted to 1f 1

2 be out of service for seven days.

Also, all the feedwater pumps were in service.

That j 3

i was another point.

It wasn' t clear, at least initially, in l

4 I

5l the earlier briefing.

All feedwater pumps were in service.

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l 6l Back to Slide 5, now, Frank, I think.

I We want to point out that in order to =cnitor system I

7 llpe rf ormance, instrumentation is provided to sense reactor 8

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9l water level, reactor pressure, valve position, recirculation i

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10 !

flow rate and other system parameters.

Reactor water level l

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6 11 l 1s =cnitored by three different types of level measuring i

l 12 devices.

These instruments sense low level and low icw level t'

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g-in the annular region of the pressure vessel, and icw low icw 13 or triple low level inside the shroud above the core.

i y

t As I said earlier, on May 2nd all plant systems were 15 i

i 16 ;

in normal lineup, with the exception of the start-up trans-former S3 and the recirculation loop D.

Start-up transicrmer 17 was removed frem service for maintenance.

Recirculation pump D la 19 had been removed about two months earlier f rom the system, due i

to a seal leak.

20 The discharge valve was closed, the suction valve 21 w

c c. e n, the discharc.e hve. ass valve cc.en, and a plate was so there was discharged over the opening in the pump housing, 23 24 continuity in the locp.

Acedeceral A eoorTers, lec.

25 Ckay.

Now, getting to the event.

In your handouts

.I 31I ogg

10 mte 9 I

Let's show you have a figure which is perhaps unnumbered.

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the fic.ure that shows she secuence.

Slide 7, it is.

And i

2, i

that's what you' re icoking for.

3 i

(Slide.)

4 (.

We can' t keep it up there all the time, but it i

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6; would be handy to refer to.

We're going to show you the reactor I

and what's going on.

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We'll go back to 5, Frank, and state that at the I

g, I

t time of the event, which was 1:51 p.m.,

the reactor was at 9

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10 l 98 percent power.

1 CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

1:51?

11 i

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i 12 l MR. CHECK:

The afterncon of the 2nd of May.

The l

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i reacter was at 98 percent pcwer and the water level was at 13 14 ;

13 feet, 4 inches, above th ; core.

Feedwater flow and recir-i s

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15 culation flow are normal.

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16 l What I'm going to present new is a summary of the i

1:7 !

important elements of the transient.

One thing -- the i

la initiating event.

While conducting routine tests in the 19 !

isolation condenser actuation system, an instrument technician caused the hydraulic disturbance in the instrumen: line that 0

was sensed by the reactor protection system as a high reactor

)

pressure condition.

22 t

The reactor protecnicn system scrammed the reac: Or

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and tripped the recirculation pumps.

This reactor recircula-AC9 E*C1rdt 9 tOO r'T rt, I nc.

25 tion pump trip, it is interesting to note, is what we call an 311 047

11 mee 10 '

l i

1 ATWS pump trip.

It is something that was installed in the

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2l fall of last year, more or less at our urging, as a product i

i of our ATWS review.

3, I

l Okay.

Immediately then, the reactor water level I

4 I

l began decreasing due to collapse of steam bubbles in the core. j 3

l What Frank is going to show here is -- it should be in two 6'

7l colors, but 'it isn' t.

It would be too apparent.

We're going t

try t show the level within the shroud area that is 8

directly above the core and that in the annulus, 9

t Okay.

Immediately the reactor water level began 10 (

11 l decreasing due to collapse of steam bubbles in the core, also the continuing ficw of feedwater.

But the feedwater pumps 12,

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r were on.

The continued flow of feedwater to the annulus 13 ccoled and shrunk the water in the downccmer, this annulus l

14 l

15 regien.

16 !

At 13 seconds, the turbine generatcr trips.

Auto-1 i

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matic transfer of loads -- Frank, cerhaps if we went back to lee' 6 for a minute, it would be useful to lock at this diagram la I

I 19 i again.

I t

Automatic transfer of loads frem the auxiliarv

,0 transformer to the start-up transformers was successful for

3.,.

- cransformer SA, but failed, of course, for S3, because start-uc it was cut of service.

This left feed and condensate pumps 24 13 and 1C without pcwer, and they tripped temporarily.

ACS Efderal RecorMrt, IOC.

23 Condensate pump 1A alcne cculd not meet the suction 311 048

mte 11 i

1, pressure requirements of feedwater pump 1A.

So feedwater pump 1.:

2; tripped.

This is a kncwn characteristic of the feedwater i

3l system.

I 4

We now have a loss of feedwater transient.

5, Perhaps we can go back to 5.

I 6i The operator at this point makes an unsuccessful 7'

attempt to restart feedwater pump 1A.

This was due, we l

l 3

learned later, to a lack of a permissive signal from the 9

lubricatien system.

Oil pur.ps provide lubrication to feedwater.I There was a lack of a permissive signal which indi-10 '

pumps.

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cated that the feedwater pump was being adequately lubricated.

12 So he couldn' t start up t!.e feedwater pump.

j r

13 At this point --

i 14 CCMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:

What is the line below the l

l 15 water level?

