ML19209B794

Fire Hazards Analysis Rept. Prepared for Met Ed

ML19209B794
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	05/15/1975
From:	Brannen W GILBERT/COMMONWEALTH, INC. (FORMERLY GILBERT ASSOCIAT
To:
References
GAI-1938, NUDOCS 7910100488
Download: ML19209B794 (190)

Text

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.z MAY 15, 1977 GAI REPORT No. 1938 TEREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 FIRE RAZARDS ANALYSIS REFORT METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

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Prepared by:

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r W. A. 3rannen, P.E.

Fire Protection Engineer Gilber: Associatas, Inc.

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.v Approved by:

e i.M.ptectic,nEngineer R

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Fire.ro Metropolitan Edison Compar, h

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N.- ' ( q(

} :.201 Gilbert Associates, Inc.

?. O. Box 1498 Reading, Pennsylvania 19603 casssc.mn===sa O

7910100 4

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Pane 1.0 DERODUC"~.ON 1.1-1 L.1 HACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 1.1-1 1.2

SUMMARY

OF FLANNED MODIFICAT!ONS 1.2-1 2.0 METHODOLOGY - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 2.1-1 2.1 DCRODUCTION 2.1-1 2.2 INFORMATION COLLECTION 2.2-1 2.3 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 2.3-1 3.0 SAFE REACTOR SHUTDOWN 3.1-1 3.1 SHUTDOWN SEQUENCE 3.1-1 3.2 DESCRI?rION OF SAFI SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS /EQUIFMCiT 3.2-1 4.0 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 4.1-1 4.1 REACTOR 3UILDING 4.1-1 4.1.1 Reactor 3uildine Outside Secondary Shield.

North at R3-la (Elevation 231')

4.1-2 4.1.2 Reactor Building Outside Secondary Shield.

Southeast at F3-lb (Elevation 281')

4.1-2 4.1.3 Reactor Building Outside Secondarr Shield.

Southwest at RS-lc (Elevation 281')

4.1-3 4.1.4 Reactor Buildine Outside Secondatr Shield at RS-2 (Elevation 308')

4.1-4 4.1.5 Reactor Building Outside Secondary Shield at RS-3 (Elevation 346')

4.1-5 4.1.6 Reactor Building Inside Secondarv Shield, East at R3-ld (Elevation - All) 4.1-6 4.1.7 Reactor Buildine Inside Secondar-i Shield, West at RS-le (Elevation - All) 4.1-7 4.2 AUXILIARY 3UILDING 4.2-1 4.2.1 Decav Heat Re= oval Pit A (El.tvation 261')

4.2-1 4.2.2 Decav Heat Re= oval Pit 3 (Elevation 261')

4.2-2 4.2.3 Renainder of Auxiliary Building (Elevations 271', 281' and 305')

4.2-3 4.2.3.1 Heat Exchanger Vault (Elevation 271')

4.2-4 4.2.3.2 Makeup and Purification Pu=ps A, 3 and C Cubicles (Elevation 231')

4.2-4 4.2.3.3 7alve Gallery (Elevations 281' and 295')

' 2-6 4.2.3.4

?enetration Area at Elevation 281' 4.2-6 4.2.3.5 Re=ainder of Elevation 231' 4.2-7 4.2.3.6 Denineralizers and Motor Control Centers (Elevation 305')

4.2.3 1413 02 i

e TABLE OF CONIDTS (Cont'd)

Section Title Paes 4.2.3.7 Decay Eeat Re= oval and Nuclear Service Closed Cycle Cooling Punp Area (Elevation 305')

4.2-9 4.2.3.8 Gas Decay Tanks (Elevation 305')

4.2-10 4.2.3.9 Re=ainder of Elevation 305' 4.2-10 4.3 DITERMEDIATE SUILDDIG 4.3-1 4.3.1 Vat.ve Gallerv mad Penetration Room (Elevation 295')

4.3-1 4.3.2 Turbine Driven E=ertenev Feedvater Puno Roon (Elevation 295')

4.3-2 4.3.3 Motor Driven E=er2enev Feedvater Pu=o Area (Elevation 295')

4.3-3 4.3.4 Renainder of Elevation 295' 4.3-4 4.3.5 Internediate Buildine at Elevation 305' 4.3-5 4.3.6 Internediate Building at Elevation 322' 4.3-5 4.3.7 Inter =ediate Building at Elevation 355' 4.3-6 4.4 CONTRCL SUILDING 4.4-1 4.4.1 Control Building Area C3-1 (Elevation 306')

4.4-1 4.4.2 Control Building Area C3-2a (Elevation 322')

4.4-2 4.4.3 Control Building Area C3-2b (Elevation 322')

4.4-4 4.4.4 Control 3uilding Area C3-2c (Elevatien 322')

4.4-5 4.4.5 Control 3u11dina Area C3-2d (Elevation 322')

4.4-6 4.4.6 Control Su11dinz Area C3-2e (Elevation 322')

4.4-7 4.4.7 Control Building Area C3-2f (Elevation 322')

4.4-8 4.4.8 Control Building Area C3-2g (Elevation 322')

4.4-9 4.4.9 Control Building Area C3-3a (Elevation 338'-6") 4.4-10 4.4.10 Control 3uilding Area C3-3b (Elevation 338'-6") 4.4-11 4.4.11 Control Su11 ding Area C3-3c (Elevation 338'-6") 4.4-12 4.4.12 Control Buildine Area C3-3d (Elevation 338'-6") 4.1-14 4.4.13 Control Buildine Area C3-4a (Elevation 355')

4.4-15 4.4.14 Control Building Area C3-4b (Eltvation 355')

4.4-16 4.4.15 Control Building Area C3-5a (Elevation '280')

1.4-18 4.4.16 Control Buildine Area C3-5b (Elevation 380')

4.4-19 4.5 DIESEL GENERATOR SUILDDiG 4.5-1 4.5.1 Diesel Generator Buildinz Area DG-1 (Elevation 305')

4.5-1 4.5.2 Diesel Generator Building Area DC-2 (Elevation 305')

4.5-2 4.5.3 Diesel Fuel Oil Storate Tank (Underground) 4.5-3 4.6 DTAKE SCREEN AND PUMP EOUSE 4.6-1 4.7

?UEL HANDLOTG BUILDING 4.7-1 4.7.1 Fuel Eandling 3uildine at Elevatien 231' 4.7-1 4.7.2 Fuel Eandling 3uilding at Elevation 305' 4.7-2 4.7.3 Fuel Handline 3uilding at Elevations 329' and 331' 4.7-3 4.7.4 Fuel Handling 3u11 ding at Elevation 342' 4.7-4

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e TA31.E OF CONTEITS (Cont'd)

Section Title Pace 4.7.5 Zone 3etween Fuel Fool (East Wall) and Control Building (Elevatten 322' to 380')

4.7-4 4.7.6 Air conditionine Ecuionent Room (Elevation 285')

4.7-5 4.3 TUR3 DIE BUILDDiG 4.3-1 4.9 SERV 7CE 3UILDD*G 4.9-1 4.10 An INT.ut2 TCINEL 4.10-1 4.11 YARD AREA 4.11-1 4.11.1 Condensate Storare Tanks Area 4.11-1 4.11.2 Borated Water Storage Tank Area 4.11-2 5.0 PO DT-3Y-PODIT COMPARISON TO APPDIDIX A 5-1 APPDID C 5A RESUME OF FIRE ?ROTECTION EIGLT.IR SA-1 1413 004 111

e LIST OF TABLIS Table

7tei, 3-1 SAFE SSJTDOZI RELATED EQUI w,,_,tr

.1413 005 h /*N 17

LIST OF DRAWINGS Dwe. No.

Title D-023-001 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - PLOT PLAN D-023-002 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - REACTOR, AUXILIARY AND FUEL HANDLING BUILDDIG PLAN - 3ASE D T FLCOR -

ELEVATIONS 271'-0", 281'-0" D-023-003 FIRE PROTEC ION EVALUATION - REACTOR, AUXILIARY AND FUEL EANDLING BUILDDIG PLAN - GROUND FLOOR -

ELEVATIONS 308'-0", 305'-0" D-023-004 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - INTERMEDIAII AND DIESEL GDIERATOR BUILDING PLAN - 3ASDENT FLOOR -

ELEVATIONS 295'-0", 305'-0" D-023-005 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - RFACTOR, AUXILIARY AND FUEL EANDLDiG BUILDDIG PLAN - ELEVATIONS 331'-0",

329'-0", 322'-0" D-023-006 FIRE PROTECTICN EVALUATION - INTERMEDIATE 3UILDING PLAN - MEZZANDE FLOOR - ELEVATION 322'-0" D-023-007 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - REAC*0R AND FUEL FCIDLING BUILDDIG PIAN - OPERATING T.00R - ELEVATIONS 346 '-0",

348'-0" D-023-008 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATIOa - INTE? MEDIATE 3UILDING PLAN -

OPER. FLOOR - ELEVATION 355'-0" - SECTION 1-R LOOKDIG NOR*H D-023-009 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - REACTOR BUILDING ?! tN -

ELEVATICN 365'-6" D-023-010 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - REACTOR SUILDDIG -

SECTIONS A-A AND 3-3, LOOKING NORTH.CID EAST D-023-011 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - AUXILIARY 3UILDING -

SECTIONS E-E AND J-J, LOOKDiG F_1ST D-023-012 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - AUIILIARY AND FUEL EANDLDIG 3UILDDiGS - SECTION C-C, LOOKING NORIH D-023-013 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - AUXILIARY AND FUEL HANDLUTG BUILDUiGS - SECTIONS D-D AND E-E, LOCKING NOR*H 3-023-014 FIRE PROTICTION EVALUATION - PUEL EANDLUiG 3UILDING -

SECTIONS F-F AND G-G, LOOKDIG F.AST 1413 006 Gams /Cannenesta V

LIST OF DRAWINGS (Cont'd)

Dwz. No.

Title D-023-013 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - INTERMEDIATE BUILDING -

SECTIONS S-S AND T-T, LOCKING NORTH A D Z.tST D-023-016 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - CONTROL ROOM TOWER PLAN -

ELEVATIONS 380'-0", 355'-0", 338'-6", 322'-0" D-02.-017 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - CONTROL ROCM TCWER FIM -

ELEVATIONS 306'-0", 290'-0", 285'-0" D-02 -018 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION - INTAKE SCREEN AND PL?? HOUSE PLAN - ELEVATION 308'-0" - SECTION, LOCKING NORS D-023-019 FIRE ?ROTECTION EVALUATION - AIR INTAKE ~UNNFL PLAN -

ELEVATION 281'-0" - SECTIONS, LC0 KING NORTH AND WEST 1413 007 vi

1.0 INrRODUC* ION 1.1 3ACKGROCID AND FURPOSE The Nuclear Regulatory Ccenission (NRC), in a let:er dated May 11, 1976, requested that Metropolitan Idison Ccapany condue: an ern-ina: ion of the *hree Mile Island Nuclaar Station Unit 1 (TMI-1). The purpose of the investigation was to ecepare existeng fire protestion provisions with the guidelines presented in Standard Review Plan (SR2) 9.5.1, " Fire Protection," dated May 1, 1976, which includes Branch Technical ? cst: ion A?CS3 9.5-1.

Metropolitan '.fison was specificallg requested to:

Identify and discuss those guidelines which are satisfied.

a.

b.

Identify those guidelines for which =odifications, procedural changes, or enhanced training of personnel are required..

indicating those that are being developed or planned.

c.

Identify those guidelines which are not satsified and will not be satisfied, providing a basis of justification for this position.

In a subsequent letter dated Septe=ber 30, 1976, the NRC transmitted Appendix A to APCSB 9.5-1, which provides certain acceptable alternatives :o the positions given in APCSB 9.5-1 for plants already in operation. Therefore, the evalus: ion has been perfo= sed and the point-by-point co=parisons have been ade with respect :o : hose guidelines in Appendix A identified as applicable to " plants under construe:1:n or operating plants." In addi: ion, the NRC stressed that for purposes of evaluation, a fire hazards

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analysis cust be perfor=ed to the I' vel of detail indicated by to the NRC's letter, "Supplanentar7 Guidance on Infornation Needed for Fire Protection Progras Evaluation." It was requested that the analysis be conducted under the technical direction of a qualified fire protection engineer. In addition to the fire ha:ards analysis, proposed technical specifications for the existing fire protection syste=s were requested to be sub=itted. These were transsitted by Metropolitan Edison to the NRC on February 10, 1977.

The purpose of this report is to present the results of the fire protection program evaluation, including the fire ha:ard analysis, for Three Mile Island Suelear Station Unit 1 in accordance with the aforementioned NRC requirements. Gilbert Associates, Inc.,

Reading, Pennsylvania assisted Metropolitan Edison in the perfor=ance of this evaluation. Mr. 'J. A. Brannen of Gilber:

Associates, Inc., was the qualified fire protection engineer for the project.

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1.1-2

1.2

SUMMARY

OF PI. VINED MODIFICATIONS As a result of the fire ha:nrds analysis, cer:ain IMI-1 nodifica:1ons are placned. These =odifications, discussed in :he conclusion sec: ion for each fire zone, are su=marized below.

Building Fire Area /~one Oescriotion of Chanco (Section)

Reac:or 3u11 ding All zotes Add fire de: action systes to allow for early warning. (4.1)

Inside Secondary Shield Add curbs inside secondary (Elevation 281')

shield.

(4.1. 6.3, 4.1. 7.3)

Inside Secondary Shield, Add ther=al insulation to decay West (Elevation 281')

hea valve, CE-V1.

(4.1.7.3)

Outside Secondary Shield, Add ther=al insulation to decay Southwest (Elevation 231')

heat valve, DE-V2.

(4.1.3.3)

Auxiliary Building Decay Heat Pit A Add fire danper in the EVAC supply and return due:; seal cable and pipe penetrations.

(4.2.1.3)

Decay Eaat Pic 3 Sa=e as above.

(4.2.2.3)

Eeat Exchanger Vault Add a fire hose reel.

(4.2.3.1.3)

Pipe Penetration Area Install ioni:ation fire (Elevation 231')

detection system and auto =acic water spray systas.

(4.2.3.4.3)

Makeup & Purification Add fire danper in EVAC due:

Pump Cubicle 3 penetrat ng the concre:e wall (Elevation 281')

adjacent to cubiclu A; seal penetratf-ns.

(4.2.3.2.3)

In:arnediate Elevation 295' Add fire barrier :o reac:or 3u11 ding building anergency cooling valves.

(4.3.1.3)

Add fire detection systes :o allow for early warning.

(4.3.1.3 chrough 4.3.4.3)

Elevation '05' Replace door :o :urbine building wi:5 Class A doer.

(4.3.3.3)

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e 3uildine Fire Area / Zone Descriotion of Change (Section)

Inter =ediate Elevation - All Seal joints.nere inter =ediate 3uilding building wall abuts reactor (Cont'd) building.

(4.3.3)

Control 3uilding Adjacent Stairwell Area Add fire heses at each (Elevations 322', 338'-6",

elevation.

(4.7.5.3) 355', and 380')

'Jalls, Callings and Floor Add fire da=pers in each duct (Elevations 320', 338'-6",

penetration.

(4.4.2.3 through 355', and 380')

4.4.11.3; 4.4.13.3 through 4.4.16.3)

Control Ecom Alter window and door to provide (Elevation 355')

appropriate fire resistance rating; Add Ealon syste= to computer room subfloor.

Install ionitation detectors in panels.

(4. 4.14. 3)

E.S. Actuation Enclose cable in fire retardant (Elevation 338'-6")

=aterial or add sprinklers.

(4. 4.11. 3)

Elevations 306', 322',

Seal cable and pipe 338'-6", 355', and 380' penetrations.

(4.4.1.3 through 4.4.11.3; 4.4.13.3, 4.4.15.3, 4.4.16.3)

Elevations 306', 322',

Doors to fuel handling building 338'-6", 355', and 380' to be Class A doors.

(4.4.1.3, 4.4.4.3, 4.4.11.3 4.4.12.3, 4.4.13.3 through 4.4.16.3)

Diesel Generator DG-2 (Elevation 305')

Eeplace access door fres 3uilding service building with Class A door.

(4.5.2.3)

Fuel Eandling Elevation 281' Coat those control trays which 3uilding constitute significant fire loading or add automatic sprinkler systes.

(4.7.1.3)

Tuel Eandling Elevation 305' Upgrade door to A label.

Building to (4. 7. 2. 3)

Reactor Building access hatch Elevation - All Seal joints where fuel handling building wall abuts reactor building.

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Building Fire Area / Zone Descriotion of Chance (Section)

Fuel Handling Elevations 322' to 380' Replace unlabeled doors 3uilding to with Class A doorr..

(4. 7. 5. 3)

Control Building Turbine Building Elevation - All 7eal joints and penetrations.

Replace unlabeled doors with Class A doors.

(4. 8. 3 )

Sarvice 3uilding Replace violated Class A door with approved A labeled door.

(4.9.3) 1.2-3

e 2.0 MC ECDOLOGY - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 2.1 IN1"it0 DUCTION A major task within the Fire Protection Evaluation progrem was the fira hacards analysis. This task consisted of deter-ining the severity of,s fire at any location within M-1, and then judging what affect a fir:2 at that location would have on the ability to acco=plish safe shutdown.

The objective of this effort was to evaluate whether a single fire could prevent safe reactor shutdown. '4here it was deter =ined that a single fire might jeopardize safe reactor shutdown, a =odification has been planned to prevent loss of reactor shutdown capability. A su==ary of planned nodifications is -esented in Secti n 1.2 of this report.

The fire hacards analysis was perfor=ed in two phases:

the first was an information collection process, and the second was the actual analysis and effects evaluation.

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2.1-1

2.2 INFORMA!!ON COIL.ECTION Before the fire ha:ards analysis could be perforned, infor=ation abou: T't!-l was corpiled. The affort involved determining equipment required for safe shutdown, including investigating cable and equipment separation, inventorying combustibles, structural fire barrier review, fire detection /protec:1on syste=s review, and then presenting.his infor=acion on fire ha:ards analysis layos drawings.

2.2.1 Safa Shutdown cuiceent The essential functions which sust be preserved for safe reac:or shu:down are che ability to: re=ove decay heat from the core, maintaia reactor coolant syste= wa:er inventor /, ensure core subcri:1cality, and control reactor coolant systes pressure and '

te=perature. Heat removal capability at hot condi:1ons requires the capability to du=p =ain steam to a heat sink and the abili:y to control steam generator pressure and water level. This, in : urn, provides for reac:or coolant systa= te=pera:ure control. Heat removal capabili y at lov temperature conditions requires use of the decay heat re= oval systes and : hose suppor:ing systa=s required for effec:ive decay heat renoval.

Saf a shutdown equipment is defined as the sechanical, elec:rical, and ventilation equipment including instr.rsentat'in, con:rols, and cable which are required for safe shu:down operation.

"'h e following are the bases for the inclusion of the equipment referenced in See: ion 3.0.

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The reliability of the offsite and casite power sources, the t.

physical separation of redundant equip =ent, and the ' 9 e resistance and nonfla=e propagating properties of the cable in the electrical syste=s for 211-1 are described in Chap' ar 8 of c

the FSAR and indicate that a total less of all offsite electrical power is very unlikely. Ecwever, for the purpose of this analysis, a total loss of offsite electrical power to TMI-1 has been assu=ed; thus only the e=ergency core cooling system (ECCS) equipment and the ensite e=ergency power system, which provides ECCS electrical power, have been relied upon to effect 01I-1 safe shutdown. This assu=ption is considered the most conservative ccedition, since tha availability or restoration of Di!-l offsite electrical power would allev the use of additional equip =ent for which no credit has been taken.

b.

Manual operation of valves or local centrol of equip =ent is considered acceptsble since =ost operations do not require 1:nediata action to =aintain safe shutdown conditiens. This approach was used to reduce the qucucity of equip =ent required; however, encugh equipt:ent is identified in the fire hazards analysis to ensure that the cooldown will always be under the control of the operators.

c.

The folicving categories of valves are censidered in the analysis:

(1) Valves for which a change in position is required during the shutdcwn sequeme. Included are both =anually and me-413 Olb

,,2

renotely operated valves. Valves which are in the required position before a pactulated fire are assu=ed not to change position or lose pressure retaining capability.

(2) Valves which have a " fail safe" feature and do not fail in the position required for shutdown.

It is assux::ed that those that fail in the position required for shutdown will do so as a result of loss of electric power or air supply dua to a fire.

If the electrical or air supplies are available, these valves can be renocely positioned by operator action.

(3) Valves which have the backup or redundant valve in the same zone or area without physical barriers or fire barriers.

ii) Valves which are re=ote from asseciated equip =ent.

Valves in the same area as the associated equipnent were not considered if the function of this equipt:ent was assus2d to be lost.

d.

The selection of the instru=entation to be censidered in this analysis was based upon -J:e need to:

(1) Maintain the

-d d e::: level of redundancy an the reactor protection systen to ensure an auto =atic reactor :-1p should a fire result in an := safe condition.

1413 016 G2ms/cannemusin I

2.2-3

(2) Provide sufficient information so the operator can ascertain the safety status of the reactor.

(3) Provide sufficient infor=ation for the operator to control reactor cooldown in accordance with shutdown procedures.

(4) Protect the engineered safeguards actuation systa=s which are not required for safe shutdown of the reactor, but whose actuation would adversely affect shutdown procedures.

2.2.2 Inventerv of Combustibles The types of cembustibles considered included petrolaus products, cable insulation, charcoal filters, and =aint..ance and operating

supplies, a.

Petroleum Products Petroleum products are defined, for the purposes of this report, as lubricants and diesel fuel utilized at DfI-1.

Lubricants were tabulated for all equip =ent containing one quart or = ore. Lubrication of equipment requiring s= aller quantities of oil is normally accon:plished through sealed bearings or oil / grease cup arrange =ents and is required in negligible a=ounts.

All transfor=ars within OfI-1 buildings are of the dry construction type and, hence, contain no petroleus products.

1413 017 Gibert/Cmmrouse 2.2-4

b.

Cable Insulation Cable insulation for power, control, and instrumentation cable installed in.able trays wi*.hin the reactor building was included 'n the fire loadings. These loadings were considered even though vendor cast reports confirm the nonfla=e propagating properties of the cable insulation.

In the remaining areas of DiI-1 only the control and instrument cable installed in cable trays v.ts censidered, since the power cable is provided with an interlocked armored jacket and is not considered to contribute to the fire loading. Cables installed within conduit were not considered to contribute to the fire loadings. Cable insulation is pri=arily Kerite (approxi=ately 95 percent), and is fire resistant and confla=e propagating. The Kerite cable has been qualified by tests to be of fire resistant construction. Copies of these tests are on file with Metropolitan Edir,n. The instrument cable that is not Kerite is Continental Wire silicone rubber with a fiberglas outer covering. This cable is also fire resistant and confla=a propagating. Although, as stated, the cabling has been demonstrated by cast to be of fire resistant construction, to =eet the conservative require =ents imposed by Appendix A, the cable insulation has been assu=ed to be combustible with a calorific value of 10,000 Stu/lb.

Control and instrument cables installed in cable trays are

=ultiple layer, random fill, whereas power cables are installed in a single layer.

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\\d mm, 2.2-3

e Cable insulation quantity was estimated using the following procedure. For each tray considered within an area, the nunber of circuits contained was deter =ined from the tray circuit listing. The insulation quantity was then deter =ined by =ultiplying the number of circuits, by the tray length by the W ght of the insulation of an average cable site representative of the tray leading. The total insulation weight for an area was the result of the su==ation of the individual :ays. Since =ost circuits do not tun the full length of a tray, this process yields a conservative (high) esti= ate of cable insulaf. ion quantities.

Instru=ent and control cabinets, =otor control centers, and switchgear equip =ent were evaluated to determine their potential contribution to the fire loading. Considering the seuill amounts of fire resistant and nonfla=e propagating viring in this type of equip =ent, together with the metal enclosure, the contribution to the fire loading is considered negligible.

c.

Charcoal Filters The quantity of charcoal in the filters was determined frem the filter =anufacturer's data.

d.

Maintenance and Operating Supplies Maintenance and operating supplies consist of paper, cloth, plastic, ce=bustible and fla==able liquids, and other ite=s required for nor=al operations.

In contrast to the first 1413 O1!

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three categories of conbustibles, which are permanent and part of the design, these supplies are transient, say vary with eine, and can be =oved aSout. Because of these characteristics, they are subject to ad=inistrative control.

Certain areas of til-1, however, require a continual replentish=ent of these supplies. The controlled access dressing crea, for instance, will always con, ~tn clothing and associated supplies. For the fire hazards analysis, a survey of the 'aintenance and operating supplies, records, and furnishings was conducted. The fire loadings used for these transient supplias are representative of what was determined during that survey.

2.2.3 Structural Fire Barrier Review The structural review consisted of deter =ining fire ratability of existing fire barriers and structures between fire areas withi-TXI-1.

Included in this review was a survey of wall and floor punetrations between fire areas.

2.2.4 Fire Detection /?rotection Systens Review The existing DiI-1 fire detee:1on and prctection systa=s were reviewed to determine their adequacy in protecting safe shutdown equipment.

2.2.3 Fire Hazards Analvsis Iavout Drawings _

These drawings, nu=bered E-023-001 through E-023-019, show each fire area; separating f'.re barriers; the safe shu:down equip =en:

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required within each area, and the existing fire suppression equipment within each area. These form the basis for the :enal fire hazards analysis presented in Section 4.0.

1413 021 2.2-3

5 2.3 7 IRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS The fire ha:ards analysis presented in Section 4.0 was perfor=ed using the steps discussed below.

2.3.1 Identification of Fire Areas and Zones TMI-1 was divided into fire areas in ac:ordance with c.te definitions of Appendix A to 3 ranch Technical Position A?CSB 9.5-1.

For analytical purposes, certain fire areas were subdivided into fire zoness Each fire area and zone is identified and described in Section 4.0.

