ML19220A608

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Sys & Components Used to Mitigate Effects of Postulated Steam Line Break Are Acceptable,Provided MSIVs Automatically Acutate Upon Indication of Break in Line
ML19220A608
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 05/05/1976
From: Deyoung R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Arnold R
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7904240006
Download: ML19220A608 (2)


Text

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Metropolitan Edison Cccoany ATTN:

Mr. R. C. Arrold Vice President P. O. Eox 542 Reading, Pennsylvania 19603 Gentlemen:

At several recent meetings, your staff has presented verbally the status of your efforts in resacnse to our request for additional analysis, Item 21.50, dealing with a postulated staan line break at Three Mile Island Unit 2.

During these meetings, questions were raised about the suitability of the systems and cccponents used to mitigace the effects of that accident.

'Je have considered these systems in the light of the preliminary infomation on your analyses available to us and tentatively con-clude that, provided the following criteria are cet, the present systems and c::mponents as designed are acceptable for use in your analysis in response to Item 21.50.

1.

The main steam isolation valves should be automatically actuated upon indication of breaks in the main steam lines.

2-The Condensate and Feedwater System, including the emergency feed features, should be designed so that any single failure will not prevent isolation of the syster. to terminate feedwater flow.

Iso-lation should be autcmatically actuated unless it can be shown that the time available to perform all necessary operator action is acceptable.

It is believed that confomance with these criteria will improve the capability of the plant to handle the full spectrum of steam line breais.

We await completion of your analysis in accordance with Item 21.50, including conformance with the above or adequate justification of any proposed alternative.

Sincerely, a _.

7 9 () 4'2 4 C C) O Io 0

C. CeVoung, Assistant Director for L:gnt Water Reactors Division of Project '!anage. ent SEE PRE g S b '1 FOR ADDITICRAL R

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. G. Ocx 542 Peading, Tennsylvania 19603 Centlenen:

't several recsnt neetinns, your staff h2s crcsented verbally the status of your efforts in resennse to our raquest #nr additicnal analysis, Itar.' 21.50, cealinivith a nostulated stem lire Preak at Three Mile Island Unit 2.

Norina these meetines, cuesticrs were raised about the suitabiliti cf the systens cnd ccr~'onents used t.' nitigate tne effacts of that. accident.

s We have considered these systens in t'e' light of t'e erelf-inary information on your analyses availahle to as and tentatively conclude that, prcvided the folle. ine criteria 3ra net, use of the cresent systems and conponents to miticate the consecuences of staan line breaks both inside and outside of containment is accentable.

1.

The main steam isolation v::1ves should be autcratically actuated.

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2.

The Condensate and Feedwter Systen includinn thm ererca' icy fesd

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features, should he designad so that any sincle failure will net

?rav?nt timely isciation of tha systen?-

3..~m It is 1 elieved that confomance with these criteria teill irr' rove t%

capability of the plant to handle the #ull seectrun of steam line breakr

'!e await completion of your analysis in accordance with Item 21.60 including confomance with the above or adequate justification of any orocosed alternative.

Sincerely,

r. C. DeVounc, assistant 'iractor for Lir"it 'ater eactors Civision of Project "anace ent (3 8 7 N cc:

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