ML19209C007

Amend 2 to Restart Rept

ML19209C007
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	10/10/1979
From:	METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19209C003	List: ML19209C002 ML19209C007
References
NUDOCS 7910110388
Download: ML19209C007 (12)

Text

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.0 IKIRODUCTION AND REPORT ORGANIZATION 1-1 1.1 Introduction 1-1 1.2 Report Organization 1-1 1.3 Abbrev iations 1-2 2.0 PLANT MODIFICATIONS 2.1-1 2.1 General 2.1-1 2.1.1 Short-Term Modifications 2.1-1 2.1.1.1 Control Grade Reactor Trip on Loss of 2.1-1 Feedwater/ Turbine Trip 2.1.1.2 Position Indication for PORV and Safety 2.1-4 Valv es 2.1.1.3 Emergency Power Supply Requirements 2.1-5 for Pressurizer Heaters, PORV, Block Valve, and Pressurizer Level Indication 2.1.1.4 Post LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner System 2.1-8 2.1.1.5 Containment Isolation Modifications 2.1-11 2.1.1.6 Instrumentation to Detect Inadequate 2.1-17 Core Cooling 2.1.1.7 Auxiliary Feedwater Modifications 2.1-20 2.1.2 Long-Term Modifications 2.1-27 2.1.3 Met-Ed Initiated Modifications 2.1-28 3.0 PROCEDURAL MODIFICATIONS 3-1 3.1 General 3-1 3.1.1 Emergency Procedures 3-2 3.1.2 Administrative Procedures 3-2 3.1.3 Surv eillanc e/Pr ev enta tiv e Main te nance / Co rrec t iv e 3-3 Maintenance Procedure 3.1.4 Operating Procedures 3-3 i

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, TABLE OF CONTENTS _ Continued P_a.g e 4.0 EMERGENCY PLANNING 4-1 4.1 Introduction 4-1 5.0 THREE MIII. ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION ORGANIZATION 5-1 5.1 General 5-1 5.2 Station Organization 5-2 5.2.1 Vice President - Nuclear Operations 5-2 5.2.2 Unit Superintendent 5-2 5.2.3 Supervisor of Operations 5-2 5.2.4 Shif t Supervisor 5-2 5.2.5 Shift Foreman 5-3 5.2.6 Supervisor Preventative Maintenance 5-3 5.2.7 Director - Technical Support 5-3 5.2.8 Shif t Technical Engineer 5-3 5.2.9 Manager of Support Services and Logistics 5-3 5.2.10 Supervisor - Radiation 5-4 5.2.11 Manager - Training 5-4 5.3 Station Support Organization 5-4 5.4 Minimum Qualification Requirements for IMI Unit 1 Personnel 5-6 5.4.1 Vice President - Nuclear Operations 5-6 5.4.2 Unit Superintendent 5-6 5.4.3 Supervisor of Operations 5-7 5.4.4 Shif t Supervisor 5-7 5.4.5 Shift Foreman 5-8 5.4.6 Supervisor Preventative Maintenance 5-9 11 Am. 2 1130 030

TABLE GF CONTENTS - Continued Page 5.4.7 Director - Technical Support 5-10 5.4.8 Shift Technical Engineer 5-10 5.4.9 Manager of Support Services and Logistics 5-12 5.4.10 Supervisor - Radiation Protection and Chemistry 5-12 5.4.11 Manager - Training 5-12 6.0 OPERATOR ACCELERATED RETRAINING PROGRAM 6-1 6.1 Introduction 6-1 6.2 Program Objectives 6-1 6.3 Topical Outline 6-2 6.4 Program Rationale 6-5 6.5 Instructional Procedure 6-6 6.6 Evaluation Procedure 6-9 6.7 Program Format 6-11 7.0 RADWASTE MANAGEMENT 7-1 7.1 Ceneral 7-1 7.1.1 Near erm Modifications 7-1 7.1.2 Lon; erm Modifications 7-2 7.2 Discussion of Specific Items 7-2 7.2.1 Specific Areas of Separation / Isolation 7-2 7.3 Radwaste Capability 7-6 8.0 SAFETY ANALYSIS 8-1 8.1 Introduction 8-1 8.2 Areas of Investigation 8-2 111 Am. 2 1130 031