2.3.2 Review of Safe Shutdown Eouionent within Areas and Zones The safe shuedown equipnent is described in Section 3.0 and is shown on the fire hazard analysis layout drawings E-023-001 through E-023-019.

The drawings also show the relative position of nechanical equipment, instr==ent sensors or transmitters, control and power centers, and trays catrying safety related cables.

Although not shown on the drawings, separation between redundant cabling was considered during the analysis.

The purpose of the review was to ensure that, in the event of a fire, TMI-l can be safely shut down. The considerations for each zone are discussed in Section 4.0.

2.3.3 Calculation of Area or Zone Fire Load The conbustible nacerials located within each area or tone were listed and the fire loading, was calculated in 3tu/ft This nunb2r was used to verify the adequacy of the existing fire barriars, in accordance with Table 6-3A of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook. 14th Edition.

)413 02 2 32srt/canmoneeseca 2.3-1

2.3.4

.eview of the Ventilation Svstems Ventilation systa=s were eval.ated by areas and :enes based upon rie following considerations:

a.

What effect might the ventilation scheme have on a fire within an area or :ene?

b.

Where would products of ceabustion be routed through the ventilation systes?

c.

Would the ventilation system help to spread a fire to another area or :ene?

d.

What is the affect of shutting down the ventilation system in an area or :ene in the event of a fire?

e.

Are there any fire or s=oke da=pers in the ventilation ducts?

2.3.5 Examination of Existing Area or Zone Fire Detection /Sucoression/

Containment

'v="4-ation consisted of detersining how a fire within the area or

ene would be extinguished, once detected.

It was assu=ed that any permanently installed fire protection equipment would fc.nction as designed. The review assured that a fire would be contained within a fire area until extinguished.

2.3.6 Degree of Cocoliance with the Soecific Secaration Criteria of Regulatorv Guide 1.75 (Revision 1.

1/75) 2.3.6.L Introduction Regulatory Guide 1.75 "?hysical Independence of Electrical Syste=s" addresses the separation require =ents for redundant circuits used in nuclear plant safety syste=s.

The level of redundancy of the lk af%.

2.3-2

reactor protection system at IMI-l is described f detail in Chapter 8 of the ISAR. For the purpose of this report the following is a su==ary description.

a.

Reactor Protection System (RPS)

The RPS is a four-channel, redundant syste= in which the four protection channels are brought together in four identical 2-out-of-4 logic networks of the reactor trip =odules. A trip in any two of the four protection channels initiates a trip of the four logic networks. The system to this point has the reliability and advantages of a pure 2-out-of-4 system.

Each of the reactor trip =odules (2-out-of-4 logic networks) controls a control red drive breaker or contactor. Thus, a trip in any two of the four protection channels initiates a trip of all the breakers and contactors.

The viring associated with the input signal to the reactor protection system is segregated in four independent instru=ent channels (identified as A, 3, C, and D channels) which run in either totally enclosed instrunent cable trays or conduits.

Circuit wiring from the reactor protection system to the trip breaker, as well as the cross circuit wiring between the reactor protection rack subasse=bly, is routed exclusively in physically separated and independent steel conduits, a

b.

Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Except for reactor building spray actuation, which is not required for safe shutdown following a fire, the engineered safeguards actuation syste= has a 2-out-of-3 logic developed in a 1-out-of-2 actuation channel.

'413 02 A I

I

• but sC_

.n 2.3-3

The viring associated with the input signals is segregated in three independent instrunant channels (identified as A, 3, and C channels) which are installed in either totally enclosed instrunent cable trays or steel conduits. The output viring is separated into two independent actuation channels (identified as A and 3) and routed in physically separate and independent control cable trays or steel conduit.

Some auxiliaries are controlled by either "A" or "B" actuation channels. These have been identified as being controlled by a "C" actuation channel and have been kept physically separated f rom both "A" and "B" channels. The "C" channel alone does not provide 100 percent of the safe shutdown equipment require =ents.

Usually the equipment assigned to the "C" channel represents excess redundancy such as is obtained by the use of three 100 percent capacity items of equipment.

Except for the interlocked ar=ored jacketed power cable for the nakeup punp and nuclear service cooling pu=ps, "C" channel equipment say be lost in a fire s1=ultaneously with either A or 3 equipment.

2.3.6.2 Analysis Regulatory Guide L.75, Revision 1, sets forth reqairements for the physical independence.cf redundant circuits and electrics 1 equipnent to be provided to ensure that potential hazards vill not prevent the successful operation of the protectivo functions required during and following any design basis accident (DBA).

Since within the context of this report, fire is the only

)4\\

1.3-4

postulated hazard and no DBA has to be canaidered si:ultaneously, all requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75 need not be evaluated in this report.

The requirements =ost relevant to this fire hazards analysis are those relative to the separation of cable raceways in the cable spreading room, main control room and IMI-l balance-of-planc (30P) areas.

Chapter 8 of the FSAR describes the separation requirements which have been followed in the design and construction of IMI-1.

The following provides an evaluation of the digree of compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation requirt=ents for the purpose of supporting the conclusions of this report.

a.

General Separation Features The a=ount of. physical separation used throughout IMI-l between redundant safety related equipment and wiring is con =ensurate with the postulated, internally generated cable fire hazards (uninterrupted circuit faults).

Since nost of the safety related equipment is also required for safe shutdown of IMI-I following a fire, the as-built separation provides adequate protection against internally generated fires.

Inherent features of the IMI-l equipment '.ocations have been used to provide =axd '- separation. The nost i=portant of i

/

2.3-5

these features are the following:

(1) The two energency diesel generators are each located in an independent, separate concrete bu.. ding.

(2) The redundant engineered safeguards switchgear (1160 and 480 volt) are located in independent rooms bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire walls.

(3) The redundant batteries and inverters are also located in independent roons bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire walls.

(4) Particular precautions have been taken to ensure that the redundant cables entering the relay room / cable spreading room are provided with spacial separction and/or L7.,

listed fire barriers.

(5) Safety related cables inside the reactor building have been run in steel condule.

Redundant cables were not routed in areas where concentrated coebustible materials exist. Class LE cables and non-Class lE cables are installed in safety related raceways.

These cables have been color coded to identify their channel association, as well as to discrf rinate between their classification. Non-Class 1E cables, color coded to indicate association with a particular channel, have not been run with any redundant channel cabling.

b.

Central Design 3 asis The specific separation criteria discussed in ite=s e, d and e for safaty related cabling were utill:ed in the M il

_3 1413 C

.2-4

6 construction of IMI-1.

These criteria are based upon the following:

(1) Use of open ventilated steel tray for power and control cable.

(2) No cable splices in raceways.

(3) No cable tray overfill.

(4) Limitation of fire hazards to failures or faults internal to the electric equipment or cable circuits.

(5) Use of flame retardant and conflane propagating cables.

Manufacturer test reports are on file with Metropolitan Edison.

c.

General Area Criteria (1) In areas of IMI-1 containing redundant color coded viring, a 3 foot mbhum cmration has been =aintained between viring of nutually redundant channels. A 3 foot separation in the vertical or hori: ental direction is naintained between raceways of different channels, where possible.

(2) If the 4

4-"a separation of iten c. (1). was not naintained, a UL listed fire barrier three eines the width of the videst raceway involved (nininum vid.th of barriers is 18 inches), either vertically or horizontally, has been installed.

3arrier =aterial

}kk )

s,ms 2.3-7

consists of Johns-Manville Marini:e 63 :ype A insulation 1/2 inch thickness listed by UL.

k'here with a sini prac:1 cal, the vertical barriers ex:end from one foot below the cable tray to the ceiling.

d.

Relay Room Area Criteria This room also serves as the cable spreading area for cable entering :he control room. The following separation is provided in the relay room:

(1) klere cable tray's parallel each other in the hori: ental plane, the 3 foot separa:1on is =sintained.

(2) k'here cable trays of different channels parallel or cross over each other, and a 3 foot separation could not be

=aintained, a fire barrier was inst.alled.

(3) k*here a channelized condui: parallels a channeli:ed cable

ay, a 6 inch separation is naintained in any plane, except when a enanneli:ed conduit is above a channeli:ed tray; in this case a three foot separation is naintained.

(4) A channelized conduit intersec:ing a channeli:ed cable tray at any angle maintains a 3 foot separation above the tray, and a six inch separation below the tray, (5) Condui:s of different channels =ain:ain a 6 inch separation, e.

Control Room Cri: aria In the control room, separatica is provided for safety related co=ponen: cables and viring located inside cabinets and

}h}

~aws/he 2.3-8

consoles.

The components sounted in control cabinets are arranged to =aintain a three foot physical separation for items of mutually redundant engineered safeguards channels.

Where this separation distance cannot be =aintained a fire barr'.ar has been installed.

Floor slots and raceways have been arranged in a =anner to ec= ply vich the separation requirements.

Field viring between the raceway and cabinet terminal blocks is arranged to =aintain separation between channels. This separation is 3 feet where possible, but 6 inches is the sinisus acceptable withcut fire barriers.

Internal cabinet viring of safety related circuits is identified and separated by channels. Wiring of =utually redundant channels is separated by at least six inches free space or by a firepreofing type barrier =aterial installed between channels.

2.3 6.3 Evaluation - Conclusion While Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 1, did not constitute design criteria for THI-1, the separation criteria established uere based -

upon draf ts of IEEE 384. The criteria that were used =eet the intent and, in =any instances, exceed the requirements of Regulacqry Guide 1.75.

The most important differetce is the Regulatory Guide requirement for 5 feet vertical spatial separation between redundant cable tray run in general areas rather than the 3 feet used.

It is considered that, within the context of this report, the consequences of'this difference in separation require =ent are r.ot significant.

1413 030 s, m1 - -,

2.J-9

2.3.7 Containnent of Radioactivity The reactor, auxiliary and fuel handling buildings house equipment that nor: ally contains radioactivity. The =echods of containing radioactive leakage and releases from these buildings are as follows:

a.

Reactor 3uilding Liquid spillage er Isakage, from equip =ent within the reactor building, drains inte the building sump. From -Jie reactor building sump liquid drains to the auxiliary building sump, where it is pu= ped to the siscellaneous waste storage tank in the auxiliary building for cornal liquid waste processing.

Section 11.2.1 of the FSAR details the handling and containing of liquid radicactive wastes.

Gaseous release or leakage within the reactor building is retained within the building until released in a controlled manner. These releases are controlled by existing procedures and are released through the contai==ent purge exhaust system to the environment.

b.

Auxiliary and Fuel Handling 3uildings Liquid spillage or leakage from equipment within these

~

buildings drains into either the spent fuel pit sump or the auxiliary building sump.

From either sump, it is pumped to the niscellaneous waste storage tank in the aurd iary building for nor=al liquid waste processing.

Section 11.2.1 of the FSAR details the handling and containing of liquid radioactive wastes.

1413 031 2.3-10

Radioactive gases from equipment leakage pass into the auxiliary and fuel handling exhaust ventilation systems and through the associated roughing, EPA, and charcoal filters.

The release of radioactive gases to the envirecsent is controlled by existing procedures.

Radioactive liquids and gases are nor= ally contained within piping and process equipment, such as tanks, pu=ps, compressors, demineralizers, filters, and evaporator packages. The major sources of radioactivity would be the storage tanks which are located in shielded cubicles having very low fire loadings. Tanks are provided with over pressure devices which will operate if a fire causes pressure buildup within the equipment. Liquid releases would be collected through the floor drain systes and would be released as described above. Releases f cs the gaseous radioactive vaste system would be limited to.he waste gas decay tanks since the gaseous spaces of the other tanks are interconnected through the vaste gas vant header system. This would allow the gaseous expansion due to a fire in one area to be accoesodated throughout the entire systes. The waste gas decsy tanks, which are isolated from the vent header. are each located in a cubicle that has no permanent co=bustible fire loading.

The cubicles are connected by access openings. F.xcep t for periods when naintenance is being perfor=ed, no combustible nacerials vill be present in these cubicles.

Therefore, no fire which cannot be readily extinguished is postulated.

, n. 1. -; OH m g_

2.3-11

Another possible problem resulting from a fire is that the water used to fight the fire =sy becces radioactively Contaminated. Eowever, such cont 3Sination does not result in uncontrolled releases. The fire fighting water will be contained and controlled in the sa=e =anner as equip =ent spillage or leakage described above.

2.3.8 3 asis For Conclusions Conclusions regarding the adequacy of existing fire protection in the fire harards analysis are based upon the folicwing:

a.

If the existing fire barriers or barriers with planned modifications (sealing penetrations, adding fire dampers in ducts, installing rated access doors, etc.) are adequate to prevent the spread of a fire based upon the calculated loading, to redundant equipment or cable, no further modifications were considered.

The adequacy of fire barriers for the calculated fire loadings was based upon requirements in the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 14th Edition, Page 6-81 Table 6-8A.

Changes to existing fire barriers to achi ve the required rating of walls, floors, or ceilings are included as reco=._anded design modifications in Section 1.2.

b.

If the spatial sep wation between redundant equipment or cable is sufficient to prevent a fire, based upon the calculated loading, from causing loss of function of both items, then no f urther modifications were considered. If teet/crvnmeesta 2.3-12

e the existing fire protection systens are considered adequate for the types of potential fires, then no =odifications to these systems are required. The adequacy of spacial reparation for electrical equip = ant is based upon Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 1, as discussed in See:1on 2.3.6.

c.

No nodifications to the existing fire protection were required for the following:

(1) In areas or zones where the calculated fire loading is sininal.

(2) Where no redundant safe shutdown equipment or cables are located.

(3) Where the fire protection equipment is considered adequate for the types of potential fire.

It is concluded that a single fire in these areas or :enes will not affect nore char. one channel of equipment or cable.

Therafore, such a fire will not jeopardize the safe shutdown capability of IMI-1.

d.

The existing fire protection equipment for each area or :ene was reviewed to decernine if it is adequate for the calculated fire loading and the type of potential fire that can be expected.

If it was concluded that an additional or different type of fire protection equipment was required, it was included in the reco== ended nodifications in See:1on 1.2.

)h\\ )

=

2.3-13

a.

klare redundant electrical equip =ent with ambient :esperature limitations is located in :he sa=a room or fire ar:a, the significant combus:1bles are either protec:ed with autonatic extinguishing systems or enclosed in fire retardant nacerials.

L'here redundant electrical equipnent with temperature limitations is located in adjacent rooms and fire dampers are installed in the com=en EVAC due: at the separating walls, che effects of the loss of cooling were evaluated. It was concluded that for the worst case situation, = ore than one hour is available to extinguish the fire and establish backup cooling by means of portable fans. This would enable cooling air to circulace from areas not affected by the fire. This is considered adequate time for the fire brigade to respond to this type of situation.

f.

In areas or :enes where automatic fire suppression systems have been installed, it is concluded that safe shutdown equipmcat and cable are adequately protected to prevent loss of function of both channels or to prevent the spread of fire to areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment or cable.

g.

In areas or :enes containing safe shutdown valves, where*-Jte camperature effects of the fire could impair valve functions, i: was concluded that a ther=al barrier or autentic fire suppression system, dependen: upon location, was necessary.

This sculd protect valve operators and persi: =anual operation after the fire was ex:inguished. Ic.c cher=al barrier and automatic fire suppression system location is ircluded in the design nodifications listed in Section 1.2. 1413,35 0

G2irt/Cnmoneanct 2.3-14

3.0 SAFE REAC OR S'dUTOOW The =ain conside acion of the fire hazatds analysis was to evaluate the.apability of safe reactor shutdown. The safe shutdown procedure was assumed to start with IMI *. at full power and end with the reactor coolant system in long term cooling operation utiliting the decay heat removal systa=.

Section 3.1 presents the shutdown sequence upon which the analyris was based. See:1on 3.2 contains brief descriptions of the systems requirac for safe reactor snutdcun. Table 3-1 is a list of equipnent necessary for safe shutdown.

3.1 SEUTDOW SEQLT.NCE The following shutdown sequence was derived from existing shutdown esargency procedures. For the fire hatards analysis, the shutdewn sequence starts with a reactor trip, actuated automatically or manually ft a the control rocs or the control rod drive trip breaker area. Once actuated, no further control rod =ocion is required.

Following a reactor shutdown or trip, e=ergency feedwater flow to the steam generators is established. Throughout the cooldown, steam generator water levu is maintained by manually controlling the emergency feedwater control valves. Reactor coolant system cooldown is initiated by relieving main steam through the at=ospheric steam dump valves. Reactor coolant system water 1413 036 G4srtitmummmuuta 3.1-1

inventory is =aintained by operation of the =akeup pu=ps.

Pri=ary coolant letdown is isolated and the makeup pu=ps are cycled to

=aintain pressurizer level which otherwise would decrease due to reactor coolant system contraction during cooldewn.

The procedure, assu=ed for purposes of defining safe shutdcwn equip =ent for the fire ha:ards analysis, is to borate while =aking up for reactor coolent te=perature contraction. The reactor coolant contraction during cooldown allows for injection of sufficient boric acid solution frc= the borated water storage tank to achieve a 1 percent subcritical sargin in the cold condition as described in the basis of Technical Specification 3.2.

Decay heat re= oval is established at its nor=al point during the reactor cooldown sequence. Once decay heat removal is established, the emergency feedwater and steam du=p are secured. Cooldown continues until cold shutdown condiciens are achieved and long ters d6 cay heat re= oval is established, thereby ending the cooldown process.

1413 037

-.3.1-2

3.2 DESCRIPTION

OF SAFE S'dETDOWN SYSTEMS / EQUIPMENT The systems and equip =ent required for a cold shutdown of the r-

_ s a discussed herein. ~hese systems and/or equipnent include:

P a.

Makeup and Purification b.

Decay Heat Removal c.

Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Watar d.

Decay Heat River Water e.

Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cool 1=g Water f.

Emergency Diesel Generators g.

Emergency Feedwater h.

Main Steam 1.

Reactor building Esergency Cooling j.

Inser==entatico and Control Equipment k.

Electrical Equipment 3.2.1 Makeue and ?urification System Nor=al operation of the makeup and purification system is described in Section 9.1 of the FSAR. For reactor shutdewn this system has two functions:

a.

To inject water into the reactor coolant systes at high pressure for saintaining e5:e required reactor coolant volu=e during 2

ther=al contraction due to the ce=perature decrease.

b.

To inject boric acid from the borated water s'terage tank into the reactor coolant system to increase borou concentration to that required for cold shutdown.

)h\\b 0 G21ert/tammerwesta 3.2-1

3.2.2 Decav Heat Removal System Normal operation of the decay heat removal systes is described in Section 9.5 of the FSAR. The fonctions of this system during reactor cooldown are as follows:

a.

Remove core decay heat and reactor coolant system sensible heat during the latter stages (belev 250 F reactor coolant te=perature) of cooldown until completa cold shutdown conditions are achieved.

b.

Following cooldown, re=ove core decay heat to =aintain constant reactor coolant system ta=perature at cold shutdown conditions.

c.

Frovide auxiliary spray te the pressurizar to conplate pressuri:er cooldown.

d.

Provide a source of boric acid from the borated water storage tank for the nakeup pump to borate the reactor coolant system to the cold shutdown condit. ions.

3.2.3 Decav Heat Closed Cvele Ceoling Water Nor=al operation of the decay heat closed cycle cooling water systes is described in Section 9.6 of the FSAR. The functions of this systes during reactor cooldown are as follows:

a.

Transfer the heat removed from the reactor coolant system through heat exchangers to the decay heat river water systes.

(This is the same as the nor=al function of this system.)

b.

Provide backup coolic;; water for nakeup pt. p notors and bearings.

)k 3.2-2

=

3.2.4 Decav Heat River Water Nor=al operation of the decay heat river water system is described in Section 9.6 of the FSAR. The function of this system durig reactor shutdown is to circulate river water through the decay bear. seriice coolers. This is the same as the cornal function for this systen.

3.2.5 Nuclear Services closed cvele cooling Water system Not=al operation of the nuclear services closed cycle cooling water system is described in Section 9.6 of the FSAR. Auxiliaries naeded for reactor cooldown and to naintain cold shutdown conditions, which require cooling water frem the nuclear services closed cycle cooling wster system, are as fallows:

a.

Spent fuel coolers.

b.

Reactor building recirculation unit fan motor coolers.

c.

Makeup pu:sp and =otor (MU-P13).

d.

F.nergency feedwater pu=p rocms and instru=ent af.: ce= pressor roen air coolers.

e.

Nuclear seriice closed cycle cooling pump area and decay heat closed cycle cooling pump area air coolers, f.

Spent fuel punp area air coolers.

)h\\ )

h/Cammermenta. -

3.2-3

s For reactor cooldewn and under cold shutdewn conditions, the loop with the internediate coolers can be isolatsd. The river water to the internediate coolers can be isolated and the additzenal flow =ade available to the nuclear services coolers by operator action. Also, the cooling water to the above services represents only a portion of the nor=al cooling water requirements. This reduced closed cycle cooling water requirement, combined with the additional river water available due to the shutdown of the Later=ediate coolers, permits use of sinisus squipment that must remain operational for reacco-cooldown and =aintenance of cold shutdown conditions.

3.2.6 Emergenev Diesel Generators Upon loss of the cornal sources of electrical power, power is supplied from two automatic, fast startup diesel generators.

The ratings of each e=ergency diesel generator are indicated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. Each energency diesel generator feeds one of the engineered safeguards 4160 volt busses, and is capable of continuously supplying the engineered safeguards load and selected balance-of-plant loads connected to the associated bus.

These loads encompass the safe shutdown functions.

Sufficient fuel is stored onsite in the =ain storage tank to allow one diesel generator to supply power re

'enents for seven days. Fuel storage at each diesel generator (in day tanks) is suft.cient for approx 1=ately three hours of full load operation. Fuel level in the day tanks is automatically naistained 1413 041 2srt/Cammenuano 2.2-4

s from the sain storage tank using an a-c =otor driven pump associated with each diesel generator. A redundant d-c motor driven pump is provided for each diesel generator.

The diesel generatore are separately eaclosed and located in an annex on the opposite side of the building fr>m the 230 kv substation and transformers.

Each diesel engine is automatically started upon the occurrence of a loss of voltage on the 4160 volt engineered safeguards bus with which the emergency diesel generator is associated. Loss of voltage detection uses 2-rut-of-3 logic. The generator is aucc=atically connected to the bus when it reaches operating speed and voltage.

The sequence following the starting signal is as follows:

a.

Automatic tripping of all feeder breakers.

b.

Automatic closure of the emergency diesel generator circuit breaker af ter the generator comes up to speed and voltage.

c.

Automatic and manual senrting of equipment required for safe operation.

3.2.7 Emergenev Feedwater System The nornal function of the emergency feedwater system is described in Section 10.2 of the FSAR. For nor=al shutdown of the reactor, the =ain feedwater systes provides feedwater to the steam generators for re= oval af decay heat when the reactor coolant te=perature is above 250 F.

Assusing a.he complete loss of offsite electrical power, the emergency f eedwater system will at :o=atically take over the decay heat removal function of the =ain feedwater syste=.

Gmers/t.._ _

=

1413 042 3 2-5

3.2.8 Main Steam System The nor=al funce:.on cf the =ain steam system is deacribed in Section 10.2 of the FSAR.

For nor=al shutdown of the reactor, the steam produced in the steam generators by decay heat is bypassed to the condenser through the steam dump system at reactor coolant temperatures above 250*F.

Assuming complete loss of offsite electrical power to U.I-1, the steam is discharged to the at=osphere via the =ain stess safety valves and the controlled atmospheric relief valves util the reactor coolant system temperature is reduced

• .o 250 F.

Af ter cooling to 250 F, the decay heat re= oval system is used to achieve cold shutdown conditions in che reactor coolant system.

3.2.9 Reactor Buildinst Energenev Cooling Svstem The normal operation of the reactor building e=ergency cooling system is described in Section S.6 of the FSAR. During nor=al shutdown of the reactor, the reactor building ventilation system re= oves heat frem the reactor building as described in Section 5.6 of the FSAR. Assuming co=plete loss of -of fsite electrical power, the reactor building emergency cooling system will recove heat from the reactor building.

3.2.10 Instrumentation and Control Svstems Table 3-1 identifies the instrumentation which has been considered based upon the criteria outlined in Section 2.2.1, ices d.

Following an automatic trip by the reactor protection system or an operator initiated shutdown. sufficient instru=entation will be available for the operator to ascertain the safety status of the ldl3 bk saw%

3.2-6

reactor coolant system and to control pri=ary system cooldot.m. The reactor protection parameters =casured by redundant ins tru=e.uts,

together with the div2rse control rod indication (actual and inferred), will indicate pri=ary system status.

If required, the reactor coolant pri=ary system will be isolated by closing all letdotm paths, and pressuri:er level will be

=aintained by control of the m.keup pu=p which takes suction from the borated water storage tank. Reac or coolant temperature and pressure will also be =aintained within the cooldown envelope by manual control of feedwater level in either one or both of the steam generators.

1413 044 3.2-7

TABLE 3-1 (Page 1 of 6)

SAFI SHUTDCWN RELATED EQUIPMETI a.

