ML19221B064
| ML19221B064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-09.5.1, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-9.5.1, SRP-09.05.01, SRP-9.05.01, NUDOCS 7907120341 | |
| Download: ML19221B064 (50) | |
Text
NUREG-75/087 fpn nic,s o
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'S U.S. WUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UN'" /OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR 9'
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SECI!ON 9.5.I f!RE PROTECTION PROGRAM l
REVIEW RESPONSIBilITIE5 Primary
- Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB) l Secondary - Structural EnaineerinI Branch (SEB)
Mechanical Engineering Branch (MEB)
Instrumentation and Control Systecis Branch (iC58)
Power Systems Branch (PSB) l I.
AREAS OF REVIEW The purpose of the fire protection program (fPP) is to provice assurance, through a j
defense-in-depth design, that a fire will not prevent the performance of nece' y
safe plant shutdown functions and will not significantly increase tne risk of radio active releases to the environment in accordance with General Design Critoria 3 and 5.
l The fire protectinn program consists of fire detection and extinguishing systeins and equipment, administrative controls and procedures, and trained personnel.
The ASB review of the fire protection program includes a review of the evaluation of potential fire hazards described in the applicant's Safety Analysis Report (SAR), and a resiew of the description of the fire protection system design showing the system characteristics and layout which define the " fire prevention" and
- fire protectian" portions of the program.
The A5B reviews the total fire protection program described in the applicant's Safety Analysis Report (SAR) with respect to the criteria of Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 attached to this sRP section, spacifically with respect to the following:
l 1.
Overall fire protection program requirements, including the degree of involvement and assigned responsibility of management; fire protaction administrative controls and quality assurance program; fire brigade training activities and ccordination with offsite fire fighting organizations, including their capability in assist g in the extinguishment of plant fires.
2.
Evaluation of potential fire hazards for safety-related areas throughout the plant and the effect of postulated fires relative to sr.aintaining the ability to perform cafe shutdown functions, and minimizing radioactive releases to the environment.
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3.
Plant layout, egress routes, facility arrangements, and structural design features which control separation or isolation of redundant safety systems and selection of the methods f or fire detection, control and extinguishing; control of fire hazards; fire barriers and walls; use of noncombustible materials; floor drains, ventilation, emergency lighting and c ommunication systems.
4.
The functional performance of the fire fighting systems, extinguishing agents, including the detection, alarm, suppression, control, and extinguishing systems described in the SAR to verify the adequacy of the FPP to protect safety related equipment.
5.
The fire protection system piping and instrumentation diagrams (P& ids); including redundancy of equipment; the FPP design criteria and failure modes and effects analysis (impairment) 6.
On multiple unit applications, the additional fire protection and control provi-sions during construction of the remaining units will be reviewed to verify that the integarty and operability of the fire protection system is maintained.
7.
Quality Assurance 3 ranch (QAB) will evaluate the adequacy of the QA program under SRP section 17 and the organizational arrangements under SRP section 13.1.
8.
Emergency Planning Branch (EPB) will evaluate the adequacy of the offsite emergency olanning under SRP section 13.3.
9.
Operating License Branch (OLB) will evaluate the fire protection brigade training programs under SRP section 13.2 and plant procedures under SRP section 13.5.
10.
The Technical Specifications prepared by the applicant for fire protection are reviewed at the operating license stage (FSAR).
Sec.Jndary reviews are perf ormed by other branches and the results are used by ACB to complete the overall evaluation of the fire protection program.
ICSB and PSB will review the electric power, and instrumentation and control featuresofthel design of the FPP, with the exception of detector sensitivity and location. Review elements include power sources, provisions for safe cold shutdown, testing, and technical specifica-tions.
ICSB and PSB will evaluate the consequences of failure of the FPP c,n safety-related l electrical equipment and cables, the adequacy of electrical cable construction and cable raceways including trays, ard adequacy of safety divisional separation criteria. Review l
elements include the consequences of Class IE equipment exposure to fire fighting medium as well as fire effects. SEE will, upon request, verify the acceptability of the design l
analyses, procedures and criteria used for seismic Category I supporting structures for the FPP, and for externally impased system loads resulting from less sesere natural
\\
Rev. 2 9.5.1-2
phenomena. MEB will, upon request, review that portion of the hose standpipe system which should remain functional following a postulateJ SSE, and confirm that system 9
components, piping and structeres are designed in accordance with applicable seismic design criteria.
II.
ACCEPTANCE CRIfERIA The applicant's fire protection prog.am is acceptable if it is in accordance with the following criteria:
1.
General Design Criterion 3, as related to fire prevention, the design and opera-tion of ' ire detection and protection systems, and administrative coatrols oro-vided to protect saf ety-related structures, systems ar..! components of the reactor facility.
2.
General Design Criterion 5, as related to fire protection for shared safety-related structures, systems and components to assure the ability to perform their intended safety function.
3.
Applicable provisions of Branch Technical Positio:i (BIP) ASB 9.5-1 and Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 (attached)
See Implementation section of BIP ASB 9.5-1.
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.78, as related to habitable areas such as the control room and the use of specific fire extinguishing agents.
5.
Regulatory Guide 1.101, as related to fire protection emergency planning for those areas of review identified in subsection I of this SRP section as being the responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria and their methods of applica-tion are contained in the SRP sections corresponding to those branches.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES Upon request f rom the primary reviewer, the secondary review branches will provide input for the areas of review stated in subsection I of this SRP section. The primary reviewer obtains and uses such input as required to assure that this review procedure is complete.
The reviewer will select and emphasize material frem this SRP section as may be appro-priate for a particular case.
1.
ASB reviews the SAR to determine that the appropriate level of manage nent and trained, experienced personnel are responsible for the design and implementation of the fire protection program in accor dance with BTP ASB 9.5-1.
}bh )b 9.5.1-3 Rev. 2
2.
ASB reviews the analysis in the SAR of the fire potential in safety-related plant areas and the h3zard of fires to these areas to determine that the proposed fire protection program is able to maintain the ability to perform safe shutdown functions and to minimize radioactive releases to the environment.
3.
ASB reviews the F PP P& ids and plant layout drawings to verify that f acility arrangement, buildings, and structural and compartmentation features which affect the methods used for fire protection, fire control. and control of hazards are acceptable for the protection of safety-related equipment.
4.
58 determines that design criteria and bases for the detection and suppression systems for smoke, heat and flame control are in accord with the BTP guidelines and provide ndequate protection for safety related structures, systems and compo-nents.
The reviewer determin-that fire protection support systems, such as emergency lighting and communication systems, floor drain systems, and ventila-tion and exhaust systems are designed to operate consistent with this objective.
ASB reviews the results of an FPP failure modes and effect analysis (impairment) to assure that the entire fire protection system for one safety related area cannot be impaired by a single failure.
5.
For multiple unit sites, ASB determines that protection is provided to operating units during concurrent construction of other units.
This includes an evaluation of the total fire protection program for each plant, the overall program for the site, includino division of responsibility on fire protection matters.
6.
ASB reviews the technical specifications proposed by the applicant for fire protection (OL).
The reviewer will determine that the limiting cor.ditions for operation and surveillance requircments of the tech 3ical specifications are in agreement with the requirements developed as a result of the staff's review.
IV.
EVALUAl!ON FINDINGS
" Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the proposed fire protection program design criteria and bases are in conformance with General Design Criteria 3.nd 5; Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.101; Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 (or Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1 for applications dated prior to Ju?y 1, 1974), as well as applicable industry standards. The acceptance basis is the design and location of safety-related structures and systems to minimize the probabili;y ana effect of fires and explosions; use of noncombustible and heat resistant materials whenever practical; and provision of fire detection and fire fighting systems of appropriate capacity and capability to minimiz?
adverse effects of fire on safety-related systems.
We, therefore, find the pr,asad fire protection ;irogram acceptable."
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Rev. 2 9.5.1-4
V.
REFFRENCES 1.
10 CiR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 3, " Fire Protection."
2.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
<ral Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components.'
3.
Regulatory Guide 1.78, " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release."
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants."
5.
Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants."
6.
Appendix A to Branch Technical Position AS8 9.5-i, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976."
g ua w 9.5.1-5 Rev. 2
BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION ASB 9.5-1 GUIDELINES FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 9
9 us n
TABLE OF CONTENTS A.
IaTRODUCTION.
9.5.1-10 8.
DISCUSS 10N.
9.5.1-10 1.
Defense-in-Depth.
9.5.1-11 2.
Use of Water on Electrical Cable Fires.
9.5.1-12 3.
Establishment and Use of Fire Areas.
9.5.1-13 4.
Definitions.
9.5.1-14 C.
POSITIJNS.
9.5.1-16 1.
Overall Requirements of the Fire Protection Program.
9.5.1-16 a.
Personnel.
9.5.1-16 b.
Fire Hazard Analysis.
9.5.1-17 c.
Fire Suppression System Design Basis.
9.5.1-19 d.
Simultaneous Events.
9.5.1-19 Implementation of Fire Protection Programs.
9.5.1-20 e.
2.
Administrative Pr ocedures, Controls a id Fire Brig 3de.
9.5.1-20 3.
Quality Assurance Program.
9.5.1-23 a.
Design Control and Procurement Document Control.
9.5.1-23 b.
]nst uctions, Procedures and Drawings 9.5.1-23 Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services 9.5.1-23 i.
d.
Inspectio1 9.3.1-23 e.
Test and Test Control.
9.5.1-24 f.
Inspection, Test and Operating Status
.5.1-24 q.
Nonconforming Items.
9.5.1-24 h.
Corrective Action.
9.5.1-24 i.
Racords.
9.5.1-24 Audits.
9.5.1-24 a -)
) h 0 b b l-9.3.1-7 Rev. 1
4.
General Plant Guidelines.
9.5.1-24 a.
Building Design.
9.5.1-24 b.
Control of Combustibles 9.5.1-2<
c.
Electrical Cable Ccnstruction, Cable Trays and Caole Penetrations.
9.5.1-28 d.
Ventilatioa.
9.5.1-30 e.
Lighting and Communication.
9.5.1-31 5.
Fire Detection and Suppression.
9.5.1-12 a.
Fire Detection.
9.5.1-32 b.
Fire Protection Water Supply Systems.
9.5.1-33 c.
Water Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systems.
9.5.1-35 d.
Halon Suppression Systems.
9.5.1-36 e.
Carton Dioxide Suppression Systens 9.5.1-37 f.
Portable Extinguishers.
9.5.1-37 6.
Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas.
9.5 1-37 a
Pri nary and Secondary Containment.
9.5.1-37 b.
Cor trol Room Complex.
9.5.1-39 c.
Cab.e Spreading Room.
9.5.1-40 d.
Plant Computer Rooms.
9 3.1-41 e.
S.vitchgear Roems.
9.5.1-41 f.
