ML19210B094

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 32 to DPR-50

ML19210B094
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	11/30/1977
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19210B088	List: ML19210B087 ML19210B093 ML19210B094
References
NUDOCS 7911040037
Download: ML19210B094 (7)

Text

[

p UNITED STATES i

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMis.

y 4

j.l WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 g

Ye SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIOil SUPPORTING AMENDt'ENT fiO. 32 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICEilSE f!0. OPR-50 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY JERSEY CErlTRAL POWER At;0 LIGHT COMPANY PENT 45YL'!At11A ELECTRIC COMPAt4Y

'THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO. 1

~

DOCKET NO. 50-289 INTRODUCTION Following a fire at the Brcwns Ferry Nuclear Station in 14 arch 1975, we initi Ated an evaluation of the need for improving the. fire protection programs at sil licensed nuclear. pcwer plants. As part of this continu-ing evaluation, in February 1976 we published a report entitied

" Recommendations Related to Brcuns Ferry Fire", HUREG-0050. This recort recommended that improvements in the areas of fire prevention and fire control be nade in most existing facilities and that consideration be given to design features that would increase tne ability of nuclear facilities to withstand fires *.,ithout the loss of important functions.

To implement the report's recom.endations, the NRC initiated a prggram for reevaluation of the fire protection programs at all licensed nuclear power stations and for a comprehensive review of all new license applications.

We have issued new guicelines for fire protection programs in nuclear power plants. These g';idelines reflect the recccmendations in NUREG-0050.

.These guidelines are contained in the following documents:

" Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety. Analysis Reports for Nuclear Pcwer Plants," NUREG-75/087, Section 9.5.1, " Fire Protection," May 1976, which includes " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," (BTP APCSB 9.5-1), May 1,1976.

~

" Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants"(Appendix

.. A to. BTP APCSS 9.5-1), August. 23, 1976.

/

. "Supplenenta.y Guidance on Information Needed for Fire ~ Protection Program Evaluation," September 30, 1976.

" Nuclear Plant Fire Protection ' Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance," June 14, 1977.

'D 3;D {jY 4

~

5

1. 911040037-

=

e

Petropolitan Edison Company, Jersey Central Power and Light Company, and Pennsylvania Electric Company (licensees) have submitted a description of the fire protection program for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit No.1 by letter dated April 1,1977. This pro-gram is under detailed review by the NRC.

In the interim, until we complete our detailed review, we have concluded that it is appropriate to amend the facility license by incorporating into the Technical Specifications operability and surveillance requirements for the existing fire protection equipment and systems.

In addition, the amendment would include administrative requirements for the implementation of the fire protection program.

By~ letter dated September 30, 1976, we requested the licensees to sub-mit Technical Specifications for the presently-installed fire protection equipment at this facility.

By letter of December 2,1976, we issued sample Technical Specifications and reiterated that these specifications were for existing systems only.

Subsequently, the licenseesproposed Technical Specifications by letter dated February 10, 1977. Based on our review and consideration of that response and the responses of other licensees, we modified certain action statements and surveillance frequencies in order to provide more appropriate and consistent specifications which we fondarded to the licenseesby letter of June 16, 1977. That letter also requested sub-mittal of appropriately revised specifications.

The licenseesresponded by letter dated August 12, 1977. He have reviewed the licensees' response and have made modifications where necessary to assure conformance to the fullest extent practicable with our reouire-ments as set forth in the sample Technical Specifications pending com-oletion of our ongoing detailed review of fire protection at this facility.

1;!e have discusseri these rodifications with the licensees, and they have agreed to all modifications. However, it will be necessary to provide a period of time to modify procedures to conform with the details of the modifications to the Technical Specifications and to provide time to complete the required personnel training where necessary, therefore the amendment would become, effective 30 days after the date of issue.

DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The guidelines for Technical Specifications that we developed and sent to

• all licensees are based on assuring that the fire protection equipment currently installed for the protection of safety related areas of the' plant'is operable. This assurance is obtained by requiring periodic surveillance of the equipment and by requiring certain corrective actions to be taken if the limiting conditions for operation cannot be met.

These guidelines also include administrative features for the overall fire protection crogram such as interim fire brigade requirements, training, procedures, management review and periodic indepencent fire protection and loss prevention program inspections.

c,

.\\ ] h

\\c n

i;v o U

~ ~

-. l--

. The equipment and components existing at this facility and included in the scope of these Technical Specification requirements are fire detectors, the fire suppression systems, and the hose str.tions.

Goerability of the fire detection instrumentation provides warning capability for the prompt i

detection of fires, to reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment by allowing, rapid response of fire suppression systems.

In the event that the minimum coverage of fire detectors cannot be cet, hourly fire patrols are recuired in the affected area until the i

The operability inoperable instrumentation is restored to operability.

of the fire suppression systems provides capability to confine and In the event that portions of.the fire suppression extinguish fires.

systems are inocerable, alternate backup fire fignting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the In the event that the inoperable equipment is returned to service.

fire suppression water. system becomes inoperable, a backup fire 8

protection water system is required within 24 -hours and a report to the NRC is required within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to provide for prcmpt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures for adequate fire i

suppression capaDility.