Mechanical Eouier. cat Makeup and Purification System Identification No. Recuired Loestion Makeup pu=ps and MU-PlA,3,C 1

Auxilia n building, associated oil pu=ps Elevation 281' Borated water storage MU-714A,3 1

Auxiliary building, tank to =akaup pu=p Elevation 281' suction isolation valves Makeup pu=p discharge W-716A,3,C,D 1

Auxiliary building, lines (safety injection Elevation 281' and 305 '

lisos) to reactor coolant system isolation valves Decav Heat Removal System Decay heat re= oval DH-CIA,3 1

Auxiliary building, coolers Elevation 261' Decay heat re= oval DH-PLA,3 1

Aux 111aq building, pu=ps Elevation 261' Borated water storage DH-Tl i

Outdoors, at grade tank Reactor coolant system DE-71 1

Reactor building, outlet to decay heat Elevation 231' rencval pumps suction, DH-V2 1

Reactor building, isolation valves Elevation 281' DH-V3 1

Auxiliary building, Elevation 231' Reactor coolant systan DE-V4A,3 1

Auxiliary building, in14e valves from decay Elevation 281' heat removal pu=p discharge, isolation valves Decay heat resoval DH-712A,3 1

A"v4ary building, pumps suction lines, Elevation 281' isolation valves 1413 045

TA3LE 3-1 (Page 2 of 6)

Identification No. Recuired Location Decav Heat Closed Cvele Cooling Water System Decay heat closed cycle DC-PIA,3 1

Auxiliary building, cooling water punps Elevation 305' Decay heat closed cycle DC-C2A,3 1

Auxiliary building, coolers Elevation 271' Decay heat closed cycle DC-IIA,3 1

Auxiliary building, cooling surge tanks Elevation 329' Decav Heat River Water Svstem Decay heat river DR-PIA,3 1

Intake screen and water pumps pump house, Elevation 308' Nuclear Serrices River Warer Svstems Nuclear services river N1-PlA,3,C 1

Intake screen and water pumps pu=p house, Ilevacitn 308' Nuclear Serrices Closed Cvele Cooling Water Syste=s Nuclear serrices closed NS-CIA,3,C,D 2

Auxiliary building, cycle coolers Elevation 271' Nuclear services closed NS-PIA,3,C L

Auxiliary building, cycle cooling water Elevation 305' pu=ps Nuclear services closed NS-Il i

Fuel handling building, cycle cooling surge tank Elevation 348' E=ergency Diesel Generator Systems Diesel generators EG-T-1A,3 1

Diesel generator and reisted auxiliaries building, Elevation 305' 1413 046

TABLE 3-1 (Page 3 of 6)

Identification No. Recuired Location Energency Feedvater System bergency feedwater v.otor driven 2

Intermediate building, pumps EF-P2A,3 Eevation 295' or Turbine 1

driven EF-P1 Condensate storage CO-TIA,3 1

Outdoors, Elevccion 305' tanks Emergency feedwater EF-V30A,3 1

Inter:ediatt building, control valves nevation 295' Main Steam System Controlled at=ospheric MS-V4A,3 1

Inter =ediate building relief valves levation 295' Main steam safety MS-V17A,3,C,D All Intermediate building, valves MS-718A,3,C,D All Cavation 322' MS-V19A,3,C,D All MS-V20A,3,C,D All MS-V21A,3 All Reactor Building Enertenev Cooling System Reactor building RR-CIA,3,C 2

Reaccor building, emergency cooling nevation 281' units Reactor building RR-PIA,3 1

Intake screen and e=ergency cooling pump house, Elevation 308' pumps Reactor building RR-V4A,3,C,D 2

Istarmedlata building, cooling unit river Elevation 295' water outlet isolation valves 1413 047

TA3LE 3-1 (Page 4 of 6) b.

Instrunentation and Control Ecuf rment Descriotion Id entifiestion No. Recuired Location cut of core detectors NI-5, NI-6 2 of 4 Reactor building inside NI-7, NI-8 prinary shield Reactor coolant pressure RC3A-PT1, Reactor building RC33-PT2 2 of 4 around secondary shield, RC33-PT1, Elevation 346' RC3A-PT2 RC3A-PT3, RC3A-PT4 2 of 3 RC3B-PT3 Reactor coolant RC4A-TE2, Reactor building inside temperature RC4B-TE2 2 of 4 secondary shield RC4A-TE3, (pri=ary system piping)

RC43-TE3 Reactor coolant flow RCl4A-APT 1, Reaccor building outside RCl4A-aPTO 2 of 4 secondary shield, RC14A-APT 3, Elevation 308' RC14A* APT 4 RC143-APT 1, RCl4B-APT 2, 2 of 4 RC143-APT 3, RCl4B-APT 4 Reactor building pressure BS-282-PT, Auxiliary building, 3S-285-PT, 2 of 3 Elevation 281' BS-288-PT 35-283-PS, Auxiliary building, BS-28 6-PS,

2 of 3 Elevation 281' BS-289-PS BS-284-PS, Auxiliary building, BS-287-PS, 2 of 3 Elevation 231' BS-290-PS Engineered safeguards ES 31 stable 2 of 3 Control building, actuation racks Cabinets 1,2,3 Elevation 338'-6" 1413 048

TA3LE J-1 (Page 5 of 6)

Descriction Identification No. Recuired Location ES Actuation Control building, Relay Cabinets 1 out of Elevation 338 '-6" 1A,2A,3A 2 sets of ES Actuation cabinets Control building, Relay Cabinets Elevation 338'-6" 13,23,3B ES Actuation 1 of 2 Cabinets 4,5 Reactor protection Sub-assenbly 2 of 4 Control building racks A,B,C,D control roon, Elevation 355' Stean generator steam SP6A-PT1, 0.te of Reactor building, pressure SP6A-PT2 either El. 231' SP6B-PT1, A or 3 SP63-PT2 PS-600, PS-601 1 of 2 PS-602, twice PS-603 PS-604, PS-505 1 of 2 PS-606, twice PS-607 St:a generator feedwater SPI-A-LT1, 1 of 2 Reactor building, level SP1-3-LT1 El. 281' Control rod position 1 of 2 Reactor building, indication switches inside pr1=ary shield Control red drive N/A Control building, control, relative rod El. 338 '-6" position indication relay room Auxiliary relay ICC, TCL, 1 of 3 Control building, cabinet ICR El. 338'-6" relay room Main control roon Section CC, Control building console CL, CR control roes, El. 355' 1413 049

TABLE 3-1 (? age 6 of 6) c.

Electrical Ecuienent Descristion Identification No. Recuired Location Ene:gency diesel DG1, DG2 1 of 2 Diesel generator building, DG-1 and DG-2 4160 V switchgear ID, 1E 1 of 2 Control building, Elevation 338'-6" 480 7 switchgene I?, 15 1 of 2 Control building, Elevation 322' Engineered safeguards 1A, 13 1 of 2 Control building, notor control center Elevation 322' 3atteries A and C, 1 of 2 Control building, 3 and D sets Elevation 322' Inverters 1A and IC, 1 of 2 Control building, 13 and ID sets Elevation 322' Distribution panels A,3 1 of 2 Control building, Elevation 322' AC ar.d DC transfer Control building, switch Elevation 322' Screen house 480 7 A,3 1 of 2 Intake screen and switchgear pmp house Screen house notor A,3 1 of 2 Intake screen and control center pu:sp house 1413 050

4.0 FIRE EAZARDS ANAI,YSIS 4.1 REACTCR BUII. DING The reactor building houses the nuclear steam sapply system. This equipuent is shown on drawings E-023-002, E-023-003, E-023-005, E-025-007, E-023-009, and E-023-010.

The building is bounded on the north by the inter =ediate building, on the east by the turbine building, on the south by the fuel handling building and on the southwest by the auxiliary building.

The walls, dome, and floors of the reactor building are of reinforced concrete construction. The inside surface of the reactor building is lined with a carbon steel liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operation and accident conditions. Access to the area is through personnel and equipment access hatches. The building has three floor elevations with open stairways and other openings between the stairs. The sceas generators, reactor coolant pumps, and pressuricer are located within a concrete secondary shielding, open at the top, and accessible at the lowc elevation through a shielded labyrinth. The biological shield around the reactor vessel, and the refueling pool above it, divide the secondary shield into two parts. Each part contains one steam generator and two reactor coolant punps.

The reactor building comprises a single fire area which, for the purpose of analysis, has been divided into seven fire tones as described in the following sections.

1413 051 4.1-1

4.1.1 Reactor Buildine Outside S condarv Shield North at RL-la (Elevation 281')

4.1.1.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment located in this tone consists of reactor building emergency cooling units A, 3 and C (see drawing

_, E-023-002, coordinate E-15).

4.1.1.2 Analysis The ecmbustibles in this zone consist of cable insulation and transient =aterial. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 2

4,925 Stu/ft in a 6,550 ft area. Fire protection for this tone consists of water fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-002, and accessible Ealon fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-003.

4.1.1.3 Conclusion Due co the Ifmited a=ount of ecmbustible sacerial in this zone and the separation between the enclosed, redundant reactor building emergency cooling units, the existing fire protection for this :ene is considered adequate. However, because of limited access to the reactor building, a fire detection system will be added in this :ene for early warning in the event of a fire.

4.1.2 Reactor Building outside Secondarv Shield, Southeast at R3-lb (Elevatien 281')

4.1.2.1 Description The safe shutdown equipcent located in this scue consists of instru=entation for the seasurement of steam generator A feedwater and pressuri er levels (E-023-002, 3-12).

4.1-2

4.1.2.2 Analysis

• he combustibles in this :ene are negligible. Three pressuri:er level transmitters are'locued in this zone with wiring in setallic conduit cc the reactor building termin.. :- boxes.

There is no per=anent combustible =acerial close to the transmitters and their viring.

Fire protection for this :ene consists of a water fire extinguisher as shown on drawing E-023-002, and accessible Halon fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-003.

4.1.2.3 Conclusion Due to the negligible arouse of combustible =aterial in this =ene, the spatial separation between sesam generator A and 3 level instrumentation, and the absence of combustible =sterial in the vic1=1ty of the pressurizer level transmitters and associated wiring, the fire protection for this zone is considerad adequate.

However, because of the limited access to the reactor building, a fire detection system vill be added in this zone for early warning in the event of a fire.

4.1.3 Reactor Building Outside Secondarv Shield. Southwest at RS-lc (Elevation 281')

4.1.3.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment located in this :ene consists of instrumentation for seasurement of steam generator 3 feedwater level, decay heat re= oval valve (DE-72), and safety related cable.

(E-023-002, E-11).

1433 053 aut10ameneenta 4.1-3

4.1.3.2 Analysis The combustibles in this :ene consist of cable insulation and transient =aterial. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 2

9,300 Stu/ft in a 1,700 fe' area. Fire protection for this tone consists of water fire extinguishers as snown on drawing E-023-002, and accessible Halen fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-003.

4.1.3.3 Conclusion The results of the analysi indicate that thermal protection will be required for the decay heat renoval valve. Due to the li=ited anount of combustible nacerial in this :one, the spacial separation between steam generators A and 3 level instru=entation and the thermal protection to be provided for the decay haat valve, the fire protection for this =ene is considered adequate. However, because of the ifmited access to the reactor building, a fire detectica system will be added in this tone for early warning in the event of a fire.

4.1.4 Reactor Building Outside Secendarv Shield at R3-2 (Elevation 308')

4.1.4.1 Description The safe shutdown equip =ent located in the :ene consists of instrumentation for sessurement of steam generators A and 3 steam pressure (E-023-003 and E-023-005, E-14).

4.1.4.2 Analysis The co=bustibles in this :ene consist of charcoal in the kidney filter plenu=, cable insulation and transient =atsrial. As a 1413 054 C.2ert tCamman=emm

4. l'-4

~e s

result, :here is a :otal fire loading of 17,500 Stu/f t-in a 9,850 f:2 area.

Fire protec:1on for :his :ene consists of :so water fire ex:inguishers and a self-contained autenatic deluge water systes for the charcoal in the kidney fil:er plenus. The detection and deluge actuator system for the kidney filter plenus is connec:ed to the emergency power.

E=ergency power is not provided for the

vo 90 gym pumps.

4.1.4.3 Con;1usion l

Due to the li=1:ed combustible sacerial in this zone, the spacial separation between redundant instrumentation, and the automatic deluge water system provided for the charcoal in the kidney filter planus, the existing fire protection for this :ene is considered adequate. Eowever, because of :he limited access to the reactor building, a fire detection systes will be added in this :ene for early warning in the event of a fire.

4.1.5 Reactor Building Outside Secondar-r Shield at RS-3 (Elevation 346')

4.1.5.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment located in this :ene consists of instrumentation for naasurement of reactor coolant pressure.

(E-023-003, D-11; E-023-005, D-12; E-023-007, E-13; E-023-009, E-6).

4.1.5.2 Analysis The combus-dbles in this ene consist of cable insulation and transient =aterial. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 3,250 Stu/f:2 12 a 9,850 f:2 area.

The fire protec: ion for this

}h\\b c;

=

4.1-3

a

ene consists of water and dry chemical fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-007, and accessible Ealon fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-003.

4.1.5.3 Conclusions Due to the limited a=ount of co=bustible sacerial in this :one and the spatial separation between redundant safe shutdown instrumentatf an, the existing fire protection for this :ene is considered adequate. However, because of the limited access to the reactor building, a fire detection system will be added in this

ene for early warning in the event of a fire.

4.1.6 Reactor Building Inside Secondarr Shield. East at R3-Id (Elevation - All) 4.1.5.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment located in this zone consists of steas generator A, the pressuri:er and associated relief valves, and instr==entation for measurement of pressurizer and reactor coolant camperature. (E-023-002, D-12; E-023-003, C-12; E-023-005, C-12; E-023-007. D-12; E-023-009, C-6).

4.1.6.2 Analysis The combustibles in this zone consist of oil in the reactor coolant pump socor lubrication system and cable insulation. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 240,000 Stu/ft2 is a 1,700 ft2 area.

Of this amount, the oil contained in each reactor coolant pump 2 to the fire

otor contributes approxisately 100,C00 Stu/f t loading. Each =otor is equipped with an oil splash guard d signed to collect the lubricating oil in case of a spill or frrn breakage of the oil pipe or the oil reservoir.

amne

=

'. 1-c*

The splash guard essentially enc 1:ses the upper bearing housing and is surrounded by a collection gu::er.

Three 2 inch lines are conbined to drain, :hrough a ce==on 2-1/2 inch drain line, any accenulated oil to a collector.

The lower bearing is equipped with a collection pan, also connected to the 2-1/2 inch drain line. The auxiliaries required for reactor coolant pump =otor lubrication are located in the upper bearing housing. The upper bearing oil reservoir has a capacity of 120 gallons and the lower bearing oil reservoir has a crpacity of 18 gallons. The fire protection for this zone consists of accessible water fire ex:inguishers and accessible Halon fire extinguishers.

4.1.6.3 Conclusion Considering tha: :he existing splash guard, which collects spilled oil, appreciably reduces the probabili:y that lubricating oil will be in contact with hot pipes, the potential for a reactor coolan pump oil fire is very low.

In the event of a fire, sufficient spacial separation exists between redundant safe shutdown instrumentation and between the redundant steam generntors to ensure safe shutdown.

Therefore, the existinf fire protection for thi.s :ene is considered adequate. However, because of the 14 1:ed access :o the reactor building, a fire detection system will be added in :his zone for early warning in the event of a fire. Also, a curb will be added to ensure that any oil spilled in this :ene does not spread.

4.1.7 Reactor Building Inside Secondarv Shield, %~est at RS-le JElevation - All) a.l.7.1 Description The safa shutdown equip =en: located in this :ene consists of :he scarn genera:or 3, decay heat re=cval valve (OE-71), and aartic 1413 05/

c.1-7

4 instru=entation for sensurement of reac:or coolan: ta=perature.

(E-023-002, F-12; E-023-003, F-12; E-023-005, F-12; E-023-007, F-12; E-023-009, F-6).

4.1.7.2 Analysis The combustibles in this :ene consist of cable insulation and oil

" rom the reactor coolant pu=p =otor lubrication system. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 201,000 Etu/f=2 in a 1,700 ft area. Of the total fire loading, the oil contained in each 9

reactor coolant pu=p =ocor contributes approximately 100,000 3tu/ft'.

Each motor is equipped with an oil splash guard designed to collect the lubricating oil in case of a spill, breakage of the oil pipe, or breakage of the oil reservoir.

The splash guard essentially encloses the upper bearing housing and is surrounded by a collection gutter. Three 2* inch lines are combined, through a co==en 2-1/2 inch drain line, to drain any accu =ulated oil to a collector. The lower bearing is equipped with a collection pan, which is also connected to the 2-1/2 inch drain line. The auxiliaries required for reac:or coolan: pu=p :otor lubrication are located in he upper bearing housing. The upper bearing oil reservoir has a capacity of 120 gallons and the lower bearing reservoir has a capacity of 18 gallons. The fire protection for this zone consists of a vater fire extinguisher and an accessible Halca fire extinguisher.

1413 058 3;beticawesenta 4.1-3

s 4.1,7.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that thernal protection will be required for the decay heat renoval valve. Considering that the existing splash guard, which collects spilled oil, appreciably reduces the probability that lubricating oil will be in contact with hot pipes, the potential for a reactor coolant pu=p oil fire is very low. In the event of a fire, sufficient spatial separation exists between redundant safe shutdown inset.: mentation and between the redundant steam generators to ensure safe shutdown. Therefore, the existing fire protection for this tone is considered adequate.

However, because of the id feed access to the reactor building, a fire detection system will be added in this :ene for early warning in the event of a fire. Also, a curb will be added to ensure that any oil spilled in this :ene does not spread.

4.1-9

9 L

4.2 AUIILI.GY BUILDING The auxiliary building houses auxiliary equipment for the nuclear reactor. This equipnent includes warte handling and safe shutdown equipnent as shown on drawings E-023-002, E-023-003, E-023-005, E-023-011, E-023-012, and E-023-013.

The building is bounded on the northeast by the reactor building and on the east by the fuel handling building. Remaining portions of the north, west and south walls are exposed to grade. The walls of the auxiliary building have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> nini=u= fire resistance rating, except for the wall dividing the auxiliary building and the fuel handling building. This wall has unpro:ec:ed openings such as doorways, cable penetrations, and duct penetrations. Wall, floor, and roof construction consists of reinforced concrete. Within the auxiliary building, stairways are open between floors. A metal enclosed building with yactory Mutual (Di) Class 1 roof is provided on top of the auxiliary building to house non-safety related equip =ent.

The auxiliary building consists of three fire areas: decay heat renoval pits A, 3, and the rm* der of the building which is divided into eight fire zones.

4.2.1 Decav Heat Renoval Pit A (Elevation 261')

4.2.1.1 Descrip tion Safe shutdown equipment located in decay heat re= oval pi: A consists of decay heat re= oval ptcp A, decay heat re= oval coole: A, and associated valves. The pit area has reinforced concre:e walls 14 0 060 4.2-1

and floor and is covered with a reinforced concrete slab provided with sealed concrete equipment access hatch covers. The ceiling is penetrated by air handling supply and return ducts, cabla trays, piping, and steel personnel access hatches.

(E-023-005, J-16).

4.2.1.2 Analysis The combustibles in this area consist of pu=p lube oil and cable insulation. As a result, there is a total fire leading of 3,600 Beu/ft contained within a 900 ft area. The fire protection for this area consists of dry che=1 cal fire extinguishers and accessible fire hose as shown on drawing E-023-002.

4.2.1.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate, that to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of the fire area =ust have a fire resistance rating of 1/2 hour. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of the EVAC ducts, cable penetrations, and piping penetrations. To obtain the required 1/2 hour fire resistance rating, fire da=pers will be installed in the HVAC ducts and all penetrations will be adequately sealed. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area vill be considered adequate.

4.2.2 Decav Reat Removal pit 3 (Elevation 261')

4.2.2.1 Description Safe shutdewn equip =ent located in decay heat re= oval pit 3 consists of decay heat re= oval pu=p 3, decay heat cooler 3, and associated valves.

S.e pit area has reinforced concrete valls and 1413 06\\

h/Cmumwoom 4.2-2

flocr and is covered with a reinforced concrete slab provided with sealed concrete aquipnent access hatch covers. The ceiling is penetrated by air handling supply and return ducts, cable trays, piping, and steel personnel access hatches.

(E-023-005, J-15).

4.2.2.2 Analysis The combustibles in this area consist of pump lube oil and cable insulation. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 3,350 Stu/ft contained within a 1,000 ft area. The fire protection for this area consists of dry chemical fire extinguishers and accessible fire hose as shown on drawing E-023-002.

4.2.2.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that to contain a fire of the above leading the boundaries of the fire area =ust have a fire resistance racing of 1/2 hour. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of the EVAC ducts, cable penetrations, and piping penetrations. To obtain the required 1/2 hour fire resistance rating, fire dampers will be installed in the E7AC ducts and all penetrations vill be adequately sealed. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area vill be considered adequate.

4.2.3 Remainder of Auxiliarv Eu11 ding (Elevations 271'. 281' and 305')

Yor the purposes of fire analysis, this area has been divided into nine fire zones, each of which is described in detail below.

)k\\b

m. -

4.2-3

4.2.3.1 Hea: Exchanger Vault (Elevation 271')

4.2.3.1.1 Descript1:n The safe shu:down equip =ent located vi:hin this :ene consists of nuclear service heat exchangers A, 3, C, and D, decay heat renoval service coolers A and 3, and associated valves.

(E-023-002, 3-6).

4.2.3.1.2 Analysis The combustibles in this :ene consist of cable insulation and cransient nacerial. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 2,700 Stu/f:2 contained within a 7,000 f:' area. Marinite boards are provided between redundant cable trays as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. Fire protection in the zone consists of a dry che=ical fire extinguisher as shown on drawing E-023-002.

4.2.3.1.3 Conclusions Due to the lisi:ed a=ount of ce=bustible sacerial in the zone and the separation between redundant equip =ent and cable trays, fire protec:icn for this zone is considered adequate. Ecwever, the safe shutdown equipment in this area is not within reach of the nearest fire hose. Therefore, to meet the require =ents of Appendix A, a fire hose will be installed for backup protection.

4.2.3.2 Xakeup and Pu'ification ?u=ps A, 3, and C Cubicles (Elevation 231')

r 4.2.3.2.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment contained w1:hin each cubicle consists of a nr.keup pu=p and associated euxiliaries.

(E-023-002, G-9).

kk\\ )

"4bstitzuwweeta 4.2-4

4.2.3.2.2 Analysis Each cubicle consists of concrete valls, floor, and calling with a hollow, =etal, louvered door providing access to a ec==en corridor, ne combustibles in each cubicle consist of pu=p lube oil and cable. As a result, there is a m' um fire loading of 2

58,500 3tu/f: contained within cubicle A, 15,200 Stu/fc in 2

cubicle 3, and 14,000 3tu/ft in cubicle C.

Each cubicle has an 2

area of 220 ft A cou:=on on-safety relaced HVAC duct penetrates each cubicle at 16 feet above the floor. Floor drains are provided for each cubicle. De fire protection for the cubicles consists of a dry chenical fire extinguisher and accessible fire hose as shown on drawing E-023-002.

4.2.3.2.3 Conclusion ne results of the analysis indicate -dat to contain a fire of the above loading in cubicle A, the barrier between cubicia A and cubicle 3 sust have a fire resistance rating of I hour. To obtain this racing, a fire da=per will be installed in the HVAC duct penetration and the cable penetraciens will be adequately sealed.

Due to the limited amount of combustible nacerial in cubicles 3 and C, and the concrete wall between them, fire cannot spread from one cubicle to another. n erefore, a fire inside or adjacent to one cubicle will not spread or cause da= age to the other cubicles.

Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this cone will be considered adequate.

3413 006 4.2-5

T 4

4.2.3.3 Valve Gallery (Elevations 231' and 295')

4.2.3.3.1 Description There is no saf e shutdown equip =ent located within this :ene other than the safety related cables which are above elevation 295'.

(E-023-002, F-9).

4. 2.3.3.2 Analysis The only conbustible in this :ene is cable insulation. As a result, o

there is a total fire loading of 3,600 Beu/f t contained within a 300 ft2 area. Marinite barriers or spatial separation between the redundant cable trays are provided as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR.

Fire protection for this :ene consists of dry chenical fire extinguishers and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-002.

4.2.3.3.3 Conclusions Due to the limited arouse of combustible =aterial in the ene and the separation between redundant trays, the fire protection for this

one is considered adequate.

4.2.3.4 Penetration Area at Elevation 281' 4.2.3.4.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment located within this :one consists of decay heat renoval valves (DH-74A, B and DE-V12A, 3), ::.akeup and purification valves (E-714A, 3 and E-16A, 3, C, D), safety related cable and instr.:=entation. (I-023-002, F-ll).

4.2.3.4.2 Analysis The ce=bustibles in this :ene consist of cable insulation and transient nacerial. As a result, there is a total fire loading of

)p3 Ob5 a ~e -

4.2-6

41,300 Stu/f t-contained within a 750 f t2 area. Marinite barriers or spatial separation between the redundant cable trays ara provided as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR.

Fire protection for this :one consists of dry chemical fire extinguishers and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-002.

4.2.3.4.3 Conclusions Due to the a=ount of combu.scible =aterial in this :ene, an aut:natic c.eluge water systes initiated by ioni:stion detectors will be provided. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this :one will be considered adequate.

4.2.3.5 Re=ainder of Elevation 281' 4.2.3.5.1 Descrip tion The only safe shutdown equipment located in this :ene is safety related cable. Liquid and gaseous radioactive nacerial is contained within this :ene. The bulk of this =aterial in contained in 6

evaporators and steel tanks. (E-023-002, E-6).

4.2.3.5.2 Analysis The combustibles in this :ene consist of pump lube oil, cable insulation and transient sacerial. As a result, there is a total 2

fire loading of 20,500 Stu/ft contained within a 14,000 f t2 area.

Marinite boards are provided between redundant cable trays as stated in Chapter 3 of the FSAR.

Fire protection for this :ene consists of dry chesical fire extinguishers and accessible fire hoses as shot.n on drawing E-023-002.

1413 066 G2wtitzmweesta 4.2-7

4.2.3.5.3 Conclusion Due to the linited anount of conbustible caterial in the :ene, the sas.' ration provided 1 ween the redundant cable trays, and the absence of safe shutdcwn equipment, the existing fire protection for this :ene is considered adequata.

4.2.3.6 Demineralicars and Motor Control Centers (Elevation 305')

4.2.3.6.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment contained within this tone consists of the sakeup and purification systen valves and the engineered safeguards otor control centers lA and 13.

The bulk of the radioactive material in the =ene is contained in the desinerali:ers.

(E-023-003, G-9).