Remote Safety-Relatfd Panels.
9.5.1-42 q.
Safety-Related Battery Rooms.
9.5.1-42 h.
Turbine Building.
9.5.1-42
- i. Diesel Generator Areas.
9.5.1-42
- j. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas.
9.5.1-43
'. Safety-Related Pumps.
9.5.1-13 v
1.
New Fuel Area.
9.5.1-44 m.
Spent Fuel Pool Area.
9.5.1-44 n.
Racsaste and Decontamination Areas.
9 5.1-44 c.
Safety-Related Water Tanks.
9.5.1-44 p.
Records Storage Areas.
9.5.1-44 q.
Cnol ing Towers.
9.5.1-45 r.
Miscellaneous Areas.
9.:.1-45 7.
Special Protection Guidelines.
9.5.1-45 a.
Storage of Acetylene-Oxygen Fuel Gases.
9.5.1-45 b.
Storage Areas for Ion-Exchange Resins 9.5.1-45 J 't j Rev. 1 9.5.1-8 i A r, l9O
c.
Hazardous Chem -.is.
9.5.1-45 d.
Materiais Con'.aining Radioact.ivity.
9.5.1-45 0.
IMPLEMENTATION.
9.5.1-46 REFER-
'ES.
9.5.1-47 i [( d b '
g 9.5.1-9 Re ' 1
A.
INTRODUCflCN General Design Criterion 2, " Fire Protection," of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, " Licensing of Production,_nd Utilization Facilities," requires that structures, systems and components important to safety be designed and located to minimizc, consistent with other safety requirements, the probabil-ity and offect of fires and explosions. Nonccmbustible and heat-resistant materials are required to be used wherever practical throughout the unit, particularly in locations such as the containment and contro.1 room.
Criterion 3 also requires that fire detection and suppression systems of appropriate capacity and capability be provided and designed to minimize the adverse ef fect of fires on structures, systems and components important to safety and that firefighting systems be designed to ensure that their failure, rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly imp:;r the safety capability af these struc-tures, system' nd components.
This Branch ~.echnical Position (BTP) presents guidelines acceptable to the NRC staf f for implementing this criterion in the develc Hent of a fire protection program for r.uclear power plants. The purpose of the fire protection program is to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and te minimize radio-active releases to the environment in the event of a fire.
It implemeats the philosophy of defense-in-depth protection against the hazards of fire and its cssociated effects on safety-related equipment.
If designs or methods different from the guidelines recommended herein are used, they must provide equivalent fire pr^tection.
Suitable bases and justiii-cation should be provided for alternative approaches to establish acceptable impitmentation of General Duign Criterien 3.
This BTP addresses fire protecti 7 programs for safety-related systems and equipment and for otner plant areas containing fire hazards that could adversely af fect safety-related system;.
It does not give guidance for protecting the life or safety of the site personnel or for protection against economic or property Inss.
This document supolements Regulatory Guide 1.'/5, " Physical Independence of Electrical Systems," in determining the fire protec-tion for redundant cable systems.
B.
DISCUSSION There have been 32 fires in operating U.S. nuclear power plants through December 19/S.
Of these, the fire on March 22, 1975 at Browns ferry nuclear plant was the most severe.
With approximately 250 operating reactor years of experience, one may infer a frequency on the order of one fire per ten reactor years. Thus, on the average, a nuclear power plant may experience one or more fires of varying severity during its operating life. Although WASH-1400, " Reactor Safety Study - An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nucleir Pov'- Plants," dated October 1975, concluded that ine Browns Ferry fire d d not affect the val <ity of toc overall risk assessment, the staff concluded that cost-effective mm
. 1
O fire protection measures should be instituteu to signifiantly decrease the f requency and severity of fires and consequently initiated the development of this BTP.
In this develop-ment, the staff made use of many national standards and other publications related to fire protection. The documents discussed below were particularly useful.
A document entitled "The International Guidelines for the Fire Protection of Nuclear power Plants" (IGL), 1974 Edition, Second Reprint, published on behalf of the National Nuclear Ricks Insurance Pools and Associatioa, provides a step-by-step approach to assess-ing the fire risk in a nuclear power plant ana :'escribes prntective measures to be taken as a part of the fire prctection of these plants.
It provides useful guidcnce in this important area.
The Nuclear Energy Liability and Property Insa.nce Association (NELPIA) and the Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pool (MAERP) have prepared a document entitled "5pecifica-tions foi Fire Protection of New Plants," which gives general conditions and valuable criteria. A special review group organized by NRC under Dr. Stephen H. Hanauer, Technical Advisor to the Executive Dire: tor for Operations, to study the Browns Ferry fire, issteJ a report, NUREG-0050, "Recommendatians Related to Browns Ferry Fire," in February 1976, which contains recommerdations applicable to all nuclear power plants. This BTP uses the appii-cable irformation contained in these documents.
The fire protection program for a nuclear power plant presented in this BTP consists of design features, personnel, equipment and procedures that provide the defense-in-depth protection of the public health and safety. The purpose of the program is to prevent significant fires, to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutd'wn condition, and to minimize radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a significant fire. To maet this objective, it is essential that management participation in the program begin with early design concep+s and plant layout work and continue through plant operation and that qualified staff le responsible for engineering and design of fire pro'ection systems that provide fire detection, annunciation, confine-ment and suppression for the plant.
The staff should also be responsible for fire preven-tion activities, maintenance of fire protection systems, training, and manual firefighting activities. It is the combination cf all these that provides the needed defense-in-depth prctection of the public health and safety.
Some of the major conclusions that emerged f:om the Browns Ferry fire investigations warrant emphasis and are discussed below.
1.
Defense-in-Depth Nuclear power plants use the concept of defense-in-depth to achieve the required high degree of safety by using echelons of safety systers. This concept is also applicable to fire safety in nuclear power plants. With respect to the fire protection program, the defense-in-depth principle is aimed at achieving an '1 equate balance in:
\\b 9.5.1-11 Re v.
1
a.
Preventing fires from starting; 9
b.
Detecting fires quickly, suppressing those fires that occur, putting them out quickly, and limiting their damage; and c.
Designing plant safety systems so that a fire that starts in spite of the fire prevention program and burns for a considerable time in spite of fire protection activities will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
No one of these echalons can be periect or complete by itself. St~ngthening any one can compensate in some measure for weaknesses, known or unknown, in the cthers.
The primary objective of the fire protection program is to minimize both the probabil ity and consequences of postulated fires.
In spite of steps taken to reduce the probability of fire, fires are expected to occur.
Therefore, means are needed to detect and suppress fires with particular emphasis on providing passive and active fire protection of appro-priate capability and adequate capacity for the systems necessary to achie"e and maintain safe plant shutdown with or without offsite power.
For other safety-related systems, the fire protection should ensure that a fire will not cause the loss of function of such systems, even though loss of redundrncy within a system may occur as a result of the fire.
Generally, in plant areas wnere the pc entiai fire damage may jeopardize safe plant shutdown, the primary means of fire protection should consist of fire barriers and fixed automatic fire detection and sunpression systems. Also, a backup nanual firefighting capability shou d be provided ttroughout the plant to limit the extent of fire damage. Portable l
equipment cons: sting of hoses, nozzles, portable extinguishers, complete personnel protec-tive equipment, and air breathing equipment should be prov;ded for use by properly trained firefighting personnel. Access for effective manual application of fire extinguishing agents to combustibles should be provided. The adequacy of fire protection for any partic-ular plant safety system or area should be determined by analysis of the effects of the postulated fire relative to maintaining the ability to safeiy shut down the plant and minimize radioactive relnses to the environment in t,'e event of a fire.
Fire protection starts with design and must be c7rried through all phase; of construc-tion and operr. tion.
A quality assurance (QA) program is needed to identify and rectify errors in design, construction and operation and is an essential part of defense
-depth.
2.
Use or Water on Electrical Cable Firas Experience with major electrical cable fires shows that water vill promptly extinguish such fires. Since prompt extinguishing of the fire is tital t reactor safety, fire and water damage to safety systems is reduced by the more efficient application of water from fixed systems spraying directly on the fire ratt.er than by tanval application with fire ho>es.
Appropriate firefignting precedures and fire training should provide the tchniques.
Rev. I 9.S.1-12 j
equipment and skills for the use of water in fighting electrical cable fires in nuclear plants, particularly in areas containing a high concentration of electric cables with plastic insulation.
This is not to say that fixed water systems should be installed everywhere. Equipm(nt that may be damaged by water should.. v lued or relocated away from the fire hazard a!d the water.
Drains should be provided to remove any water used for fire suppression and extinguishment to ensure that water accumulation does not incapacitate safety relatM equipment.
3.
Establishment and Use of Fire Areas Separate fire areas for each division of safety-related systems will reduce the possi-bility of fire-related damage to redundant safety related equipment. Fire areat should be established to separate redundant safety divisions and isolate safety-related systems from fire hazards in nonsafety-related areas.
Particular design attention t the use of separate isolated fire areas for redundant cables will help to avoid loss of redundant safety-related cables. Separate fire arean should also be employed to limit the spread of fires betc/een components that are major fire hazards within a safety division. Where redunrant systems canrot be separated by fire barriers, as in contair, ment and the control room, it is necessary to employ other measures to prevent a fire f rom causing the loss of f unction 01 safety-related systems.
Within fire areas cortaining components of a safety-related system, special attention should te given to detecting and suppressing fires that may adversely af fect the system Measures that may be taken to reduce the effects of a postulated fire in a given fire area include limiting the amount of combustible materials, installing fire resistant construction, providing fire stops or fire-retardint coating in cable trays, installing fire detection systems and fixed fire suppression systems, or providing other protection suitable to the installation. The fire hazard analysis will be the mechanism to determine that fire areas have been properly selected.
Suitable design of the ventilation systems can limit the consequences of a fire by preventir g the spread of the products of comt ustion to other fire areas It is important that means be provided to ventilate, exhaust or isolate the fire area as reqcit ed and that consideration be given tc the consequences of f ailure of ventilation systens due to fire causing loss of control for ventilating, exhausting or isolating a given fire area.
The i olate is particularly important to ensure the habit-capability te v'ntilate, exhaust or f
abilit) of rooms or spaces @ t must be attended in an emergency.
In the design, provision snould be made for personnel access to and escape routes from each fire area.
-Q b.
1 f. O
\\ 't o 9.5.1-13 Rev. I
4.
Definitions For the uter's convenience, some of the terms related to fire protection are presented below w th their definitions as used in this BIP.
i Approved - tested and accepted for a specific purpose or application by a nationally recognized testing laboratory.
Automatic - self-acting, operating by its own mechanism when actuated by some imper-sonal influence such as a change in current, pressure, temperature or inechanical configuration.
Combustible Material - material that does not meet the definition of noncombustible.