16 MR. CHECK:

That's a mistake.

This is an artist's 17 conception of Cyster Creek.

18 CCMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:

Yeah, you kncw them artists.

MR. CHECK:

We didn' t QA the slides suf ficiently.

19 l ou say there was not a v

20 ccMMIssicNzR KznNEDv.

21 signal?

This is just a failure of signal er an actual 22 failure?

23 MR. CHECK:

I don' t want to get into ecc nuch 24 de t ail.

We can if you wish.

But functionally, a signal cr Acs Weceral A eoo,'ers, I nc.,

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a condition which would allcw the feedwater pumpt to star: cp

-e 311 049

13 i me.e 12 i

1l didn't exist.

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2' COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Was that because of a failure?,

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3 MR. CHECK:

A breaker f ailed to close or open.

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i 4,

CCMMISSICNER KENNEDYr It's not -he question of the

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whole loop' 1

6' MR. CHECK:

No.

It's a minor electrcmechanical I

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e-8 7;

problem.

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10 ll !

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12 r

l 13 l 14 ll l'

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16 '

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I 19 l

i 20 22

~. n Acs.;w:c i ars.n. inc.

25 'l l

311 050 u

.t

CR 5078 49

,DAV/PV 14 i

I I

l Ckay.

Ne're still at 13 seccads, and counting.

i i

l 2i, At about tnis time, then, the water level decreases j

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3l to the icw-level SCRAM set point.

Had the plant nct SCRA>1'd new; m

4' it would upon reaching the 11'5" set point above the core, i

I 5,

At 43 seccnds, wnen the water level was 8'3" above I

I 6! the core, the cperator initiated the closure of the main steam i.

7! isolation valve to conserve inventory.

I 8'

I will trv to back up a little bit in the talk.

l 9j Inventory is, of course, important here.

The feed-l 10 l water pumps were on until about 30 seconds ago; that is, until i

11 ! the turbine generator tripped.

So supply was continuing to the i

12 i reactor.

That's fine.

At the same time, of course, the steam I

r' 13 lines were open, and water in the form of steam was leaving the l

14 ; vessel, but this was balanced.

Feedwater pumps had tripped at I

4 15 13 seconds; and new 30 seconds later, because the cperator kncws!

l

, he wants to conserve inventory, he isolates the reactor by clos-!

16 17 ing the main steam isolation valves, so now he has a closed 18 system and one of constant inventory.

I 19 j This action would have happened autcmatically 30-cdd l

seccnds later, we calculate, en the basis of a kncwledge of 20 When the 21 hcw rapidly the water level was running in the annulus.

22 ' water level reaches a icw-icw set point --

7'?"

="cVe che ccre 22

-- a signal is generated to isolace the reacccr, cicse the main 4

steam isclacicn valves.

4 AcsNmi seco, us, inc.

25 Thac, of course, d.

act happen here, because the 311 051

pv2 i

I 15 t

I cperator interrupted -- properly -- the sequence cf events.

I l'

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2l At a minute and a quarter into the event, the cpera-l t

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3' tor put an isolation condenser into service and began a cen-

! trolled cooldewn program of intermittert isolatien cendenser f

4 I

i 3

operation.

This was carried out ever the next half-hour.

New, here is an inportant point:

The procedures 6,

I 7; governing isolation condenser operation instruct the operator to 3 close the discharge valves en recirculation lecps A and E, the i

I

! two leops to which the isolation condensers are connected.

ThisI 9-I I

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' is to protect against an excessive ficw condition in the cen-10 t

11 l denser piping that would actuate the break-sensing auccmatic 12 ! isolation provisions of the isolatica condenser.

High-ficw con-i l

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' ditions in the isolation condenser are sensed autcmatically as 13 14 a break in that system, and autcmatically then the reactor takes l 15 ' steps to isolate itself to isolate the break.

16 This system, this break-sensing system, was especially 17 l sensitive during the time when recirculation pumps ccntinued to They pulled water dcwn frem the isolation condensers.

But la run.

19 as I mentioned earlier, these recirc pumps were tripped on the i

90, event or shortiv. thereafter because of the ATWS c.um.

t r i c..

21 Here, perhaps, is where a procedure hasn't caught up 22 with the actual modification of the plant.

At this same cime, l

22'the operator apparently closed the discharge valves in recircu-24 lation lecps 3 and C, as well, mest prchably in preparacion for AM 8"def al S tOQ f*tr1, I FC.

is recuired 25 restarting these pumps. Cicsing the discharge valves 311 052

pv3 i

16 l

1 hy precedure for restarting pu=ps.

i I

i I

S 2

So, he's got two procedures together:

Cne of t.am i

l 3

was perhaps cut of date.

The otner one, he maybe shouldn' t have l l

4; been locking at quite so quickly.

i 5

But at any rate, he prepared to start the recirc pumps i

6l by closing the discharge valves, but he didn's carry through on i

7 the action.

l 1

s' In a minute and a half, then, we have not an isolation l

9 condition, but certainly a choked-flow condition.