4.2.3.6.2 Analysis The combustibles in this :one consist of cable insulation and transient nacerial. As a result there is a total fire loading of 22,000 Stu/ft contained wi-Jtin a 4,500 f e area. Spatial separation is provided between. redundant cable trays as stated in Chapter 8 of the 75AR. The engineered safeguards =otor control centers lA and 13 are separated by a *

• m" distance of 5 feet.

The fire protection for this :ene consists of dry chenical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-003.

)h\\

~, 4srt /".

2 1.2-8

4.2.3.6.3 Conclusion Due to the li::1ced anount of combustible naterial in the :ene and the separation between redundant equipment and cable creys, fire protection for this :one is considered adequate.

4.2.3.7 Decay Heat Removal and Nuclear Service Closed Cycle Cooling Pu=p Area (Elevation 305')

4.2.3.7.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment contained within this :ene consists of the decay heat closed cycle cooling pu=ps A and 3, the nuclear service closed cycle cooling pu=os A, 3, and C and the decay hea:

and nuclear ser:1ce cooling pu=ps air handling units A and 3.

(E-023-003, H-11).

4.2.3.7.2 Analysis The conbustibles in this zone consist of pump lube oil, cable insulation and transient c:aterials. As a result, there is a total 2

fire loading of 9,000 Stu/ft contained within a 1,200 ft area.

Each pu=p is located in a reinforced concrete cubicle with front vall and ceiling openings to a cescon area. The safety related cables within this zone are located above the cubicles. Marinite barriers or spatial separation are provida.' between the redundant crays as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. Fire protectior. for this zone consists of dry chemical and carben dioxide fire extinguishers and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-003.

gi3 068

- _=

4.2-9

4.2.3,7.3 Conclusion Due to the limited a=ouw of combustible =atarial in this =ene and the separation between redundanc equipment and cable trays, fira protection for this :ene is considered adequate.

4.3.2.8 Gas Decay Tanks (Elevation 305')

4.2.3.8.1 Description There is no safe shutdown equipment located within this =ene.

Radioactive =aterial in this zone is contained within steel tanks (E-023-003, J-8).

4.2.3.8.2 Analysis There are no combustible =aterials in this :ene. Fire protection for this zone consists of dry chemical and carbon dixoide extinguishers and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-003.

4.2.3.8.3 Conclusion Due to the absence of combustible =aterial and safe shutdown equipment, fire protection for this :one is considered adequate.

4.2.3.9 Remainder of Elevation 305' 4.2.3.9.1 Description There is no safe shutdown equipment located vi-J11n this zone.

Radioactive sacerial in the :ene is contained within steel tanks and charcoal filter housings.

(E-023-003, H-8).

1413 069 4.2-10

4.2.3.9.2 Analysis The combustibles in this :ene consist cf char: cal, cable insulation, a plastic tank, pol @y1 chloride (pVC) pipe and transient

=aterials. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 23,700 2

Bcu/ft contained within a 9,000 fe' area. The bulk of the combustible =aterial consists of charcoal which is protected by auto =atic deluge water syste=s. Fire protection for the remaining portion of this zone consists of dry c u ical and carbon dioxide n

' ire extinguishers, and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-003.

4.2.3.9.3 Conclusion 3ecause of the existing deluge systems for the charcoal filters, the limited a=ount of combustible material in the remaining portion of the zone, and the absence of safe shutdown equipment, fire protection for this zone is considered adequate.

)h\\

4.2-11

4.3 INTERMEDIATE 3UIlDING The inter =ediate building houses auxiliary turbine cycle equipnent.

• he safe shutdown equipment within the 'au11 ding is shown on drawings E-023-004, E-023-006, E-020-008, and E-023-015.

The building is bounded on the northwest by the diesel generator building, the northeast by the service building, the east by the turbine building, the south by the reactor building, with the west side exposed.o grade. The volls, floor, and roof are constructed of reinforced concrete. Access to the inter =ediate building is through an unlabeled, 1-1/2 hour fire resistance rated door. The stairways inside the inter =ediate building are open between floors.

The inter =ediate building is considered to be ene fire area divided into seven fire enes.

4.3.1 valve Callerv and Penetration Room (Elevation 295')

4.3.1.1 Description Safe shutdown equipment located in this :one consists of reactor building emergency cooling valves (RR-74A, 43, 4C, 4D) and safety related cable.

(E-023-004, F-3).

4.3.1.2 Analysis The only conbustible in this zone is cable insulation. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 8,500 Stu/ft2 contained within a 400 f 2 area Marinite barriers or spatial separation are provided between the redundant cable trays as stated in Chapter S of the FSAR. Fire protection for this :ene consists of water and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-004.

1413 071 htt3rimommemQ 4.3-l

4.3.1.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that additional fire barriers are required to prevent loss of function of the reactor building emergency :coling valves in the event of a fire. Due to the lirited a=ount of ceabustible sacerial in the =one, the separation between redundant cable trays, and the proposed addition of fire barriers discussed above, fire protection for this =ene will be considered adequate. Ecwever, because of the limited access to the inter =ediate building, a fire detection system will be added in this =ene for early warning in the event of fire.

4.3.2 Turbine Driven E=ertenev Feedwater Pu=o Roce (Elevation 295')

4.3.2.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment located within this :ene consists of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pu=p and steam supply valves.

(E-023-004, E-8).

4.3.2.2 Analysis This :ene is separated f cm redundant equipment in the area by concrete walls and ceiling, which are penetrated by cable, pipe, an unlabeled metal access door, and a Class A rated access door.

Combustibles in this :ene are pump and turbine lube oil, transient sacerial, and cable insulation. As a result, there is a cotal fire 2

9 loading of 14,400 3tu/ft contained within a 500 ft area.

~

Marinite barriers or spatial separation are provided between the redundant cable trays as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. Floor drains are provided in the roem. Fire protection for this :ene consists of water and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers, and accessible fire hoses as shown on dranius E-023-004 1413 072 m=

4.3-2

4.3.2.3 Conclusion Due to the limited amount of combustible material in this ene, the spatial separation and partial barriers between redundant and other safe shutdewn equipment in the area, and the separation between redundant cable trays, the existing fire protection for this zone is considered adequate. However, because of limited access to the inter =ediate building, a fire detection system will be added in this ene for early waraing in the event of a fire.

4.3.3 Motor Driven "emer:encv Feedwater Pu=o Area (Elevation 295')

4.3.3.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment contained within this :ene consists of emergency feedwater valves (EF-730A, 303) and motor driven emergency feedwater pu=ps A and 3, and emergency feedwater pu_p area air handling units A and 3.

(E-023-004, C-8).

4.3.3.2 Analysis The combustibles in this zone consist of pt=p and air compressor lube cil, transient sacerials and cable insulation. As a result, o

there is a total fire leading of 7,100 3tu/f t' contained within a

• 300 fe area. Floor drains are provided throughout this zone.

Marinite barriers or spatial se.paration are provided between redundant cable trays as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. Spatial separation nists between redundant equipment. Fire protection for this :ece consists of water and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing F-023-004 1413 073 4.3-3

4.3.3.3 Conclusion Due to the linited a=ount of combustible =aterial in this :ene, the spatial separation and partial barriers between redundant and other safe shutdown equipment in the area, and the separation between redundant cable trays, the existing fire protection for this :ene is considered adequate. Eowever, because of linited access to the inter =ediate building, a fire detection system will be added in this zone for early warning in case of a fire.

4.3.4 Rasainder of Elevation 295' 4.3.4.1 Descrip tion No safe shutdown equipnent is located in this zone other than safety related cable.

(E-023-004, D-8).

4.3.4.2 Analysis The only conbustible in this zone is comprised of transient

=aterials. As a result, thera is a total fire loading of 1,900 3tu/ft2 contained within a 1,700 ft2 area. Adjacent zones in the area are separated by walls and ceiling which are penetrated by cable, pipe, and access openings. Fire protection for the :ene consists of water and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-004.

4.3.4.3 Conclusion Due to the linited a=ount of combusrible nacerial and absence of safe shutdown equip =ent, the existing fire protection for this :ene is considered adequate.

However, because of linited access to the internediate building, a fire detection syste= will be added in this

one for early war-ing in case of a fire.

\\h\\

=

4.3-4

4.3.5 Internediate Building at Elevation 305' 4.3.5.1 Description No safe shutdown equip =ent or safety related cable is located in this =ene.

(E-023-004, E-9).

4.3.5.2

.halysis The only co=bustible in this :ene is comprised of transient sacerials. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 1,900 Stu/ft2 con'tained in a 1,700 ft2 area. Fire protection for this zone consists of water and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-004.

4.3.5.3 Conclusion Due to the limited amount of combustible material and absence of safe shutdown equip =ent, the existing fire procaction for this zone is considered adequate. However, a Class A door vill be installed between the turbine and intermediate building to =aintain the recaired 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier between buildings.

4.3.6 Inter:ediate Building at Elevation 322' a.3.6.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment located in this :ene consists of the = sin steam safety valves (MS-V17A, 3, C, D; ISA, 3, C, D; 19A, 3, C, D; 20A, 3, C, D; 21A, 3).

(E-023-006, E-8).

4.3.6.2 Analysis Cosbustibles in this =ene consist of cable insulation and transient

=a terials. As a result, there is a total fire leading of 6,200 3tu/ft2 contained within a 6,600 ft2 area. Fire protection for this 1413 075 1.3-5

T 4

zone consists of accessible fire hoses as shown on drawings E-023-004, E-023-006 and E-023-008, and accessible water and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-004 4.3.6.3 Conclusion Due to the limitad acount of combustible =aterial and the spacial separation between redundant safe shutdown equip =ent, the existing fire protection is considered adequate for this :ene.

4.3.7 Inter =ediate Building at Elevation 355' 4.3.7.1 Descrip tion No safe shutdown equipment or safety related cable is located in this ene.

(E-023-008, E-8).

4.3.7.2 Analysis ne only combustible in this zone is ce= prised of transient

=aterials. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 800 Stu/f t2 contained within a 4,000 ft2 area. Fire protection for, this :ene consists of accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-008, 4.3.7.3 Conclusion Due to the limitad amount of combustible =aterial and absence of safe shutdown equipment, the existing fire protection for this zone is considered adequate.

1413 076 c,-:e 4.3-6

4 4.4 CONTROL SUI 1 DING The control building houses the control roon, electrical equipnent, of fices, repair shops, and laboratories. The safe shutdown equipnent is on drawings E-023-016 and E-023-017.

The building is bounded on the north and east by the turbine building, on the west by the fuel handling building, while the south side is exposed to grade. The wan s of the control building have a n "4 un 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating.

'a'all, floor, and the d

roof are constructed of reinforced concrete.

The building has five levels connected by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rated stairwen. This stairwen serves cou:=en elevations of the fuel handling building and control building. As win be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3, the results of the analysis of the fuel handling building identify the need for instaning fire hoses in this stairwell area tu provide protection at elevations 322', 338', 355' and 380'.

The control building is analyzed as 16 fire areas which are described below.

4.4.1 Control Building Area C3-1 (Elevation 306')

4.4.1.1 Description The only safe shutdown equipnent located in this area is safety related cables.

(E-023-017, C-13).

1413 077

=

4.4-1

4.4.1.2 Analysis The combustibles in the area consist of stored and transient nacerials and cable insulation. As a result, there is a total fire o

loading of 53,000 3tu/ft' contained within a 6,000 ft area. Marinite boards are provided between redundant cable trays as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. This area is separated frem the fuel handling building by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rated wall, with the exception of the access door, cable and piping penetrations. Fire protection for this area consists of an automatic sprinkler system and dry chemical and water fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-017.

4.4.1.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that to sepattte the control building frrs the fuel handling building, the access door =ust be replaced with a Class A door. The cable and piping penetraciens will be adequately sealed. Due to the absence of safe shutdown equipment, separation between redundant cable trays, and the presence of the aute=atic sprinkler system, fire protection for this area vill be considered adequate, when upgraded as discussed above.

4.4.2 Control Buildine Area C3-2a (Elevation 322')

4.4.2.1 Descrip tion The safe shutdown equipment in this area consists of engineered safeguards 480 volt switchgear l? and notor control center lA.

(E-023-016, F-8).

1413 078 G2 art /t;.wnammenta 4.4-2

4.4.2.2 Analysis The only combustible in this area is cable insulation. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 75,000 Stu/f t' contained within an 800 ft area. Marinite boards are provided between redundant cable trays as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. The area is bounded by 3-hour fire resistance rated walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are-penetrated by cable, piping and E7AC ducts. Access to this area is through Class A rated or unlabeled natal doors. The fire protection for this area consists of EVAC duct r=oke detectors, which actuate alar =s in the control room, and dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-Old.

A fire hose will also be available in che adjacent stairwell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

4.4.2.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area must have a fire resistance rating of one hour. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of tha unlabeled metal doors, EVAC ducts, cable and piping penetrations.

The existins; unlabeled natal doors have an c.ccepted 1-1/2 hour fire resistance rating. Cable and piping penetrations will be adequately sealed and fire da=pers will be installed in the EVAC duct penetraticus to comply with the required one hour fire resistance rating for the area. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area will be considered adequate.

1 4 1 3 Cf7 9 m-4.4-3

4.4.3 Control Building Area C3-2b (Elevation 322')

4.4.3.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment in this area consists of engineered safeguards 480 volt switchgear 15, noter control center 13, and switchgcar area booster fans A and 3.

(E-023-016, G-8).

4.4.3.2 Analysis The only cenbustible in this area is cable insulation. As a result, 2

there is a total fire loading of 45,000 Sta/ft contained within an 2

800 ft area. Marinite boards are provided between redundant cable trays as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. The area is bounded by 3 nour fire resistance raced walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are penetrace.d by cable and HVAC ducts. Access to the area is through Class A rated and unlabeled =etal doors. The fire protection for this area consists of HVAC duct s=oke detectors, wh.ich actuate alar =s in the control roon, and dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairwell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

4.4.3.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area =ust have a fire resistance rating of one hour. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exceptien of the unlabeled natal doors, dVAC ducts, cable and piping penetra-ions.

\\4 4.4-4

The existing unlabeled =ecal doors have an accepted 1-1/2 hour fire resistance rating. Cable and ciping penetrations will be adequately sealed and fire da=pers will be installed in the HVAC duct penetrations to comply with the required one hour fire resistance rating for this area. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area vill be consf dared adequate.

4.4.4 Control Building Area C3-2c (Elevation 322')

4.4.4.1 Description The safe shutdewn equipment in this area consists of the engineered safeguards AC transfer switch for valve =otor control center IC, and the DC transfer switch for panel IM.

(E-023-016, H-8).

4.4.4.2 Analysis Combustibles in this area consist of cable insulation, and transient and stored materials. As a' result, there is a total fire loading 2

of 52,000 Stu/ft contained within a 1,000 ft area. ~his area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance raced walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are penetrated by cable and HVAC ducts. Access to this area is through Class A rated or unlabeled =etal doors.

~he fire protection for this area consists of HVAC duct smoke detectors, which actuate alarms in the control room, and dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016.

A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairwell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

)h\\

4.4-5

F I

4.4.4.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that in order to contain a fire of the above leading, the boundaries of this fire area nust have a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire resistance rating.

The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of the unlabeled natal doors, EVAC ducts, cable and piping penetrations.

To obtain the I hour fire resistance rating, fire da=pers will be installed in the EVAC duct penetrations and cable and pipe penettations will be adequately sealed. The existing unlabeled doors have an accepted 1-1/2 hour fire resistance rating. Class A doors to the fuel handling building vill be provided to naintain the required 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier between buildings. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area will be considered adequate.

4.4.5 Control Building Area C3-2d (Elevation 322')

4.4.5.1 Description The safe shutdown equipnent in the area consists of battery chargers A, B, and E, inverters LA, 1C, and II, and AC and DC distribution panels.

(E-023-016, F-6).

4.4.5.2 Analysis The only co=bustible in this area is cable insulation. As a result, 3

there is a total fire loading of 74,000 3tu/f t" contained within a 600 f: area. This area is bounded by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rated walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are penetrated by cable and EVAC ducts. Access doors to this area are Class A rated. Fire

• [g }

h t" - m I

4.4-6

protection for this area consists of EVAC duct smoke detectors, which actuate alar =s in the control room, and dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016.

A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairwell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

4.4.5.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire ' area nust have a fire resistance rating of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance racing with the exception of the EVAC ducts, cable and piping penetrations. To obtain the required I hour fire resistance rating, fire danpers will be installed i= the EVAC duct penetrations and the cable and piping penetrations will be adequately sealed. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area vill be considered adequate.

4.4.6 Control Building Area C3-2e (Elevation 322')

4.4.6.1 Description The safe shutdown equip =ent in the area consists of bactary chargers C, D, and F, inverters 13 and 1D, and AC and DC distribution panels.

(E-023-016, H-6).

4.4.6.2 Analysis The only corhustible in this area is cable insulation. As a resul:,

2 there is a total fire loading of 62,000 3tu/ft contained within a 600 ft area. This area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resis:ance ratad valls, a floor and a ceiling, '.Mch are penetratad by cable and HVAC ducts. Access doors to this area are Class A rated. Fire protectica MIC_ -

gg 3 083

^'~

for this area consists of HVAC duct smoke detectors, which actuate alar =s in the control roos, and dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairwell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

4.4.6.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate thag to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area =ust have a fire resistance rating of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of the WAC ducts, and cable and piping penetrations. To obtain the required I hour fire resistance rating, fire dampers will be installed in the WAC duct penetrations and the cable and piping penetrations will be adequately sealed. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area vill be considered adequate.

4.4.7 Control 3uilding Area C3-2f (Elevation 322')

4.4.7.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment in the area consists of batteries A and C.

(E-023-016, G-5).

4.4.7.2 Analysis Combustibles in this area consist of cable insulation and battery cases. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 21,000 3tu/ft contained within a 600 f 2 area. This area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance raced walls, a ficer and a ceiling, which are penetrated by cable and WAC lucts. Access doors u p._

4.4-8

to this area are Class A raced. Fire protection for this area consists of EVAC duct s=oke detectors, which actuate alarus in the control roon, and dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairwell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.3.3.

4.4.7.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area =ust have a fire resistance rating of 30 minutes. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of the EVAC ducts, and cable and piping penetrations. To obtain the required 30 minute fire resistance rating, fire danpers will be installad in the EVAC duct penetrations and the cable and piping penetrations will be adequatels sealed. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area vill be considered adequate.

4.4.8 Control Building Area C3-2e (Elevation 322')

4.4.8.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment in the area censist of batteries 3 and D.

(I-023-016, H-5).

4.4.8.2 Analysis Combustibles in this area consist of cable insulation and battery cases. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 12,000 Stu/ft contained within a 600 ft area. This area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rated walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are penetrated by cable and EVAC ducts. Access decrs k.h \\

4.4-9

e to this area are Class A rated. The fire protec:ian for this area consists of HVAC duct s=oke detec: ors, *4hich actuate alar =s in :he control roon, and dr.i chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawi=g E-023-016. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairvell area as will be discussed in See:1cn 4.7.5.3.

4.4.8.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that i= order :o cen: sin a fire of the above leading, the boundaries of this fira area nust have a fire resistance rating of 30 ninutes. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance racing vich :he exception of the HVAC ducts, and cable and piping penetraticas. To obtain the required 30 ninute fire resistance racing, fire da=pers will be installed in the HVAC due: penetrations and the cable and piping penetrations will be adequately sealed. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this crea vill be censidered adequate.

4.4.9 Control Building Area C3-3a (Elevation 338'-6")

4.4.9.1 Description The safe shutdeva equipment in the area censists of engineered safeguards 4160 volt switchgear 1D.

(E-023-016, G-15).

4.4.9.2 Analysis The only ec=hus:1ble in this area is cable insulation. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 61,000 3tu/f:2 centained wi:his an 2

800 ft area. This area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance ra:ed walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are pececrated by cable and HVAC

\\f\\b c.auticuamamneo 4.4-10

ducts. Access to this area is through C1:ss A rated doors. The fire protection for this area consists of EVAC duct snoke detectors, which actuate alarus in the control roon, and dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown en drawing E-023-016.

A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairvell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

4.4.9.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that in order to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area nust have a fire rasistance rating of I hour. Tne walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of EVAC ducts, cable and piping penetrations. Cable and piping penetrations will be adequately sealed and fire da=pers will be installed in the E7AC duct penetrations to comply with the required one hour fire resistance rating for this area. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area will be considered adequate.

4.4.10 Control Building Area C3-3b (Elevacion 338'-6")

4.4.10.1 Description The safe shutdovu equipment in the area consists of engineered safeguards 4160 volt switchgear 12.

(E-023-016 E-15).

4.4.10.2 Analysis The only conbustible in this area is cable insulation.

As a result, o

there is a total fire loading of 39,000 3tu/f t' contained within an 300 ft area. This area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rated walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are penetrated by cable and EVAC ldI3 Oh7

.a s/t - _

4.4-11

ducts. Access to this area is through Class A raced and unlabeled netal doors. The fire protection for this area consists of HVAC duct s=oke detectors, which actuate alarns in the control room, and dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawing I-023-016. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairvell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

4.4.10.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that in order to centain a fire of the above leading, the boundaries of this fire area nust have a fire resistant rating of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resiscance rating with the exception of the unlabeled metal doors, HVAC ducts, cable and piping penetrations. The existing unlabeled =etal doors have an accepted 1-1/2 hour fire resistance rating. Cable and piping penetrations will be adequaceiv sealed and fire da=pers will be installed in the HVAC duct penetrations to comply with the required one hour fire resistance rating for this area. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area vill be considered adequate.

4.4.11 control Building Area C3-3c (Elevation 338'-6")

4.4.11.1 Description The safe stutdown equipment in the area consists of actuation cabinets A, 3, and engineered safeguards relay cabinets 1, 2, and 3.

(I-023-016, J-15).

I

)k)b 00 4.4-12

4.4.11.2 Analysis The only cembustible in this area is cable insula: ion. As a result, there is a :ocal fire loading of 30,000 Stu/f: contained within a 1,000 f:' area. This area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resis:ance rated walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are penetrated by cable and EVAC ducts. Access to this area is by Class A rated and u= labeled metal doors. Fire protection for this area consis:s of FUAC duct smoke detectors, which actuate alar =s in the control room and dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacan stairvell area as will be discussed in See:1on 4.7.5.3.

4.4.11.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate : hat :o contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area sust have a fire resistance rating of 30 minutes. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of the unlabeled metal doors, KVAC ducts, cable and piping pencerations. To obtain the 30 minute fire resistance racing, fire da=pers will be installed in the HVAC duct penetrations and cable and piping penetrations will be adequately sealed. The existing unlabeled doors have an accepted 1-1/2 hour fire resistance rating. To prevent loss of function to the redundant safe shutdown epipment located in :his area, cables will be enclosed in fire retardant sacerial or sprinkler protection will be provided for the cable trays. Class A doors to the fuel handling building will be provided :o naistain :he required 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier between buildings. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire procaction for :his area will be considered adecuate.

me 4.4-13 1413 089

4.4.12 Control Buildinst Area C3-3d (Elevation 338'-6")

4.4.12.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment in the area consists of relay cabinets ICC, ICL, and IC2.

(I-023-016, E-12).

4.4.12.2 Analysis Conbustibles in this area consist of cable insulation and transient nacerial. As a result, there is a total fire leadi=g of 2

2 191,000 Stu/ft contained within a 2,800 ft area. Marinite boards are provided between redundant cable trays as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. This area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rated walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are penetrated by cable and EVAC ducts. Access to this area is through Class A rated or unlabeled natal doors. Fire protection for this area consists of a low pressure carbon dioxide system actuated by heat detectors, dry chenical and Halen fire extinguishers and accessible carbon dioxide extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairwell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

4.4.12.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area nust have a fire resistance racing of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance racing with the exception of the doors to the fuel handling building. These will be replaced vich Class A doors to =aintain the required 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire bar-ier between buildings. With the existing carbon dioxide syste=, fira extinguishers, and future fire house installation, the fire protection for this area vill be considered adequate, g[]

34srt/Canmenmenta 4.4-14

4.4.13 Control Building Area C3-4a (Elevation 355')

4.4.13.1 Description No safe shutdown equip =ent is located in this area (E-023-016.

3-7).

4.4.13.2 Analysis Cc=bustibles in this area consist of stored and transient =aterial.

As a result, there is a total fire loading of 82,000 Beu/ft contained within a 2,900 f t area. This area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire resistance raced walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are penetrated by HVAC ducts, cable and pipe pentrations. Access doors to this area are unlabeled. The fire protection for this area consists of EVAC duct s=oke detectors and ionitation detectors at selected locations. Dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers are shown on drawing E-023-016. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairwell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

4.4.13.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that in order to centain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area =ust have a fire resistance rating of 1-1/2 hour. The walls, ficar and ceiling have a sinimum of 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of the HVAC ducts, cable and pipe penetrations. The existing unlabeled doors have an accepted 1-1/2 hour fire resistance racing. Fire da=pers will be installed in the EVAC duct penetrations and cable and' pipe penetrations will be adequately sealed to neet the tequired

)h\\b 4.4-15

1-1/2 hour fire resistance racing for the area. Cnce upgraded as discussed abeve, the fire protection for the area vill be considered adequate.

4.4.14 Control Building Area C3-4b (Elevation 355')

1.4.14.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment in this area consists of nuclear instrumentacien and reactor protection panels A, 3, C, and D, and safety related control consoles and panels.

(E-023-016, 3-5).