Control Room Complex - the zone served by the control room emergency ventilation system (see SRP Section 6.4, " Habitability Systems").
Fire Area - that portion of a building or plant that is separated fram other areas by boundary fire barriers.
Fire Barrier - those components of construction (walls, floors and their supports),
including beams, joists, columns, penetration seals or closures, fire doors and fire dampers that are rated by approving laboratories in hours of resistance to fire aad are used to prevent the spread of fire.
Fire 5 top - a feature of construction that prevents fire propagation along the length of cables or prevents spreading of fire to nearby combustibles within a given fire area or fire zone.
Fir ( Crigade - the team of plant personnel assigned to firefighting and who are equipped for and trained in the fighting of fires.
Fire Detectors - a device designed to automatically detect the presence of fire and initiate an alarm system and other approoriate action (see NFPA /2E, " Automatic fire Detectors"). Some typical fire detectors are classified as follows:
H(at Det^ctor a device that detects a predetermined (fixed) temperature or rate of temperature rise.
Smoke Detector a device that detects the visible or invisible products of combustion.
1, [} h j !} f Rev. 1 9.5.1-14
Flame Detector - a device that detects the infrared, ultraviolet or visible radiation produced by a fire.
Line-Type Detector s device in whirn detection is continuous along a path,
- e. g., fixed-temperature, heat-sensitive cable and rate-of-rise pneuma:,ic tubing detectors.
Fire Protection Program - the integrated effort involving components, procedures and personnel utilized in carrying out all activities of fire protection. It includes svstem and facility der Nn, fire prevention, fire detection, annunciation, confinement, suppression, administracive controls, fire brigade organization, inspection and mainte-nance, training, quality assurance and testing.
Fire lating - the endurance period of a fire barrier or structure; it defines the period of resistance to a standard fire exposure before the first critical point in behavior is cbse ved (see NFPA 251).
Fire Suppression - control and extinguishing u ' ires (firefighting). Manual fire su'pression is the use of hoses, portable extinguishers, or manually-actuated fixed systems by plant personnel. Automatic fire suppression is the use of automatically actuated fixed systems such as water, Halcn or carbon dioxide systems.
Fire lones - the subdivisions of fire areas in which the fire suppression systems are designed to combat particular types of f ires.
Noncombustible Material a.
Material, no part of which will ign:te and burn when subjected to fire.
b.
Material having a structural base of noncombustible material, as defined in a., above, with a surfacing not over 1/lfrinco thick that has a flame spread rating nat higher than 50 when measured using ASTM E-84 Test " Surface Burning Characteristics of Buildirg Material', "
Raceway refer to Regulatory Guide 1.75.
Restri:ted Area any area to which access is controlle<i by the licensee for purposes of protecting individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials.
Safety-Related Systems and Components - systems and components required to shut down the reactor, mitigate the consaquences of postulated accidents, or maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition.
9.5.1-15 Rev. I
Secondaiy Containment a structure that completely encloses primary containment, used for corcrolling containment leakage.
Sprinkler System a network of piping connected to a reliable water supply that will distribute the water throughout the area protected and will dischar
'ie water through sprinklers in sufficient ouantity either to extinguish the fire entirely or to prevent its spread. The syste usually activated by heat, includes a controlling valve and a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in operation. The following cate-t gories of sprinkler systems are defined in NFPA 13, " Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems"'
Wet-Pipe System Dry-Pipe System Preaction System Deluge System Combined Dry-Pipe and Preaction System On-Off System Standpipe and Hose Systems a fixed piping system with hose outlets, hose and nozzles connected to a reliable water supply to provide effective fire hose streams to specific areas inside the building.
Water Spray System - a network of piping similar to a sprinkler system except that it utilizes open-head sp.ay nozzles. NFPA 15, " Water Spray Fixed Systems," provides guidance on these systems.
C.
POSITION 1.
Overall Requiremer of the Fire Protection Program Pe rs o n n_e_1 a.
Responsibility for the overall fire protec'. ion program should be assigned to a designated person in the upper level of management a'ho has management control over the organizations involved in fire protection activities. This person should retain ultimate responsibility even though for,nulation and assurance of program implementation is delegated.
Such delegation of authori'y should be to a staff composed of personnel prepared by training and experience in fire p stection and personnel prepared by training and experience in nut.iear plant safety to provide a balanced approach in directing the fire prot-
- f. ion program for the nuclear power plant.
G Rev. 1 9.5.1-16
} fj }
r
The staff should be responsible for:
(1) Coordination of fire protection program requirements, including considera-tion of potentia' hazards associated with postulated fires, with building layout and systems design.
(2) Design and maintenance of fire detection, suppression and extinguishing systems.
(3) Fire prevention activities.
/4) Training and manual firefighting activities of plant personnel and the fire i
brigade.
(5) Prefire planning.
On sites where there is an operiting reactor and construction or modification of ot',er units is underway, the superintender t of the operating plant should have the lead respunsibility for site fire protection.
(N)TE: NFPA 6, " Recommendations for Organization cf Industrial Fire Loss Prevention,"
contains useful guidance for the organization and operation of the entire fire loss preven-tion program.)
b.
Fire Hazard Analy @
The overall fire protection program should allow the plant to maintain the ability to perform safe shutdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a fire. A major element of this program should be the evaluation of potential fire hazards throughout the plant and the effect of postulated fires on safety related plant areas.
Fire initiatian should be postulated at the location that will produce the most severe fire, assuming an ignition source is present at that point. Fire development sho' consider the potential for involvement of other combustibles, both fixed and transient, the fire area. Where aut'matic suppression systems are insta led, the effects of the l
postulated fire snould be evaluated with and without actuation of the automatic suppression system.
(1) A detailed fire hazard analysis should be made during initial plant design to re flect the proposed construction arrangement, materials and f acilities. This analysis should be revised periodically as design and construction progress and before and during major plant modificatio.is.
9.5.1-17 Rev. 1
(2) The fire hazard analysis shot: M be a systematic study of (a) all elements of the fire protection program being proposed to ensure that the plant design has included adequate identification and evaluation of potential fire hazards, and (b) the effu t of postulated fires relative to maintaining the ability tn perform safe shutdown functions and minimizing radioactive releases to the environment.
(3) Experienced judgment is necessary to identify fire hazards and the conse-quences of a postulated fire starting at any point in the plant. Evaluation of the conse-ouences of the postulated fire on nuclear rafety should be performed by persons thoroughly trained and experienced in reactor safety.
The person conducting the analysis of fire hazards should be thoroughly trained and experienced in the principles of industrial fire prevention and control and in fire phenomena from fire initiation, through its developmen';,
to propagation into adjoining spaces. The fire hazard anaiysis should be conducted by or under the direct supervision of an engineer who is quulified for Member grade in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
(4) The fire hazard analysis should separately identify hazards and provide appropriate protection in locations where safety-related losses can cccur as a result of:
(a) Concentrations of combustible contents, including transient fire loads due to combustibles expected to be used in normal operations such as refueling, maintenance and modifications; (b) Continuity of comtustible contents, furnishirgs, building materials, or combinations thereof in configuration, conducive to fire spread; (c) Exposure fire, heat, smoke or water exposure, including those that may necessitate evacuation from areas that are required to be attended for safe shutdown; (d) Fire in control rooms or other locations having critical safety-related functions; (e) Lack of adequate access or coke removi.1 facilities that impede fire extinguishment in safety related areas; (f) Lack of explosion prevention measures; (g) Loss of electric p wer or ccatrol circuits; and (h)
I, advertent operation of fire suppression systems.
(5) The fire hazard analysis should ver.*fy that the fire protection program guidelines of this BTP have been net.
Tc that end, the report on the analysis should list e
Rev. 1 9.5.1-18 j', O -}h 3
tU
applicable elements of the program, with explanatory statements as needed to ident'fy location, type of system, and design criteria. The report should identify any desiations from the regulatory position and should present alternatives for staff review. Justifica-tion for deviations from the regulatory position should shew that an equiva'ent level of protection will be achieved. Deletion of a protective feature with;oc compensating alterna-tive protective measures generally will not be acceptable, unless it is clearly demonstrated that the protective measure is not needed because of the design and arrangement of the particular olant.
fire Suppression System Design Basis c.
(1) Total reliance should not be placed on a single fire suppression system.
Approptiate backup fire suppression capability should be provided.
(2) A single active failure or a crack in a moderate energy line (pipe) in the fire suppression system should not impair both the primary and backup fire suppression capability. For example, neither the failure of a fire pump, its power supply or controls, nor a crack in a moderate energy line in the fire suppression system, should result in loss of function af hot 5 sprinkler and hose standpipe systems in an area protected by such primary and backup systems.
(3) As a minimum, the fire suppression system should be capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown f llowing the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
In areas of high seismic activity, the staff wi'.1 consider on a case-by case basis the need to design the fire detection and suppression systems to be functional following the SSE.
(4) The fire protection syr*
s should retain their original design capability fur (a) natural phenomena of less severity and greate'. frequency than the most severe natural phenomena (approximately once in 10 years) such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, ice storms, or small-intensity earthquakes that are characteristic of the geographic region, and (b) potential man-creatad site-relatec events such as o l barge collisions or aircraft
~
i crashes that have a reasonable probability of occurring at a specific plant site.
The affects of lightning strikes should be included it the overall plant fire protection program.
(5) The consequences of inadvertent operation of or a crack in a moderate energy line in the fire suppression system should meet the guidelines specified for moderate energy systems outside containment in SRP Section 3.6.I.
d.
Simultaneous Events (1) fires need not be postulated to be concurrent with nonfire related failures in safety systems, other plant accidents, or the most severe natural phenomena.
h 9.5.1-19 Rev. 1
(2) On multiple reactor sites, unrelated fires need not be postulated to occu simultaneously in more than one reactor unit.
The effects of fires involving facilities shared between units and fires due to man-created site-related events that hase a reason-able probacility of occurring and affecting more than one reactor unit (such'as an aircraft crash; should be considered.
e.
Implementation of Fire Protection Proorams (1) The fire protection program (plans, personnel and equipment) for buildings storing new reactor fuel and for adjacent fire areas that could affect the fuel storage area should be fully operational before fuel is received at the site.
Such adjacent areas include those whose flames, hot gases, and fire generated toxic and corrosive products may jeopardize safety and surveillance of the stored fuel.
(2) The fire protection program for an entire reac'.or unit should be fully operationil prior to initial fuel loading in that re?ctor unit.
(3) On reactor sites where there is an operating reactor and construction or modification of other units is under way, the fire protection progrel should provide for continuing evaluatior. of fire hazards. Additional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative contrc1s should be provided as necessary to protect the operating unit from construction fire hazards.
2.
Adm i n i s t ra t i c Procedures, Cuntrols and Fire Brigade Administrative procedures consistent with the need for maintaining the perform-a.
ance of the fire protection system and personnel in nuclear power plants should Le p % ided.