It's not true '

t l

10 1 of isolation.

A chcked-ficw condition between the annulus and I

11 the core, the only path being through the bypass lines arcund f

12 l each of the discharge valves and each of the five loops.

(.

In a minute and a half after the event --

13 14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Five lcops or four loops?

4 f

15 l MR. CHECK:

Five.

There are five, althcugh one was i.

i I

16 out of service.

It has the same bypass capacity.

1 l

17j CCMMISSICNER KENNEDY:

The bypass was open?

Okay.

18 !

MR. CHECK:

Yes.

19,

At a minute and a half, then, the icw-level alarm 1

20 cleared as water was added to the annulus from the isolation 21 ' condenser.

The inventcry in isolation ccndenser just scrt of 22 whceshed in, and the level, at abcut three ninutes into the l

22ievent, the icw-Icw-Icw er triple-icw condition inside the shrcud 24 was alarmed.

This correspcnds to 5'6" above the core.

.Lcg earJeral Af 00rtgrf, I FC.

25 The operator continued contrciling reacecr cecidcwn 311 053 3

.I

pv4 i

l 17 1 1

1 ! with an isolation condenser ficw.

l t

2i We new skip to about a half-hour af ter the SCRAM, but

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3, observe that it was during this peried -- Shat is, frcm three -

l l

I 6

4; actually, frem seven minutes to 32 minutes -- that the minimum i

1 5' water lavel has been calculated to occur.

The minimum calculated I

levels ranged frcm one foot to 3-1/2 feet above the core; under l i

1 6l i

7; the alarm point, but above the cere.

s MR. EISENHUT:

Scmewhere in that hatched crea.

9 MR. CHECK:

Right.

i 10 MR. EISENHUT:

Cepending on different assumptions in l

11 l;the calculations.

l

}

i 12 MR. CHECK:

We'll talk about the calculations in a I

13 little bit.

I l

14 At 32 minutes, then, the operator restarted recircula>

15 tion pu=p C, but upon learning that the water level in the annu,

16 ! lus had dropped three feet in less than two minutes, he shut down 17 the pump and isolated it to investigate it.

18 At this time, the icw-lcw-low level alarm apparently 19 ! cleared.

At 39 minutes, the operator placed recirculation pump 20 A in service.

This re=cved the disparity in water level between 21 the annulus and the ccre, the resui-= ~ Tavel being 11'4" above

'I 22, the cere.

It equilibraced at that point.

22 At one heur, the startup cransformer that had been 24 Out of service fer the surveillance was returned te service.

And ac..a.m a oemn. i-c.

25 in nine hours, the reacter reached a cold shutdcwn -- eight 0:

311 054

pv5 i

18

-l, I

I I

i 1

nine, in that area.

l l

2' Okay, new, we get to cu; safety review.

j I

t 3,

As 2 underteck to review the May 2 event, it was curj

.i s

i l

purpose first to establish that the plant was in a safe, stable 4

i condition; secend, to determine what, if any, prcmpt regulater_

l 6, actions were required for other plants; third, to assess syste-i 7 !.matica11y the condition of the reactor and its readiness to start I

5; up again.

i t

To get firsthand information regarding the event, the ;

9 I

10. condition of the plant, we sent a f actfinding team to the site i

11 ll that worked with the I&E team already there.

On the basis of 12; their telephone report back to us on the afternoon of the 3rd, F

13 we were able to confirm cur earlier reports frem the licensee, I

1 i

14 and I&E, that the plant was in a sa:e, stable condition.

i 15 We were also able to make a c. reliminarv. findine. that f

1 16 1, the principal f actor contributing to the severity of the event i

17 was the interruption of the gcad hydraulic cenmunication between f

13 l the annulus and the core region of the reactor.

With this lat-o 19 !ter information, we knew we could confine our inmediate attentien 20 ; for other reactors to ncn-jet pu=p awas, because en a jet pump 21 plant there is no way to isolate the ccre frca the annulus. As 22 4 uck would have it, en May 3 no non-jet pu o SWRs sere Operating.

1

l 23 l So, with Cyster Creek determined safe and ne prcrpt regulatory acticn apparently needed for other plants, we con-24 AcsJedef al Aeocruri. Irc. (

25 tinued with our systematic review.

Before permitting Cyster 3Il 055

pv6 f

19 l

i I

I Creek ec start up, we needed ta find that the core was is li I

i 2j damaged, that the event would not reoccur.

Also, we had to j

i 1

examine whether any other actions needed to be taken - fcr exr7 e, 3

s I

i 4L by Inspection and Enforcement -- to the condition of the core l

I l

5 questien, to determine that the core was undamaged.

l l

I Calculaticns of minimum water level were performed 6;

7! by Exxcn, General Electric on behalf of the licensee, and by us.

l.

g' Throughout the event, the rate at which the water-steam mixture I.

l

! in the reactor could accept heat exceeded the rate at which heuc 9'

I i

i 10 l was transferred arem the fuel to the water.

Thus, it would be i

I l

l 11 ; suf ficient to show that the core remained covered.

I l

12 l All calculations indicated that the core did not I

/~

13l uncover.