4.4.14.2 Analysis Combustibles in this area consist of cable insulation and transient nacerial. As a result, there is a total fire leading of 58,000 2

2 3tu/ft contained within a 3,100 ft area. This area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rated walls, floor and ceiling, with the exception of the adjacent computer room, which is bounded by 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire resistance rated walls and ceiling, which are penetrated by EVAC ducts. Access doors to this area and the adjacent co=puter room are unlabeled natal doors. The fire protection for this area consists of ioni:ation detectors, which actuate alar =s in the control room, and dry chemical, carbon dioxide, and halon fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairwell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

hicammarmenta i.4-16

4.4.14.3 Conclusion The resul:s of the analysis indicate, that to preven a fire f:cm entering :his area, :he fire resistance : stings =us: be =aintained as follows:

(a) Floor - 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (b) Walls 1/2 hours (control building)

I hour (fuel handling building) 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (turbine building)

(c) Ceiling - 30 =inutes The floor and turbine building vall have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating vi:h the exception of EVAC due:s. The remaining valls and ceiling have a sinimum of 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire resistance rating vi:h the exception of EVAC due:s, recessed vindow and unlabeled doors. To obtain :he required fire resistance ratings, fire da=pers vill be installed in the HVAC ducts, while the recessed window and door to the co=pu:er roes will be altared to provide a B level rating. Class A doors to :he fuel handling building vill be provided :o =aintain the required 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier between buildings. To provide addi: ion-.1 protection for the safe shutdevn control panels, ioni:ation detectors will be installed in the panals for early warning. An automatic Halon systen vill be provided for the underfloor area of computer :com and adjacent cable :rench. Once upgraded as discussed above, :he fire procaction inside and adjacent :o this area vill be considered adequate.

)h\\ )

htcammomsenta -

4.4-17

4.4.15 Control Building Area C3-Sa (Elevation 380')

4.4.13.1 Descrip tion The safe shutdown equignent in this area consists of E7AC nor=al duty supply fan A, e=ergency ventilating supply fan A, and ventilating exhausts fans A and 3.

(E-023-016, 3-14).

4.4.15.2 Analysis C;sbustibles in this area consist of cable insulation and charcoal.

As a result, there is a total fire loading of 16,000 Stu/f t2 contained within a 3,000 f t area. This area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance raced walls, a floor and a ceiling, which are penetrated by EVAC ducts. Access to this area is through an unlabeled natal door which is contained within =ovable steel partitions. The fire protection for this area consists of EVAC duct s=oke detectors, which actuate alarms in the control room, and dry chenical and water fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016. The charcoal contained within the air filters is provided with heat sensors for detection and a deluge water systes for fire protection of the charcoal. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent stairvell area as will be discussed in Section 4.7.5.3.

4.4.15.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area =ust have a fire resistant racing of 30 ninutes. The walls, a floor and a ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of the E7AC ducts, cable penetraticus, and door openings. To obtain the required 30 ninute fire resistant rating, fire daspers will be smes/:.wam au

)h\\ b. ( p'

4. 1-18

installed ir. the HVAC duct penetrations. The existing door and partition :o the fuel handling building will be replaced w1:h a Class A door and 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rated wall to naintain a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier between buildings. Cable and piping penetra:Lons will be adequately sealed. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire pt a ection for this area vill be considered adequate.

4.4.16 Control Building Area C3-5b (Elevatten 380'T 4.4.16.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment in the area censists of HVAC nor=al duty supply fan 3, and e=ergency ventilating supply fan 3.

(E-023-016, 3-13).

4.4.16.2 Analysis combustibles in this area consist of cable insulation and charcoal.

As a resul:, there is a total fire leading of 15,000 Stu/f:2 2

contained vi:hin a 3,000 ft area. *his area is bounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rated walls, a floor and a ceiling penetrated by HVAC ducts. Access to this area is through an unlabeled =ecal door which is contained within =ovable steel partitions. The fire protection for this area consists of HVAC duct smoke detectors, which actuate alarns in the control room, and dry chemical and water fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016. The charcoal contained within the air filters is provided w1:h heat sensors for de:at:fon and a deluge water system for fire protection of the charcoal. A fire hose will also be available in the adjacent sesirwell area as will be discussed in See:1on 4.7.5.3.

1413 095 4.4-19

4.4.16.3 Conclusion I

The results of the analysis indicate that to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area aust have a fire resistant rating of 30 =1=utes.

The walls, floor and ceiling have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating with the exception of the hTAC duct, cable penetrations, and door openings. To obtain the required 30 =inute fire resistance racing, fire danpers will be installed in the HVAC duct-penetrations. The existing door and partition to the fuel handling building will be replaced with a Class A door and 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rated wall to =aintain a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier between buildings. Cable and piping penetrations will be adequately sealed. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area vill be considered adequate.-

)h\\

G2Mrt t'h 4.4-20

4.5 DIESEL GE:iERATCR SUILDI:!G The diesel generator building houses two independent diesel generator units, ac vell as related auxiliaries. The diesel generators are Class II and are required for safe shutdevn of T2".I-l.

'"he safe shutdown equi;nent and auxiliaries are shown on drawings E-023-CC4, E-023-006, E-023-008, and E-023-015.

The diesel generator building is constructed of reinforced concrete divided into two fire areas separated by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistarce rated concrete vall. Accessbetweenthetwofirearlaswithinthe diesel building is provided by Class A fire doors. The interior fire vall of the building serves as a barrier between the two independent units. Further discussion of the evo fire areas is given in the following sections.

4.5.1 Diessi Generator Building Area DC-1 (Elevatios 305')

4.5.1.1 Description The safe shutdown equipment contained within this area includes the A e=argency diesel generator and engine, the diesel fuel day tank, the fuel transfer pu=ps, the diesel generator air receivers, the diesel generator rocs air handling unit, and the diesel generator centrol panel.

(E-023-004, 7-13).

4.5.1.2 Analysis The ce=hustibles i= this area consist of lube oil in the engine, fuel oil in the day tank and :ansient =aterial. As a result, a total fire leading cf 96,000 Stu/ft is contained within a e

3,650 ft area. Ilectrical equip =ent in this area is enclosed and therefore adds no additienal fire loading.

~

'~

we _ _:

)h k D NI' 4.5-L

The fire protection fer this area censists of as aute=ctic spri=kler and deluge system designed to :TPA Standards 13 a:d 15 and accessible dry che=ical fire extinguishers.

4.5.1.3 Cenclusien The results of the analysis indicate that to contain a fire cf the above leading, the beundaries of this fire area =ust have a fire resistance racing of 1-1/2 hcurs. Since the building is designed for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating and is previded with aucceacic sprinkler and deluge syste=, fire prctection for the area is censidered adequate.

4.5.2 Diesel enerater Buildine Area EC-2 (Elevatien 305')

4.5.2.1 Descriptien

• he safa shutde'. equipment cent ined within this area includes the 3 emergency diesel generater and engine, the diesel fuel day tank, the fuel transfer pe=ps, the diesel generator air receivers, the diesel generator reem air handling unit, and the diesel generater centrol panel.

(E-023-004, F-11).

4.5.2.2 Analysis ne combustibles in this area censist cf lube oil in the engine, fuel oil in the day tank and transien* =aterial. As a result, a total fire loading of 96,000 3tu/ft' is contained #. thin a 2

3,650 ft area. Electrical equipment in this area is enclosed and therefere adds no addi:1ccal fire leading. The rating of the Class A deer between the diesel generater buildi=g and the service building has been negated by add 1=g a screen.

)h\\b 0

~4bTt / Ca.9fnemy,30 4.5-2

The fire protection for this area consists of an autenatic sprinkler and deluge systes designed to NF?A Standards 13 and 15 and accessible dry che=1 cal fire extinguishers.

4.5.2.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that to contain a fire of the above loading, the boundaries of this fire area sust have a fire resistanca rating of 1-1/2 hour.

The building is designed for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance racing and is provided with autenatic sprinkler and deluge systen. The door between the diesel generator building and service building will be replaced with an actual Class A door. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this area will be considered adequate.

4.5.3 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank (Underrround) 4.5.3.1 Description The only equipment within the area is a buried 30,000 gallon fuel oil storage tank located north of the diesel generator building.

(E-023-004, E-15).

4.5.3.2 Analfsis Due to the underground location of the storage tank, no analysis is cecessary.

4.5.3.3 Conclusion Ne fire protection is required.

1413 099 s

m-4.5-3

4.6 DITAKI SCREEN AND PCMPECUSE The %'.ac screen and pt. phause contains equip =ent for 2!I-1 vater supply. This equir=ent includes safe shutdown and fire protection co=ponents as shown on drawing E-022-018.

The building is located vest of the OC-1 co= plex along the Susquehanna River. The building is constructed of reinfoceed concrete with all four valls exposed to grade, except for a portion of the north vall which is attached to the buildf=g that houses che diesel driven fire pu=p and related equip =ent.

For purposes of analysis, the building is considered as a single fire area at elevation 308'.

4.6.1 Descriction Safe shutdown equip = cut located in this area consists of screen house air handling units A and 3, screen house 480 volt switchgear, screen house 480 vole =otor control centers, decay heat river water pu=ps A and 3, nuclear service river water pu=ps A, 3, and C, reactor building e=ergency tooling pumps A and 3, and associated valving.

(E-023 018, D-11).

4.6.2 Analvsis The co=buatibles in this area consist of lube oil, cable insulation, and transiant =aterials. As a result, there is a total fire s

leading of 10,000 3tu/ft' contained within a 10,000 fe' area. hre protection for this area is co= prised of an aute=atic sprinkler syste=, and dry che=ical and water fire extinguishers.

aws _

=

4.6-1

4.6.3 Cenclusion Due to the limited amount of combustible sterial in this area, the separation between redundant equipment, and the automatic sprinkler system provided for this area, the existi=g fire protection is considered adequate.

1413 101 a.6-2

4.7 FUEL HMDLING BUILDING The fuel handling building is used for receiving, scoring, preparation, handling and transfer of fuel.

Equipmen: for safe shutdown is shown on drawings E-023-002, E-023-003, E-023-005, E-023-007, E-023-009, E-023-012. E-023-013, E-023-014, E-023-016, and E-023-017.

The building is bounded on the north by :he reactor building, on the east by the control conplex, on the south by :he fust ' handling building for TMI-2, and on the west by the auxiliary building.

The walls of the fuel handling building have a sini=us 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistasce racing, with the exceptions of the walls dividing the auxiliary building and :he fuel handling building. These walls have unprotec:ed openings such as doorways, cable and duct penetrations. There is also a com=on area between :he TMI-l and

• MI-2 fuel handling buildings.

'Jall, floor, and roof construe: ion is of reinforced concrete. Gracing is provided for the differen:

elevations in the =ene between the fuel pool (east wall) and :he control building. The fuel har.dling building stairways are open between floors.

The fuel handling building consists of one fire area which has been divided into six fire =enes as dese:1 bed below.

4.7.1 Fuel Handling 3uilding at Elevation 291' 4.7.1.1 Description The only saf e shutdown equipment loca:ed in :his :ene is saf e:y rela:ed cable. Electrical penetratioss between :he fuel handling and reactor buildings are provided on :he north wall of this :ene.

1413 102 4.7-1

Radioactive caterial in the :cce is contained within steel enclosures.

(E-023-002, E-7).

4.7.1.2 Analysis The conbustibles in :his :ene consist of punp lube oil, ::ansient nacerials, and cable insulat_on. As a result, :here is a :stal 3

fire loading of 33,000 Stu/f t contained w1:his a 7,500 f:, area.

Marini:e boards are provided between redundas: cable trays as stated in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. Fire protec: ion for this :ene consists of dry chenical fire ex:inguishers and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-002.

4.7.1.3 Conclusion The :otal fire loading for this :one is not excessive, and =arinite board and spatial separation are provided between redundan: ::ays.

However, che concentration of the redundant channels in the :ene warrants either coating of those control cable trays or adding an autoracic sprinkler systen for :he :ene. With either of these alternatives inplenented, the existing fire protec:1on will be considered adequate.

4.7.2 Fuel Handling Building a: Elevatten 305' 4.7.2.1 Description The only safe shutdown equipnent located w1:hin :his =ene is.afety related cable.

(E-023-003, D-5).

4.7.2.2 Analysis Canbustibles in :his :ene consist of cable insulation and ::ansian:

=aterials. As a resul:, there is a :stal fire loading of 32,200

)h\\

4.7-2

9 Stu/f t' contained within a 7,000 ft' area. Access to this area is through a type 3 door. Fire protection in this :ene is comprised of dry chenical sp.i carbon dioxide fire extinguishers, a sprinkler system between the east vall of the fuel pool and the control building, and accessible fire hoses as shown on drawing E-023-003.

4.7.2.3 Conclusion Dua to the linited anounts of cenbustible nacerial in this :ene, the separation between redundant cable trays, and the absence of safe shutdown equipsent, the existing fire protection is censidered adequate, provided the control building door is replaced with a Class A door.

4.7.3 Fuel Handling Building at Elevations 329' and 331' 4.7.3.1 Description The safe shutdown equipsent ccncained vichin this :ene consists of the decay heat closed surge tanks A and 3 and safety related cable.

(E-023-005, E-6; E-023-016, J-7).

4.7.3.2 Analysis Cosbustibles in this :ene consist of cable insulation and transient nacerials. As a result, there is a total fire loading of 2,300 atu/f t' contained within a 4,000 f t' area. Fire procaccion for this

ene consists of an accessible fire hose and water and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers in adjacent :enes as shown on drawing E-023-005.

m-4.7-3

4.7.3.3 Conclusion Due to the linited anount of conbustible nacerial in this :ene and the separation provided between redundant cable ::ays, the existing fire protection is considered adequate.

4.7.4 Fuel Handline Building at Elevation 343' 4.7.4.1 Description The only safe shutdown equipnent contained within this =ene is the nuclear service closed cooling surge tank.

Spent radioactive fuel is stored under water within the fuel pools. New fuel is stored in either the dry fuel storage pits or the spent fuel storage pools.

(E-023-007. E-6).

4.7.4.2 Analysis The conbustibles in this =ene consist of fuel handling bridge and crane lube oil, transient nacerials, and cable insulation. As a 9

result, there is a total fire loading of 1,000 Stu/f t' contained within a 7,900 ft area. Fire protection in this ene consists of dry che=1 cal, water and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers and an accessible fire hose as shown on drawings E-023-007 and E-023-009.

4.7.4.3 Conclusion Due to the 11=1ted anount of conbustible natarial in this =ene, the existing fire protection is considered adequate.

4.7.5 2cne 3etween Fuel Peol (East Wall) and Control 3u11diez (Elevations 322' to 380')

4.7.5.1 Description The only safe shutdown equipnent located in this :ene is safety related cable.

(E-023-016; J-7, J-14, D-7, 0-14).

)$\\b m

4.7-4

4.7.3.2 Analysis The ce=bustibles in this :ene consist of cable insulation and

ansient and stored =aterials. As a resul:, :here is a :otal fire loading of 77,000 3tu/f ' contained w1:hin a 2,500 f:' area.

Access to this area is through unlabeled =etal doors. Floors withis this :ene above elevation 322' consist of grating. Fire protection for this :ene consists of dry chemical and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers as shown on drawing E-023-016.

a.7.5.3 Conclusion Due to the anount of co=bustible =aterial, fire hoses will be provided at each elevation and unlabeled doors to the control building vill be replaced with Class A doors. Once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection for this :ene will be considered adequate since the loss of the safety-related cable will not co= pro =ise safe shutdown.

4.7.6 Air Conditioninz Zeuirnent Roo= (Elevation 235')

4.7.6.1 Description No safe shutdown equip =ent is located in this :ene.

(E-023-017, H-14).

4.7.6.2 Analysis The only co=bustible in :his :ene is lube oil. As a re.sul:, there is a :otal fire loading of 375 3tu/f: contained vi:hin a 900 f:

Fire protection for this :ene consists of a dry chemical fire area.

extinguisher as shown on drawing E-023-017.

14\\5

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-,;bettemerwomo 4.7-5

4.7.6.3 Conclusion Due to the 11:1:ed a=ount of combustible =aterial in :his :ene and the absesce of safe shutdown equipment, the exis:ing fire protec:1on is censidered adequa:e.

\\4\\3

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/

M 4.7-6

4.8 TUR3INE SUILDING The turbine building houses the :urbine genera:or and 1:s auxiliaries and is shown on drawing E-023-001.

The building is bounded on the nor:h by the service building, on the west by :he intermediate building, fuel handling building, reactor building and the control building.

The eas: and south walls are exposed to grade.

For the purposes of analysis, che building is considered to be a single fire area.

4.8.1 Description There is no safe shutdown equipment located within this area.

Safety-related channel C cable passes through the area enroute to the reae:or building from the control building.

(E-023-001, E-10).

4.3.2 Analysis The walls separating :he turbine building from other portions of TMI-1 containing saf e shutdown equipment have a mini =um 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance racing, w1:b :he exception of unlabeled doors, cable and piping penetrations, and tue structural joints between :he reactor building buttresses and the turbine building wall. The safety related cable which passes :hrough the area is for one channel only, and therefore may be disabled without causing loss of func: ion.

In the event of a fire wi:hin :he :urbine building,

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-u,-

e.5-1

access to the reaccer building via the personnel access hatch nay not be possible.

In this case, accessability will be ensured by the equipment access hatch located in the northwest quadrant of the reactor building.

4.S.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis i=dicate that to ensure that the walls vill adequately contain any fire within the turbine building, the unlabeled doors =ust be replaced with Class A doors, and cable and piping penetrations and the structural joints sust be adequately sealed. Although the personnel access hatch to the reactor building is unlabeled, it is considered adequate because of the air lock construction.

Due to the absence of safe shutdown equip =ent within the ares and che isolation provided between this area and safe shutdown areas of TMI-1, once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protection vill be consider 2d adequate.

)h\\

a.f-2

4.9 SERVICE SUILDING The service building houses offices, shops, lockers, and also provides for storage and is shown on drawing E-023-001.

The building is bounded on the south by the turbine building, on the southwest by etc internediate building, and on tha west by the diesel generator building, with the north and east walls being exposed to grade.

For the purpose of analysis, the building is considered to be a single fire area.

4.9.1 Descriocion There is no safe shutdown equipment or safety related cable located within the area.

(E-023-001, E-13).

4.9.2 Analvsis The wall separating the service building from other portions of IMI-1 containing safe shutdown equipment has a mini =u:2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating which was' negated by the cutting of the Class A door.

4.9.3 Conclusion The results of the analysis indicate that in order to separate the service building frem other areas, the violated Class A door =ust be replaced with an approved A labeled door. Due to the absence of safe shutd=wn equipment and the isolation provided between this area and safe shutdewn areas of the IMI-1, once upgraded as discussed above, the fire protectics is considered adequate.

kh\\b Met /Cunmanwowt3 4.9-1

4.10 AIR IrAKE TITRI.

An air intake :unnel is provided to admit outside air to TMI-l and is shown on drawings E-023-002, E-023-011, E-023-014, and E-023-019.

The tunnel is designed to provide adequate separation be: ween TMI-1 and the cutside air intake in the event of a hypothetical aircraf: incident. F1:e protection inside the tunnel is provided in accordance w1:h FSAR See:1on 9.8.6.

The air tunnel is constructed of reinforced concrete. I: is located southwest of iMI-l and connects :o the auxiliar7 building and fuel handling building. Except for tha intake structure, the

unnel is lecated underground.

For purposes of analysis, the air in:ake tunnel was considered as one fire area.

4.10.1 Descriction The only safe shutdown equipnent located in this area is safety related cable routed in conduit.

(E-023-019, F-9).

4.10.2 Analvsis Although so appreciable anoant of ce=bustible nacerial is presen:

in the area, fire protection is provided to prevent the spread of fire along the air intake :unnel in :he event of the hypothetical aircraft incident. This fire protection consists of an au:o=atic Halen suppression system ac:uated by ultraviole: or pressure de:ectors, an autcra:1c deluge water systes activatad by heat de:ec: ors, and snoke de:ec: ors to actuate alar:s in the con::cl room.

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MI M 4.10-1

)

4.10.3j#

Conclusien

/

D e ac1:1;1e levels of fire Protec:1cn discussed for the hypothetical aircraft inciden are = ore :han adequate for :he fire ha:ards censidered in this analysis.

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4.10-2

4.11 YARD ARIA The yard area ces:ains storage tanks for the turbine cycle syste=s and reactor systems; these tanks are located at grade. The tanks required for safe shu:down are shown on drawing E-023-001.

The areas considered in the analysis are :he portions of the grade adjacent :o the :wo condensate storage tanks, and the berated water storage tank. One cendensate s _ rage tank is located north of the turbine building and east of the service building, while the other is located north of the auxiliary building and west of the diesel generator building. The borated water s:orage :ank is north of the auxiliary building and west of the reactor building.

4.11.1 Condensate Storage Tanks Area 4.11.1.1 Description The actual condensate storage tanks A and 3 are the only safe shutdown equip =ent in this area.

(E-023-001, D-12).

4.11.1.2 Analysis Condensate storage tank A is located adjacent to the auxiliary boiler fuel oil storage tank. There is no significan: :=ount of combustible sacerial in the area adjacent to condensata storage tank 3.

The two condensate s:orage tanks are = ore than 400 fee:

apart with the service and diesel generator buildings located between them. Fire protection for the area consists of fire hydrants.

14\\5 \\\\5 C.w tCarwnonwesta 4.11-1

4.11.1.3 Conclusion 3ecause of the physical separation bet'eeen the tso redundant tanks, the existing fira protection for the area is considered adequate.

4.11.2 3erated k'acar Storage Tank Area 4.11.2.1 Description The borated water storage tank is the only safe shutdown equipment located in this area.

(E-023-001, G-11).

4.11.2.2 Analysis There is no significant a= cunt of combustible =aterial in this area adjacent to the tank.

Tire protection for this area consists of fire hydrants.

4.11.2.3 Conclusion Due to the negligible a=ount of cenbustible sacerial in this area, the existing fire protection is considered adequate.

1413 114 Caiter'.t"1mmewsac 4.11-2

3.0 porNT-3T-?OI:; COMPAR: son TO AFFC; DIX A This section contains a point-by-poise cenparison to NRC 3 ranch Technical Position APCS 3 9.3-1 Appendix A.

O 1413 115 s.

5-1

Position For Plants Under Construction and Coeratinz Plants Metrocolitan Edison Reseense Positions A.

Overall Reouire=ents of Nuclear Plant Responsibility for the overall Fire Protection Program fire protection program lies with the Vice President -

1.

Personnel Generation. Currently, the Vice Presiden:.- Generation utili:es Responsibility for the overall fire the Manager-Generation Engineering, protection program should be assigned the Manager-Generation Quality to a designated person in the upper Assurance, and the Manager-level of management. This person Generation Administration, to should retain ultimate responsibility assist in formulating, and even though for=ulation and assurance assuring i=plementation of :he of program i=plementation is delegated.

fire protection progras. These Such delegation of authority should be

=anagers =eet the standards of to staff personnel prepared by training ANSI N18.1.

Staticu =anage=ent and experience in fire protection and and supervision personnel are nuclear plant safety to provide a responsible for day-to-day balanced approach in directing the fire Lople=entation of fire protection protection progra=s for nuclear power program activities. Docu=entation plants. The qualification requirements of assigned responsibilities for :he fire protection engineer or are accomplished by =eans of consultant who will assist in the design a " Fire Protection Program and selection of equipment, inspect and Plan" which was issued by the test the co=pleted physical aspects of Vice President - Generation the system, develop the fire protection on April 1, 1977. At present, program, and assist in the fire-fighting the FSAR does not specifically training for the operating plant should discuss the training and be stated. Subsequently, the FSAR updating provisions regarding should discuss the : raining and the fire protection. The FSAR updating provisions such as fire drills will be updated to comfors :o provided for saintaining the competence this position by September 1, 1977.

of the station fire-fighting and operating crew, including personnel The Manager-Generation responsible for maintaining and Engineering is designated as inspecting the fire protection equip =ent.

Met-Ed's " Fire Protection Engineer". The qualifications and experience of the incu= bent are set forth in Appendix 5A.

As part of the effor: necessary to respond to Appendix A, the design of :he fire protection syste=, and the associated equip =ent, vis reviewed under the direction of a consultant who is a member of

/

5-2

Position For Plants Under Construction and Coeratinz Plants Metrocolitan Edison Resconse the Society for Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE).

The fire protection equipnent has been inspected, and test progra= results reviewed, by a number of different organizations and individuals with special expertise in fire protection systa=s and equipment such that Met-Ed is assured of the ability of the installed syste=s to function as necessary to neet their design objectives.

System i= prove =ents, nodifications, and additions necessary as a result of the aforementioned design review in response to APCS 3 9.5-1 will be designed under the direction of a consultant who is a ne=ber of SFPE as approptiate.

The Met-Ed Fire Protection Engineer shall periodically review the technical adequacy of the fire fighting training program.

The fire protection staff should be responsible for:

(a) coordination of building layout Building layout and syste=s and systa=s design with fire area design review are the requirements, including responsibility of the consideration of potential hazards Met-Ed Fire Protection associated with postulated design Engineer. Consultants basis fires, will be used as necessary when additional specialized qualifications are needed.

(b) design and naintenance of fire Design control of systa=s d2tection, suppression, and is the responsibility of extinguishing systa=s, the Manager-Generation 7 gineer (MGE). Maintenance is the tesponsibility of the TMI-l Superintendent.

hk

Posi: ion For Plants Under Construe:1on and Coeratine Plancs Metrocolitan Idison Resoonse (c) fire prevention activities, Fire prevention activities are included in the industrial safety progrs= under the Manager

- Generation Ad=inistration.

(d) ::aining and =anual fire-fighting Training of IMI-l personnel is activities of plan: personnel and the responsibility of the Manager the fire brigade.

- Operation Quality Assurance.

(NOTI:

-NFPA 6 - Reco==endations for Supervision of =anual fire Organization of Industrial fighting activities is the Fire Loss Prevention, contains responsibility of the OfI-l useful guidance for organization Superintenden: and he has assigned and operation of the entire specific fire fighting responsi-fire loss prevention progra=.)

bilities to station personnel in the Station Energency Plan. The

=anagers listed above all have available the assistance of the

• MI-1 Safety Supervisor for coordination and direction of :he i=ple=entation of :hese activi:ies.

2.

