ML19225B478
| ML19225B478 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1979 |
| From: | Crossman W, Oberg C, Tomlinson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19225B475 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-79-09, 50-482-79-9, NUDOCS 7907250226 | |
| Download: ML19225B478 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000482/1979009
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF IflSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
-
Report No. STN 50-482/79-09
Docket No. STN 50-482
Category A2
Licensee:
Kansas Gas and Electric Company
P. O. Box 208
Wichita, Kansas
-
Facility Name: Wolf Creek, Unit No.1
.
Inspection at: Burlington, Coffey County, Kansas
Inspection conducted: April 23-26,1979
Inspectors:
Of4/ -
4-/-79
.
C. R. Oberg, RegcJor Inspector, Projects Section
Date
(Paragraphs 1, 2', 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 17 & 18)
,6 &
(o-04 79
0. P. fopfinson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Support
Date
Section (Paragraphs 7 & 10)
$ k h /A L
6 - (/- 79
. F. Suermann, Bdactor Inspector (RIII)
Date
'
(Paragraphs 15 & 16)
~
. k.
%
g -p'ff
J. C. Mattia, Reactdr Inspector (RI)
Date
(Paragraphsll, 12, 13 & 14)
d 7!79
Approved:
=
W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section
Date
'&
b
7f
R. E. ' Hall, Chief, Engineping Support Section
Date /
398
191
79072 5 on0
Inspection Sunmary:
,_
Inspection on April 23-26, 1979 (Report No. STN 50-482/79-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of safety related concrete;
.
reactor pressure vessel internals; Ultimate Heat Sink Dam; construction
deficiencies; QA audits; NDE activities; and licensee action on previously
identified inspection findings. The inspection involved ninety-two inspcetor-
hours on site by four flRC inspectors.
Resul ts: Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations
were found in five areas; two apparent items of noncompliance were found in
two areas (infraction - failure to follow storage procedures for reactor vessel
internals - paragraph 13 and infraction - failure to conduct quality control
inspection- paragraph 15).
--
398
192
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
.
Principal Licensee Personnel
- M. E. Clark, QA Manager, Site
- D. W. Prigel, QA Engineer
- G. W. Reeves, QA Engineer
- T. Newman, QA Auditor
R. Seiple, Dames & Moore, Consultant
"
SNUPPS
- R. D. Brown, SNUPPS Site Representative
Daniel International
- W. E. Hitt, Project Manager
- V. J. Turner, Project QA Manager
- D. L. Jones, Project QC Manager
- C. L. Phillips, Project Civil Engineer
J. Kerns, QC Inspector
T. Green, Civil OC Lead Engineer
C. Parry, QC Lead Receiving Inspector
S. E. Jinks, QC Civil Engineer
J. Ayres, QA Engineer
S. Kapp, Senior Aggregate Lab Technician
D. Davis, QC Civil Lead Inspector (Rebar)
G. Gukeisen, Area Eng'ineer, Storage and Maintenance
Clarkson
J. Carsen, Clarkson Project Manager
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Noncompliance (STN 50-482/78-11):
Failure to Follow Specifications
for Adjacent Cadweld Staggering.
The IE inspector confirmed through dis-
cussion and review of records that the nonconforming Cadwelds were replaced
with Cadwelds which were properly staggered.
The training specified for
Cadweld QC inspectors was conducted on Daniel Construction Procedure
QCP IV-102 and Bechtel Specification No.10466-Cll2(Q) as they pertain to
spacing of adjacent Cadwelds. This item is considered closed.
398
193
3
(Closed) Unresolved ! tem (STN 50-482/78-10):
Containment Spray Pump
Pedestals.
The IE inspector had quastioned the paint thickness on the
containment spray pump pedestals that were modified in the field. The
original QC coating inspector's repcrt couldn't be located. The assioned ~
QC inspector issued another survei,llance report dated April 23, 1979.
The report indicated that thc. painting was acceptable. Daniel QC also
issued an interoffice w.emo dated April 23, 1979, to explain the issuance
of the second serveillance report several months after the original
inspection was ccnducted.
In view of this, the IE inspector requested
that a paint thickness examination test be conducted during his presence.
This was done and the paint thickness was measured to be from 5-8 mils
in the modified areas. This thickness meets the specification require-
ments.
This item is considered resolved.
"
(0 pea) Noncompliance Item (STN 50-482/78-12):
Failure to Control Special
Processes.