TABLE OF CONTENTS _ Continued Page 8.2.1 Modifications Resulting from the 8-2 August 9, 1979 Order 8.2.2 Modification as Result of Order of May, 8-2 1978 8.2.3 Modification Originating from within Met-Ed 8-3 3.2.4 I&E Bulletin 79-05C 8-3 8.3 Ef fect of Changes on Safety Analysis 8-3 8.3.1 Rod Withd.rawal from Startup 8-3 8.3.2 Rod Withdrawal at Power 8-4 8.3.3 Moderator Dilution Accident 8-5 8.3.4 Cold Water Addition 8-5 8.3.5 Loss of Coolant Flow 8-6 8.3.6 Dropped Control Rod 8-7 8.3.7 Loss of Electric Power 8-8 8.3.8 Station Blackout (Loss of AC) 8-8 8.3.9 Steam Line Failure 8-9 8.3.10 Steam Generator Tube Failure 8-11 8.3.11 Fuel Handling Accident 8-12 8.3.12 Rod Ejection Accident 6-12 8.3.13 Feedwater Line Break Accident 8-13 8.3.14 Waste Gas Decay Tank Rupture 8-14 8.3.15 Small Break Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCA) 8-15 8.4 Summary and Conclusions 8-17 9.0 DRAWINGS 9-1 iv Am. 2 1130 032

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Page 10.0 CROSS REFERENCE TO ORDER RECOMMENDATIONS 10-1 10.1 Introduction 10-1 10.2 Short-Term Recommendations and Met-Ed Responses 10-1 10.3 Specific Responses to Recommendations 10-4 10.3.1 Response to IEB 79-05A, Item 2 10-4 10.4 Long-Term NRR Recommendations and Met-Ed Responses 10-6 11.0, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 11-1 11.1 Introd uc tion 11-1 11.2 Technical Specification Changes 11-1 11.2.1 Auxiliary (Emergency) Feedwater ( AFW) 11-1 11.2.2 Reactor Trip on Loss of Feedwater or Turbine 11-1 Trap 11.2.3 High Pressure Trip Setpoint Reduction 11-1 11.2.4 Containment Isolation Setpoints 11-1 11.2.5 Hydrogen Recombiner 11-2 11.2.6 TMI-1/IMI-2 Separation 11-2 11.2.7 Administrative Coatrols 11-2 v

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2.1.1.7 Auxiliary Feedwater Modifications 1

2.1.1.7.1

System Description

The TMI Unit #1 Emergency Feedwater System is being modified so tha t :

1.

Both of the motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater ( AFW) pumps automatically start upcn loss of both main feedwater pumps or loss of four (4) Reactor Coolan'. Pumps.

2.

The motor driven AFW pumps are automatically loaded on the diesel generator during loss c~ offsite power.

3.

Indication is available in the control room of AFW flow to each steam generator.

4.

Manual control independent of the Integrated Control System (ICS) is available to the operator in the control rcsm.

5.

Control room aanunciation for all auto start conditions of the AFW system is awailable.

2.1.1.7.2 Design Bases The 131-1 Auxiliary Feedwater System ( AFW) is being modified so that a single failure will not result in the loss of auxiliary feedwater system function during a Loss of Coolant Accident.

To accomplish this the requirements of NUREG-0578 Section 2.1.7a and 2.1.7b will be met.

In addition, the emergency feedwater control valves are being modified auch that they fail open on loss of instrument air in order to meet the single failure criteria.

2.1.1.7.3

System Design

As indicated in Chapter 10 of TM1 Unit #1 FSAR, the Emergency Feedwater System was designed to operate:

1) on loss of all four Reactor Coolant pumps and 2) if both main feedwater trajns f ail.-

The original system design was based on use of three auxiliary feedwater pumps. One of the three pumps is turbine driven and has a capacity of 920 gpm.