Desien Bases The overall fire protection progra:

See:ics 4.0 of this report (Fire should be based upon evaluation of

?.a:ards Analysis) provides this potential fire ha:ards throughout the co=parison. Likewise, e=ergency plant and the effect of pos:ulated procedures are based on design basis fires relative to

=aintaining TMI-1 in a

=aintaining ability to perfor= safety safa condition.

shutdown functions and =ini=1:e radioactive releases :o the environ =ent.

3.

Backuo Total reliance should not be placed on In all areas where auto =atic a single auto =atic fire suppression suppression syste=s are or will systa=.

Appropriate backup fire be provided, adequate =anual suppression capabill:7 should be suppression equipnent including provided.

fire hose sta::.ons and/or portable fire ex:inguishers are available.

a.

Single Failure Criterion A single failure in :he fire suppression ne fire suppression syste=s nee:

~

systa= should not i_ pair both the pri=ary

he single failure cri: aria and and backup fire supprassion capabili:7 are described in Positice C.

For exa=ple, redundant fire water pu=ps w1:h independent power supplies and controls should be provided. Postulated

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5-a

e Position For Plan:s Under Construe:1on and Oceratine Plants Metrooolitan Edison Resconse fires or fire protection systes failures need not be considered con:urrent with other plant accidents or the =ost severe natural phenomena. The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the overall plant fire protection program.

3.

Fire Suooression Svstems Failure or inadvertent operation of the Failure or inadver:ent operation fire suppression system should not of the fire suppression system incapacitate safety related systems or will not incapacitate safety co=ponents. Fire suppression systems related systems or ce=ponents.

that are pressuri:ed during nor=al Fire suppression systems that plant operation should =eet the are pressuri:ed during nor=al guidelines specified in APCSB 3 ranch operation =ee: the guidelines Technical Position 3-1, " Protection specified in APCSB 3 ranch Against Postulated Piping Failures in Technical Position 3-1.

Fluid Systems Outside Containment."

6.

Fuel Storare Areas Schedule for i=ple=entation of N/A

=odifications, if any, will be established on a case-by-case basis.

7.

Fuel Leading Schedule for i=ple=entation of N/A modifications, if any, will be established on a case-by-case basis.

8.

Multiole-Rese:or Sites On =ultiple-reac:or sites where there TMI-1 (operating uni:) is are operating reactors and construction completely isolated :, rom TMI-2 of remaining units is being co=pleted, (fac y under constuction) and the fire protection program should protec:ed by the security fence, provide continuing evaluation and except for the cou=:on connec:1on include addi:1onal fire barriers, fire between the fuel handling protec:1cn capability, and ad=inistra-buildings.

The cc= son connection tive controls necessary to protect the between the fuel handling operating uni:s from construe: ion :. ire buildings is sealed c:.f bv hazards.

The superintendent of the a :ence and secudy guard operating plant should have the lead preven:ing c nstme:Lon responsibility for site fire protection.

personnel fro = entering TMI-1.

The : ire protection provi:ed in the *MI-l fuel handling building vill adequa:ely protec: :he operating facility (see Section I. 7).

Also, the spacial s'ep aration, in conjunction with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barriers between s uctures housing 5-5

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{ Q' 1

e s

?csition For Diants Under Construction and Ooerating plants Metrocolitan Edison Resoonse safety related equip = enc, precludes the need for any additional fire protection evaluation for potential cons: rue:1on fire ha:ards.

The super-intendent will have the lead onsi:e responsibili:y for fire protection.

9.

Sinultaneous Fires Si=ultaneous fires in more than one N/A reactor need not be postulated, where separation require =ents are =et.

A fire involving more than one reactor unit need not be postulated except for facilities shared between units.

3.

Ad=inistrative Procedures, Controls and Fire Brigade 1.

Administrative procedures consistent Procedures covering these with :he need for maintaining the subjects are in effect. The perfor=ance of the fire protection IMI-l fire brigade organization syste= and personnel in nuclear power is in accordance with NFPA plants should be provided.

reco==endations and has been audited by NF.L?IA and the NRC.

Guidance is contained in the following publications:

NF?A 4 - Organization for Fire Services NFPA 4A - Organization for Fire Departnent NFPA 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention NFPA 7 - Manage =snt of Fire Energencies NFPA S - Manage =ent Responsibility for Effects of Fire on Operations NF?A 27 - Private Fire 3:1gades 2.

Effective ad=inistrative =easures Ad=inist:ccive =easures controlling should be inple=en:ed :o prohibit storage of ce=bustible =aterial bulk storage of ce=bustible =aterials are now in effect. Additionally, inside or adjacent :o safety related periodic firy ha:crds inspections buildings or syste=s during operation are perfor=ed by the General or raintenance periods. Regulatory Public Utilities (GPU) Fire Task Guide 1.39, "'dousekeeping Require =ents Force. These inspections f or *4ater-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants",

include audi:s of follow-up on provides guidance on housekeeping, open ite=s.

including :he disposal of cocbustible a:erials.

g l

i-6 1

w-Positica For Plants Under Construction and Ooersting Plants Metrocolitan Idisen Resconse 3.

Nor=al and a'enor=al condizions or other Nor=al and abnor=al condiziens anticipated opera:1ons such as which are associated w1:h

=edifications (e.g., breaking fire

=aintenance and operations and stops, inpair:ent of fire detection which have the potential :o and suppression syste=s) and refueling adversely affect reactor safety ac:ivities should be reviewed by are controlled by procedures appropriate levels of manage =ent and approved by the IMI-1 Superin-appropriate special actions and tendent. Similarly, the Manager-procedures such as fire watches or Generation Engineering is temporary fire barriers i=ple=ented responsible for insuring =odifi-

o assure adequate fire protection cations are conducted in accord-and reactor safety.

In particular:

ance with procedures which ensure reactor safety. These members of

=anagement are responsible for prese 1bing action necessary to co=pensate for any ca=porary redue:icn in fire protection or increased risk of fire as a resul: of off-nor=al condi: ions.

(a) Work involving ignition sources Position 3(a) and 3(b) are such as welding and flame cutting currently met at IMI-1.

should be done under closely controlled conditions. Procedures governing such work should be reviewed and approved by persons trained and experienced in fire protection. Persons performing and directly assisting in such work should be trained and equipped

o prevent and combat fires.

If this is not possible, a person qualified in fire protection should directly =enitor the work and function as a fire watch.

(b) Leak :es:ing, and similar procedures such as air flow determination, should use one of the com=ercially available aerosol techniques. Open flames or combustion generated s=oke should not be permitted.

(c) Use of co=bustibic =aterial, e.g.,

The use of co=bustible =aterial EEPA and charcoal filters, dry ion in the IMI-1 controlled area is exchange resins or other combustible it=ited.

Non-treated wood is not supplies, in safety related areas used inside buildings containing should be controlled. Use of wood safety related systems.

inside buildings containing safety related sys:ess or equipment should be per:1::ed caly when suitable non-combustible substitutes are not available.

If wood =ust be used, only fire retardant created wood (scaffolding, lay down blocks) k should be per=itted.

Such 5-7

e Fosition For Plants Under Construction and Ooers:ine Clants Metrocolitan Edison Resocnse materials should be allowed into safety related areas only when they are to be used t=nediately.

Their possible and probable use should be considered in the fire hazard analysis :o determine the adequacy of :he installed fire protection syste=s.

4 Nuclear power plants are frequently IdI-1 is self-sufficient with located in re=ote areas, at some respect to fire fighting distance from public fire depart =ents.

activities. The Manager-Generation Also, first response fire departments Administration has primary are often volunteer. Public fire responsibility for optinizing the depart =ent response should be supple =en:al or backup capability considered in the overall fire of public fire departments.

protection program. However, the plant should be designed to be self-sufficient with respect to fire fighting activities and rely on the public response only for supplemental or backup capability.

5.

The need for good organi:ation, training and equipping of fire brigades at nuclear power plant sites requires effective measures be t=plemented to assure proper discharge of these functions. The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants",

should be followed as applicable.

(a) Successful fire fighting requires While we are confident that the testing and maintenance of the intent of the provisions fire protection equipment, delineated here are currently e=ergency lighting and communication, being mat, some of the docu=en-as well as practice as brigades for cation and procedure formali-the people who =ust utilize the zation implied in this position equipment. A test plan that lists

=ay not be overtly stated. All the individuals as their additional documentation and responsibilities in connec:1on procedural for=ali:ation has with routine tests and inspections been included in IMI's Fire of the fire detection and protection Protection Prograc Plan which systems should be developed. The was submitted by letter GQL-0423

est plan should contain the types, to the NRC on April 1, 1977.

1413 122 5-8

e Position For Plants Under Construction and Oeerating Plants Me:recolitan Edison Resconse frequency and detailed procedures for testing. Procedures should also contain instrue:1ons on saintaining fire protection during those periods when the fire protection sys:en is impaired or during periods of plan =aintenance, e.g., fire watches or temporary hose connec: ions to water systems.

(b) 3asic : raining is a ne:essary This position is, at present, element in effee:1ve fire fighting met a: TMI-1.

Local fire operation. In order for a fire companies have agreed to assist brigade to operate effectively, at IMI; will participate in 1: sust operate as a team.

All drills and are receiving annual sembers ust know what their training a: the site.

In the individual duties are. They future, this training will must be familiar with the layout include practical demonstra: ions of the plant and equipment location of fire fighting peculiar to a and operation in order to permit nuclear plant. With respect to eff ective fire-fighting operations the i= plied fixed loca: ion, pre-during ti=es when a particular area designated offsize co=nand post, is filled with s=oke or is it is our posi: ion that this is insufficiently lighted. Such not necessary. During the condue:

training can only be accruplished of fire fighting, renote location by condue:ing drills several times co==and posts are es:ablished as a year (at least quarterly) so needed on a case by case basis.

that all sembers of the fire The opef7um location for such brigade have had the opportunity ec==ard posts is quite often to train as a tea =, testing itself onsite and virtually impossible in the major areas of the plant.

to pre-designate. Drills will The drills should include the include the st=ulated use of simulated use of equipment in equip =ent in each area. These each area and should be preplanned drills will be preplanned and and post-cri:iqued to establish post-critiqusd :o establish :he the training objective of the

aining obj.scive of the drills drills and determine how well and to determine how well these these objectives have been met.

objectives have been set.

These drills should periodically (at least annually) include local fire department participation where possible. Such drills also permit supervising personnel :o evaluate the effectiveness of co=munications vi:hin the fire brigade and wi:h the on scene fire team leader. :he reactor operator in the con:rol roo=,

and the off-site c--~'-d post.

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Position For Plan:s Under Cons:ruction and 0:erating Plants Metrocolitan Edison Rescense (c) To have proper coverage during all Members of all shifts are trained phases of operation, =e bars of in fire procaction.

Local fire each shift crew should be trained co=panies are annually instructed in fire protection. Training of in :he araas listed. In the the plant fire brigade should be fu:ure, this annual training will coordinated w1:h the local fire be coordinated insofar as this depar:=ent so that responsibilities coordination is and remains and duties are delineated in advance.

within :he control of Mec-Ed.

This coordination should be part of training course and i=plemented into the training of the local fire department s:aff. Local fire depart =ents should be educated in the operatienal precautions when fighting fires on nuclear power plant sites. Local fire depart =ents should be made aware of the need for radioactive protection of personnel and the special hazards associgted with a nuclear power plant si:e.

(d). !;FPA 27, "?rivate Fire 3rigade" This position is currently ce:

should be followed in organi:ation, at TMI-1.

aining, and fire drills. This standard also is applicable for the inspect:en and caintenance of fire fighting equipment. A=ong the s:andards referenced in this document, :he following should be u:ili:ed: 57?A 194, " Standard for Screw Threads and Gaskets for Fire Hose Couplings", hTIA 196, " Standard for Fire Hose," NFPS 197, " Training Standard on Initial Fire Atracks",

hT?A 601, "Reco= mended Manual of Ins: ructions and Duties for the

?lant Watchman on Guard." NFPA booklets and pa=phle:s listed on page 27-11 of Volume 8, 1971-72 are also applicable for good training references.

In addi: ion, courses in fire protection and fire suppression which are recogni:ed and/or sponsored by the fire protection industry should be u:ill:ed.

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5-10

Positics For Plants Under Construe: ion and Operating Plants Metropolitan Edison Resoonse C.

Quali:v Assurance Procram Quality assurance (QA) programs of The fire protec:ica syste= for applicants and contractors should be TMI-l will be under :he scope of developed and b:placented to assure

he existing OQA plan. Mec-Ed that the requirements for design, will include :he fire protec: ion procurement, installation, and testing system under Table 1 of the and ad=inistrative controls for the fire Operational Quality Assurance Plan.

protection program for safety related This table identifies those areas as defined in this 3 ranch systems which are covered, in whole Position are satisfied. The program or in part, by the OQA plan. Those should be under the management control of 1: ems of the Fira Protec: ion Systa=.

the QA organization. The QA program criteria which were considered necessary in that apply to the fire protection program he fire hazards analysis, will be should include the following:

entered on :he QA systa=s list.

Necessary changes to the procedures i=ple=enting the OQA plan will be cade to prescribe the level of control appropriate for the fire protection syste=.

These changes will reflect chose ite=s which are and, will continue to be, of con =ercial quality. The OQA program for fire protection will be under the canage=ent centrol of the QA organiza:1cn. The changes discussed above, will be imple=enced by December 31, 1977.

The sec: ions of Mec-Ed's OQA plan listed below cover the ten c

e a s'newn 'nerein.

1.

Des 12n Control and Procurenent Document Control Measures should be established to See:1on 8.1, pp. 12 and 13 assure that all design-related See:1on 9, pp. 15 and 16 guidelines of the 3 ranch Technical Position are included in design and procurement documents and that devia:1ons therefrom are controlled.

2.

Instructions, Procedures and Drawings Inspections, tests, administrative See:1on 10, pp. 16 and 17 controls, fire drills and training that govern :be fire protec:1on program should be prescribed by documented instrue:1ons, procedures or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with :hese docu=ents.

3.

Control of Purchased Material. Ecuto=ent and Services Measures should be established :o assure Section 12, pp. IS, 19, 20, 21

hat purchased =a:erial, equipment and and 22 services confor: :o :he procure =en:

documents.

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5-11

Position For Plants Under Construction and Deeratine Plants Metrocolitan Edisen Resoonse 4.

Inseection A progra= for independent inspection See:1ou 15, pp. 24 and 25 of activities affecting fire protection shoule be es:ablished and executed by, or for, the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with documented installation drawings with test procedures for &cco=plishing the ac:ivities.

5.

Test and Test Control A tes progras should be established Section 16, pp. 25 and 26 and i=plemented to assure that tasting is perfor=ed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate confor=ance with design ani system readiness require =ents.

The tacts should be perforned in accordance with wri::en cast procedures; test results should be properly evaluated and acted on.

6.

Inscection. Test and Deerating Status Measures should be established to Section 19, pp. 28 and 29 provide for the identification of 1:e=s that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspec: ions.

7.

Non-Confor=ine Itass Measures should be established to Section 20, pp. 29, 30 and 31 control itens that do not conform to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent use of installation.

8.

Corrective Action Measures should be established to assure See:1on 21, pp. 31 and 32

hat conditions adverse to fire protection, such as failures, nal-fune:1ons, deficiencies, deviations, defective co=ponents, uncontrollad combustible =aterial and sen-confor=ances are pro =ptly identified, reported and corrected.

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5-12

Position For Plan:s C= der Construction and Oceratine Plants Metrocolitan Edison Resconse__

9.

Rece,-ds Records should be prepared and =aintained Section 22, pp. 32 and 23 to furnish evidence that the criteria enu=erated above are being =e: for activities affecting the fire protection program.

10.

Audits Audits should be conducted end Section 23, pp. 33, 34, 35 and 36 docu=ented to verify compliance with the fire protection program including design and procurement docu= cuts; instructions; procedures and drawings; and inspec:1on and test activities.

3.

General Guidelines for Plant Protection 1.

Buildinz Desien (a) Plant Layouts should be arranged The fire hazards analysis portion to:

of this report identifies the fire areas and the safe (1) Isolate safety related systens shutdown equipeent wi:hin each from unacceptable fire ha:ards, area.

and (2) Alternatives:

(c) Redundant safety related Locations where redundant systa=s systens that are subject are exposed to a single fire to da= age from a single ha:ard are identified in the fire fire hazard should be ha:ards analysis. Adequate fire protected by a ce=bination protection is, or will be, of fire retardant coatings provided for these areas.

and fire detection and suppression syste=s, or (b) a separate system to perfor= the safe:y function should be provided.

(b)

In order :o accr=plish 1.(a) above, f ee the fire ha:ards analysis in safety related syste=s and fire Section 4.0.

ha:ards should be identified throughou: :he planc. Therefore, a detailed fire ha:ard analysis should be =ade.

The fire ha:ards analysis should be reviewed and updated as necessary. Additional fire ha:ards analysis should be

} k } f)

\\

done af:er any plant nodification.

5-13

4 Position For Plants Uader Const:uction and Deeratin2 plants Metrocolitan Edisen Resconse (c) A1:ernative guidance for constructed plants is shown in Section E.3,

" Cable Spreading Room."

(d) Interior wall and structural IMI-l s: rue: ural cocponents =ee:

co=potents, thermal insulation this criterion.

caterials and radiation shielding

=aterials and scund-prcofing should be non-combustible.

Interior finishes should be non-combustible or listed by a nationally recognired testing laboratory, such as 7actory Mutual or Underwriters' Laboratory, Inc. for fla=a spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its use configuration (ASIM E-84 Test), " Surface 3urning Character-istics of Su11 ding Materials").

(e) Metal deck roof construction Roof construe:1on is of reinforced should be non-combustible (see concrete to give a noncombustible the building =aterials directory rating, with the exception of of the Underwriters Laboratory, the auxiliary building which lac.) or listed as Class I by has FM Class I roof, as Tactory Mutual Systen Approval described in Section 4.0.

Guide. Where combustible =aterial is used in =ctal deck roofing design, acceptable al:ernatives are (1) replace combustibles with non-combustible =aterials, (ii) provide an automatic sprinkler system, or (iii) provide abili:y to cover roof exterior and interior with adequate water volu=e and pressure.

(f) Suspended ceilings and their IMI-1 areas =eet these criteria.

supports should be of non-combustible construe:1on.

Concealed spaces should be devoid of cenbustibles. Adequate fire detec: ion and suppression syste=s should be provided where full Srple=en:ation is not practicable.

}k\\ )

5-14

Position yor Plants Under Cons:ruction and Ooeratine Plants Metrocolitan Edison Resoonse (g) 'digh voltage - high a=perage All inside transformers are dry transfor=ers installed inside

ype.

buildings containiog safety related syste=s should be of

he dry :ype or insulated and cooled with non-co=bustibla liquid. Safety related syste=s tha: are exposed :o fla==able oil filled ::ansformers should be protec:ed frc= :he effects of a fire by:

(1) replacing with dry transfor=ers or transfor=ers that are insulated and cooled with non-co=bustible liquid; or (ii) enclosing the transfor=er with a three-hour fire barrier and installing au:o=atic water spray protection.

(h) Buildings containing safety related Outdoor transformers are within syste=s, having openings in ex arier 30 feet of openings in the walls closer than f0 feet to turbine building wall. Transfor=ers fla==able oil filled transferrers are adequately protected by fixed should be protected fro = the effec:s aute=atic water spray systa=s.

of a fire by:

The turbine building wall is protected by a water curtain (i) closing of the opening to have which operates with :he water fire resistance equal to three spray systems. No safety related

hours, systems are exposed to :he

ansformers.

(ii) constructing a three-hour fire barrier between the transformers and the wall openings; or (iii) closing the opening and providing he capability to maintain a water curtain in case of a fire.

(1) yloor drains, sized to remove Floor drains are designed :o expected fire fighting water re=ove the expected fire fighting flow should be previded in : hose water flow fre= areas where fixed areas where fixed water fire water fire suppression syste=s suppression syste=s are installed.

are installed or where fire hose Drains should also be previded in

=ay be used. Equip =ent is other areas where hand bosa lines installed on pedes:als. yor

=ay be used if such fire fighting

=odifications identified in this wa:ar could cause unacceptable report, the adequacy of existing floor drains will be addressed.

Protec: ice of exposed equipmen :o

}k 5-15

Position For Plants Under Construction and Ocetatint plants Metrocolitan Edison Resconse da= age to equip =ent in the area.

water dacage will be provided as Equipment should be installed en required.

pedestals, or curbs should be provided as required to contain Drains in areas containing water and direct it to floor ce=bustible liquids are designed drains.

(See NFPA 91X, " Water-to prevent :he spread of fire prooficg and Draining of Floors.")

throughout the drain system.

Drains in areas contad d"g combustible liquids should have Water drainage is punped from provisions for preventing the areas which =ay contain radio-spread of fire :hroughout the activity to the =iscellaneous vaste drain systen. Water drainage from storage tank in the auxiliary areas which may contain radio-building for normal liquid waste activity should be sa= pled and processing. Section 11.2.1 of the analyzed before discharge :o the FSAR details the handling and environment. In operating plants containing of liquid radioactive or plants under constructicn, if

wastes, accumulation of cater from the operation of new fire suppression syste=s does not create unacceptable consequences, drains need not be installed.

(j) Floors, walls and ceilings The fire hazards analysis enclosing separate fire areas identifies the fire barriers should have mini =us fire rating and deter =ine :he requirements of three hours. Penetrations in for maintaining their integrity.

these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be Door openings are protected with sealed or closad to provide a equivalent rated doors, frames fire resistance rating at least and hardware that have been :ested equal to that of the fire and approved by a nationally barrier itself. Door openings recognized laboratory. Such doors should be protected with are nor= ally closed and will be equivalent rated doors, frames posted with signs saying " Keep and hardware that have been Closed." Only some selected tested and approved by a doors are locked.

nationally recognized laboratory.

Such doors should be normally Penetrations for ventilation closed and locked or alar =ed with syste=s will be protected by alarm and annunciation in the fire dampers where deemed necessary control room. Pene: rations for by :he fire hazards analysis.

ventilation systes should be protected by a standard " fire The fire ha:ard in each area has door damper" whers required.

been evaluated to deter =ine barrier

(?.efer to NFPA 80, " Fire Doors require =ents.

Where barrier fire and Windows.") The fire hazard resistance is not adequate, in each area should be evaluated additional fire de:ection and to de:er=ine barrier require =ents.

suppression is or will be provided If barrier fire resistance cannot as described in (1), (ii) and (iii).

be =ade adequa:e, fire de:ection 1413 130 3-16

s Position ?cr Plants Under Construction and Doeratine Plants Metrooolitan Edisen Resoonse and suppression should be provided, such as:

(1) water curtain in case of

fire, (ii) fla e retardan: coatings,

(*11) additional fire barriers.

2.

Control of Combustibles (a) Safety related syste=s should be The fire hazards analysis isolated or separated from identifies these hazards and conbustible =aterials.

b' hen this the protection afforded.

is not possible because of the rature of the safety system or the conbustible =aterial, special protection should be provided to preven: a fire from defeating the safety systes function. Such protection =ay involve a combination of auto =atic fire suppression, and construction capable of vichstanding and containing a fire that consu=es all co=bustibles present.

Exa:ples of such combustible nacerials that =ay not be separable fren the re=ainder of its system are:

(1) E=ergency diesel generator fuel oil day :anks (2) Turbine-generator oil and hydraulic control fluid syste=s (3) Reac:or coolant pu=p lube oil sy: stem (b) Sulk gas sto. age (either Bulk gas is stored in outside conpressed or cryogenic), should areas in accordance with OSEA not be per=1::ed inside structures 1910.101. A fire or explosion housing safety-related equipment.

will not adversely affec: any Storage of flan able gas such as safety related sys:e=s or hydrogen, should be located equip =ent.

outdoors or in separate detached buildings so : hat a fire or 1413 131 3-17

+

Position For Plants Under Construction and Operatics; Plants Metrecolitan Edison Resconse explosion win not adversely affect any safety related systems or equipment.

(Refer to NFPA 50A, " Gaseous Hydrogen Systems.")

Care should be taken to locate The hydrogen storage containers high pressure gas storage have their long axis at right containers with the long axis angles to the east van of the parallel to building va ns. This turbine building. The bydrogen will m him b e the possibility of is stored to the north ea't of s

van penetration in the event the transfor=e area, 138 feet of a container failure. Use of from the east turbine building co= pressed gases (especially wall.

fla==able and fuel gases) inside buildings should be controlled.

(Refer to NFPA 6, " Industrial Fire Loss Prevention.")

(c) The use of plastic =aterials The quantity of plastic =aterial should be m1n 54:ed.

In throughout is negligible.

particular, haloginated plastics It has always been Met-Ed policy such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC) to avoid the use of polyvinyl and neoprene should be used only chloride (PVC) and neoprene, when substitute non-combustible unless substitute, noncombustible materials are not available. All

=aterials are not available.

plastic materials, including fla=a and fire retardant materials, At present, Met-Ed has specified will burn with an intensity and and is purchasing Griffolyn Type BTU production in a range similar 55 Fire Retardant plastic sheeting to that of ordinary hydrocarbons, for a n aintenance activities.

When burning, they produce heavy Griffolyn Type 55 IR sheeting is smoke that obscures visibility classified by Underwriters and can plug air filters, Laboratories Test No. 723 as especially charcoal and HEPA.

follows:

The haloginated plastics also release free chlorine and Flame Spread 10 hydrogen chloride when burning Fuel Contribution Not deter _inable which are toxic to humans and Snoke Developed 45 corrosive to equipment.

(d) Storage of fla==able liquids Fla==able liquids are stored in should, as a sd

• ~um, comply accordance with the require =ents with the requirements of NFPA 30, of NF?A 30 and OSHA 1910.106.

"Flam=able and Combustible Liquids Code."

3.

Electric Cable Construction. Cable Travs and Cable Penetrations (a) Only non-co=bustible nacerials Cable trays are of noncombustible should be used for cable tray

=ecal construction.

construction.

7g

)h\\

U" 5-18

Position yer Plants Under Ccnstruction and Oceratine Plan:s Metreoclitan Edisen Rasconse (b) See Section E.3 for fire protection guidelines for cable spreading rooms.