RECO Corporation has agreed in writing to revise Welding
Procedure ES-106N. The revision is to include the requirements of ND-4412
of the ASME Code,Section III,1974 Edition through Winter 1975 Addenda for
removal of mill scale, grease, oil ano 91 deleter sus materials prior to
initiation of welding.
Spot radiography was performed on site of the
areas which . ';ared to have been welded without removal of the mill scale.
A total of s-
'n radiographs on two circumferential butt welds on Job 238
were evaluatt
and accepted by Peaboby Testing and KG&E. The procedure
revision will
o provide for spot radiography of the work of each
welder on each tu k as required by Appendix X, pccagraph X-3720(b) of the
ASME Code.
This item will remain open pending the issuance of the RECO procedure
revision containing the noted requirements.
3.
Site Tour
'
The IE inspectors conducted a walk-through of various areas of the con-
straction to observe construction activities in progress and to observe
the status of housekeeping. No items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified.
4.
Construction Deficiency - Damage to Essential Services Water System (ESWS)
Valve Operator
On February 14, 1979, KG&E reported to RIV a potential 10 CFR
.55(e)
matter involving damage to a Limitorgt.e valve operator (Valve No. C-03406,
Serial No. 260389).
Dui 79 the initial operational check, the valve
'
actuator was energized in the closed position instead of a mid-position.
The limit switches had been bypassed, and upon energization, the valve was
driven into the stops causing the actuator tc crack in five places. On
March 14,1979, KG&E reported that the incident did not appear to be
reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e) for the following reasons: (1) the
electrician's error in wiring did not appear to be a breakdown in the QA
398
194
_4_
program; (2) a deficiency in final design is not involved; (3) damaged
operator will be replaced; and (4) deviation from perfonnance is not
involved.
.
The IE Inspector determined that a change to Construction Work Procedure
WP-VI-200, " Installation of Rotating Equipment," is now in the process' of
approval.
This change will control energization of similar equipment in
the future.
After inspection of the valve operator, review of the NCR
(15N 0744-M), and discussion with responsible constructor and licensee
perscnnel, the IE inspector concluded that this event is not a Construction
Geficiency.
5.
Construction Deficiency - Pressurizer Supports
"
On March 23, 1979, SNUPPS (Gaithersburg) reported a Construction Deficiency
'
involving a design problem wit; 'he pressurizer supports. This deficiency
affects all SNUPPS units (work has not commenced at Wolf Creek).
Speci fi-
cally, the deficiency involves 2-1/2 inch diameter threaded studs of ASTM
AS40, Grade B23, Class-1 material which were to be welded, with a full
penetration groove weld, to girders of A36 material. The weld and/or
material may be inadequate.
A design fix is being prepared by the AE,
Bechtel.
A written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) will be
submitted by SNUPPS (Gaithersburg). The IE inspector determined that KG&E
site personnel were aware of the deficiency.
6.
Construction Deficiency - Hold Down Bolts for Essential Services Water (ESW)
Pumps
On April 23, 1979, the licensee reported a potential 50.55(e) construt
.
deficiency involving the designed embedded length of the hold-down bolt
for
the ESW pumps. The AE (Bechtel) reported to KG&E that the embedded length
of the 2 inch diameter (3 foot 8 inch length) was inadequate for the
service required.
Presently 2 feet 10 inches of the bolts are embedded
in concrete. There are twenty bolts for each of the two ESW pumps. The
bolts have not been installed.
Bechtel is reviewing the design.
A KG&E
representative stated that a report will be submitted as required by 10 CFR 50.55(e).
7.
Construction Deficiency - G&W Pipe Assemblies
As a result of a potential 10 CFR 50.55(e) situation reported to RIV on
March 29, 1979, the IE inspector reviewed the radiographs for piping
assembly A-9-ll, welds #1 through #8.
This assembly was fabricated,
welded and accepted by Gulf and Western Energy Products.
The assembly
was accepted also by Daniel site receipt inspection, but at installation,
a Daniel QC inspector noted a possible nonconfonnance condition on the
inside surfaces of the two end joints.
An NCR was issued stating these
conditions.
A discussion involving representatives from Daniel, KG&E,
Bechtel, and Gulf und Western failed to resolve the differences of
opinion as to the acceptability of the welds.
Pending resolution of
-5-
398
195
these differences, a stop-work has been issued by KG&E for the instal-
lation of all Gulf and Western ASME Class II piping pre-assemblies.
The IE inspector determined from review of the radiographs that the rough ,
surface condition of the welds and the quality of the radiographs are such
that no meaningful interpretation of the integrity of tne welds could be
made. The radiographs of these eight joints failed to meet the minimum
requirements of the ASME Code,1974 Edition with Addenda through Summer of
1975, in that none exhibited all elements of permanent identification on
the film, and some did not have the proper sensitivity or penetrameter
placement.