I 14 i To suppor+ the conclusion of no core damage, the ii

, licensee and we examined plant records for radiclegical evidence 15 I

16 Iof core uncovery.

i (Ccemissioner Bradford leaves the reem at 2:48.)

17 ;

i le !

MR. CHECK:

We found that the reactor ccolant sa=cle 19, analyses f rom before and several days after the event showed no 20 'i unusual increases in concentratiens of radienuclides.

21 Also, the continuously recorded signals frca the plan 22 ' stack and the steam air ej ector acnico 3 shcwed no unusual 22 increases of airborne radioactivity.

24 We have concluded fr:m all of this that the ccre was ACS 4?Cef 31 AeCor*ers, IFC.

25 nce damaged.

3II 056

e. v7 20 l

I ll, Safety analyses of a spectrum of postulated translerms

^

i 2:Iand analyses are performed for each plant.

The respense of the l

3l plant is shcwn generally by calculation to be 1cceptable: that l

i

\\

~

4 is, to meet specified acceptance criteria. These acceptance l

5' criteria, or simulations of pcstulated events, take explicit i

I 6 l,credit for certain equipment and design features in the plant; t

l I.

i i

7 where this is done, and to assure that things will go as analyced, I

technical specifications are established to assure the availa-g i

i i

9l bility and correct operation of the assenti:1 equipment.

I i

10 But, again, on May 2, the loss-of-feedwater transient.

l 11, did not proceed as expected, because essential equiement was nott i

t i

I i

12 ; operated as assumed; specifically, the discharge valves and the f

13 recirculation loops were closed.

I i

14 The licensee has now performed and we have reviewed i

15 a suitably bounding analysis for events of this type.

Further, 16 the licensee has proposed, and we have accepted, technical speci-i 17l fication changes which will assure that the plant matches the I

18 assumptiens of the safety analysis. Specifically, these tech spec

> changes require that the sucuien and discharge valves en each of 19 l

20 two recirculation icops remain open to guarantee easy hydraulic i

21 cc=munication between the annulus and the core.

Also, the icw-22 1cw water level signal that has been assumed in the analysis to 1

22 actuate the isolation ccndensu:.3 would be added as a limiting 24 safety system setting.

icea.c r.

nemmn. inc.

25 Finally, to emphasize 'ts import ance and cc remcVe 3l1 057

pv8 v

1 i

I any ambigulty, the low-low-lcw water level has been establ =hed i

i

^

1:

t 2 as a safety linit for all =cdes of reactor operation.

I I

3' With these technical specification changes, we have i

ccmpleted our technical review cf the May 2 event at Cyster Creek 4

i 5, and are reasonably assured that it won't recccur.

I 6l In connection with cne other thing, I&E has been lock-i I

7' ing at certain things.

One thing that remains before reccmmend- ;

1 I

gi ing that the Oyster Creek plant be permitted to resume cperation l

9 is a finding by I&E that the licensee has attended to these

\\

i 10 ; matters within the secpe of that office -- f or example, that I

i 11 needed procedure revisiens and indicated cperator training have i

l i

12 ! been satisfactorily acccmplished.

And I lock --

l 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Could you just return to the 14 point about the procedures being cut of date?

I didn't fully 15 understand that.

16 MR. JORDAN: I will pick up cn that in just a mcment.

I 17l An inspection of the licensee's corrective acticns 18 was conducted en May 7 through 11, and on May 14, in conjunction 19 ' with the detailed inspection of Bulletin 790 8.

As you recall, 20 Bulletin 7903 was a bulletin sent to all boiling water reactors 21 based on the Three Mile Island accident, fer them to take acticns Three Mile Island.

22, in response to the problams that were fcund at 23 The precedure changes were initiated by the licensee 24 to assure Ehat at least two recirculation locps discharge valves ra.:. cum a. con.n. me.

25 are open at all times.

3i1 0.68

, v9 e

l l

i (Ccmmissioner Bradford returned to the rocm at 2:52.);

1 2'

MR. JORDAN:

Training sessions had been verified and l

i 3

conducted by the licensee en the May 2 event.

The training pro-:

I, gram was revised to include in-depth review and precedure i

a, i

I

!' changes to include conditions which may arise frcm multiple or 5

6' coincidental failures.

The inspecters verified that a startup l

i I

program has been developed in ccmpliance with the conditions of 1

i 7

t i

i the safety analysis review.

3 i

I 9l Could I have slide II-4, please.

t 10 (S lide. )

i 11 '

The inspections of the licensee's action in response l'

to Bulletin 7908 included review of operator training, which was, 12,

i a discussicn with two operatorc c.er shift.

Durine. those dis-

/

13 i

14 cussions, the discussions with regard to che May 2 event at this 15 facility were also discussed.

The inspector verified the operability of 10 engineere 16 17 safety feature systems.

This is making a hand-over-hand walkdown 18,of each of the systems, reviewing the valve lineups physically 1

1 19 l against the pNIDs, and verifying that the licensee 's lineup 20 procedure was correct.