The remaining two pumps are motor driven I

and have a capacity of 460 gpm.

The three pumps are located in the Intermediate Building which is designed to withstand seismic events, tornado, missiles and a hypothetical aircraf t incident.

The turbine driven pump is physically separated from the motor driven units. One of the motor driven pumps is powered from the class IE 4160 volt bus ID while the other motor driven pump is powered from the redundant class lE 4160 ;;1t bus lE. The design of the ID and IE Bus has been changed so that they continue to supply power to the motor-driven pumps during loss of of f-site 2.1-20 Am. 2 1130 034

power conditions with coincident ESAS actuation. To limit i

I voltage dip on the diesel generator during loss of off-site power and coincident ESAS actuation condition, the motor driven pumps will be loaded as a block 5 load (i.e. will be loaded 5 seconds after block 4 loading). Power to the turbine driven pumps is from the safety related portion of the Main Steam System. The design of this system remains unchanged and is described in Chapter 10 of the FSAR.

Both of the motor driven and turbine-driven emergency feedwater pumps receive an auto-start signal on loss of all four reactor coolant pumps and loss of both main feedwater pumps. This is accomplished by utilizing contacts from the Reactor Coolant Pump power monitors and by sensing the differential pressure across the main feedwater pumps. The RC pump power monitors are a safety grade system and are described in chapte. 7 of the TMI-1 FSAR. The main feed pump differential pressure sensing equipment is control grade. Both of the above initiation ; 8 anals and circuits are designed so that a single fr.flure w._1 not result in the auxiliary feedwater system not functioning.

To accomplish this, the actuation system is arranged into two trains. Each train contains two differential pressure switches (one for each main feedwater pump), and four contacts from the RC pump power monitors (one for each pump).

Power for the "A" train is from the 120 V. AC Vital Distribution Panel VBA.

Panel VBA can receive power either from the "A"

station battery through the 1A invarter or from the "A" diesel generator. The "B" actuation train utilizes redundant pressure switches and RC pump power pump monitors and is powered from the 120 V. A.C. Vital Distribution Panel VBB.

Panel VBB can receive pcaer from either the "B" station battery through the IB interter or from the "B" diesel generator.

In addition to the above actuation signals, the turbine driven pump also receives an automatic start signal from the main feed pump trip circuitry. The datails of this actuation signal are discussed in chapter 10 of the TMI-l FSAR.

All three emergency feedwater pumps discharge into a common header.

From this common header a separate six inch line de-livers water to each steam generator. Each of the two supply lines contains an air operated control valve (EF-V30 A/B).

Under normal operations air for the control of these valves is supplied from the instrument air system. The instrument air i

system is described in chapter 5 of tne TMl-1 FSAR.

In the event

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the main source of instrument air is not available, a back up source of instrument air has been provided. The back-up air supply is received from a 80 gal, reservoir which is supplied by an 18 SCFM air compressor. Transfer to the back up air supply is automatic and no operator action is required. The back-up air compressor is powered f rom the 1A 480V Engineered Safeguards Ccntrol Center.

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To provide further assurance that emergency feedwater can be delivered when required, the failure mode of control valves EF-V30 A/B is being changed.

Currently these valves fail half open on loss of control power and fail "as-is" on loss of instru-ment air.

The change consiscs of modification to the operator such that on loss of air, the valves will fail in the open position and remain in this position.

Control valves EF-V30 A/B are controlled by the Integrated Control System. The design of this sytem is described in chapter 7 of the TMI-l FSAR. Upon loss of all reactor coolant pumps, and/or both feedwater pumps, the IC positions the control valves to maintain steam generator water level.

If reactor coolant pumps are available, the ICS controls are set to maintain a 30 inch water level on the start-up range level indicator.

If reactor coolant pumps are not available, the ICS maintains steam generator water level at 50% on the operating range level in-dicator.

The Integrated Control System is a control grade system.

It does, however, receive power f rom the Class IE power system.

Specifically the ICS is supplied from Distribution Panal ATA.

This panel can be powered from the station batteries thru in-verter 1A and Panel VBA or from ES Control Center lA through Panel TRA.

