ML19221A185

Tech Specs for ECCS

ML19221A185
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/01/1979
From:	Metropolitan Edison Co
To:
References
NUDOCS 7905190246
Download: ML19221A185 (4)

Text

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yq >,280*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS sub ystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem canprised of:

One OPERABLE high pressure injection (HPI) punp.

a.

b.

One OPERABLE low pressure injection (LPI) pump.

c.

One OPERABLE decay heat cooler.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the d.

borated water storage tank (BWST) on a safety injection signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a borated water storage tank low level signal during the recirculation phase of operation.

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APPLICABIL'TY:

MODES 1, 2 and 3.

9 ACTION:

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable a.

subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be~ in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the b.

Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and subnitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

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, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

1. =='

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following a.

valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:

Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position a.

DH-V102A DHR pump suction OPEN-b.

DH-V1028 DHR pump suction OPEN c.

DH-V157 BWST to spent fuel CLOSED b.

At least,,ce per 31 days by:

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Verifying that the LP injection cross-over valves are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in t6e closed position.

2.

Verifying)that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct-position.

By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris c.

(rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction af the pump suction during LOCA conditions.

This visual inspect.,n shall be performed:

1.

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

2.

Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the DHR system from the Reactor Coolant System when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is > 350 psig.-

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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2.

A visual inspection of the containment emergency sump which verifies that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump ccmponents (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

3.

Verifying a total leak rate < 6 gallons per hour for the LPI systen at:

a)

System pressure of 3.150 psig for those parts of the system downstream of the pump suction isolation valve.

b) 3_56.2 psig for the piping from the containment emergency sump isolation valve to the pump suction isolation valve 4

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e.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1.

Ver.ifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a ESFAS test signal.

2.

Verifying that each HPI and LpI pump test starts auto-

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matically upon receipt of a ESFAS test signal.

f.

By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated discharge pressure on recirculation flow when tdsted pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

1.

High pressure injection pump 3.1125 psig.

2.

Low pressure injection pump 3,151 psig.

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v EMERGENCi CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 7

BASES 4

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3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems with RCS average temperature > 280"F ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the core flooding tanks is capable of supp. lying sufficient core co'oling to maintain the peak cladding tempera-tures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double end,ed break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling j

capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS -temperature below 280 F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures, that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in tha,

T-safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.-

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Power is required to be removed from any valve which fail.s to meet single failure criteria. The decay heat removal system leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage rates assumed for the system during the recirculation phase of the low pressure injection will not be exceeded.

T/~ ~.; ~ 03 RAT EL nni en u unet-6Ah PERABILITY of the borated water storage tank (BWST) as par the ECCS e

.es that a sufficient supply of borated water is av

.able for injection the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.

The limi e a BWST minimum volume an ron concentration ensure that 1) s #

cient water is available within c

• inment to pemit recircul +' n cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reac will remain subcri al in the cold condi-tion following mixing of the

• T and the P% water volumes with all control rods inserted except for.

reactive control assembly.

% LOCA analyses.

These assumptions are consistent The contained water me limit include allowance for water not usable because of ank discharge line location other physical cha racte ris tics.

e limits on contained water volume, ' d boron con-centration e are a pH value of between 8.5 and 10.5 of' the - lution-sprayed -.nin containment after a design basis accident.

The and mini : tes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chlor q_g-7

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