Guidance is contained in the following publications:
NFPA 4 - Organization for Fire Services NFPA 4A - Organization of a Fire Department NFPA 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention NFPA 7 - Man 3gement of Fire Emergencies NFPA 8 - Management Responsibility for Effects of Fire on Operations NFPA 27 - Private Fire Brigades NFPA 802 - Recommended Fire Protection Practice for Nuclear Reactors b.
Effective administrative measures should be implementad to prohibit bulk storage of combustible materials inside or adjacent to safety-related buildings or systems during cperation or maintenance periods. Regulatory Guide 1.39 provides guidance on housekeeping, inc luding the disposal of combustible materials.
fG hev. I 9.5.1-20 9U
c.
Normal and abnormal conditions or other anticipated operations such as modifica-tions (e.g., breaching fire barriers or fire stops, 'mpairment of fire detection and suppres-sion systems) and transient fire load conditions such as those associated with ref ueling activities should be reviewed t4y appropriate levels cf management and the f ire protection staff. Appropriate special action and procedures such as fire watches or temporary fire barriers should be implemented to ensure adequate fire protection and reactor safety.
In particular:
(1) Work involving ignition sources such as welding and flame cutting should be done under closely monitored cond;tions that are contrciled by a permit fjstem.
Prscedures such work should be reviewed and approved by persons trained and experienced in go v e rr.
3 fire protection. Persons perfcrming and directly assisting in such work should be traineo and equipped to prevent and combat fires.
If this is not possible, a person trained in firefighting techniques and plant emergency procedures should directly monitor the work and function as a f ire watch.
In instances where such operations may produce flame, sparks or molten metal through walls or penetritions, care should be taken to inspect both rooms or areas (see NFPA-51B, " Cutting and Welding Processes").
(2) Leak testing and similar procedures such as airflow determination should use one of the commerciallj available techniques Open flames or cambustion generated smuke should not be permittod.
(3) Use of combuscible laterial, e.g.,
HEPA and charcoal filters, dry ion-exchange res ins, or o t her combus t it'le supplies, in safety related areas shcald be controllfd.
Use of wood inside t;uildings containing saf ety-related systems or equipment should be permitted only when suitable noncombustible substitutes are not available.
If wood must be used, only fire retardant treated woud (scaffolding, lay-do n blocks) should be permitted.
Such materials should be allowed into safety related areas only when they are to be uwd immediate!j.
Their possible and prJbable use should be considered in the fire hazard
.inalysis to determine *he adequacy of the installed fire prutection systems and the effects lo sdety-related equipment.
(4) Disarming of fire detection or fire suppression systems should be cor. trolled sy a permit system.
Fire watches should be established in areas where systems are so jisumed.
d.
The plant should be cesigned to be self sufficient with respect to firefighting activities to protect safety related plant areas.
Public fire department response should be provided for a the c"erall fire protection program for supplemental and backup capability.
The need for good acqaniz1 tion, training, and eouipping of fire brigades at e.
O nuclear power plant sites requires that ef fective measure, 7-be implemented to en" propg g h t0 L S.1-L 1 Rev. 1
discharge of-these functiens.
D-gu ; d =ce in Regulatory Guida J.101, " Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants," should be followed as applicable.
(1) Success f ul firefightirt requires testing and maintenance of the fire protec-tion equipment and the emergency lighting and communication, as well as nractice as brigades for the people who must utilize the equipment. A test plan that lists the individuals and their responsibilities in connection with routine tests and inspections of the fire detec-tion and protection systems should be developed. The test plan should contain the types, frequency and detailed procedures for testing. Procedures should also contain instructions on maintaining fire protection during those periods when the fire protection sys m is impaired or during periods of plant maintenance.
e.g.,
fire watches or ttmporary nose connections ta water sysicms.
(2) Basic training is a necessary element in effective firefighting operation.
In order for a fire brigade to operate effectively, it must cperate as a team.
All members must knew what their individual duties are.
lhey must be familiar with tho layout of the plant and with equipment location and operation in order to permit effective firefighting operations during times when a particular area is filled with smoke or is insufficiently lighted. Such training can only be accomplished by conducting drills and classroom instruc-tion several times a year (at least quarterly) so that all members of the f:re brigado have had *?e opportunity to train as a team testing itself in the major areas of the plant.
The drills should include the simulated use of equipa.ent ir each area and should be preplanned and po$tCritiqued to establish the training objective of the drills and determine how well these objectives have been met.
These drilis should provide fc-Incal fire department participation periodically (at least annually). Such drills also permit supervising person-r.el to evaluate the effectiveness of commu-ications within the fire brigade and with the on scene fire team leader, the reactor operator in the control room, the plant physical security organization, and any other command post.
(3) To have proper coverage during all phases of operation, members of each shift crew should be ' rained in fire protection. Training of the plant fire brigade should be coordinated with the local fire department so that responsibilities and duties are delineated in advance. This coordination should be part of the training course and should be includea in the training of the local fire department staff.
The plant fire brigade should not include any of the plant physical security personnel required to be available to fulfill the response requirements of paragraph 73.55(h)(2) of 10 CFR Part 73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.'
local fire departments should be provided training in operational precautions when fighting fires on nuclear power plant sites and sheuld be made aware of the need for radiological protection of personnel and the special hatards asso-ciated with a nuclear power plant site.
(4) NFPA 27, " Private fire Brigade," should be followed in organization, training and fire drills. This standard also is applicable for the inspection and maintenance of ieB 557 Rov. I 9.5.1-22
firefighting equipment. Among the standards referenced is this document, NFPA 19/, " Train-ing Standard on Initial Fire Attacks," should be utilized as applicable. NFPA booklets and pamphlets listed in NFPA 27 may be used as applicable ft training references. In addition, courses in fire prevsntion and fire suppression 1. hat are recognized or sponsored by the fire pr otection industry should be utilized.
3.
Quality Assurance Program The quality assurance (QA) programs of applicants and contractors should ensure that the guidelines for design, procurement, installatir n and testing and the administrative controls for the fire protection systems for safety-related areas are satisfied. The QA program should be under the management. control of the QA organization. This control con-sists of (1) formulating a fire protection QA program that incorporates suitable require-ments and is acceptable to the management responsible for fire protection or verifying that the program incorporates suitable requiremer,t md is acceptable to the management responsi-ble for fire protection, and (2) verifying the _, ctiveness of the QA program for fire protection through review, surveillance and audits. Performance of other QA program func-tions f r meeting the fire protection program requires.. ants may ba performed by personnel oitside of the QA organization. The QA program for fire protection should be part of the overall plant QA program.
It should satisfy the specific criteria listed below.
a.
Design and Procurement Document Control Measures should be established to ensure that the guidelines of the regulatory pasition of this guide are included in design and procurement documents and '. hat deviations therefrom are controlled.
b.
Instructions, Procedures and Dr wings Inspections tests, administrative controls, fire drills, and training that govern the fire protection program should be prescribed by documented ins truct.icns, proce-dures or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with ti,ese documents.
c.
Control of Purchased Mate. ial, E uipment and Services S
Measires should be established to ensure that purctased material, eqa.pment and services conform to the procurement documants.
d.
Inspection A program for independent inspection of activities affecting fire protection should be established and executed by ar for the organization performing the activity to
@ verify conformance with documented installation dra.vings and test procedur ing the activities.
h
- 9. 5.1 - n Rev. I
e.
Test and Test Control A test program should be established and implemented to ensure that testing is perfurmed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance Wttft design and system readiness requirements. The tests should Le performed in accordance with written test procedures; test results should be properly evaluated and acted on.
f.
Inspection, Test and Operating Status Measu' s should be established to provide for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections.
g.
Ncnconforming Items Measures should be established to control items that do not conform to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent use or installation.
h.
Corrective Action Measures should be established to ensure that conditions adverse to fire protec-tion, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible material and nonconfo mances, are promptly identified, reported, and corrected.
i.
Records Records should be prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the criteria 2 numerated above are being met for activities affecting the fire protection program.
j.
Audits Audits should be coad cted and documented to verify compliance with the fire protection prcgram, including design and procurement documents, instructions, procedures and dra ings, and inspection and test activities.
General Plant Guidelines a.
Building Design (1) Fire barriers with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours should be used, axcept as noted in other paragraphs, to:
Rev. 1 9.5.1-24 1/O
,FQ l &C JJ}
(a) Isolate safety-related systems from any potential fires in nonsafety-related areas that could affect their ability to perform their safety function; w
(b) Separate redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard; and (c) Separate individual units on a multiple unit site unless the requirements of General Design Criterion 5 can be met with respect to fires.
(2) Appropriate fire barriers should be provided within a singlt division to separate components that present a fire hazard to other safety-related com,.nents or high concentrations of safety-related cables within that division.
(3) Each cable spreading rocm should contain only one redundant safety division.
Cable spreading rooms should not be shared between reactors. Cable spreading rooms should be separated from each other and frcm other areas of the plant by barriers having a mirimum fire resistance of three hours.
(4) Interior wall and structural components, thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding materials, and soundproofing should be noncombustible. Interior finishes should be noncombustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory such as Factory Mutual or Underwriters Laboratorv, Inc., for:
(a) Surface flamespread rating of 50 or less when tested under ASTM E-84, and (b) Potential heat release of 3500 Btu /lb or less when tested under ASTM D-3286 or NFPA 259.1 Materials that are acceptable for use as interior finish without evidence of test and listing by a nationally recognized laboratory are the following:
Flaster, a custic plaster Gypsum plasterboard (gypsum wa11 board)
Any of the above, plain, wallpapered, or painted with oil-or water-base paint Ceramic tile, ceramic panels 9
IThe concept of using a potential heat release limit of 3500 Btu /lb is similar to the
" limited combustible" concept with its like limit, as set forth in NFPA 220.
th I
9.5.1-25 Pev. I
Glass, glass blocks Brick, stone, concrete blocks, plain or painted Steel and aluminum panels, plain, painted, or enamelad Vinyl Lile, vinyl-ashestos tile, linoleum, or asphalt lile on concrete floors.
(5) Metal deck roof construction should be noncombustible, listed as " acceptable for fire" in the UL Building Materials Directory, or listed as Class I in the factory Mutual System Approval Guide.
(6) Suspended ceilings and their supports should be of noncombustible construc-tion.
Concealed spaces should be devoid of coiabustibles except as noted in Position C.6.b.
(7) Transformers installed inside fire areas containing safety-related systems should be of the dry type or insulated and cooled with noncombustible liquid. Where trans-formers filled with combustible fluid e e located in nonsafety-related areas, there should be no openings in the fire barriers separating such transformers f rom areas cofitaining safety related systems or equipment.