We have reviewed the licenseer proposed interim Technical Specifi-cations against our requirements as implemented in.the sample Technical Specifications. We have made some modifications to the Specifications that were proposed by the licenseesin order to make them conform to our requirements. One of the proposed j

specifications that we changed involves the minimum size of the l

on-site fire brigade.

In our previous sample Technical Specifications we did not identify the number of members on a fire brigade that I

we would find acceptable. We have now concluded that minimum number for a typical commercial nuclear power plant to be five (5).

The basis for this conclusion is presented in an attachment to this SER entitled " Staff Position Minimum Fire Brigade Shift Size."

In the report of the Special Review Group on the Browns Ferry Fire

'NUREG-0050) dated February 1976, consideration of the safety of operation of all operating nuclear power plants pending the completion of our detailed fire protection evaluation was presented.

The following quotations from the report summarize the basis for our conclusion that the operation of the plants, until we complete our review, does not present.an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

suo

.= =

9 ed

i.

4-

"A probability assessment of public safety or risk in quantitative terms is given in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). As the result of the calculation based on the Browns Ferry fire, the study concludes that the potential for a significant release of radioactivity

.from such a fire is about 20% of that calculated from all other causes analyzed. This indicates that predicted potential accident risks from all causes were not greatly affected by consideration of the Browns Ferry fire.

This is one of the reasons that urgent action in regard to reducing risks due to potential fires is not required.

The study (WASH-1400) also points out that 'rather straight -

fontard neasures, such as may already exist at other i

nuclear plants, can significantly recuce the lik'elihood bf a potential core celt accident that night result-from-a large fire.' The Review Group agrees.

j l

' Fires occur rather frequently; however, fires involving equipment unavailability comparable to the Browns Ferry fire are quite infrequent (see Section 3.3 [of NUREG-0050]).

The Review Group believes that steps already taken since March 1975 (see Section 3.3.2) have reduced this frequency significantly.

I

" Based on its review of the events transipiring before, during and aft 3r the Browns Ferry fire, the Review Group concludes that the probability of disruotive fires of the magnitude of the Browns Ferry event is small, and j

that there is no need to restrict operation of nuclear i

power plants for public safety. However, it is clear that much can and should be done to reduce even further

-the. likelihood of disabling fires and to improve assurance of rapid extinguishment of fires tnat occur. Consideration should be given also to features tnat would increase further the ability of nuclear facil.ities to withstand large fires without loss of important funct. ions should

! such fires occur."

2

, a __

mee M"

. em samum

• e

<[5 7 eq 1

svs c

-r-----

e e

e4

Subsequent to the Browns Fer y fire and prior to the Special Review Group's investigation, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement tock steps with regard to fire protection. Special bulletins were sent to all licensees of operating power reactors on ttaren 24,1975, and April 3,1975, directing the imposition of certain control.s over fire ignition sources, a review of procedures for controlling maintenance and modifications that might affect fire safety, a review of emergency procedures for alternate shutdown and cooling methods, and a review

-of flammability of materials used in floor and wall penetration seals.

Special inspections covering the installation of fire stops in electrical cables and in penetration seals were ccmpleted at all operating pcwer reactors in April and fiay 1975. Inspection findings which reflected non-compliance witn NRC requirements resulted in requiring corrective action by' licensees. Folicw-up inspections have confirmed-tnat licensees,

.... are taking the required corrective actions and that adm.inistrative control procedures are in place.s

" Since these inspection activities and the subsequent Special Review..

. Group recommendations in the 1975 to 1976 time period, there has been no new information to alter the conclusions of the. Special Review Group, and the ongoing fire pr'tection program ficwing frca those conclu' ions is still adequate.

s Therefore, we have found these specifications acceptable on an interim

' basis until such time that our everall review is cceplete, required equipment is installed and operable, and final specifications have been developed and issued.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION We have determined that the amendment does not authorite a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level.

and will not result in any significant enviro mental impact.

Having made this determination, we have further. concluded that the

~

amendment involves an action which is insignificant frcm the stand-point of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4),

that an envirohmental impact statement or negative declaratidn and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection

.with the issuance of this amendment.

I CONCt.USION

. ~' e have concludad, base'd on'the consideratiens discussed above,

~. -

.W that:

(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant in-crease in the probability or consequences of accidents previously

~

considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consider-ation, (E) there is reasonable assurance that the healtn and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be ccncucted in compliance with the Cc= mission's regulatiens and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common cefense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

(.

99]D D ~T ss f(]nS.w Date:' November 30, 1977 D

G a

7 1~

f

~

lc"oa le7 7

a Staff Position 1

~

Minimum Fire Gricade Shift Size INTRODUCTION Nuclear pcwer plants depend on the response of an ensite fire brigade for defense against tne effects of fire on plant safe shutdewn capabilities.

In scme areas, actions by the fire brigade are the

~

,only means of fire suppression.

