ML19210A394
| ML19210A394 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1976 |
| From: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Arnold R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910290620 | |
| Download: ML19210A394 (7) | |
Text
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DISTRIBUTION:
December 9, 1976 Docket File NRC PDR L PDR Docket no.: 50-289 ORB #4 Rdg Gray File VStello GZech KRGoller C4h \\gcq TJCarter OELD, Attorney Metropolitan Edison Company OI&E (3)
ATTH: hr. R. C. Arnold RReid Vice President - Generation GZwetzig P. O. Box 542 RIngram Reading, Pennsylvania 19603 DEisenhut TBAbernathy Gentlemen:
JRBuchanan ACRS (16)
At the November 5, 1976, meeting between Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) licensees and the staff, we irifcated that we would advise each licensee of the additional inurmation needed to complete our eval-uation of the measures he had proposed to prevent reactor vessel overpressurization. This information has now been identified and is listed in the enclosure.
In order that we may complete our review in a timely manner, you are requested to submit the information listed in the enclosure within 30 days of receipt af this letter.
Sincerely, haimasu:tsr Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Infomation cc w/ enclosure: See next page n,
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12/g/76 12/3/76 Torin ALC 318 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240 W u. s. aovsnmusur PalNTING oPFICss 1974.936-144 7910290620
Metropolitan Edison Company cc:
G. F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 GPU Service Corporation Richard W. Heward, Project Manager Thomas M. Crimmins, Jr., Safety and Licensing Manager 260 Cherry Hill Road Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Pennsylvania Electric Company Mr. R. W. Conrad Vice President, Generation 1001 Broad Street
.Johnstown, Pennsylvania 15907 Mr. Weldon B. Arehart, Chairman Board of Supervisors of Londonderry Township 2148 Foxiana Road Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Miss Mary V. Southard, Chairman Citizens for a Safe Environnent P. O. Box 405 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 Government Publications Section State Library of Pennsylvania Box 1601 (Education Building)
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17126 5
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w REQUES1 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MEASURES TO PROTECT AGAINST REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURIZATION 1.
In light r design criteria discussed on November 5,1976, it appear'. t'iat further analysis may be necessary to verify that your overpressurization system design i.s adequate to meet Appendix G limits assuming an additionci singla fcilure, Please provide a schedule for submittcl of further system ar.alysos, or justify why further analyses will not be necessary.
2.
The criteria discussed at the Novemt:er 5 meeting are listed belo :
1)
Credit for operator action 2)
Single failure criteria
- 3) Testability 4)
Seismic design and IEEE 279 criteria Provide information regarding how you intend to meet these criteria.
Where deviations frcm the criteria are contemplated, pleue provide a detailed justification including the technical basis for not meeting the criteria and, when significcnt, the impact on the schedule for implementation.
Describe all redundant and diverse systems which are available to provide overpressure protection.
3.
Provide schematic piping and instrumentation diagrams of all systems which are utilized during plant shutdown and stcrtup operations, indicate primary and alternate flow paths, fluid cnd heat sources, pressure and ficu controllers, RCS pressure protection systers, and ECCS and make up systems.
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. 4.
Provide a failure modes and effects analysis of the overpressure protection systsm for startup, shutdo: n, and testing operations chic,N defines the limiting combination of initiating event and additional single failure or operator error subsequent to initiation of t!.e overpressure transient.
5.
Indicate for your low temperature overpressure protection systen host the system has been designed to handle common failure modes such as those resulting frem loss of offsite pov;er and seismic events.
Describe the failure mode of the air operated mcheup flow control vain and the letdor;n ficw control valve upon loss of cir supply.
Identi fy the events / failure modes which could result in loss of air supply.
6.
Discuss the basis for determining the most limiting initial conditions for analysis of the overpressure transient.
Itcms that must be considered include but should not be limited to:
RCS pressure, valve openina time, steam generator temperature difference, reactor coolant pump scal pressures, pressurizer levci, makeup tank level, accumulator pressure, relief valve water relief capacity, and pump heads and flows.
7.
Provide a transient analysis of the reactor coolant system response to inadvertent actuation of a single train of high pressure injection nucos.
Dascribe what administrative controls and procedures a used during startup and shutdown, and during component and/or
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. system testing to justify the assumption that inadvertent injection by core than one high pressure train is not credible.
Provide a similar discussion and analysis of a core ficod tank discharge.
For both situations indicate the basis for identifying the limiting single failure or cocon failure mode.
8.
Does your plant have relief capacity installed in the decay heat removal system that could provide additional protection in the event of an overpressure transient? What is the water relief capacity of ths valve? Is the decay heat removal system autcmatically isolated en RCS high pressure? What are the pressure setpoints for the D"R relief valve opening and its automatic isolation?
9.
During the November 5th meeting, the possibility of limiting the volure of water in the RCS make up tank was discussed.
It was stated that this :ould preclude filling the pressurizer if the make up control valve should fail full open.
Is this procedure a viable option at your facility? Is water level in the Make Up Tank generally controlled automatically? Specify your assumptions for initial pressurizer level, make up tank uater volume, and other design considerations which would result in limiting RCS pressure to within Appendix G limits.
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. 10.
Describe what instrumentation and alarms are available to the operator to aid in detection and termination of an overpressure transient.
11.
What precautions are taken during startup, shutdown and testing to verify that critical procedural steps are performed to reduce the likelihcod of inadvertenty. initiating en overprossure transient and minimizina the im;:.ct of the trar.sient on the RCS.
Uculd s teps such as lock out of pumps and accumulators and reducing the water level in the pressurizer and take up tenk he acccmplished by dcuble check off and sien off procedures to insure against error?
What procedures normally are follo.cd for altering the status of pun;s or valves under administrative restriction?
12.
If power is removed from valves as part of administrative controls used for overpressure protection, what status lights and indicators are available to verify their proper aligr. men;?
When administr;tive controls call for removing power frcm a valve or a pump, is this accomplished frcm the control reem or from a motor control center?
- 13. -
Describe any testing procedure proposed to insure operation of overpressure protecticn devices.
At what times would these tests be performed?
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.. The problem of pressurizer relief valve maintenance was also discussed 14.
at the l'ovember 5th meeting.
The relief valve is normally isolated and removed during shutdown conditions if maintenance is required.
This would reduce the level of protecticn available to mitigate th2 consequences of a pressure transient.
Please discuss what measures will be taken at your plant to provide overpressure protection when the relief valve is removed frcm service and indicate how the criteria enumarated at the t'ovember 5th meeting will be met.
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