Manual Control of the emergency feedwater control valves can be taken from the control room. When manual control is selected all active so p:nente cf f.

'CS are bypassed except for the raise /

lower voltage circuit.

A. further assurance that control of the emergency feedwater control valves are available to the operator, an additional manual control station is being provided for each valve. The controls will be located in the control room and will be totally separate from the ICS.

Power f rom the redundant portion of Class 1E power system will be provided to the back-up controls.

Each of the emergency feedwater supply lines has also been provided with a flow sensing device. This device is a sonic flow device as manufactu ed by Controltron and will be installed downstream of the ntrol valves before the the lines enter the containment building. The output of the flow de ices will transmit the signal to the main control room where meters will be installed to read flow directly. The equiptent to be installed will be safety related. Cabling will bc routed as described it.

Section 7 of the TMI-1 FSAR. The power supply for the instru-ments will be derived from the vital 120 V power system. Redundant Power supplies will be uscd.

2.1.1.7.4 System Operation The TMI-1 Auxiliary Feedwater System is a stand-by plant system which is not used during normal plant start-ups, shutdowns or operation. The system is maintained in stand-by during plant 2.1-22 Am. 2 1130 036

operations and is automatically actuated upon loss of both main i

feedwater pumps or loss of all four RC pumps. The following l

table gives actuation time for the system:

Ev ent Turbine-Driv en Motor-Driv en a)

Loss of Feedwater or Immediate 5 Sec.

Loss of RC Pumps b) Above with loss of 10 Sec 15 Sec off-site power (LOP) c) Above with ESAS but 15 Sec 20 Sec no LOP o) Above with ESAS and 25 Sec 30 Sec LOP Start-up and test data indicatea that the turbine driven pump requires 18 seconds to reach fu:1 flow. The motor-driven pumps should be capable of accelerating to full speed in less than 10 seconds. Therefore under worst case conditions emergency feed-water flow should be established within approximately 40 seconds.

Control of auxiliary feedwater following initiation is accom-plished by the ICS.

The ICS controls the injection of auxiliary feedwater to maintain water level in each steam generator to one of two setpoints depending on whether RC pumps are or are not av ailable. Under forced cooling conditions, the ICS controls level to 30 inches on the start-up range since this is sufficient to provide core cooling.

I',ever upon loss of forced RCS cooling the ICS controls steam gent.acor level to 50% on the operating range to promote natural circulation with the Reactor Coolant System.

Manual controls in the control room are available for the opera-tor to take control when needed or in the event of ICS failure.

2.1.1.7.5 Design Evaluations Table 8-1 of the TMI-l FSAR indicates that the heaviest loading on one diesel generator would result in 2513 KW or 97% of con-tinuous rating of 2600 KW.

The addition of the motor-driven emergency feedwater pump will add 450 H.P to the diesel laoding or 365 KW.

This will result in a total loading of 2878 KW or 96% of the diesel's 2,Ouv hr rating of 3,000 KW.

Since no credit has been taken for the reduction in pumping requirements following a LOCA and since the diesels 2,000 hr rating is ne exceeded, the diesel operability will not be affected. A de tailed loading study has also verified this fact and testing will be performed to further verify this fact.

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e l

2.1.1.7.6 Safety Evaluation The addition of the motor driven auto-start circuits and addition of these motors to the diesel block loading sequence ensures that

_arl.e failure will not result in less than the minimum requir-

>d pi-capacity being available under all conditions including le s ur off site power.

The TMI-l AFW design provides a emergency feed line with control provisions in the line to each steam generator. The design is such that he required quantity of water can be provided to at least one

cam generator during all single failure conditions involving a Loss of Coolant Accident or loss of normal feed.

Under steam line or feed l'_e break conditions, when both main and auxiliary feedwater is isolated to the af fected steam genera-tor, a single failure of the unaffected auxiliary feed line control valve will produce unacce; table results. To counteract this situation several short term decign improvements have been inplemented. A Back up instrument air systems have been added, the failure mode of the control valv es have been changed, and an additional manual control station has been added.