In other areas, that are orotected by correctly designed automatic detection and suppression systems, manual fire fighting efforts are used to e.stinguish':

(1) fires too small to actuate the autcmatic system; (2) well developed fires if the

~

autc=atic system fails to function; and (3) fires that are not ccmoletely,

i I

controlled by the aut matic system. Thus, an adecuate'ffre brigade is essential to fulfill the defense in deoth recuiremants which crotect

. safe shutdcwn systems frca the effects of fires anc their related,

combustion by-products.

t DISCUSSION There are a number of factors that should be considered in establishing the minimum fire brigade snift size.

They include:

1) plant gecmetry and size.;

l

2) quantity and quality of detection and suppression systems;

3) fire fighting strategies for postulated fires;

4) fire brigade training; i

5) fire brigate ecuipment; and

6) fire brigade supplements by plant personnel and local fire 8

department (s).

In all plants, the majority of postulated fires are in enclosed windew-less structures.

In such areas, the working environment of the brigace created by the heat and smcke builduo witnin the enclosure, will recuire the use of self-centained breathing apoaratus, smcke ventilation equi; ment, and a personnel replacement capability.

~

. Certai'n functio'ns must be performed for all fires, i.e., comand brigade act!ons, inforn plant management, fire suppression, ventilation control,

. provide extra equipment, and account for possible injuries.

Until a site

.g specific review can be completed, ' n interim minimum fire brigade size.

a of five persons has been established. This brigade size should provide a minimum working number of personnel to deal with those postulated fires in a typical presently operating commercial nuclear power station._

-e.

-e n

ibu3 1 lo c

i

~

N w

a b

t 2-If the brigade is composed of a smaller number of personnel, the fire attack may be st pped wnenever new ecuipment is needed or a person is We note that in tne career fire service, the minimum engine comcany manning considered to De effective fcr an initial injured or f atigued.

attack on a fire is also five, including one officer and four team memoers. -

It is assumed for the purposes of this position that brigade training

• and equipment is adequate and that a backup capability of trained

' individuals exist whether through plant personnel call back or from the local fire department.

POSITION The minimum fire brig'ade shift size shculd be justvfied by an analysis

~

1.

of the plant specific factors stated above f.or the plant, after modificaticas are c:mplete.

~2.' In the interim, the minimum fire brigade thift size shall be five These persons shall be fully qualified to perform their persons.

assigned responsibility, and shall include:

One Sutervisor - This individual must have fire tactics training.

• He.wili assume all ccm=and resconsibilities for fighting the fire.

' During plant emergencies, tne brigace sucervisor should not have other responsibilities that would detract from his full attention being devoted to the fire. This sucervisor should not be actively engaged in the fighting of the fire. His total function should be j

to survey the fire area, ccmmand the brigade, and keep the upper levels of plant management informed.

i i

Two Hose Men - A 1.5 inch fire hose being handled within a window-

~

I The two less enclosure would require two trained indivi. duals.

team members are recuired to anysically hancie the active hose line and to protect each otner wnile in the Jdverse envircoment of the fire.

Two Additional Team Members - One of these individuals would be

'requirec to su:piy fillec air cylinders to the fire fighting.

members of the brigade and the second to estabilsh..smcke ventilation ----

These two individuals would '

. and' aid in fi.1. ling tne, air cylinder.

also act as the first backup tc the engeged team.

.g

• -Me

wgg, 4

JUJ

3' 7590-01 i

n l

UNITED STATES fUCLEAR REGULA 0RY COMf1ISSION

' DOCKET fi0. 50-289 METROPOLITAtt EDISOf' C0f* patly JERSEY CEf;iRAL POWER AliD LIGlti CC'1PAfiY PENNS'f LVAtlI A ELECTRIC C0;' pat:Y NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AffEi!Df1ENT TO FACILITY

{

OPERATING LICENSE The IJ. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has issued Amendment No. 32to Facility Operating License No. DPR-50, issued to Metropolitan Edison Corcpany, Jersey Central Power and Light Company, and Pennsylvania Electric Company (the licensees), which revised Technical

~

l Specifications for operation of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1 -(the facility) located in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.

The i

amendment becomes effective 30 days after its date of issuance.

l The amendment incorporates fire protection Technical Specifications on the existing fire protection equipment and adds administrative controls related to fire protection at the facility. This action i

is being taken pending completion of the Commission's overall fire protection review of the facility.

Tite application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Ag:mic Energy Act of 1954, as amenced (the Act), and

.the Commission's rules and regulations. The Ccamission has made acpropriate t

findings as required by the Act and the Ccmmission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are 'seti forth in thedicense amendment.

Prior puhlic notice of this amendment was not recuired since the amendment does not involve a significant ha:ards consideration.

nlo "Y$ N [f c

3sua

.; g o w

~~

7590-01

~

The Comission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this, amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the

~~

application for amendment dated February 10, 1977, as re. vised August 12, 1977, (2) Amendment No. 32 to License No. DPR-50, and (3) the Comission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Ccmission's Public Document

~

Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Box 1601 (Education Building), Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

. Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 30th day of November 1977.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Nh /

\\

Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch f4 Division of Operating Reactors s

W e

y p

,y esS

-