21 Through that review, cnly one instance was identified t

22 ' in which there was a deficiency.

This was a case in which three I

22 valves, w..n cn were idenci lec as ceing locked in an ccen ecs -

24 tien, were in the correct position but they were nce locked.

A.;.e.,ai a.ecmri. rc..

.a.d sc ncn w.eliance censideracion is being given with regard cc 25 r

a al 3Ii 05

o_ v10 23 r

1 that item.

{

m i

2l All of the safety systems were verified to be properly I

3l aligned both electrically and mechanically for autcmatic actua-s i

)

4; tion.

l SI The precedure changes with respect to both Three Mile!

l 6' Island-type event and this May 2 event at Oyster Creek were l

7, found to have been implemented.

5 The licensee has established two dedicated phone lines I

1 9l for NRC use and has prcmulgated a memo to operating personnel I

1 10 lconcerning prompt notification of events.

i e

I 11 i The inspector also identified instances in which the 121 small instrument valves were not identified or were not. sho:rr en the' i

e 13 piping instrumentation drawings.

The licensee is ccamitted to 14 correct this problem in a timely fashicn.

15 Now, so far as the procedures, your question is:

How 16 did this procedure caission occur; specifically, what it was.

I 17 There were two precedures that were involved.

One I

i 18 ' procedure was a standing order'which required tripping of A&E 19 ' recire pumps and opening the two-inch bypass valves, closing the 20 discharge valves.

This particular precedure shculd have been 21 changed when a mcdification was made in August of '73 which 22 caused the c.ume.s to tric. when there was a reactor trip.

This is 23 the ATWS mcdification.

That mciification was not dcne to the 24 crocedures.

~

ac. ;.cerai aecer en. w.

25 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY :

Y0u said "shculd have been 311 060

pvil I

24 l

made."

Is this something they should have figured out, something Ij i

2! that we asked them to do and they did not do?

I 3 i MR. JORDAN:

No.

Anytime a modification is performed,,

the licensee is cbligated to review his procadures to see how the 4

i i

i5' modification affects his procedures and then train his persennelt I

I 6 l so they can respond to that physical plant change.

I i

7l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Now, with all the hulletins i

that have come out after Three Mile Island, the B&W plants, will' 8;

I i

I they have gone through that cycle as well and reviewed all of 9

I 10 their procedures to be sure that they're consistent with the l

11 bulletins?

l l'

12 I MR. JORDAN:

The procedure review, they are being l

13 requested to do according to the bulletin does not specifically !

14 address design changes.

That's another little nuance.

If that 15 answers your question.

16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

It would help if you would 17 start by saying "Yes" or "No" at the beginning of that paragraph.

i l

18 i

MR. MOSELEY:

Excuse me.

I think the answer to your 19 iquestion is:

They are already required to do this.

This is a This was 20 part of the administrative controls in the QA program.

21 just a glitch, in this particular case, that happened at Cyster 22 ' Creek.

So there was no new requirement.

I 'celieve that answe rs 23 ',ycur question.

24 COMMISSICNER 3RACFORD:

But do we kncw, for example,

ice 3,cere nemmes rec. :

25 that we have now required that a reactor trip instantly apen a i

311 ogi

pv12 25 i

l i

1 1l turbine trip?

Are there any reviews of procedures?

^

6 2 l MR. JORDAN:

Those mcdificatio".s that have been I

I 1

3 required by the bulletin and by the order are being reviewed l

t

\\

4i specifically by the inspectors at the site, and they're being f

5' verified as those changes have been incorporated in the pro-t6' cedures.

I I

I i

I 7

CCMMISSICNER BRADFORD:

I am sorry.

Not just new, I

but ara there also operating procedures -- in this case, appar- ;

g I

i 9i ently -- that effectively would improve the system, but didn't i

10 give the cperator the right procedures to cope with the improved 11 l system?

They've now improved the system in the B&W plants as i

i 12 i well; does the operator have the corresponding procedures?

I v_

13 MR. JORDAN:

Yes, sir.

14 MR. DENTON:

In the B&W plants, part of cur review t

15 was precedures that implemented the new design changes.

So we t

16 would say "Yes" for the B&W changes.

17 MR. JORDAN:

And for the changes with respect to the 18 bulletin.

That's with respect to the order.

With respect to the i

lo I bulletin, these are being reviewed by inspecticn procedures for 20 ' each of the Westinghouse and GE plants where there are precedure 21 changes or acdifications of the facility as a result of that e.-_A9 22 j bulletin.

e 22 24

.L. ; cue a,ccc.n. inc.

25 311 062

26 78.10.1 mge i

We do have that a ssurance.

Were there f urther questions abou t 2

the procedures?

3 COMMISIONER GILINSKY :

No.

4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Please go ahead.

5 JR. JORDAN:

Could I have slide five, plea se ?

6 (Slide.)

7 In general the notifications by the licensee and 8

within NRC did not proceed as rapidly as desired.

Based on the 9

potential seriousness of this event, of f se tting this statement, 10 it should be noted t ha t a t the time the NRC was notified tnat 11 the reactor was in a saf e shutdown condition with no 12 abnormalities in plant paremeters or radioactivity levels, the 13 licensee was committed to remain in shutdown until the event 14 was thoroughly reviewed.