(8) Buildings contaihing safety-related systems should be crotected.rcm exposure or spill fires involving outdoor oil-filled t ransf ormers by providing oil spill confinement or drainage away Tram the buildings aid:
Locating such transf ormers at least 'O feet distant f rom the building, or Ensuring triat such building walls within 50 feet of oil-filled trans-formers are witt.out openings and h;,ve a fire rm.istance rating of at least three hours.
(9) floor drains sized to remove expected fit u rf:ow without flooding safety-related equipment should be provided in those areas xed water fire suppres-sion systems are installed. floor drains should also b+ prov
.+d in other areas where hind hose lines tr.ay be used if such firefighting water could cause unacceptable damage to saf ety-related equipment in the area (see NFPA-92, ~~ Waterproofing and draining of floors"'
Where gas suppression systems are instalico, the drains should be provided with adequate seals or the gas suppression system should be sized to compensate for the loss of the suppression agent through the drains. Drains in areas containing combcstible liquids should have provisions for preventing the spread of the fire throughout the drain system. Water drainage Rev. I 9.5.1-26
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from areas that may contain radioactivity should be collected, sampled and analyzed before discharge to the environment.
(10).loors, walls and ceilings separating fire areas should have a minimum fire rating of three hours. Openings through fire barriers around conduit or piping should be sealed er closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that required of the barrier itself. Door openings should be protected with equivalently rated doors, frames and hardware tnat have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory.
Such doors should be normally closed and delay-alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the control room, locked closed, or equipped with automatic self-closing devices using magnetic hold open devices that are activated by sm( e or ate of rise heat detectors protecting both sides of the opening. The status of doors equipped with magnetic hold open devices should be indicated in the control room. Fire barrier openings for ventilation systems should be protected by a " fire door damper" having a rating equivalent to that required of the barrier (see NFPA-80, " Fire Door:, and Windows"). Flexible air duct coupling in ventila-tion and filter systems should be noncombustible.
(11) Personnel access routes and escape routes should be provided for each fire Stairwells outside primary containment serving as escape routes, access routes for area.
firefighting, or access routes to areas containing equipment necessary for safe shutdown should be enclosed in masonry or concrete towers with a minimum f.
? rating of two hours and self-cicsing Class B fire doors.
(12) Fire exit routes should be clearly marked.
b.
Contrul of Combustibles (1) Safety related systems should be isolated or sen rated from combustible niaterial s.
When this is not possible because of the nature of the safety system or the combustible material, automatic fire suppression should be provided to limit the conse-quences of a fire.
(2) Use and storage of compressed gases (especially oxygen and flammable gases) inside buildings housing safety-related equipment should be controlled. Bulk storage of flammable gas should not be permitted inside structures housing safety-related equipment and should be sufficiently remote that a fire or explosion will not adversely affect any safety related systems or equipment (see NFPA 6, " Industrial Fire loss Prevention").
(3) It is recognized that halogenated cnmpounds are used to improve the fire retardancy of cable insulation; insulating and jacketing materials should be chosen to have a high flame resistance and low smoke and offgas characteristics without degrading the required electrical and physical properties. However, plastic materials should not be used for other applications unless suitable noncombustible materials are not available.
149 001 9.5.1-27 Rev. I
(4) Storage and usage of flammable liquids st.'uld, as a minimum, comply with the requirements of NFPA 30, " flammable and Combustible Liquids Code."
c.
Electrical Cable Construction, Cable frays and Cable Penetrations (1) Only metal should be used for cable trays. Only metallic tubing should be used for conduit.
Thin wall metallic tubing should rot be used flexible metallic tubing should only be used in short lengths to connect to equipment. Other raceways'she"ld be made of noncombus' _le material.
(2) Redundant safety related cable systems outside the cable spreading room should be separated from each other and f em potential fire exposure h3zards in nonsafety-related areas by fire barriers with a minimum fire rating of three hours.
These cable trays should be provided with contiaucus line-type heat detectors and should be accessible for manual firefighting. Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with fire suppre,-
sion water without electrical faulting. Manual hose stations and portable hand extin-guishers should be provided. Safety-related equipment in the vicinity of such cable trays that does not itself require fixed water suppression systems but is subject to unacceptable damage from water should be protected Safety-related cable trays of a single division that are separated from redundant divisions by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of three hours and are normally accessible for manual firefighting should be protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing autouatic water suppression in the area wher? such a fire could occur. Automatic area protection, where provided, should consider cable tray arrangements and possible.ransient combustibles to ensure adequate water coverage for areas that could present an exposure hazard to the cable system. Manual hose standpipe systems may be relied upon to provide the primary fire suppression (in lieu of automatic water suppression systems) for safety related cable trays o' a single division that are separated from redun-dant safety divisions by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of three hours and are normally accessible for manual firefighting if all of the following conditions are met:
2 (a) The number of equivalent standard 24-inch wide cable trays (both safety-related and nonsafety-related) in a given fire area is six or less; (b) The cabling does not provide instrumentation, control or power to systems required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown; and (c) Smoke detectors are provided in the area of these cabl'e routings, and continuous line-type heat detect 6rs are provided in the cable trays.
2 Trays exceeding 24 inches should be counted as two trays; trays exceeding 48 inches should be counted as three trays, regardless of tray fill.
Rev. I 9.5.1-28
Safety-related cable trays that are not accessible for manual fighting should be protected by a zoned automatic water system with open-head deluge or open direc-tional spray nozzles arranged so that adequate water coverage is provided for each cable trcy.
Such cable trays should also be protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression in the area where such a fire could occur.
In such plant areas as primary and secondary containment or other areas where it may not be possible because of other overriding design features necessary for reasons of nuclear safety to separate redundant safety-related cable systems by three-hour-rated fire barriers, cable trays should be protected by an automatic water system with coen-head deluge or open directional spray nozzles arranged so that adequate water coverage is provided for each cable tray.
Such cable trays should also be protected from the effects of a potential exposura fire by prov: ding automatic water suppression in the area where such a fire could occur.
The capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown considering the effects of a firo invalving fixed and potential transient combustibles should be evalu-ated with and withot t actuation of the automatic suppression system and should be justified on a suitably defir?d basis.
(3) Calle and cable tray penetration of fire barriers (vertical and horizontal) should be sealeJ to give protection at least equivalent to that required of the tire barrier.
The design of f re barrier penetrations for horizontal and vertical cable trays should be qualified by t>sts.3 The penetration qualification tests should use the time-temperature exposure cur, specified by ASTM E-119, " Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials."
Openings n ide condeit larger than four inches in diameter should be sejled at the fire barrier pe etration; these seals should be qualified by tests as described above.
Openings inside conduit four inches or less in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier and should be qualified by tests as described above unless the conduit extends at least five feet on each side of the fire barrier and is 5ealed either at both ends or at the fire barrier with noncombustible material to prevont the parsage of smoke and hot gises.
Fire barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolation or pressure differentials should bo qualified by test to maintain the ou -iur integrity under the conditions specified above.
(4) Fire sttps should be installed every 20 feet along horizontal cable routings in areas that are not protected by autcmatic water systems Vt tical cable routings should have fire stops installed at each floor / ceiling letel.
Between evels or in vertical cable chases, tire stcps should be installad at the midheight if the vertical run is 20 feet or more but less than 30 feet or at 15-foot intervals in vertical runs of 30 feet or more unless scch vertical cable routincp are protected by automatic water systems directed on the cable trays Individual fire stop designs should prevent the propag3 tion of a fire for 3 Penetration qualification test criteria are under development. Guidance is currently available in the form of a draft standard, " Standard for Cable Penetration Fire Stop Tost Procedure," being developed by Task Force 12-40 of the IEEE Insulated Cenductors Committee.
149 0()3 9.5.1-29 1
a minimum period of thirty minutes when tested for the largest number of cable routings and maximum cable density.
(5) Electric cable conutructions should, as a minimum, pass the flame test in the current IEEE Std 383
'This does not imply that cables passing this test will not require fire protectio.
(6) Cable raceways should be used only for cables.
(7) Miscellaneous storage and piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases should not creat a potential exposure hazard to safety-related systems.
d.
Ventilation (1) The products of combustion and the means by which they will be removed from each fire area should be estaolished during the initial stages of plant design. Concidera-tion should be given to the installation of automatic suppression systems os a means of limiting smoke and end heat generation. Smoke and corros.ve gases should generally be discharged directly outside to an area that will not affect safety-related plant areas.
The normal plant ventilation system may be used for this purpose if capable and available.
To facilitate manual firefighting, separate smoke and heat vents should b, provided in specific areas such as cable spread coms, diesel fuel oil storage areas, switchgear 2
rooms, and other areas where the otential exists for heavy smoke conditions (see NFPA 204 for additional guidance on smoke control).
(2) Release of smoke and gases containing radioactive materials to the environ-ment should bo monitored in accordance with emergency plans as described in the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants." Any ventilation system designed to exhaust potentially radicactive smoke or g3ses should be evaluated to ensure that inadvertent operation or single failures will not violate the radiologically controlled areas of the plant design. This requirement includes containment functions for protecting the public and maintaining habitability for operations personnel.
(3) Special protectio.; for ventilation power and control cables may be required.
The power supply and controls for mechanic 31 sentilation systems should be run outside the fire area served by the system where practical.
(4) Engineered safety featura filters should be protected in accordancr with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52.
Any filter that includes combustible materials and is a potential exposure fire hazard that may affect safety related components should be pro-tected as determined by the fire hazard analysis.
(5) The fresh air supply 'ntakes to areas containing safety-related equipment or systems should be located remote from the exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other fire Rev. 1 9.5.1-30
areas to minimize the possibility of contaminating the intake air with the products of combustion.
(6) Stairwells should be designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire.
s (7) Self-contained breathing apparatus using full-face positive pressure masks approved by NIOSH (National Institute for Gccupational Safety and Health--approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, daaage control, and control room personnel.
Control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a mani-fold system piped from a storage res 3rvoir if practical. Service or rated operating life should be a minimum of one-half hour f]r the self-contained units.
At least two extra air bottles should be located on site for each self-contained creathing unit.
In addition, an onsite six-hour supply of reserve air should te provided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only uaits approved for breathing air should be used; compressors should be operable assuming a loss of offsite power.
Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.
(8) Where total flooding gas extinguishing systems are us m ea intake and exhaust ventilation dampers should be controlled in accordance with NFPA 12, " Carbon Dioxide Systems,' and NFPA 12A, "Halon 1301 Systems, to maintain the necessary gas concentration.
e.
Lighting and Cammunication Lightirg and two way voice communication are vital to safe shutdown and emergency response in the event of fire.