(c) Au:cmatic water sprinkler systens Automatic water spray systa=s or should be provided for cable cable coatings will be provided trays outside the cable spreading in areas of concentrated cable room. Cables should be designed loading in accordance with the to allow wetting down with deluge fire hazards analysis.

(See water without electrical faul:ing.

See:1on 2.3.6 for degree of Manual hose stations and portable ce=pliance to Regulatory Guide hand extinguishers should be 1.75).

Potential wa:er danage provided as backup. Safety related will be considered if water equipment in the vicinity of such sprays are used.

cable trays, that does not ? self require water fire protection, but is subject :o unacceptable damage from sprinkler water discharge, should be protected frem sprinkler system operation or =alfunction.

When safety related cables do not satisfy the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.75, all exposed cables should be covered with an approved fire retardant coating and a fixed auto =atic water fire suppression system should be provided.

(d) Cable and cable ::ay penetration Cable penetraciens in fire of fire barriers (vertical and barriers have'been sealed with horizontal) should be sealed to kaowool, =arinite board and give protection at least equivalent flamemastic er will be sealed with to that fire barrier. The design silicone forn consistent wi:h of fire barriers for hori: ental fire barrier fire resistance and vertical cable trays should, reqt remen:s.

as a mini =um, =eet the requirements of ASTM E-119, " Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials,"

including the hose stream test.

Where installed penetration seals are deficient with respect :o fire resistance, these seals =ay be protec:ed by covering both sides with an approved fire retardant natarial. The adequacy of using such =aterial should be de= ens::ated by sui:able testing.

1413 133 f-L9

e Position For Plants Under Construction and Ooerating Plants Me:rocolitan Edison Ressense (e) Fire breaks should be provided as Additional fire breaks are no:

deemed necessary my :he fire dee=ed necessary as the resul:

hazards analysis. Flame or flame of :he fire ha:ards analysis.

retardant coatings =ay be used as a fire break for grouped elec:rical cables te lisit spread of fire in cable ventings.

(Possible cable dera:ing owing :o use of such coa:ing =aterials

=ust be considered during design.)

(f). Elec:ric cable construe:1ons Electric cable :enstrue: ion should as a =inimum pass :he

=eets the current IEEE 3S3 fla=e current IEEE No. 383 flame tes.

test.

(This does not i= ply that cables passing this test will not require additional fire protection.)

For cable installa: ion in operating plants and plants under construction

hat do not seat the IEEE No. 383 flame test requirenents, all cables must be covered with an approved flame retardant coating and properly derated.

(g) Applicable to new cable New cable will meet IEEE 383 installations.

flame test.

(h) Cable trays, raceways, conduit, This criterien is =et, tretches, or culver:s should be used only for cables. Miscellan-eous storage should not be permitted, nor should piping for fla= sable or combustible liquids or gases be installed in there areas. Installed equip =ent in cable tunnels or culverts, need not be removed if they presen:

no hazard :o :he cable runs as de: ermined by the fire hazards analysis.

(i) The design of cable tunnels, The cable trench is not provided culverts and spreading roo=3 with autocacic or =anual s=oke should provide for auto =atic or venting. The cable spreading

=anual s=oke venting as required area does have provisions for to facili: ate manual fire

=anual r=oke venting. Gaseous fighting capabili:y.

suppression systa=s are, or will be, installed to provide extinguish-

=ent prior to the genera:1on of any appreciable a=ount of s=oke.

Fortable fans will exhaust any g \\ g s=oke fro = :he con:rol building

hrough doors to the fuel handling building, and then exhaust :he s=oke :o :he outside :hrough overhead doors.

_7n

o Position For Plants Under Construction and Oceratine Plants Metroeolitan Edison Resconse (j ) Cables in the control room should Cables in the control roer.7:e be kept to the minimun necessary pri=arily chrough the floor frc= for operation of the control roem.

he relay rocs and :er=inate in All cables entering the control con:rol panels, consoles or room should :ernisate there.

equipment. However, se=e cabling Cables should not be installed in is installed in a floor trench from floor trenches or culverts in the the I/O cabine: to the cocputer area control rocm. Existing cabling where they are installed in a installed in concealed floor and concealed floor. An au:ccanic Ealen ceiling spaces should be protected suppression sys:en will be installed with an auto =atic total flooding for the protection of the cable halon systes, trench and concealed floor. 4 Ventilation (a) The products of combustion that Ventilation for critical areas need to be re=oved from a specific is evaluated in Sections 2.0 fire area should be evaluated to and 4.0 of this report. Areas determine how they will be containing radioactive =aterial controlled. Snoke and corrosive release potentials are also gases should generally be auto-outlined. Ibnitoring of radio- =atically discharged directly ac:ive contamina: ion is discussed outside to a safe location. in Chapter 11 of the FSAR. Snake and gases containing radio-Monitoring of specific areas will active =aterials should he be acco=plished in accordance with =enitored in the fire area to existing IMI-l procedures when deter =ine if release to the necessary. environ =ent is within the per=issible limits of the plant Technical Specifications. The prcducts of combustion which need to be re=oved from a specific fire area should be evaluated to determine how they will be controlled. (b) Any ventilation system designed No systems are designed solely

o exhaust s=oke or corrosive for smoke re= oval. Existing gas 2s should be evaluatad to ventilation syste=s which would ensure that inadvertent operation be used fer s=oke re=cval n3.e:

or single failures will not these cri:eria. violate the con: rolled areas of

he plant design. This requirement includes contain=ent functions for protection of the public and =ain:aining habitability for opera ions personnel.

1413 135 3-21

o Posi:1on For Plants Under Construe:1on and Ooerating places Metrooolitan Edisen Reseense (c) The power supply and controls for The power supply and controls for =echanical ventilation systems the =achanical ventilatica should be run outside the fire syste=s used to cool redundan: area served by the system. saf e shutdown equip =en: have been run in the sa=e area as :he applicable equipment. These controls seet the separation require =en:s outlined in Chapter 8 of the FSAR. (d) Fire suppression syste=s should Charcoal fil:ers are not engineered be installed to protec: charcoal saf ety f eatures. However, filters in accordance with auto =atic deluge syste=s are Regulatory Guide 1.52, " Design provided for the protection of the Testing and Maintenance Criteria charcoal filters, for A:=ospheric Cleanup Air Filtration." (e) The fresh air supply intakes to Fresh air supply intakes are areas containing safety related re=otely located w1:h respect to equipment or systems should be exhaus: air outlets, thus located re=ote from the exhaust minimi:ing the possibility of air outlets and smoke vents of contaminating the intake air with other fire areas to sini=1:e the the products of ecsbustion. possibility of contamd'nting the intake air with the products of combus: ion. (f) Stairvells should be designed to The control building stairvell nini=12e s=oke infiltration during is enclosed as indicated on the a fire. Staircases should serve layou: drawings attached to :his as escape routes and access routes report. All other stairways are for fire fighting. Fire exit open between floors. Elevators routes should be clearly =arked. are not used during fire Stairvells, elevators and chutes energencies. Escape and access should be enclosed in =asonry routes have been established by towers with minimum fire rating pre-fire plan and are practiced of :hree hours and automatic fire tc drills by operating and fire doors at least equal to the brigade personnel. All fire enclosure construe: ion, at each exit routes are clearly posted opening into the building. throughout ~MI-1. Elevators should not be used during fire c=ergencies. Where stairvells or elevators cannot be enclosec in :hree-hour fire raced barrier with equivalent fire doors, escape and access routes should be established by pre-fire plan and practiced in } } k gJ drills by opera:ing and fire brigade personnel. 3-22

o Position For Plants Under Cons: rue:1on and coeratinz ?lants Metrooolitan Edison Resoonse (g) Smoke and heat vents =sy be useful Forced convection ventilation in specific areas such as cable is provided throughout IMI-l spreading rooms and diesel fuel and is in excesg of 300 cfs oil storage areas and ruicchgear for each 200 f: of floor area. roo=s. 'Aen natural-convection ventilation is used, a sini=us ratio of 1 sq. foot of venting area per 200 sq. feet of floor area should be provided. If forced-convec:1on ventilation is used, 300 CFM should be provided for every 200 sq. feet of floor area. See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on s=oke control. (h) Self-contained breathing apparatus, self-contained breathing apparatuses using full face positive pressure using full face positive pressure masks, approved by NIOSH (National = asks approved by NIOSH, are Insti:ute for Occupational Safety provided for the fire brigade, and Health - approval formerly damage control and control roen given by the U. S. Sureau of personnel. Each self-contained Mines) should be provided for fire breathing apparatus has two spare brigade, damage control and bottles. Also, there is an air control foes personnel. Centrol ce= pressor and cascade system at room personnel =ay be furnished IMI-1 for unlimited air supply. breaching air by a =anifold system piped frem a storage Precautions have been taken to reservoir if practical. Service locate the compressor in areas or operating life should be a free of dust and contaninan:s. sini=us of one half hour for the self-contained units. At leas: two extra air bottles should be located onsite for each self-contained breathing unit. In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to persi quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If ec= pressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air should be used. Special care =ust be taken to locate he compressor in areas free of dust and conta=inants. \\4\\3 \\57 5-23

o = Posi:1on For Plants Under Construe: ion and Doeratine Plants Metroco21:an Edison Resoc se (1) Where total flooding gas Where required, ventilation ex:inguishing systems are used, da=pers close on actuation of a area intake and exhaust vent-gaseous extinguishing system. Llation dampers should close upon initiation of gas flew to =aintain necessary gas concen-

ation.

(See NFPA 12, " Carbon Dioxide Syste=s", and 12A, "Halon 1301 Syste=s.") 5. Liehtine and Cc==unication Ligh dag and two way voice E=e:Lency lighting for the control ce==unication are vital to safe room is provided from AC safety shutdown and e=argency response related distribution panels; in the event of fire. Suitable additional ligh:ing is from fixed and portable e=ergency electrical DC power. lighting and ce==unication devices should be provided to satisfy the following requirements: (a) Fixed emergency lighting E=argency lighting for means of should consist of sealed beam egress lighting is provided units with individual 8-hour throughout TMI-1 and is powered 4"*-um battery pcwer supplies. f cm amargency AC safety related swi:chgear. The e=ergency AC power is core reliable and does not present th? =aintenance problems associated with sealed beam units. (b) Suitable sealed bean bat:ery Sealed beam battery pewered, powered portable hand lights portable hand lights e:e provided should be provided for e=ergency for energency use. use. (c) Fixed emergency co--"nication Headsets, powered by 110V safety should use voice powered head related switchgear can be plugged sets at pre-selected staticus. into jacks throughout IM1-1. No voice powered headsets are available. (d) Fixed repeaters installed to A: IMI-1, a fixed repeater is per=1: use of portable radio located in the pretreat=en area, ce==unica: ion units should be which is near the geographic protected fres exposure fire center of the sca:icn. This enables da= age. por:able radio ce==unication throughou: :he sta:icn. The repeats: is not protec:ed from exposure fire da=sge; however, it }k}) k is located in an area with -d a=ount of combustible na:erial, thereby represen:ing a low fire poten:ial. 3-24

r Position For Plants Under Construe: ion and Coerating Plants Metrocolitan Edisen Resoonse E. Fire Detection and Suoeression 1. Fire De:ection (a) Fire de:ec:1on sys e=s should as Fire detec: ion sys:e=s ce= ply a =inimum ccmply wich NFPA 72D, with NFPA 72D, except that no " Standard for the Installation recorder is provided. This Maintenance and Use of deviation is acceptable since Proprietary Protec:1ve Signaling adequate records are kept. Systems." Deviations from the requirements of NFPA 72D should be iden:1fied and justified. (b) Fire detection systen should give Fire detection systems give audible, audible and visual alars and and visual alars through the TMI-l annunciation in the control room. annunciation system in the control Local audible alar =s should also room. Local alarns do not sound a: scand at the location of the fire. the location of the fire. (c) Fire alar =s should be distinctive Fire alar =s have s:andard annunci-and unique. They should not be ator tone. Ecwever, engraved flash-capable of being confused with ing windows are provided for the any other plant systen alar s. fire alars in the control room. (d) Fire detection and act ntion The firs datec:fon and deluge systems should be connec:ed to actuation systems are connected the plant energency power supply. to IMI-1 energency power supply. 2. Fire Protection Water Sueolv Svstems (a) An underground yard fire =ain The underground yard fire =ain loop should be installed to loop is ins:alled in accordance furnish anticipated fire water with NFPA Standard 24. Section requirenents. NFPA 24 - Standard 9.3.7.4 of the FSAR gives a for Outside Protection - gives detailed description of the system, necessary guidance for such installation. It re'ferences Underground pipe is carbon steel other design codes and standards (ASIM A-53 Gr. 3, or ASTM A 134 developed by such organizations or AP' SL, Gr. 3), shop coated as the American National for underground service with hot Standards Institute (ANSI) and the coal car enamel and asbestos felt A=arican Water Works Association per AWWA Spec. C-203. Above (AWWA). Lined steel or cast iron ground pipe is carbon steel, ASTM pipe should be used to reduce A-106. internal :uberculation. Such tuberculation deposits in an Flushing is acco=plished by using unlined pipe over a period of fire hydrants. No =eans for years can significantly reduce treat =ent is available. Sectional water flow through the ce=bination control valves (post indicator of increased friction and reduced valves) are provided to isola:e pipe dia=eter. Means for :reating por: ions of :he =ain for mainte-and flusning :he systa=s should be nance or repair vi:hout shu::ing off :he entire systes. Posi:1on 1413 139 2-25

i Position For Plants L*nder Construction and Ooeratint plants Metrocolitan Fdison Resoonse provided. Approved visually indicators are provided with the indicating sectional con:rol sectional control valves. valves, such as Pos: Indicator Valves, should be provided :o isolate portions of the =ain for uaintenance or repair without shutting off the entire syste=. Visible location =arking signs for underground valves is acceptable. Alterna:ive valve position indicators should also be provided. The fire =ain system piping should The fire =ain piping is separate be separa:e from service or from the do=estic and sani:ary sanitary water system piping. For water service piping. operating plants, fire = aim 'sstem piping that can be isolated from service or sanitary water syste= piping is acceptable. (b) A co==on yard fire =ain loop =ay A coc=en yard fire =ain loop serve multi-uni: nuclear power serves DfI-l and TMI-2. plant sites, if cross-connected See:ional control valves (post between units. Sectional control indicator valves) are provided valves should per=i: naintaining to per:1: independence of the independence of the individual individual loop around each unit. loop around each unit. For such (See FSAR, Fig. 9-25). The water installations, ce==on water supply is si:ed for the largest supplies =ay also be u:ili:ed. single expected flow. The water supply should be sized for the largest single expected flow. For =ultiple reac:or sites wi:h widely separated plants (approaching 1 =ile or more), separate yard fire =ain loops should be used. See:ionalized systems are acceptable. (c) If pu=ps are required :o =eet Three fire pumps (2500 gp= 3 sys:e= pressure or flew require-125 psig; :wo diesel driven and ments, a sufficient nu=ber of one electrically =otor driven) pumps should be provided so that are provided for IKI-1, :hereby 100% capacity will be available =ee:ing :his require =ent. with one pu=p inactive (e.g., C:nnections to the yard fire pu=ps). The connection to the =ain loop are at leas 30 feet yard fire =ain loop fro = each apart. One addi:ional 2500 gp: fire pu=p should be widely J 125 psig diesel driven fire separated, preferably located on pu=p is located a: the IMI-2 opposite sides of :he plant. intake screen and pu=phouse. Each pu=p should have its evn Two of :he fire pu=ps are separa:ed driver wi:h independen: power by a 3 hour fire wall in :he intake screen and pu=phouse. The other two fire pu=ps are }k 5-25

a Position For Plants Under Cons: rue:1on and Oeeratine plants Metrocolitan Edison Reseense supplies and control. A: leas: spatially separated: one on the one pu=p (if not powered fres IMI-1 side in :he circulating water the e=ergency diesels) should pu=p house, and :he c:her a :he be driven by non-electrical TMI-2 screenhouse. =eans, preferably diesel engine. Pu=ps and drivers should be Alar =s indicating pu=p running, located 11 roo=s separated frem driver ava11ab111:7, and failure the rensining pu=ps and equipment to start are provided in the by a =ini=us three-hour fire wall. control room. Alar =s indicati=g pu=p rtming, driver availability, or failure

o star: should be provided in the control room.

Details of the fire pu=p The fire pu=p installation installation shculd as a 4 confor=s to NFPA 20. confors :o hTPA 20, " Standard for he installation of Centrifugal Fire Pu=ps." (d) Two separate reliable water Wa:er supply is from the supplies should be provided. If Susquehanna p.iver and the tanks are used, two 100% ("4 d" circulating water flu =e. of 300,000 gallons each) system capacity tanks should be installed. They should be so interconnec:ed that pu=ps can take sue:1on from either or both. However, a leak in one tank or its piping should not cause both tanks to drain. The =ais plant fire water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in a =ini=us of eight hours. Cc= mon tanks are permitted for A 100,000 gallon filtered water fire and sani:ary or service altitude :ank is connected into water storage. When this is the fire =ain piping. For fire done, however, mini =u fire protection, 90,000 gallons is water storage requirements should held in reserve. Internal piping be dedicated by means of a per=its 10,000 gallons :o flow :o vertical standpipe for other the =akeup desineralizers. water services. (e) The fire water supply (:otal The =axi=u= flow de=and is 2575 gp= capacity and flow ra:e) should

o :he =os: renote deluge sys:e=,

be calcula:ed on :he basis of plus 1000 sp= for =anual hose

he larges: expected flov rate strea=s.

for a period of two hours, bu: not less :han 300,000 gallcas. A single pu=p is designed :o run a: 150 percen: of ra:ed capaci:y anc provide 3750 gps a: 30 psig. )h\\b

-2,

o Posi: ion For Plan:s Under Cons: rue:Lon and Oeerati:2 plants Metroeolitan Edisen Reseense This flow rate should be based (conservatively) on 1,000 sps for anual hose s::aa=s plus

he greater of:

(1) all sprinkler heads opened and flowing in the largest designed fire area; or (2) che largest open head deluge systen(s) operating. (f) Lakes or fresh water ponds of N/A sufficient size =ay qualify as sole source of water for fire protection, but require at least

wo intakes to che pu=p supply.

• • hen a co=~on water supply is a

permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satisfied: (1) The additional fire protection water require =ents are designed into the total storage capaci:y; and (2) Failure of :he fire protection sys:es should not degrede the func: ion of the ul:1: ate heat sink. (g) Outside =anual hose installation Fire hydran:s are located should be sufficient to reach approxi=ately 250 f t apart any location with an effective around :he perimeter of IMI-1 hose stream. To accomplish and IMI-2. chis hydrants should be installed approximately every 250 feet on The lateral to each fire hydrant the yard =ain system. The is con::clied by a key operated lateral :o each hydrant from :he (curb) valve. Each fire hydrant yard =ain should be controlled is provided w1:h a hose house by a visually indicating or key con:aining 250 feet of 2-1/2 inch operated (curb) valve. A hose hose, co=bina: ion fog no::le, and house, equipped w1:h hose and auxiliary equipmen:. combina:icn no::le, and other auxiliary equipment reco== ended Eose houses around :he perine:er in NFPA 24, "Cutside "Procac:icn", of TMI-1 vill nee: :he inven:ory should be provided as needed but require =ents of NFPA 24 a: leas: every 1,000 fee:. )h\\ ) 3-28

posi:1on For plan:s Under Cons: rue:1on and Ooerstint ?lsnes Meeretoli:an Idison Reseense Thrt.'.ds co=patible wi:h : hose Threads are co=patible used by local fire depart =ents wi:h : hose used by =os: local should be provided on all fire depar:sents; however, hydrants, hose couplings and adap ers are always available s:andpipe risers. where necessary. 3. Water Serinklers and Mose S:sndoice Svsta=s (a) Each automatic sprinkler systes Headers for each building and =anual hose station standpipe containing safe shutdown eculpment should have an independent are fed from each end. The auto-connection to the plant under- =atic sprinkler systa=s and =anusi ground water =ain. Headers fed hose station s:andpipe are fed from each end are per=1::ed from headers. These neaders are inside buildings :o supply arranged such :han each is iso-sul:1ple sprinkler and standpipe lable, thereby ensuring that no systems. When provided, such single failure can i= pair the headers are considered an header function. Fire suppression extension of the yard =ain systems outlined in :he fire syste=. The header arrangement hazards analysis will address the should be such that no single case of a single failure i= pairing failure can knpair both the both the primary and backup fire pri=ary and backup fire protection protection systems. systa=s. Each sprinkler and standpipe Each sprinkler and standpipe syste= system should be equipped with is equipped with an OS&Y gate OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) valve. Each sprinkler system is gate valve, or other approved equipped with a water flow alarm. shut off valve, and water flow Standpipe syste=s are not eculpped alars. Safety related equipment w1:h a water flow alarm. Safety that does not 1:self require related equipmen: has been sprinkler water fire protection, protected frem water da= age. but is subject to unacceptable da= age if wetted by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shields or baffles. (b) All valves in the fire water Shutoff valves controlling sprinkler systess should be electri-$1'y and deluge systems are elec::ically supervised. The elec: ical supervised and alar = in :he con ::1 supervision signal should ro o=. indica:e in the control roos and o:her appropriate ce==and All valves are supplied with locations in :he plan: (See ta=per proof seals. Addi:icnally, NFPA 26, " Supervision of Valves.") a =anage=en: supervision program When elec::1 cal supervision of exists :ha: requires visual fire protec: ion valves is no: inspection. prac:1:able, an adequa:e =anage=ent supervision progra: g} should be provided. Such a 3-29

s Posi:1on For Plants Under Cons: uction and Oeeratine ?lants Met coolitan Edison ?.esconse progra= should include locking valves open with stric: key con::el; ta=per proof seals; and periodic, visual check of all valves. (c) Auto =atic sprda'A er systa=s should Sprinkler systa=s throughout *MI-l as a =ini=u= confor= :o =eet the design and installation requirenants of appropria:e requirements of NFPA 13 and/or standards such as NFPA 13. " Standard NFPA 15. for the Installation of Sprinkler Systa=s", and NF?A 15 " Standard for Water Spray Fixed Syste=s." (d) Interior =anual hose installa: ion Hose reels are provided throughout should be able to reach any DiI-l as indica:ed on the location with at least one layout drawings at: ached to this effective hose stea=. To report. Fire hose is 1-1/2 in. acco=plish this, s:andpipes with synthetic braided rayon cord pile hose connections equipped with a hose which does not require drying =ax1=um of 75 feet of 1-1/2 inch after use and testing. The pipe woven jacket lined fire hose and si:e and arrange =ent are adequate. suitable no::les should be provided in all buildings, Additional hose reels will be including contain=ent, on all provided in accordance with the floors and should be spaced at fire hazard analysis, See: ion 4.0. not = ore chan 100-foo: intervals. These syste=s =ee: the requirements Individual standpipes should be of NFPA 14. at least 4-inch diameter for =ultiple hose connections and 2-1/2-inch dia=eter for single hose connections. These systa=s should follow :he require =ents of NFPA No.14 for sizing, spacing and pipe support require =ents (NELPIA). Hose stations should be located Hose stations ars =ainly locsted outside entrances to nor= ally outside entrances to nor= ally unoccupied areas and inside unoccupied areas. Shutoff valves nor= ally occupied areas. Stand-and pressure reducing devices are pipes serving hose stations in provided at each hose station areas housing safety related and in the =ain feed to the equipment should have shu: off standpipe. valves and pressure reducing devices (if applicable) outside }k}) kk

ne area.

(e) The proper :7pe of hose no::les All areas are provided vi:h

o be supplied to each area co=bina: ion fog-straigh: strea=

should be based on :he fire no::les. Personnel are adequately ha:ard analysis. The usual

ained to =ake proper use of co=bination spray /st aight-hose sta: ions.

5-30

a Position For Plants Under Construe:ica and Goeratinc Plants Metrocoli:an Edisen Reseense s:reas no::la =ay cause unacceptable =echanical damage (for example, the delicate electronic equip =ent in the control room) and be unsuitable. Electric-ally safe so::les should be provided at locaticus where elec:rical equip =ent or cabling is located. (f) Certain fires such as those There are no =ajor fla= sable involving fla==able liquids liquid hazards in IMI-1, respond well to foas suppression. Areas involving combustible Consideration should be given to liquids are adequately use of any of the available protected. feass for such specialized protection application. These include :he more co= mon chemical and mechanical low expansion foams, high expansion feas and the relatively new aqueous film for=ing foam (AFFF). c lon Sueeression Svstems 4 a The use of Ealon fire ex:inguishing A total floodiog Halon 1301 systes agents should as a sini=us comply is provided in the supervisors wi:h the requirements of NFPA 12A office at elevation 322' of and 123, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishing the con:rol building. Ealon 1301 Agen: Systa=s - Ealon 1301 and Halon systa=s are provided in the air 1211." Only UL or FM approved agents intake tunnel (see FSAR Sections should be used. 9.8.6 and 9.8.7), which ce= ply with N7?A standards. In addition :o the guidelines of NFPA Preventative maintenance and 12A and 123, preventative =aintenance testing of systa=s are performed and testing of the syste=s, including quarterly. Halen cylinders are not check weighing of the Ealon cylinders check weighed; however, cylinder should be done at least quar:erly. pressure is checked and recorded quarterly, which would indicate any = ass loss. Particular consideration should also be given to: Considsration has been given :o it es. - ;a), (b) and (c). (a) =d-d us required Ealon conce -

stion and soak :ine (b) toxici:y of Halon (c) Icxici:y and corrosivt charac: eristics of ther=al deco posi:1on produe:s of Halon.