15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Now what is it that 16 triggered the notification to the NRC7 17 MR. JORDAN:

On the part of the licensee?

18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yes.

19 MR. JORDAN:

His concern that he may have exc eeded 20 the safety limit.

21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :

The triple low signal?

22 MR. JORDAN:

Ye s, and tha t procedure had been 23 modified as a result of the I & E Sulletin 79-C8 t ha t he had 24 placed in it.

If the safety limit is excaeced you would no tif y

~

25 the NRC within this one ^. cur period.

This notifica tion was

's 3i1 063

27 78.10.2

=&-

1 done an hour and half after the onset of the event.

2 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY:

And when would you expect 3

them to notify you?

4 MR. JORDAN:

Within an hour of the event.

Within 5

three minutes, we received the triple low level, so we're 6

talking about 30 minutes of delay, if you will.

7 The subsequent notification was discussions by 8

Region One inspectors and a section chief within our armed 9

personnel.

These were licensing projects people, and with 10 the information they had, the concerns they had f or this 11 particular event were elevated.

And I say tha t with the 12 information we had, we f eel tha t the internal notification was 13 hampered by incomplete information.

An inspector, based on 14 this raising of our interest in this matter, an inspecctor was 15 dispatched to the site that night f rom another site.

16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

In what respect was it 17 incomplete?

18 MR. JORDAN:

We had the information that there may 19 have been.the triple low level received, and we didn't have 20 the f ull cescription of the plant parameters.

So t he r e wa s 21 some question -- in f act there was some question on our part 22 the f allowing morning as to whe ther that had or had no t been 23 the triple low level received.

24 So there was a questien of whether its 25 instrumen ta tion or whe the r it was -- a pnysical ins.nector was t

28 78.1 0.3 mcc 1

on site at 3:30 a.m.

to review the incident.

He established to 2

his satisf action that the plant was in a saf e shutdown 3

condition at that point.

~

4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY :

What time was he directed to 5

go?

6 MR. JORDAN:

He was directed about 1 00 a.m.,

I 7

believe.

He was at another site, Salem.

8 MR. MOSELEY:

He was at another site.

9 (At 3:05 p.m., Commissioner Bradford left the room.)

10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I'm no.t sure.I understand what you mean by NRC internal notification hampered.

By 12 incomple te inf ormation.

13 MR. JORDAN:

Okay.

The notification process is 14 based on the severity of the incident.

15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I see.

Not having full 16 information, the severity --

17 MR. JORDAN:

It was not clear.

18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :

Have we got that cleared up?

19 MR. JORDAN:

Yes, we have.

May I have the next 20 slide, please?

21 (Slide.)

i 22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

How do you clear tha t up?

23 That's a function of the information we have available.

24 MR. JORDAN:

We've taken measures to help clear ;he:

25 up, s

311 065

29

.e.

78.10.4 me-1 MR. MOSELEY:

We also think, Commissioner, that 2

maybe we didn't ask enough questions a t the initial time.

3 MR. JORDAN:

Okay.

The actions that we've taken to try to clear that up include first of all emphasizing to all 4

5 u tili tie s -- thi s wa s through a telephone call f rom the 6

regional director to the top executive in that particular 7

utili ty -- em phasizing the importance of prompt r e por ting.

8 The second item was reviewing with each of the

~

9 operating reactor branch chief s in the regions their 10 responsibilities and the importance once again of prompt 11 re po r ting, and their passing forward and obtaining complete 12 information.

13 Thirdly, we are developing -- revising, I'll say --

14 our internal instructions to emphasize promptne ss in internal I

15 reporting.

We're al so in the process of developing more 16 definitive criteria f or issuance of binding requirements to 17 licensees, through either regulations or technical 18 specifications or Regulatory Guide 1.16 -- the mechani sm, 19 estimate, and criteria are being developed.

20 We have verified that Oyster Creek has modified their 21 reporting procedures since the event, so that they would now 22 be more conservative in their reporting.

23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I assume that when you give 24 them an hour, you also expec t them to notif y tne NRC as scon as 25 po ssible, before an hour is up.

s 311 066

30

78. I d.5 '

mcc 1

MR. JO:?AN:

We're no t asking them to say, " At one 2

hour, call u s. "

3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY :

The words are "within."

MR. JORDAN:

Yes.

4 5

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's just giving them 6

enough flexibility so they can take care of the incident.

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Right.

If they can do it 8

earlier -- I would expect them to do it earlier.

9 MR. JORDAN And one of the mechanisms to do it 10 earlier is the installation of dedicc ted telephone lines at 11 each of the se f acilities.

The next presentation will discuss 12 that area.

13 May I have the next slide, please?

4 (Slide.)

15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Let me just note that given the s

16 experience of Three Mile Island, which was recently f resh in 17 everyone's mind, and particularly in this region, Region One, 15 I have to say I find it extraordinary that we have to 19 reemphasize to the I & E reac tor branch chief s the necessity 20 of prompt notification and of getting better informatien.