Suitable fixed and portable emergency lighting and communica-tion devices should be provided as follows:
(1) Fixed self contained lighting consisting of fluorescent or sealed-beam units with individual eight-hour minimum battery power supplies should be provided in areas that must be manned for safe shutdown and for access and egress routes to and from all fire areas. Safe shutdown areas include those required to be manned 'f the c ol room must be evacuated.
(2) Suitable sea'ed-beam battery powered portable hand lights should be provided for emergency use by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown.
(3) Fixed emergency communications independent of the normal plant communication system should be installed at preselected stations.
i 149 0()5 9.5.1-31 Rev. I
(4) A portable radio communications system should be provided for use by the fine brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown.
This system should not int with the communications capabilities of the plant security force.
Fixed repea' permit use of portable radio communication units should be protected from expu re damage.
Preoperational and periodic testing should demonstrate that the frequencies used for portable radio communication will not affect the actuation of protective relays.
5.
Fire Detection and Suppression a.
Fire Detection (1) Area fire detection systems should be prosided for all areas that contain, or present potential fire exposure to, safety related equipment.
(2) Fire detection systems should, as a minimum, comply with the requirements of Class A systems as oefined in NFPA 720, " Standard for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems," and Class I circuits as defined in NFPA 70,
" National Electrical Code."
(3) Fire detectors should, as minimum, be selected and installed in accordance witn NFPA 72E, " Automatic Fire Detectors " Preoperational and periodic testing of pulsed line-type heat detectors should demonstrate that the frequencies used will not affect the actuation of protective relays.
(4) Fire detection systems should give audible and visual alarm and annunciation in the control room. Where zoned detection systems are used in a given fire area, lccal means should be prosided to identify whicn detector zone has actuated. Local audible alarms should sound in the fire area.
(5) Fire alarms should be distinctive and unique so they will not be confused with any other plant system Tlarms.
(6) Primary and secondary po.er supplies should be provided for the fire detec-tion system and for electrically operated control vilves
- o automatic suppression systems.
Such primary and secondary power supplies should satisfy provisicns af Section 2220 of NFPA 720.
This can be accomplished by:
(a) Using normal of f site power as the primary supply with a four-hour battery supply as secondary supply; and (b) Having capability for manual connection to the Class lE emergency power bus within four hours of loss of -ffsite power.
Such coimection should follow the appli-cable guinelines in Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32 and 1.75.
!\\! \\ b g S t s.
U d
/
i't 9.5.1-32 Rev. 1
b.
Fire Protection Water Supply Systems (1) An underground yard fire main loop should be installed to furnish antici-pated water requirements. NFPA 24, " Standard for Outside Protection," gives necessary guidance for such installation. It references other design codes and standards developed by nch organizations as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Water Works Association (AWWA). Type of pipe and water treatment should be design consider-ations with tuberculation as one of the parameters. Means for inspecting and flushing the systems should be provided. ?pproved visual'y indicating sectional control valves such as post indicator valves should ue provided to isolate portions of the main for mainten nce or repair without shutting off the supply to primary and backup fire suppression systems serving areas that contain or a;ose safety-related equipment.
iitary The fire main system piping should te separate from service or a
water system piping, except as described in Position C.5.c.(4).
(2) A common yard fire main loup may serve mu '.iunit nuclear power p? ant sites l
if cross connected between units.
Sectional control valves should permit maintaining independence of the individual loop around each unit.
For such installations, common water supplies may also be utilized. For multiple-reactor sites with widely separated plants (approaching 1 mile or more), separate yard fire main loops should be used.
(3) If pumps are required to meet system pressure or flow requirements, a suf fi-cient number of pumps should be provided to ensure that 100% capacity will be available assaming failure of the largest pump or loss of offsite power (e.g., three 50% pumps or two 100% pumps).
This can be accoTplished, for example, by providing either:
(a) Electric motor-criven fire pump (s) and diesel-driven fire pump (s); or (b) Two or more seismic Category I Class IE electric motor-driven fire pumi, connected to redandant Class IE emergensv power buses (see Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32 and 1.75).
Individual fire pump connectinns to the yard fire main loop should be sepa-rated with sectionalizirg valves between connections. Each pump and its driver and controls should be located in a room separated from the remaining fire pumps by a fire wall with a minimum rating of three hours.
The fuel for the diesel fire pump (s) should be separated so that it does not provid2 a fire source exposing safety related equipment. Alarms indi-cating puTp running, driver availability, failure to start, and low fire-main pressure should be provided in the control room.
Deta.ls of the fire pump installaticn should, as a minimum, conform to NFPA 20, " Standard for the Installation of Centrifuq31 Fire Pumps."
149 007 9.5.1-33 Rev. 1
(4) Two separate, reliable freshwater supplies should be provided. Saltwater or t,rackish water should not be used unless all f reshwater supplies have been exhausted. If tanks are used, two 100% (minimum cf 300,000 gallons each) system capacity tanks should be installed. They should be so interconnected that pumps can take suction f rom either or both.
However, a leak ia one tank cr its piping should be isolable so that it will not cause both tanks to drain. Water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in eight hours or less.
Common tanks are permitted for fire and sanitary or service water storage.
When thic is done, however, minimum fire water storage r equirements should be dedicated by passive means, for example, use of a vertical standpipe for other water services.
(5) The fire water supply should be calculated on the basis of the largest expected flow rate for a period of two hours, but not less than 300,000 gallons. This flow rate should be based (conservatively) on 750 gpm for manual hose streams plus the largest design demand of any sprinkler or deluge system as determined in accordance with NFPA 11 or NPA 15.
The fire water suppl, should be capa' ale of delivering this design demand over the l oi route of the water supply system.
(6) Freshwater lakes or ponds of sufficient size may qualify as sole source of water for f:re protection but raquire at least two intakes to the pump supply. One hundred percent capacity should be available following '.he loss of any one intake. When a common water supply is permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satisfied:
(a) The additional fire protection water requirements are designed into the total storage capacity, and (b) Failure of the fire protection system should not degrace the function of the ultimate heat sink.
(7) Outside manual hose installation should be sufficiant to provide an effec-tivt hese stream to any onsite location where fixed or transient combustibles could jeopard-ize safety related equipment. To accomplish this, hydrants should be installed approximately
!very 250 feet on the yard main system. A hose house equipped with hose and combination nozzle and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Protection," should be prcvidea as needed, but at least every 1,000 feet.
Alternatively, mobile means of providing hose and associated equipmelt, such as hose carts or trucks, may be used. When provided, such mobile equipment should be equivalent to the equipment supplied by three hose houses.
Threads compatible with those used by local fire departments should be provided on a' hydrants, hose couplings, and standpipe risers.
9.5.1-34 p
7
c.
Water Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systems (1) Sprinkler systems and manual hose station standpipes should have connections to the p' ant underground water main so that no si.igle actite failure or crack in a moderate-energy line can impair both the primary and backup fire suppression systems. Alternatively, headers fed from each end are permitted inside buildings to supply both sprinkler and standpipe systems, provided steel piping and fittings meeting the requirements of ANSI B31.1,
" Power Piping," are used for the headers up to and :ncluding the first valve supplying the sprinkler systems where such headers are part of the seismically analyzed ho.2 standpipe system. When provided, such headers are consioered an extension of the yard main system.
Hose standpipt and automatic water suppression systems serving a single fire area should have independent connec tions to the yard main systems. Each sprinkler and standpipe system should oe equipped with OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) gate valve or other approved shutoff valve and waterflow alarm.
Safety related equipment that does not itself require sprinkler water fire protection but is subject to unacceptable damage if wet by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shield; or baffles.
(2) Control and sectionalizing valves in the fire water systems should be elec-trically superviseo or administratively controlled. The electrical supervision signal should indicate in the control room.
All valves in the fire protection system should be periodically checked to verify position (see NFPA 26, " Supervision of Valves").
(3) Fixed water extinguishing systems should, as a minimum, conform to require-ments of appropriate standards such as NFPA 13, " Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems," and NFPA 15, " Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems."
(4) Interier manual hose installation should be able to reach any locatien that contains, or could present a fire exposure hazard to, safety-relas d equipment with at least one effective hose stream.
To acccTpli h this, standpipes with hose connections s
equipped with a maximum of 100 feet of 1-1/2-inch woven-jacket, lined fire hose and suitable nozzles sbculd be provided in all buildings on all floors.
Individual standpipes should be at least four inches in diameter for multiple hose connections and 2-1/2 inches in diameter for single hose connections. These systems should follow the requirements of NFPA 14,
" Standpipe and Hose Systems," for sizing, spacinn, and pipe support requirements.
Hose stations should be located as dictated by the fire hazard analysis to facilitate access and use for firefighting operations. Alternative hose stations should be provided for an area if the fire hazard could block access to a single hose station serving that area.
Provisions should be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connections for manual firefighting in areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake. The piping system serving such hose br
)
9.5.1-35 Rev. 1
stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should be provided with supports tu ensure system pressure integrity.
The piping and valves f or the portion of hms 3 t,inJp ip e,jstem affected by this functional reqairement ;hGuld, as a minimui
,atisfy 51 B31.1, "Po or Piping."
The water supply f or this cond; tion may be obtained n, manual operator actuation of valves in a connection to tre hose standpipe header from a normal seismic Category I water system such as the essential sen ice wit er sy s tem.
The crvss cennection should be (a) capable of providing flow to at i.ast toc hosc stations (approximttely M gpm per hase station), and (h) designed to the sama standards as the seismic Category I water >ystem; it should not degrade the performance of the seisnic Category I w3ter system.
(b, lhe pn per t ge of huse nozzle to be supplied to each area should he based on t' fi-il ni 3nalysis.
Ibe usua l combin it ; n spray / straight-stream nozzle should not be used a treas where the straight stream can cause uniccept1ble mechanical d a m a ;"> Fixed fsq nozzles.hould be provided at locations wher e high voltage shock ha z <i rd s exist.
All hos noz
!('
hould have shutoft capability. (Guidance on safe distances for water applica-tion to Iise electrical Nuipment may be fornd !n the "NFPA fire Protection Handbook ")
(6) Cert ain fires, such <15 those insolving flannable liquids, respond well to foam suppression.
Consideration shauld t'e given to use of methanical low-espansion foam systems, high-expansion foam g nerators, or aqwous film-forming f oam ( Af f f ) systems, including the M f f deluge system.
INse sjstems should comply with the reqairements of NFPA 11, NFFA IlA and NFPA 118 as applicable.
d.
halen Suppression Systems Halco fire extinguishing vstem3 snould, as 1 minimum, comply with the require-ments of NFPA 12A,ind NF P A 12B "H ilogenated f i re E xtin4;uishing Agent Systems - Halon lEl and Halon 1211."
Only la -listet or F M appro ud agents should be used.
Provisions for locally disarming automatic H3lon systems should be key locked and under stri:t adm i ni s tr i-tise control. Automatic Halon extinguishing systems shoulJ not be disarned unless controls as descrited in Pos'cicn C.2.c.
are provided.