The density variations between the penetrameter and the
radiograph area of interest, in many cases, did not fall within the minus
15% - plus 30% requirement.
On some film the location markers were
..
masking possible defects that could be located in the heat affected zone.
In several cases the film-to-object contact was not maintained and badly
distorted images of both weld and penetrameter were produced.
Al though
not a code requirement, consecutive radiographs on the same welded joint
exhibited vast density variations indicating that the exposure technique
or procedure varialles were being altered, such as exposure duration or
source-to-film distance.
This item will be considered unresolved until such time as it is demon-
strated that all G&W piping pre-assemblies are acceptable to Code
requirements.
8.
Quality Assurance Audits,
The IE inspector reviewed KG&E site QA audit of Daniel o,. ' ations.
(Reference : KG&E letter to Daniel KQWLC-281 of April 18, b79) The audit
identified thirteen new open items and closed six.
flo items of noncF.pliance or deviations were identified.
9.
General QA Indoctrination and Training
The IE inspector reviewed a random sample of records of general QA training
conducted on site selected from the electrical and welding crafts,
The
training sample of records involved twelve personnei, including a superin-
tendent, foremen and journeymen.
Discussions were held with six craft
personnel regarding their training.
The IE inspector also reviewed con-
struction procedure AP-II-06, Rev. 3 (2/5/79), " Orientation and Indoctri-
nation of Personnel ." After consideration of AtlSI f145.2 requirements and
review of the degree of implementation, the IE inspector concluded that
the requirements of the Daniel procedure meets the minimum requiremer.ts of
the AtlSI Standard and that the Daniel procedure requirements are being
satisfied.
The IE inspector did observe that general retraining to
maintain an awareness of QA/QC program should be instituted.
A Constructor
representative stated that this was presently under consideration.
flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
-6-
398
190
10.
Review of f1DE Activities - Peabody' Testing
The IE inspector reviewed the f1DE procedures in use by Peabody Testing for
the performance of radiographic, ultrasemc, magnetic particle and liquid
penetrant examination.
Also reviewed were the qualification and certification
records for all on-site Peabody Testing personnel, including evidence of
current vision tests in accordance with NTC-1A.
Calibration records and
certifications for inspection equipment and materials approved for use on
site were also checked against equipment stickers and materials batch numbers.
The IE inspector revicued approximately forty randomly selected inspection
reports generated by Peabody Testing in all four flDE methods since January 1, "
1979.
Several minor errors in data recording "ere noted and reported to the
on-site Level III supervisor who made the appropr' ate corrections and verbally
committed to reinstruct his personnel in the need for accurate reports.
fio
further action is required as these errors were detemined to be nonsignifi-
cant and were isolated cases,
fio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
Observation of Concrete Work Activities
Three concrete placements (considered difficult) were made during this
inspection period. The following specific activities ancciated with place-
ments fio. OC 133WO5, OC 133W14 and OC 135Wl; Were inspar.ted to verify compliance
with Daniel Procedures and Bechtel Specifications:
Pre-placement Inspection
Concrete Delivery and Placement
Concrete Field Testing
Concrete Consolidation
The IE inspector also verified that civil testing lah did perfom the testing
as specified in QCP-I-04, Revisi.)n 3, Appendix A for concrete produced on
April 24, 1979.
fio items of noncompliance er deviations were identified.
12.
Review of Reactor Vessel Internals Procedures
The IE inspector reviewed procedures to detemine that activities associated
with react 9r internals are controlled and performed in accordance with f1RC
requirements and PSAR cormiitments.
The following are the specific procedures
reviewed for receipt inspection, storage, handling and lifting of reactor
internals:
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398
197
Receiving Maintenance Instruction PNI-W-042, Revision 2
Work Procedure WP-IV-110, Revision 2
Quality Control Procedure QCP-I-01 Revision 5
-
Quality Control Procedure QCP-I-05, Revision 5
Westinghouse Equipment Specification No. 953080, Revision 2
The IE inspector informed the licensee that the procedure PHI-W-042 did not
specify the frequency for the " standard surveillance" that is to be preformed.
The licensee stated that an audit conducted in February 1979 indicated that
"
this was a generic item, and that Daniel is currently revising QCP-I-01,
which will correct this.
The IE inspector informed the licensee that this item is considered
unresolved pending review by NRC of the corrective action taken.
13.