21 MR. MOS ELEY :

But we don' t want to make excuses for 22 t hi s.

23 COMMISSIGNER KENNEDY:

I'm not asking. I'm just cc:menting 24 MR. MCSELEY:

It was a f unction cf the.reople who 25 were available at tha t time, the ceocle who were handling the se s

311 067

31 7S.10.6 me' I

things, were not normally assigned to operating reactors. All 2

the operating inspectors were.out in s pe c ting, and so these 3

were people who were filling in for others, and they, pe r ha ps,

4 were not as well in tune as we would have liked them to have 5

been.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Okay.

7 MR. JORDAN:

Okay.

The lasw item is the fact that a

information on this event has been disseminated to all 9

licensees.

There will be an I & E Inf ormation No tice 79-!3, 10 a copy of which has been provided to you.

11 Discussions -- and I might add as a last thing to 12 this -- discussions of this particular event with the Nine 13 Mile Point licensee have iden tif..ed a similar procedural 14 weakne ss regarding control of the recirculation proce ss, so 15 t ha t there. is obvious value in cisseminating the information 16 and discussing it quickly with the licensee.

17 Would you like to make a summary statement?

18 MR. MCSELEY:

I'll make the sumnary I & E statement.

19 It is our asse ssment basec upon the reviews of Region One and 20 the I & E heacquarters staf f that the licensee has accomplished 21 the n.eeded actions anc has demonstra ted that he's capable Of 22 operating chis f acili ty within the conditions of his license 23 with due regard to the safety implications of both the ics 24 water level event at Oyster Creek and the recent Three Mile 25 Islanc event.

311 068

32 y'e

• b e.lO.7 agc 1

So, we see no reason why they shoulo not go back s

2 into operation.

3 MR. EISENHUT:

Along that same line I should probably this same general kind of a pproach requiring a 4

point out that 5

saf e ty limit on kae ping the loops open and the triple low 6

being the safety limit, it's our in ten t tha t f or the.other 7

similar plancs that are shut down right now, we are going to a

require the same kind of changes in the other three or four 9

aff ected plants before they are going to be allowed to return 10 to power also.

This goes acro ss the rest of the aff ected N

11 plants.

g/

12 Then, to conclude, we propose to let the plant re sume 13 operation.

14 CHAIRMAN HENDRil Okay.

Everything from your 15 s tand po in t, I & E has signed off on everything, and from your lo s tand po in t is in place?

17 MR. DENTON:

Ours is in place.

I don't know if there 18 are any loose items or other matters that I & E considers.

19 MR. MOSELEY :

We have no outstanding items.

We have 20 some things that need follow up.

21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

That sounds reasonable.

22 Thank you.

Good.

23 (Whereu pon, at 3: 10 p m., Wedne sday, May 30, 1979, 24 the meeting was adjourned.)

25 311 069

STAFF EVAUMTION OF IhY 2,1979 EVENT AT OYSTER CREEK fM 6ENERATItG STATION PUPPOSE DESCRIBE EVENT Discuss SAFET/ CONSIDERATI0tG ACTIONS i

m p+

f E

h.

E

$.ri a

Y 311 370

't i

L 4

i

}

[]

0(STER CEEK PJCLEAR GBBATING STATION GBERAL E!.scTalc B'IP/2 LICENSED 1959 6

INSEP 3

y EXXDN FLEL 1

-t 1

i 3

3 2

3 j'

311 071

DIRECTLY AFFECTED

%T I3IRECTLY A:FECTED (h' STER CREEK NInsMILEPOINT Au_ OTHER I.ACROSSE OPERATING I

DRESDEN1 ENPS BIG PcCK POINT l

1 i

i t

i 311 072

t BOILING-WATER REACTOR POWER PLANT it

\\

r al U

y u

~

TURBINE GENERATOR REACTOR CONDENSER Y 2

j 25ZI.

l

~

CORE fM a

i

! r TRANSFORMER

~ CONTAINMENT CONTilOL RODS

(

~

~~

J

w.

.,.7 -. _

OUTSIDE I INSIDE DRYWELL l DRYWELL VENT TO I

(14'7") HI LO-LO-LO- (S'6")

ATMOSPilERE l

(11'5") LO ADS / RELIEF l

(7'2") LO-LO' VALVES (5)

+.,

f w

TO od9cQ%Oo oO l

STEAM MSIV

' TORUS hd

)(

N I

FEEDWATER I

ISOLATION CONDENSER I

CORE (1WO)

I I

l (F

i

'[

\\

Ab l

s L

n

' ': v 3,

g

-4 4 OTiiER LOOPS I

,g MOTOI1 OPERATED ISOLATION VALVES 10" LINE l

W

)(

F i

x " LINE 26 u

I VARIABLE SPEED 2" LINE 9

I RECIRC PUMP 9

'?#

l DISCHARGE BY-PASS VALVE O"