In addition to thu quidelines of NFPA 12A and 12B, prevent ive miintenance and testinq of the systems, including check weiqhinq of the Haeon cyIinders, should be done at least quarterly Particular consideration,hould also te e,iven to:
(i) Minimun required Halon concentration, distribution, soak time, and ventil.i-tion control; (2) Ioxicity of Halon; ev. 1 9.5.1-36 1 /O J i i lQj g,,IJ
(3) Toxicity and corresive characteristics of the thermal decomposition products of H31cn; and (4) locatiun and selection of the activating detectors.
e.
Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems Carbon dioxide extinguishing systems should, as a minimum, comply with the require-ments of NFPA 12, " Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing System, Where actomatic t.arbon dio<ide systems are used, they should be equipped with a prediicharge alarm system and a disch]rge delay to permit personnel egress. Provisions for locally disarming automatic carbon dioxide systems should be key lor' " and under strict administrative control. Automatic carbon dioxide extinguishing s)
, should not be disarmed unless controls a described in Position C.2.c. are provided.
Particuler consideration should also t.e given to:
(1) Min mum required CO, concentration, distribution, soak time and ventilatior i
control; (2) Anoxia and toxicity of CO '
2 (3) Possibility of secondary thermal shock (cooling) damage; (4) Conflicting requirements for venting during CO injection to prevent overpres-2 surization versus sealing to present loss of agent; and (5) Location and selection of the activating detectors.
f.
Portable Extinguishers Fire extinguish 9 s should be proviJed in areas that contain, or could present a fire e<posure nazard to, safety-rela.ed equipment in accordance with quidelines of NFPA 10,
" Portable Fire Extinguishers, Instal ~ation, Maintenance an1 Use."
Dry chemical extin-guishers should be installed with dus conside*'atit given to possible adverse ef ects an l
salety related equipment installed in the area.
6.
Guidelinos for Specific Plant Areas P imar u nd Secondary Containment a.
(1) Normal Operation - Fire protectico requirement, for the prirary and seccnt re containment areas should be provided for hazards identified by the fi,e hazard analysis.
149 011 9.S.1-37 Rev. 1
Examples of such hazards include lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid system for the primary coolant pumps, cable tray arrangements and cable penetrations, and charcoal filters.
Because of the general inaccessibility of primary containment during normal plant opera-tion, protection should be provided by automatic f;xed sys+ ws.
The effects of postulated fires within the primnv containment should be evaluated to ensure that the integrity of the primary coolant Jysiem and the containment is not jeopardized assuming no action is taken to fight the fiee.
Operation of the fire protection systems shauld not compromise the integrity of N containment or otN r safety related systems. Fire protection activities in tre containo. ant areas shof.d function in conjunction w th total containment requirements such i
as ventilation and cantro' of contaminated liquid and gaseous release.
In primary containment, fire detection systems should be provided for each fire hazard.
The type of detection usei and the location of the detectors should be the most suitable far the particular type of fire hazard identified by the fire hazard analysis.
A general area fire detection capability should be prcsided in the primary contai ment as backup for the above-described hazard detection. To accomplish this, suit-able smoke or heat detectors compatible with the radiation environment should be installed.
For seconaary containment areas, cable fire hazards that could affect safety should be protected as described in Position C.4.c(2).
fhe type of detection system for other fire hazards identified by the fire hazard analysis should be the most suitable for the particular type of fire hazard.
(2) Refueling and Maintenance - Refueling and maintenance operations in contain-ment may introduce additional hazards such as contamination control materials, decontamina-tion supplies, wood planking, temporary wiring, welding, and flame cutting (with portable compressed cas fuel supply). Possible fires would not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and suppression systems. Management procedures and controls necessary tr ensure adequate fire protection for transient fire loads are discussed in Position C.l.
Manual firefighting capability thould ba permanently installed in containment.
Standpipes with hose station; and portable fire extinguishers should be installed at stra-tegic locations throughot. containmert for any required manual firefighting operations.
The containment penetration: of the standpipe system should meet the isolation requirements of General Design Criterion 56 and should be seismic Category I and Quality Group B.
Adequate self-contained breathing apparatus should be provided near the containment entrances for firefighting and dam 3ge control oersonnel. These units should be independent of any breathing apparatus or air supply systems provided for general plant activities and should be clearly marked as emergency equipment.
14()
012 Rev, 1 9.5.1-38
b.
Coatrol Room Cop _1g The cuntrol ro(m complex (including galleys, office spaces, etc.) should be protected against dis.511ng fire damage and should be separated from other areac of the plant by floors, walls, and roof having minimum fire resistance ratings of three hotfrs.
Peripheral rooms in the control room complex should have automatic fire suppression and should be separated from the control room by noncombustible construction with a fire resist-ance rating of oriu hour. Ventilation system cpenings bet.een the control room and peripheral rooms should have automatic smoke dampers that close on operation of the fire detection or suppression system.
If a carbon d:1xide flooding tystem is used for fire suppression, these dampers should be strong enough to suoport the precsure rise accompanying carbon dioxide discharge and seal tightly against infiltration of carbon dioxide into the control room.
Manual firefighting capability should be provided for:
(1) Fire originating within a cabinet, console, or connecting cables; and (2) Exposure fires involving combustibles in the general room area.
Pcrcable Class A and Class C fire extinguish 9rs should be located in tne control room.
A hose station should be installed immediately outside the control roam.
Noizles that are compatible with the hazards and (quipment in the control roon should be provided for the manual hose station.
The nozzles chosen shauld satisfy actual firefighting needs, satisfy electrical safety, and minimize physical damage to electrical equipuent from hose strea, impingement.
Smoke detectors should be provided in the control rocm, cabinets, and consoles.
If redundaat safe-shutd%n equipment is located in the s ame control room cabinet or console, additional fire protection measures should be provided. Alarm and local indication should be presided in the control room.
Brrathing apparatus for control room operators should be readily available.
The outside air intake (s) for the contro! room ventilation system should be previoed with smoke detection capability to alarm 1,i the control room to en3ble manual isolation of the :ontrol room ventilation system and thus prevent smoke from entering the control room.
Venting of smoke produced by fire in the control room by means of the normal ventilation system is acceptable; however, provision should be made to permit isolation of the recirculating portion of the normal ventilation system. Manually cperated venting of the control room should be available to the operators.
- A G17 F e t.Q:Q'.
UiJ i
9.5.1-39
i All cables that en Nr the control room should terminate in the control room.
That is, no cabliny should be ; imply routed through the control room from one area te another.
Cables ir the control room should be kept to the minimum necessary for plant operation.
Caoles in underfloor and ceiling spaces should meet the separati(>n criteria given in Regulatory Guide 1.75.
Air-handling functions should be ducted separately from cable runs in such spaces; i.e.,
if cables are routed in underfloor or ceiling s,Jaces, these spaces should not be used as air plenums for ventilation of the control room fully enclosed electrical raceways in such uvierfloor and ceiling spaces, it over one square foot in cross sectioial area, should have automatic fire suppression inside. Are a.iutomat ic fire suppression should be provided for underfloor and ceiling spuces if used for cable runs unless all cable is run ;n 4-inch or smaller steel conduit or the cables are in fully enclosed raceways inte. nally protectet: by autcoatic fire suppression.
c.
Cable Spreading R g The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room should be an automatic
-ater system such as closeJ-head sprinklers, open-be.id deluge system, or open directiunal waier spray system.
Celuge ind open spray systems should have provisions for manuai opera-tien at a remote station; however, there thould be provisionc to preclude inadvertent operation. Location of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray arrange-ments and possible transient combustibles to ensure adequate water coverage for areas that could present exposure hazards to th-cable system.
Cables saould be desi,ned to allow
.;etting doon with water supplied by the fire suppression syste,a without electrical faulting.
Open-head deluge and open d:rectional spray system should be zoned.
The use of foam is acceptable.
Automatic gas systems (Halon or CO,) may be used for primary f ire su;3pression if L
they are backed up by a fixed water spray system.
Cable spreading rooms should have:
(1) At least two remote and separate entrances for access by fire brigade personne);
(2) An airle separation between tray stacks at least three f eet wide and eight feet high; (3) Hose stations and portable extinguishers installed immediately outside the Fev. 1 9.5.1-40 4 'j
(~>$'T
(4) Area smoke detection; and (5) Continuous line-type heat detectors for cable trays inside the cable spread-ing room.
1 rains to remove firefighting water stiould be provided. When gas systems are I
installed, Jrains should have adequate seals or the gas extinguishing systems should be sized to compensate for losses through the drains.
A separate cable spreading room should be provided for each redundant division.
Cable spreading rooms should not be shared between reactors. Each cable spreading room should be separated from the others and from other areas of the plant by barriers with a minimum fire rating of three hours.
The ventilation system to eaca cable spreading room should be designed to isolate the area upon actuation of any ga extinguishing system in the area.
Separate manually actuated smoke venting that is operable from outside the room should be provided for the cable spreading roord d.
Plant Computer Rooms Computer rooms for computers performirg safety-related functions that are not part of the contral room complex should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours and should be protected by automatic detection and fixed automatic suppression. Computers that are part of the control room cumplex but not in the control room shculd be separated and protected as described in Position C.6.b.
Computer cabinets located in the control roon should be protected as other control rocm equipment and cable runs therein.
Nor. safety-related computers outside the control room complex should be separated from safety-related areas by fire barriers with a minimum rating of three hcurs and should be protected as needed to prevent fire and smoke damage to safety-related equipment. Manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers should be prov ded in areas that contain, or could present a fire exposure hazard to, safety-related equipment.
e.
Switchgear Rooms Switchgear rooms contair ing safety-rolated equipment should be separated f rom the remainder of the plant by barriers with a minimum fire rating of three hours.
Redundant switchgear safety divisions should be sepa ated from each other by barriers with a three-hour fire rating.
Automatic fire detectors should alarm and snunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Cables entering the switchgear room t' It do not terminate or perf orm a function there should be kept at a minimum to minimize the combustible loading. These rooms should not be used for any other purpose, fire nose tations and portable fire extinguishers shculd be readily available outside the araa.
\\L )
9.5.1-41 hv. I
Equipment should be located to facilitate access for manual firefighting. Drains should be provided to prevent water accumulation from damaging safety related equioment (see NFPA 92M, " Waterproofing and Draining of floors").
Remote manually actuated ventila-tion should be provided for ventina smoke when manual fire suppression effort is needed (see Position C.4.d).
f.
Remote Safety-Related Panels Redundant safety related panels renote from the control room complex should be separated f rom each other by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three hours.
Panels providing remote shutdown capability should be separated from the control room complex by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three hours.
The general area housing remote safety related panels should be provided with automatic fire detectors that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in the control room.