Protection and Storage of Vessel Internals
The IE inspector observed the storage, protection and preservation of specific
reactor vessel internals (listed below) to ascertain that the requirements of
specifications and procedures are being adhered to:
Name of Item
Dwg. No.
Serial No.
Lower Internals
6123E59-H01
36190
Upper Internals
6121 E72-G01
42780
Upper Tie Plate
'
6120E10-H01
R204A02
Lower Tie Plate
6120 Ell-H01
R204A03
Holddown Spring
1050F37-H01
R958A01
The lower and upper internals were stored in accordance with NSSS requirements.
However, the IE inspector found the upper and lower tie plates and the hold-
down spring improperly stored. The enclosure used to store these items was
not weather proof. Water was found on all three items and the desicant bags
were all saturated "d some had mold growth on the outside of the bag.
Caniel
informed the IE inspector 'that their surveillance ( Audit Log #057) identified,
on February 12, 1979, that the Kelley Closure was not weather tight (water
and snow were found inside of enclosure).
The IE inspector infonned Daniel
that a deficiency report was not issued for this deficiency as required by
Daniel Procedure QCP-I-01 (Revision 5).
They stated that a follow-up surveil-
lance report #230 performed on April 25, 1979, with engineering, stated that
a weather tight enclosure is not a problem.
The IE inspector stated that level
C storage is indoors or equivalent.
Daniel stated that corrective action would
be taken.
_g.
398
198
The IE inspector also noted that for another storage inspection (Report flo.
052, performed on 2/17/79) five deficiencies were found for the storage con-
ditions for the upper and lower internals and a deficiency report for all
these deficiencies was not issued.
.
The IE inspector informed the licensee that the Daniel QC Procedure QCP I-01,
Revision 5 requires that deficiencies found during storage and maintenance
shall be handled in accordance with Daniel's Construction Procedure AP-VI-02.
This procedure requires the issue of a Deficiency Report (DR) for deficient
i tems .
The licensee was informed that this item is contrary to the requirements of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, a failure to follow procedures, aad is
--
en infraction.
14.
, Reactor' Pressure Vessel Internals Record Review
The IE inspector reviewed the following records relative to reactor pressure
vessel internals storage, protection and receipt inspection to ascertain
whether these records are in confonnance with established procedures:
QC Receiving Inspection Report, dated 2/10/79
Material Receiving Report No. 24888
Receiving and Storage Inspection Checklist, dated 2/10/79
Westinghouse quality Release No. ?2259
Westinghouse Shipment Notice, dated 11/2/78
Westinghouse Form hCS-1 (N Certificate holders)
Data Report for Internals (National Board No. W-18529)
ASME Data Report (National Board No. 18530)
Westinghouse Deviation Notices No. 13635,13650,13669 and 18277
The IE inspector noted that the Westinghouse Shipment Notice, dated November 2,
1978, had a statement as follows, "This is to certify that Item No. 1 of
P.O. No. 011471 is incomplete within this shipment." Daniel could not identify
to the IE inspector what was incomplete nor could they state what " Item 1" was
since a copy of the Purchase Order (No. 211471) was not available. On May 7,
1979, the licensee informed the IE inspector by phone that the incomplete item
(No. 1) was a device which will be used as a construction aide during the
installation of the internals. This device is called a " Roto Lock" and is not
considered to be safety related.
-9-
398
199
The IE inspector informed the licensee that this item is considered unresolved
pending review by IE inspector of Westinghouse information (purchase order and
drawing of Roto Lock) and the verification that Daniel has a procedure for -
handling safety related incomplete items that have been received on site.
15.
Lakes, Dams and Canals - Procedures Review
a.
The IE inspector completed the review of the Clarkson Construction Co.
Blasting Procedure, Specification A-3854, which was initiated during
the NRC inspection of April 16-19, 1979 (Inspection Report No. STN
50-482/79-D8).
During discussions held with the Clarkson Project
Engineer, the Dames & Moore Resident Geotechnical Engineer (RGTE),
"
Daniel QA Department and KG&E Quality Assurance Department, it was
ascertained that the blasting procedure did not accurately reflect
the procedure employed by Clarkson in performbg blasting work on the
Furthermore, Dames & Moore was not signing
the blast plans as required by the procedures, although the plans were
being reviewed by the Dames & Moore staff as required. The blasting
practice used by Clarkson was determined to be producing acceptable
results, but it did not conform to the written procedure.
The possi-
bility existed that a required check on obtaining blast approval from
Dames & Moore could be violated.