OYSTER CREEK RECIRCULATION,. STEAM AND ISOLATION CONDENSER SCHEMATIC

l Feedwater & Electrical Supply Systems l

l Main Generator l

Auxiliary Startup Transformers i

Transformer i

mm WW WW j

mmmm mm mm i

SA SB l

)

4160V Bus 1 A 4160V Bus 1B

~

Recirc. Pumps A,C,E B, D

+

l 18 Reactor m 1B Main D

Condenser 1C 1C Feedwater Condensate Pumps Pumps gpj$

3 *D

~

3 u o

SEGEEE OF EMS 0

REACTOR SCRAM, RECIRC PUPS TRIP 13SEC TURBINE GENERATOR TRIPS, FEETIATER SYSTEM TRIPS, LG4 L5. VEL SIGNAL 43 SEC O_0SE [GIVS 49 SEC REACTOR ISOLATED l

1 3/4 MIN CLOSE "A" AND "E" LOOP VALVES, PROBASLY "B" AND "C", CCmENCE INTERiliitNT ISOLATION CONDENSER OPERATION 1 3/2 MIN LU.PLEVEL CLEARS 3 MIN LGPLOW-LG1 SIG4AL 32 MIN RESTAR1 "A" RECIRC PUP, LEVEL DROPS, SECURE PUP, LGi-LGPLGV CLEARS 33 MIN PLACE "A" RECIRC PUP IN SERVICE, LEVELS IN CORE AND ANNU_US EQUILIBRATE 1 HR SB TRANSFORMER RETURNED TO SERVICE 8 HR COLD SHUTDOWN

% e%

wm o

CONCLUSION CORE UNDAMAGED RECURRENCE UNLIKELY TECH SPEC CHANGES PROCEDURE REVISIONS OPERATOR TRAINING RESUME POWER OPERATION 311 077

CONCLUSION CORE UNDAMAGED RECURRENCE UNLIKELY TECH SPEC CHANGES PROCEDURE REVISIONS OPERATOR TRAINING RESUME POWER OPERATION 3\\1 078

NRC ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO OYSTER CREEK EVENT OF MAY 2, 1979 e COMPLETE INSPECTION OF EVENT e PERFORM SAFETY EVALUATION e INSPECT LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS e REVIEW NOTIFICATION PRACTICES e DISSEMINATE INFORMATION TO ALL LICENSEES 311 079

~

INSPECTION OF EVENT MAY 3-4, 1979 e NRC TEAM:

REGIONAL DIRECTOR REACTOR INSPECTORS (3)

HEALTH PHYSICIST ENVIRONMENTAL NRR (4)

PUBLIC AFFAIRS e ESTABLISHED FACTS OF EVENT BY REVIEW 0F LOGS AND RECORDS AND INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL e

3.11 080

INSPECTION OF LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS MAY 7-11,14,1979 e REVISE PROCEDURES e TRAINING SESSIONS ON MAY 2 EVENT AND-PROCEDURE REVISIONS e STARTUP PROGRAM DEVELOPED CRD INTERFERENCE CHECKS CRD SCRAM TEST 25%

REACTOR COOLANT ANALYSIS OFFGAS ANALYSIS ACTION LEVELS FOR RADI0 ACTIVITY b\\b 0

INSPECTION OF IE BULLETIN 79-08 e OPERATOR TRAINING e OPERABILIT',' 0F ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES e ASSESSMENT OF OPERATING PROCEDURES

• EVALUATION OF LICENSEE RESPONSE 311 082

NOTIFICATIONS e EVENT INITIATED 1:50 PM, 5/2/79 e LICENSEE NOTIFICATION AT 3:20 PM DID NOT MEET INTENT OF IES 75-08 e REGION I DISCUSSIONS WITH NRR ELEVATED CONCERNS e NRC INTERNAL NOTIFICATION HAMPERED BY INCOMPLETE INFORMATION e

INSPECTOR ON SITE BY 3:30 AM, 5/3/79 e NRC TEAM ON SITE BY 3:00 PM. 5/3/7b 311 083

ACTIONS ON NOTIFICATION e 'IMPORTANCE OF PROMPT REPORTING EMPHASIZED TO ALL UTILITIES e RESPONSIBILITIES OF REPORTING EM?HASIZED TO ALL IE OPERATINC-REACTOR BRANCH CHIEFe, 5/4/79 INSTRUCTION BEING REVISED TO EMPHASIZE PROMPTNESS e

IN INTERNAL REPORTING e DEFINITIVE CRITERIA BEING DEVELOPED FOR ISSUANCE AS BINDING REQUIREMENTS TO LICENSEES e OYSTER CREEK MODIFIED REPORTING PROCEDURES e STEPS UNDERWAY TO 7.NSTALL DEDICATED TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS 311 084

DISSEMIfMTE INFORMATION TO ALL LICENSEES e

INFORMATION NOTICE ISSUED 5/29/79 PROVIDES DETAILS OF THE OCCURRENCE FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES DISPATCHFi)

TO ALL HOLDERS OF OPERATING LICEf4SES AND CONSTRUCTION PERMITS.

N0 SPECIFIC ACTION OR RESPONSE IS REQUIRED.

~

311 085 e