Combustible materials should be controlled and limited to those required for operation. Portable extinguishers and manual hose sta-tions should be readily available i7 the genera.' area.
g.
Safety-Related Battery Rooms Safety-related battery rooms should be protected against fires and explosions.
Battery rooms shoulu be separated from each othe and other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three haurs incitsive of all penetrations and openings. DC switchgear and inverters should not be located in these battery rooms. Automatic fire detection should be provided tn alarm and annunci2te in the control room and alarm locally.
Ventilation systems in the battery rooms should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentrition well below 2 vol-%.
Loss of ventilat ion should be alarmed in the control Standripe (.nd hose and portable extinguishers should be readily avai'able outside room.
the room.
h.
Turbine Building The turbine building should be separated fran adjacent structures containing safety-related equipment by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of three hours. Openings and penetrations in the fire barrier should be minimited and should not be located where the turbine oil system or generator hydrogen cooling system creates a direct fire exposure hazard to the barrier. Considering the severity of the fire hazards, def er.se in depth may dictate additional protection to ensure barrier integrity.
i.
Diesel Generator Areas Diesel generators should be separated from each other and from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours.
O Rev. 1 9.5.1-42
)h)
Automatic fire suppression should be installed to combat any diesel generator or lubricating oil fires; such systems should be designed for operation when the diesel is running without affecting the diesel. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Hose stations and portable extin-guishers should be readily available outside the area.
Drainage for firefighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided.
Day tanks with total capacity up to 1:00 gallons are permitted in the diesel generator area under the f ollowing conditions:
(1) The day tank is located in a separate enclosure with m minimum fire resist-dnce rating of three hours, iSCluding doors or penetrations.
Ihose enclosures should be capable of containing the intire contents of the day tanks and should be protacted by an automatic fire suppress {an system, or (2) The day tank is located inside the diesel generator room in a diked enclosur e that has s ~ficient capacity to hold 110% of the centents of the day tank or is drained to a safe location.
j.
Diesel fuel Oil Storage Areas Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1,100 gallons should not be located inside buildings containing safety-related equipnent.
If abose ground tanks are used, they should be located at least 50 feet from any building ontaining safety-related equiptent or, if located within 50 feet, they should be housed in a sep3 rate building with construction having a miniram fire resistance ratirq of three hours.
Potential oil spills should be confined or directed a ay from buildir,qd containing afety-related equipment.
Totally buried tanks are acceptable outside or under buildin';s (see NF PA 30, "F lammable and Combustible Liquids Code," tor addi t ion 31 guidar.ce ).
Above ground tanks should be protected b an autcmatic fire suppression system.
y k.
Safety-Related P aps Pump houses and rooms housing redundant safety related pump trains sha';d be separated from each other and from other areas of the plant by fire barriers hasing at least three-hour ratings.
These room' should be protected bj aulo:"Itic fire detectinn and suppression unless a f re hazard analysis can demor, strate that a fire will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plart shutdcwn.
Fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Hm stations and portable extinguishers shnuld be readily accessible.
9 149 017 9.5.1-43 Res. 1
Floor drains should be provided to prevent water accumulation from damaging safety related equipment (see Position C.4.a.(9)T Provisions should be made for manual control of the ventilation system to facili-tate smoke romcval if required for manual firefighting operation (see Position C.4.d).
1.
New Fuel Area Hand nortable extinguishers should be located within this area.
Also, hose stations should be located outside but within hose reach of this area.
Automatic fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Combustibles should be limited to a minimum in the new fuel area.
The storage area should be provided with a drainage system to preclude accumulation of water.
The storage configuration of new fuel hculd always be so maintained as to pre-clude criticality for any water density that might occur during fire water application.
m.
Spent Fuel Pool Area Protection for the spent fuel pool area should be provided by local hose stations ard portable a tinguishers. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and to alarm locally.
n.
Radwaste and Cecontamination Areas Fire barriers, automatic fire suppression and detection, and ventilation controls should be provided unless the fire hazard analysis can demonstrate that such protection is not necessary.
o.
Safety-Related Water Tanks Storage tanks that supply water for safe shutdown should be protected from the effects of an exposure fire.
Combustible materials should not be stored next to outdoor tanks.
p.
Records Storage Areas Records storage areas s'hould be so located and protected that a fire in these areas does not expose safety-related systems or equioment (see Regulatory Guide 1.88,
" Collection, Storage and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Qual;ty Assurance Records").
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Rev. 1 9.5.1-44
q.
Cooling Towers Cooling towe<s should be of noncombustible construction or sc located and pro-tected that a fire will not adversely af fect any safety-related systems or equipment.
Cooling towers should be of noncombustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire protection water supply.
r.
Miscellaneous Areas Miscellaneous areas such as shops, warehouses, auxiliary boiler rooms, fuol oil tanks, and flammable and combustible liquid storage tanks should be so located and protected that a fire or effects of a fire, including smoke, will not a jversely af fect any safety-related systems or equipment.
7.
Special Protection Guidelines a.
Storage Acetylene-Oxygen Fuel Gases Gas cylinder storage locations should not be in areas that conta n or expose i
safety-related equipment or the fire protection systems that serve those safety related areas.
A permit system should be required to ute this equipment in safety related areas of the plant (also see Position C.2).
b.
Storage Areas for Ion-Exchange Re< ins Unused ion exchange resins shoul a not be stored in areas that contain or expose safety-related equipment.
c.
Hazardous Chemicals Hazardous chemicals should not be stored in areas that contain or espose safety-related equipment.
d.
Materials Containing Radioactivity Materials that collect and contain radioactivity such as spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, and HEPA filters should be stored in closed metal tanks or con-tainers that arr located in areas free from ignition sources or combustibles. These mate-rials should be protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as well.
Consideration shculd be given to requirements for removal of decay heat from entrained radioactive materials.
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9.S.1-45 Rev. 1
D.
IMPLEMENTATION 1.
Plants for which construction permit applications were docketed after March 1, 1978 should follow the guidelines of this position.
2.
Plants for which CP applications were docketed after July 1, 1976 but before March 1, 1978 should follow the guidelines of either (a) BIP APCSB 9.5-1 dated May 1, 1976, or (b) this position.
Plants for which (a) CP applications were docketed prior to, but were not issued a CP, by July 1, 1976; or (b) construction permits or operating licenses were issued prior to July 1, 1976, should follow the guidelines of either (a) Appendix A (datad August 23, l'316) to BTP APCSB 9.5-1; or (b) BTP APCSB 9.5-1 dated May 1, 1976; or (c) this position.
O Pev. I 9.5.1-46
REFERENCES National Fire Protection Association Codes and Standards NFPA 4-1977, " Organization of Fire Services."
NFPA 4A-1969, " Fire Department Organization."
NFPA 6-1974, " Industrial Fire Loss Prevention."
NF PA /-19 74, "F i re Emergencies Management. '
NFPA 8-1974, " Effects of Fire on Operations, Management Responsiblity."
NFPA 10-1975, " Portable Fire Extinguishers, Installation, Maintenance and Use."
NF PA 11-19/5, " Foam f stingui shing Sy stems. '
NFPA llA-1970, "High Expansion Foam Systems."
NFPA 11B-19/4, "Eynthetic Foam and Combined Ar,ent Systems "
NFPA l' '973, " Car bon Dioxide Systems. "
NFPA 12A-1973, "Halon 1301 Systems "
NFPA 128-1973, "Halon 1211 Systems NFPA 13-1976, " Sprinkler Systams "
N F P/L 14-1974, "Sta:dpipe and Pose Systtms "
NFPA 15-19/3, " Water Spray F ixed Systems '
NFPA 20-i9/3, " Centri f urpl F i r e Pumps. '
NFPA 24-1913, "Outside Protection."
NFPA 26-1958, " Supervision of Valves.'
N F P A 2 /- 19.7'a, " Private Fire Brio de."
149 021 9.5.1-47 Pev. 1
NFPA 30-1973, " Flammable Combustible Liquids Code."
NFPA 518-1976 " Cutting and Welding Processes."
NFPA 69-1973, "_<plosien Prevention Systems."
NFPA 70-1975, " National Electrical Code "
NFPA 72D-1975, " Proprietary Protective Signaling System;."
NFPA 72E-1974, " Automatic Fire Detectors."
NFPA 80-1975, " Fire Doors and Windows."
NFPA 92M-1972, " Waterproofing and Draining of Floors."
NFPA 197-1966, " Initial Fire Attack, Training, Standard On."
NFPA 204-1968, " Smoke and N it Venting Guide."
NFPA 220-1975, " Types of Building Construction."
NFPA 251-1975, " Fire Tests, Building Construction and Materials."
NFPA 259-1976, " Test Method for Potentential Heat of Building Materials."
NFPA 8021974, "Recommanded Fire Protection Practice for Nuclear Reactors."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents NUREG-0050, "Re;ommendations Related to Brcwns Ferry Fire," Report by Special Review Group, February 1976.
WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), " Reactor Safety Stuoy - An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," October 1975.
NUREG-75/087, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants."
Section 9.5.1, " Fire Protection Program."
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Rev. 1 9.5.1-48
Section 3.6.1, " Plant Design for Frotection Against Postulated Piping failures in Fluid cystems Outside Containment."
Section 6.4, " Habitability Systems."
Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensir.g of Production and Utilization facilities," General Design Criterion 3,
" Fire otection."
Regulatory Guide 1.6, " Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems."
Regulatory Guide 1.32, " Criteria for Safety-Related Electric Power Systems 'or Nuclear Power Plants."
Regulatory Guide 1.39, " Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
Regulatory Guide 1.52, " Design, Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Engineered Safety Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units o' Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
Regulatory Guide 1.75, " Physical Independe"ce of Electrical Systems."
Regulatory Guide 1.88, "Collo ion, Storage and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plant Quality Assurance Recoro.
Regulatory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Plannina fo-Nuclear Power Plants."
Other Docuwnts AN5I Standard B31.1-1973, " Power Piping."
ASTM D-3286, " Test for Gross Calurific Value of Solid fuel by the Isothermal-Jacket Bomb Calorimeter (1973). "
ASTM E-84, " Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials (1976)."
ASTM E-119, " Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials (1976).'
IEEE Std 383-1974, "IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," April 15, 1974.
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9.5.1-49 Rev. 1
MAERP-NELPIA, " Specifications for Fire Protection of New Plants.'
Factory 'futual System Approval Guide - Equipment, Materials, Services for Conservation of Property.
"In'.ernational Guidelines for the Fire Protection of Nuclear Powen Plants," National Nuclear Risks Insurance Pnols, 2nd Report (ICL).
NFPA Fire Protection Handbook.
Underwriters Laboratories Rating uist.
Underwriters Laboratories, " Building Materials Directory."
8 9
Rev. I 9.5.1-50 thru 9.5.1-64 3 A ()
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