All of these changes provide additional assurance that the TMI-l control valves will tv operable when required or at least will fail in the open position.

In the long term, the system will be rede-signed to account for the extremely unlikely condition where a control valve sticks closed during a steam or feedline break accident.

As noted in the discussion above on System Design:

a)

The TMI-l design provides for the automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater.

b)

Subject to the limitations discussed above the design accounts for single failures.

c)

The initiating signals are powered from Class IE power systems.

d)

The A.C. motor driven pumps aud valves in the auxiliary feedwater system are included in the automatic actuation of the loads to the emergency buses, e)

The automatic initiating signals and circuits are designed so that failure will not result in the loss of manual capability to initiate AFW frem the control room.

f)

Safety grade indication of auxiliary feedwater flow to each steam generator is being provided in the control room.

i This design is consistent with the existing system design i

(i.e. one indicator per line is provided).

g)

The Flow instruments are to be powered from Class lE power systems.

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Manual capability to initiate the auxiliary feedwater system from the control room has been retained and is such that a single j

failure in the manual circuits will not result in the loss of system function.

In addition provisions for testing of the initiating ircuits, although not currently included in the design, will be provided. Control room annunciation for all auto start conditions will also be provided.

2.1.1.7.7 Startup Testing and Inservice Testing / Inspection Requirements During the initial TMI-1 start-up testing, hot functional testing was perfermed to:

1.

Verify the Integrated Control System (ICS) controls the OTSG to the minimum level set point of 30 inches during HFT heat up.

2.

Verify the ICS controls the emergency feedwater system and OTSG level for the following simulated conditions:

a.

Both main feedwater pumps tripped.

b.

AC hand power to the ICS lost.

c.

A31 four RC pumps tripped.

d.

All four RC pumps & both main F.W. pumps tripped.

3.

Verify the auto start capability of the steam driven emergency feedwater pumps.

4.

Verify operability of the Emergency Feedwater System to supply feedwater when OTSG precsure is 1015 psig.

These tests are documented in Test Procedure TP 600 '11.

Acce pt-able test results were obtained and therefore no need ex_sts to re perform the above tests. However prior to re-start of TMI-1 the following test will be conducted:

i 1.

Functional tests shall be performed to verify the emergency feed pumps '; art on loss of feedwater or loss of four reactor coolant pumps.

2.

A functional test shall be performed to verify the operabi-lity of the diesel generators with the loading of the emergency feed pumps.

3.

The failure positions for the emergency feedwater control valves shall be verified.

4.

A functional test of the new manual control valve station and the auxiliary feedwater flow instrumentation will be performed at cold shutdown conditions.

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5.

Operability of the new back-up instrument air compressors will be demonstrated.

2.1.1.7.8 Instrumentation j

As discussed above auxiliary feedwater flow instrumentation is being provided in the design of TMI-1.

Other instrumentation required for the safe control and operation of the TMI-l AFW System, such as steam gc.erator level instrumentation, is de-scribed in chapter 7 of the FSAR.

2.1.1.7.9 Reference Drawings C-302-081 Rev IB-0 SS-201-186 Rev IA SS-201-187 Rev IA SS-201-168 Rev IA SS-201-169 Rev IA i

SS-208-203

'ev IA SS-208-205 Rev IA SS-209-031 Rev IA

{

SS-209-032 Rev IA SS-209-108 Rev IA l

SS-209-590 Rev IA SS-208-591 Rev IA l

SS-209-660 Rev IA SS-209-661 Rev IA SS-209-662 Rev IA SS-209-663 Rev IA SS-209-664 Rev IA SS-209-665 Rev IA SS-209-666 Rev IA SS-209-667 Rev IA SS-209-755 Rev IA SS-209-756 Rev IA B-308-564 Rev IA-0 E-304-274 Rev IA-0 E-304-275 Rev IA-0 E-304-276 Rev IA-0 E-304-277 Rev IB-1 B-201-043 Sheet 1 Rev IA B-201-044 Sheet 1 Rev IA 1130 040 2.1-26 Am. 2