The Clar'Ksen Project Engineer agreed
with the IE inspector that the actual practice differed from the written
procedure. The Dames & Moore RGTE also agreed that the requirement for
written approval of the blast plan was not being met. Both individuals
voluntarily agreed to review the procedures and make revisions as re-
quired to ensure the actual practice of safe ty related blasting conformed
to the written procedures.
Pending acceptable revision of the blasting procedure, the matter is
considered unresolved.
b.
Daniel does not require that Clarkson Construction Co. have a separate
quality assurance program due to th 2 nature of the work being performed.
Daniel, however, does require that Clarkson's work be monitored by
Daniel Quality Control personnel operating to existing approved QC pro-
cedures. This position is stated in Daniel Supplier Qualification
Certificates, dated March 30, 1973, and April 25,1979, and in 3 Daniel
interoffice communication, dated May 10, 1976.
A conference call among the IE inspector, KG&E, Daniel Engineering
Department, Dames & Moore, and Sargent & Lundy (Site AE) confirmed that
the rock excavation for the Ultimate Heat Sink is a safety related
a ctivity.
Daniel is required, therefore, to apply QC inspection functions
to the blasting work to supplement the monitoring activities provided
by Dames & Moore.
Discussions with the Daniel QC Manager ascertained
that Daniel has not been performing any QC inspections or surveillance
on Clarkson's blasting work and that Daniel QC is not clear on what
quantitative or qualitative criteria would be applied in perfonning
the QC work.
)N
g
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.
These items are considered to be in noncompliance with the requirements
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V and applicable specifications and -
procedures.
16.
Lakes, Dams and Canals - Ouality Records
Paragraph 302.9e, Specification A-3854 requires a blasting specialist to
a.
be present during blasting in progress and that his qualifications be
approved by the purchaser. The IE inspector verified that a full-time
blasting specialist was present during blasting work on the UHS and also
reviewed the blaster's qualifications. The qualifications appeared to
be in order.
Daniel approved the blastcr's qualifications on April 15,
-
1977.
Sarg,et & Lundy also approved the blaster's qualifications in a
letter, dated April 12, 1977, addressed to Daniel.
b.
Dames & Moore uses either of two seismographs to monitor the blasting
effects on safety related structures.
The IE inspector verified the
calibration status of both instruments and reviewed field calibration
sheets as follows:
(1)
Sprengnether Instrument Co. Model flo. VS-1100
Recorder #4690
Seismometer #4790
Certificate of Calibration, dated June 9, 1976, was signed by the
Sprengnether chief engineer and notarized. The certificate
indicated traceability to the flational Bureau of Standards (t;BS)
Calibration Services and also indicated the instrument was within
specification recording limits.
Field Calibration Check Sheet #4690/4790
Date
Instrument Within Limits
3-<
79
Yes
3-15-79
Yes
12-21-78
Yes
12-19-78
Yes
12-18-78
Yes
12-14-78
Yes
398
20
33
(2)
Sprengnether Instrument Co. Model No. VS-1100
Recorder #4681
Seismometer #4781
-
Certificate of Calibration, dated August 11, 1978, indicated
traceability to the National Bureau of Standards and that the
instrument was within specification recording limits.
Field Calibration Check Sheet #4681/4781
Date
Instrument Within Limits
,,
4-17-79
Yes
4-16-79
Yes
4-14-79
Yes
4-10-79
Yes
4-03-79
Yes
4-02-79
Yes
3-28-79
Yes
c.
The IE inspector reviewed a sampling of the Dames & Moore blast review
forms.
A total of sixty-nine forms were reviewed covering work on the
UHS from December 13, 1978, to April 17, 1979. All of the fonas reviewed
indicated whether or not blast monitoring was required and indicated
that the allowable peak particle velocity was not exceeded by any of the
blasts.
d.
The IE inspector reviewed twenty-five of the Clarkson Construction Co.
blasting plans covering the period March 16, 1979, to April 17, 1979.
All the plans reviewed indicated the depth of the drill hole, the quantity
of explosive used per hole, the stemming length, the pattern, and the hole
size as required by procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
17.
Unresolved Item
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order
to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, cr
398
20A.
_la.
.
deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed
in the following paragraphs:
7
-
G&W Pipe Assemblies
-
12
-
Reactor Vessel Internals Procedures
14
Reactor Vessel Internals Record Review
-
15
-
UHS Blasting Procedure Review
18.
Ex't Interview
'
..
The IE inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on April 26, 1979.
The IE inspectors
summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The unresolved items
and items of noncompliance were acknowledged by the licensee representatives.
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%
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