}k\\ } 5-31

a Position For Plants 'Inder Construe:1on and Oeerating Plants "etrecolitan Edison Reseense 5 Carben Dioxide Sumeressien Systens The use of carbon dioxide extinguishing A carbon dioxide system is systa=s should as a =1:1=us c:mply with provided for the protection of the require =ents of NFPA 12. " Carbon the relay room at elevation 33S'. Dioxide Extinguishing Syste=s." Particular consideracion should also The carbon dioxide system is be given to: designed in accordance with hTPA 12 to deliver s (a) =ini=um required CO: concentration concentration of 50 percen by and soak time; volu=e. (b)

oxicity of CO ;

Consideration has been given :o 2 (c) possibility of secondary :her=al shock (cooling) da= age; (d) offset:ing require =ents for venting during CO., injection to prevent overpressurization versus sealing to prevent loss of agent; (e) design require =en:s from over-pressurization; and (f) possibili:y and probability of CO., systa=s being out-of-service because of personnel safety consideration. CO2 syste=s are disar=ed whenever people are present in an area so protected. Areas entered frequently (even though duration time for any visi: is short) have often been found with CO2 systems shut off. 6. ?ortable Ex:ineuishers Fire extinguishers shoul:' he Portable fire ex:inguishers are provided in accordance with guide-provided and =sintained in lines of STFA 10 and 10A, " Portable accordance with h7?A 10. Fire Extinguishers, Ins:allation, Main:enance and iJse." Dry chemical ex:inguishers should be insalled with due consideration given :o cleanup problems af tar use and possible adverse effects on equi;=en: ins:alled in the area. 1413 146 5-32

a ?osition For Plan:s Under Construction and Oseratinz Plants Metrocolitan Edison Reseense ?. Guidelines for Soecific Plant Areas 1. Pri=arv and Secondarv Contain=ent (a) Nor=si coeration Fire protection require =ents for

he pri=ary and secondary conta1=nent areas should be provided on the basis of specific identified ha:ards. For evanple:

oLubricating oil or hydraulic fluid systa= for the primary coolan: pu=ps Cable ::ay arrange =ents and cable penetrations oCharcoal filters Fire suppression systems should The fire ha:ards analysis outlines be provided based on :he fire the protec:1on for contain=en: ha:ards analysis. areas. Fixed fire suppression capabili:y should be provided for hazards that could jeopardize safe plant shutdown. Auto =atic sprinklers are preferred. An acceptable alternata is automatic gas (Halon or CO ) for ha:ards 3 identified as requiring fixed suppression protec:1on. An enclosure may be required to confine :he agent if a gas systen is used. Such enclosures should not adversely affect safe shutdown, cr other operating equipment in con:ai=nen:. Auto =atic fire suppression capability need not be provided in the pri=ary contain=ent )k } }(7 a:=cspheres : hat are inerted during nor=al opera: ion. How-ever, special fire protection require =en:s during refueling and = air.:enance operations should be satisfied as provided belev. 5-33

s Position For Plants Under Cons: rue:ien and Cearatine ?lants Met ceelitan Edisen Restense (b) Refueline and Maintenance Refueling and =ain:enance ?:ocedures shall provide control opera:1ons in contade-ant nay for additienal hazards during introduce addi:1onal hazards refueling and =aintenance operations. such as conta=ina: ion control k'ork involving ignitica sources such =aterials, deconta=ination as welding and flane cut:ing shall supplies, wood pi ="kdng, temporary be done under closely centrolled wiring, velding and flama cutting conditices governed by procedures. (with portable ec= pressed fuel gas supply). Possible fires would not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and suppression systems. Management procedures and controls necessary to assure adequate fire protection are discussed in See:1on 3a. Equivalen protection from portable systa=s should be provided if it is i= practical

o install standpipes w1'.n hose stations.

2. Control Room The control room is essential to safe The control room is separated fres reactor operation. I: sust be the fuel handling building and pro: acted against disabling fire turbine building by 3 hour fire danage and should be separated fres resistance rated walls, and f:cm other areas of the plan: by floors, the control building by a 3 hour walls and roofs having sist=ws fire fire resistance rated floor and resistance ratings of three hours. sini=us 2 hour fire resistance rated walls and ceiling. The Control room cabinets and consoles exceptions are the EVAC ducts, the are subject to da= age from two recessed window and unlabeled dis:inct fire hazards: doors. Section 4.4.14.3 also discussed these ratings and outlines (a) Fire originating withis a

he protection for :he control roc =.

cabinet or console; and (b) Exposure fire involving co=bustibles in the general room area. Hose staticus adjacen- 'g the Hose stations will be p:cvided control roo= with pertabAe adjacen: :o :he con:rol roen. extinguishers in the cont:cl Portable extinguishers are roo= are accep table. p cvided in the ccntrol roc =. )k 5-3a

a s Position For Plants Under Construction and Coerating Plants Me:recolitan Edison Reseense No::les that are compa:ible with the Multi-purpose ec=bina:1cn fog-ha:ards and equipment in the con:rol straight s: ream no::les will be room should be provided for :he =anual provided. Personnel are trained hose s:a: ion. The no::les chosen in their safe use. should satisfy actual fire fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety and =inimize physical da= age :o electrical equip =ent from hose stream i=pingemen:. yire detection in :he control room Scoke detectors are provided in cabinets, and consoles should be the ceiling of the roem as well as provided by smoke and heat detectors in the ventilation exhaus: due: for in each fire area. Alarm and the building. Additional annunciation should be provided in protection is outlined in the the control room. Fire alarms in fire hazard analysis. (Refer to other parts of the plant should also Section 4.4.14). be ala:med and annunciated in the control room. 3reathing apparatus for control room 3reathing apparatuses for control operators should be readily available. room operators are readily avail-Control room floors, ceiling, supper:ing able. For fire ratings of the structures, and walls, including control room floors, walls and penetrations and doors, should be ceiling see See:1on 4.4.14.3-designed to a minimum fire rating of three hours. All penetra* tion seals should be air :ight. Manually operated ventilacion syste=s are acceptable. If such concealed spaces are used. The concealed space beneath the however, they should have fixed ccmouter room subfloor and adjacent automatic total flooding halon cable trench will be provided with protection. a total flooding Ealen system. 3. Cable Screading Room (a) The preferred acceptable =ethods are: (1) Automatic water system such S e relay room or cable spreading as closed head sprinklers, com (elevation 338') is open head deluge, or open protected by an au:cmatic low directional spray no::les. pressure CO, syste=.

• he room Deluge and open spray is co=ple:eI7 sealed to give a sys: ems should have 3 hour fire resis:ance rating, provisions for :anual with the exception of the C2DM cporation at a re=ote station; bus duct which has a loevered enclosure and penetrates :he wes:

wall. Pressure release devices are ac:uated by CC, discharge )k}) ik 5-35

e s Posi: ion For Plants Under Cons: ue:1cn and Deeratint ?lants Metroeolitan Edison Ressense however, :here should also be pressure an the discharge lines, provisions to preclude allowing doors and da=pers :o inadvertent operation. close, isolating :he relay room. Location of sprinkler heads Relief da=pers are being provided or spray no::les should in accordance wi:h NFPA 12 to consider cable tray si:ing prevent a pressure buildup. and arrangenents to assure adequate water coverage. Jacer spray is no: advocated Cables should be designed because of :he potential da= age to allow wetting down with to relay cabinets in the relay deluge water without roes / cable spread areas. electrical faulting. Open head deluge and open directional spray syste=s should be :ened so that a single failure will not deprive the entire area of au:e=atic fire suppression capability. The use of foam is acceptable, provided it is of a type capable of being delivered by a sprinkler or deluge system. such as an Aqueous Film For=ing Feas (AFFF). (2) Manual hoses and portable Portable fire ex:inguishers are extinguishers should be provided. Hose reels will be provided as backup. installed in accordance with the fire ha:ards analysis. t (3) Each cable spreading room Divisional cable separation for of each uni: should have IMI-l is in accordance with divisional cable separation, Regulatory Guide 1.75, and cable and be separated frem the spreading roo=s are widely other and the rest of the separated. The cable spreading plant by a =1simum three-roes is separated fres the rest of hour rated fire wall (Refer IMI-l by a 3 hour fire resistance to NFPA 251 or ASTM E-119 rating, with the exception of :he for fire test resistance CRDM bus duct which has a lou:ered ra:ing). enclosure and penetrates :he ves: vall. (4) At least two re=ote and separate entrances are Three re=ote entrances are provided to the room for provided to :hs roo=. (See access by fire brigade drawing D-023-016). personnel; and )k) 5-36

Position For Plants Under Constructien and Deeratine Plants Metreoclican Edisen Reseense (3) Aisle separation provided Cable ::ays are installed well between tray stacks should above ficor level. Access for be at leas: :hree feet wide =anual fire suppression and eigh: feet high. activities is adequate. (b) For cable spreading roo=s that do N/A not provide divisional cable separation of a(3), in addition

o =eeting a(1), (2), (4), and (5) above, :he following should also be provided:

(1) Divisional cable separation should =eet :he guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.75, " Physical Independence of Elec::1c Systa=s." (2) All cabling shculd be covered wich a suitable fire retardant coating. (3) As an alternate to a(1) above, auto =atically initiated gas syste=s (Halen or CO3) =ay be used for priE.ary fire suppression, p cvided a fixed water systa= is used as a backup. (4) Plants that cannot =eet

he guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.75 La addition to

=eeting a(1), (2), (4), and (5) above, an auxiliary shutdown syste= vich all cabling independent of the cable spreading roo= should be provided. i. Plant Co= outer Roo= Safety related ce=pu:ers should be TMI-l ce=puters are not safe:y separated fro = other areas of :he rela:ed. plant by barriers having a =1=i=u= three-hour fire resistan: : sting. Auto =atic fire de: action should be provided :o alar = and annuncia:e in the cont:cl :oc= and alar = locally. Man.ual hose s:ations and portable water and halon fire }k}} }b\\ extinguishers should be provided. 5-37

s y Position For Plants Under Const uction and Oeeratinz plants Metrocoli:an Edison Rassonse 5. Switchrear Rooms Switchgear roo=s should be separated Safety related sw1:chgear roe =s from the re=ainder of the plant by are separated from the re=ainder =ini=us three-hour rated fire of ~211-1 by 3 hour fire resistance barriers to :he extent prac:icable. rated walls, floors and ceiling. Auto =atic fire detection should alarm he fire harards analysis outlines and annuncia:e in :he control room the protectica require =ents for and alarm locally. Fire hose these areas. Portable fire stations and arable extinguishers ex:inguishers are readily available. ~ should be n;dily available. Fire hose stations will be ins:allec as discussed in See:1on 4.7.5.3. Acceptable protection for cables Water or gas suppression systa=s are that pass through the svi:chgear re: provided where cables pass reem is auto =atic water or gas agent through the switchgear room. suppression. Such automatic Houever, adequate seals will be suppression must consider preventing provided where these cables pene-unacceptable da= age to electrical trate the fire barriers. equipment and possible necessary contain=ent of agent following discharge. 6. Re=ote Safety Related Panels The general area housing re=ote Cc=bustible materials are safety related panels should te controlled in these areas. h7AC provided with auto =atic fire duct smoke detec: ors are provided detectors that alars locally and which alarm in the control roce alarm and annunciate in the only. Manual fire suppression control room. Combustible =aterials equipment is provided for chese should be controlled and I M :ed to areas. The fire harard analysis those required for operation. details these areas. ?or:able extinguishers and =anual hose stations should be provided. 7. Station 3atterr Roo=s 3attery rooms should be protected he bat:ery roo=s are separated against fire explosions. 3attery from other areas by 3 hour fire rooms should be separated from resistance rated walls, floors and each other and other areas of the ceiling. The fire hasards plant by barriers having a sini=us analysis ou: lines the protection fire rating of three-hours require =ents for these areas. inclusive of all penetra: ions and openings. (See :;7?A 69, " Standard on Explosion Prevention Syste=s. ") 'Tentilation systa=s in the battery 10 3 152 3-33

Position For Plants Under Construction and Oeeratine Plants Metrosolitan Edison Resoonse roons should be capable of =aintaining The ventilation system will the hydrogen concentration well below =aintain the hydrogen concentration 2 vol. hydrogen concentration. well below 2 percent by volume. Standpipe and hose and portable Portable fire extinguishers are extinguishers should be provided. provided and a hose reel will be installed. Alternatives: (a) Provide a total fire rated N/A barrier enclosure of the battery room ce= plex that exceeds the fire load contained in the room. (b) Reduce the fire load to be within the fire ba rier capability of 1-1/2 hours. 'sK (c) Provide a rer sta sanual actuated sprinkler system in each room and provide the 1-1/2 hour fire barrier separation. S. Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil Storage and Use Areas A blank fire wall having a =inimus No safety related equip =ent is resistance rating of three hours exposed to the turbine oil should separate all areas containing storage areas. safety related systems and equipment from the turbine oil system. When a ble.nk wall is not present, open head deluge protection should be provided for the turbine oil hatards and autematic open head water curtain protection should be provided for wall openings. 9. Diesel Generator Areas Diesel generators should be separated The diesel generator areas saet fr:m each other and other areas of this criterion. the plant by fire barriers having a ed.ni=u= fire resistance rating of three hours. ) 4 f-29

?osi: ion For Plants Under Construe: ion and Ooerating Plants Metrocolitan Edison Reseense When day :anks cannot be separated f cm As outlined in the fire ha:ard

he diesel-genera:or one of the analysis, :he diesel generator following should be provided for the is protected by co=bination open diesel genera:or area:

head feluge and closed head (a) Aute=atic open head deluge or open head spray no::le syste=(s) (b) Aut==stic closed head sprinklers (c) Auto =a:1c AFT? that is delivered by a sprinkler deluge or spray system (d) Auto =atic gas systas (Ealon or CO ) may be used in lieu of foan 3 ~ or sprinklers to cembat diesel generator and/or lubricating oil fires. 10. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capaci:y Diesel fuel for the e=ergency greater than 1100 gallons should not generators is stored in a 30,000 be located inside the buildings gallen underground tank. containing safety related equipment. They should be located at least 50 feet from any building containing safety related equip =ent, or if located w1:hin 50 feet, they should be hotned in a separate building with construe: ion having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. Suried tanks are considered as neeting the three hour fire resistance requirements. See NFPA 3C, "Flam=able and Combustible Ligaids Code", for additional guidance. When located in a separate building,

he tank should be pro:ec:ed by an au:c=atic fire suppression system such as AFF7 or sprinklers.

In operating plants where tanks are located directly above or below 1413 154

he diesel generators and canno:

reasonably be noved, separating floors and =ain s::uctural embers f-40

Posi: ion For Plants Under Construe:Lon and Oeerating Plants Metrocoli:an Edison Resoonse should, as a mini =us, have fire resistance rating of three hours. Floors should be liquid :igh: to preven: leaking of possible oil spills from one level to another. Drains should be provided to re=ove possible oil spills and fire figh:ing wucer to a safe location. One of :he following acceptable sethods of fire protec:1on should also be prrvided: (a) Auto =atic open head deluge or open head spray nos:le systen(s) (b) Auto =atic closed head sprinklers; or (c) Au:o=atic AFFF that is delivered by a sprinkler system or spray systen 11. Safety Related Pu=es Pu=p houses and rooms housing The screen house containing the safety related pu=ps should be service water pu=ps is protec:ed protected by auto =atic sprinkler with a we pipe, sprinkler systa= protec: ion unless a fire hazards (which alarms in :he control room analysis can de=onstrate t'at a only). Portable fire extinguishers fire will not endanger oth'" are provided. The fire ha:ard saf ety related equipnent re, trad analysis identifies other safe:y for safe plant shutdown. Early related pu=ps and protection. warning fire detection should. be installed wf:h alars and annuncia: ion locally and in the control room. Local hose sta:1ons and portable extinguishers should also be provided. Equipment pedestals or curbs and Equipment is installed on concre:e drains should be provided :o pads. Adequate drainage for re=ove and direc: water away from water is provided. saf ety related equipment. Provisions should be made for =anual S=oke re= oval will be provided by con:rol of :he ven:ila: ion syste= portable fans, if required.

o facili:a:e smoke rc= oval if required for =anual fire figh:ing opera:1on.

\\ 3-41

Position For Plants Under Construction and Coerstinz Plants Metrocoli:an Edison Rescense

12. New Fuel Area Eand por:able extinguishers should be Manual suppression equipsec.: such loca:ed vi:hin this area. Also, as hose stations and portaele local hose stations should be located fire extinguishers are provided.

outside but within hose reach of this Auto =atic detec: ion is provided area. Au:osatic fire detection should in the exhaust ventilatica due:s. alars and a=nunciate in the control room and alars locally. Combustibles should be limited to a mini =um in the new fuel area. The storage area should be provided with a drainage system to preclude accumulation of water. The storage configuration of new The fuel asse=blies are stored in fuel shculd always be so =aintained parallel racks having a nominal as :o preclude criticali:7 for any center-to-center distance of water density that =ight occur during 21-1/2 inches in both directions. fire water application. This spacing is sufficient to =aintain a K. of less than 0.9 whenflooded*bithunboratedwater; this is based on fuel with an enrigb=ent of 3.5 percent by weight of U~##. 13. Seent Fuel Pool Area Protection for the spent fuel pool Manual suppression equipment area should be provided by local such as hose stations and portable hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided, extinguishers. Au:omatic fire Au:e=atic detection is provided detection should be provided to in the exhaust ventilation due:s. alars and annunciate in :he control No local alar =s are provided.

oom and to alars locally.

14. Radwaste Buildine The radwaste building should be The plant has no radwaste separated from other areas of the building per se. These facilities plant by fire barriers having at are provided in :he auxiliary leas: three-hour ratings. Automatic building. Automatic detection is sprinklers should be used in all provided in the sain exhaus: areas where co=bustible sacerials ventilation duct which is are located. Autocacic fire au:o=3tically isolated upon detec:1on should be provided to detection of s=oke. No local annunciate and alars in :he con:rol alar:s are provided. See :he room and alar = locally. During a fire ha:ards analysis for :he f ira, the ventilation systens in auxiliary building. (See: ion

hese areas should be capable of 1.2).

being isolated.

• 'a : e should drain a

o liquid radwas:e building su=ps.

\\ g

o Posi:1on For Plants L*nder Construction and Ooeratine ?lants Metrocolitan Edison Rescense Acceptable al:ernative fire pror :: ion is auto =atic fire detection to alar = and annunciate in the control roo=, in addi:1on :o nanual hose stations and portable ex:inguishers consisting of hand held and large wheeled units. 15. Decencamination Areas The decontanina: ion areas should be The personnel deconta=ination protected by autenatic sprinklers area is located in the control if fla==able liquids are stored. building at elevation 306'. The Auto =atic fire de:ection should be equipment de:onta=ination area is provided to annunciate and alar = in located in the auxiliary building the control room and alar = locally. a: eleva: ion 305'. The fire hazards The ventilation systa= should be analysis outlines the protection capable of being isolated. Local for :hese areas. hose s:s: ions and hand portable extinguishers should be provided as backup :o the sprinkler systa=. 16. Saferv Related Water Tanks Storage tanks that supply water The fire ha:ards analysis outlines for safe shutdown should be the protection for this area. protected from the effects of fire. Local hose stations and portable extinguishers should be provided. Por:able ex:fnguishers should be located in nearby hose heures. Co=bustible =aterials should not be secred nex: to outdoor tanks. A =ini=u= of 50 feet of separation should be provided between outdoor tanks and ce=bustible =aterials where feasible. 17. Cooling Tevers Cooling :owers should be of non-Cooling :owers are not required co=bustible construction or so for safe shutdow=. located : hat a fire will not adversely affect any safety related systa=s or equip =en:. Cooling

owers should be of non-co=bustible construction when :he basins are used for :he ul:i= ate hest sink or for the fire pro:ection wa:er supply.

Cooling towers of co=bustible )4\\3 \\57 5-43

t ?osi:fon For Plants Under Construction and Ocerating Plancs Metroeolitan Edison Rescense cons: rue: ion, so located that a fire in thes could adversely affect safe:7 related syste=s or e"..ap=ent should be protected with an can head deluge system installation vi:h hydran:s and hose houses strategically located.

13. Miscellaneous Areas Miscellaneous areas such as records The record storage areas, shops, storage areas, shops, varehouses, and varehouses and aux 111arv boiler auxiliary boiler rooms should be so rocs are protected by au:omatic located : hat a fire or effects of a sprinklers, and are separated fire, including s=oke, vill not from safety related systems or adversely affect any safety rela:ed equipment by fire barriers.

syste=s or equipment. Fuel oil Therefore, fire or smoke would not tanks for auxiliary boilers should affect safety related syste=s or be buried or provided vi:h dikes to equipment. The fuel oil tank con:ain the entire tank contents. for the auxiliary boiler is provided vich a dike. G. Scecial Protection Guidelines 1. 'Jelding and Cutting, Acetvlene - Oxveen Fuel Gas Svstems This equipment is used in various .itorage of all oxygen / acetylene is areas throughout the plant. Storage =aintained out-of-doors. Tanks locations should be chosen to per=1: in use by =aintenance and/or fire protection by automatic contractor personnel are closely sprinkler syste=s. local hose supervised and are covered by a stations and portable equipment Met-Ed procedure which incorporates should be provided as hackup. The a per:10 syste=. No auto =atic requirements of N7?A 51 and 513 fire suppression syste=s are are applicable :o these ha:ards. afforded. A per=1: system should be required to utili:e this equipment. (Also refer to 2f herein.) 2. Storage Areas for 3rv Ion Exchange Resins Dr/ ion exchange resins should not ~here are no dry ion exchange be stored near essential safe:y resins a: M -1. related systems. Dry unused resins should be protected by automatic vet pipe sprinkler ins:allations. Detec: ion by s=oke and heat detec: ors should alar: and annunciate f)) \\5J f-:.:

e ~ ?csi:icu For Plan:s Under Cocstructien and Oeerating Plants Metrocoli:an Edison Reseense in :he control roo= and alar = locally. local hose s:a: ions and portable extinguishers should provide backup for :hese 1:aas. Storage areas of dry resin sh uld have curbs and drains. (Refer :o NFPA 92M, "'4aterproofing and Draining of Floors.") 3. Ha:ardous Chemicals Ha:ardous che=icals should be s:ored The hazardous che=icals a: IMI-1, and protec:ed in accordance with the as defined in NF?A 49, are sodien reco==endations of N7?A 19, "Ha:ardous hydroxide, sulfuric acid and chlor-Che=icals Da:a." Che=1cals storage ine gas, and are presently stored areas should be well ventilated and and protec:ed in accordance with :he pro:ee:ed against flooding conditions recoc=endations of NFPA 49. Che=- since some che=icals =ay react wi:h ical storage areas are well ventil-water to produce ignition, a:ed and protected against flooding. 4. Materials Containing Radioactivity Materials that collec: and con:ain Spent ion exchange resins will al-radioactivity such as spen: ion ways be co=pletely con:ained and exchange resins, charcoal fil:ers, will, therefore, never be exposed and HEPA filters should be stored in to ignition sources or co=bustibles. closed =etal tanks or containers Spent charcoal filters and HEPA that are located in areas free fro filters will be exposed only ignizion sources or ce=bustibles. during their re= oval from service. These =aterials should be protected After re=cval, they will be fro = exposure to fires in adjacen: stored in =e:al dru=s : hat will areas as well. Consideration should ce=pletely contain the= f:c= any be given :o require =ents for re= oval ignition sources or co=bustibles. of isotopic decay haat fro = entrained radioactive =acerials. For discussion of fire protec:1on for these =acerials refer :o See:1ons 2.3.7, 4.2.3.3 and 4.2.3.9. Filtering syste=s (charcoal) are protected by deluge fire protection systens as discussed in the applicab.a sec: ions of the fire ha:ards analysis. 1413 159 5-45

AP?T.3DII SA RISC2 0F TIRE PROTICTION ENGINEER h i*mm

R. M. Klingn=an Fire ? otection Engisee Me:ropoli:an Idison Cc=pany Mr. Klingn=an received a 3.5. Degree in Mechanical Ingineering fr = :he ?ennsylvania S:a:e Universi:7 in 1951 a=d received adt.:1onal ::aining in nuclear power reac:or engineering in 1967 fro = the U:1versi:7 of Mic.Sigan. Ze has been a licensed professional engineer in :he Ce c weal:h of ?e::sylvania since 1963. nis indivd. dual has 25 years practical engineering espe:1ence associated vi h design, construction, testing, and opera:1on of various types of =echanical equip =en: vi:h e=phasis en combustion, stea= generatien, and elec:rical genera:1on equip =ent. For the pas: 13 years, he has been pri=arily associa:ed vi::h fossil and nuclear generating sta: ions. ne ft:s: 5 of :hese years were span: on he operating s:aff of a :vo uni:, fossil-fires 400 W electrical generating station. n is positton required inci=a:e k=owledge of design,1: spec: ion, opera: ion, =aintenance, and, testing of fire protec:1on systa=s and ::aining of the in-plan: fire brigade. During the =os: recen: 8 years, he was involved v1G che design and opera:1on of one 300 F.J nuclear uni: and :he design of a 900 W nuclear unit. nese efforts included par:1cipa:Los in :he escab11sh=en: of fire protection design para =e:ers end selection of equi;=ent, involve =en in the de:er..ina: ion of tes: requirements and acceptance cri:eria for the physical fire pro:ection sys:e=, and involve =en: in developing the overall station fire protection prog-a=. 1413 161 - - c.- SA-1

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p m

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Oi c' a

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w = i + i,,I_l p d 1 i Ih,. Llala%n i 1 J + J _i .~, m m s a a .a. e o r = T. N. N. N. N. E

1. v=

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m=4 ri s *ly W e Q l

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e. n..; g,..

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• d a

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l! j j

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y..

s i..O D

t r. c

w _

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p! kllultj e H gI hYb

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l a

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1. \\

Za, m \\ g = .sce,. a i ,y e 1413 180 e

= I = 1 4 ,,i,,, t s t ii rg

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t il i ( ~ s' gt II 3-E l t mr-jih sj 5l _ C {"] D t ) !E %:S y!! *! B I u i =.., 3 's l

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r! R d if kk f k I,

s. e

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si ed r

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