ML19209A551
| ML19209A551 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck, Millstone File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1979 |
| From: | NORTHEAST UTILITIES |
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| ML19209A550 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910040307 | |
| Download: ML19209A551 (60) | |
Text
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JUSTIFICATION FOR THREE-MAN FIRE BRIGADE FOR CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST :(UCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY (MILLSTONE UNITS #1 and #2)
Prepared By Northeast Utilities Service Company SEPTEMBER, 1979 1090 275 79100403 1
s 1
The purpose of this paper is to present Northcast Utilities (NNECO &
CYAPCO) position with respect to the minimum fire brigade size required to handle postulated fires in safety related areas.
Historical information on nuclear power plant fires show that the most likely time that a fire would occur is during periods of construction, maintenance, or testing. A summary of fires at nuclear power plants is provided in Attachment 1.
Although the history shows that fewer fires occur during periods of routine operation, the basis for establishing the 3-man brigade size is that a fire will start during this lower probability period.
Fire protection concerns for nuclear power plants differ greatly from standard acceptable residential and industrial fire protection practices.
The nuclear power plant must maintain the ability to safely shutdown while minimizing radioactive release to the environment.
In order to satisfy these concerns, the NRC staff promoted the defense-in-depth concept approach to fire protection as documented in Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1.
The concept is aimed at achieving an adequate balance in:
a)
Preventing fires from starting b)
Detecting and suppressing fires quickly c)
Designing safety systems such that a fire will not prevent safe shutdown functions.
BTP 9.5-1 states that "no one of these echelons can be perfect or complete by itself. Strengthening any one can compensate in some measure for weakness, known or unknown, in the others."
To support the defense-in-depth concept, Northeast Utilities has committed considerable resources to develop a fire protection program that will minimize both the probability and consequences of postulated fires.
Northeast Utilitier' Fire Protection Program consists of active and passive features, and administrative controls to provide a balance between fire prevention and protection.
A brief summation of this program is provided below.
Development of Fire Hazard Analysis Reports Northeast Utilities' Fire Hazard Analysis Reports identify all areas of the plant as specific fire zones. Each individual fire zone is thoroughly defined in terms of. physical features, fire loading, fire protection systems and type of plant equipment located within the zone.
These reports are used as valuable reference material for fire brigade training.
Hardware Modification Many new early warning detection and suppression systems are being installed to provide active fire protection.
Passive fire protection features are also being implemented to restrict the spread of fire.
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t 2-These features include:
penetration seals, fire dampers, curbing, fire doors, fire retardant coatings, and oil collection systems.
Administrative Control Features Administrative control procedures have been revised to conform to NRC's guide entitled Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance.
Administrative control procedures for NNECO and CYAPCO address fire protection organizational structure, functional responsibilities, fire brigade training, control of combustibles, control of ignition sources and method of fire protection designs, review, and procurement.
Technical Specifications of Fire Protection Systems Fire protection active and passive systems for safety related areas have been documented in the form of technical specifications.
Consequently an increased degree of assurance is provided for the reliability of these systems.
NU Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Plants The NU Fire Protection Program details guidelines to assure positive attention to all aspects of fire protection.
It incorporates NRC guidelines, American Nuclear Insurers requirements and NFPA design practices, to form a detailed, coht sive and workable program.
Quality Assurance Fire protection quality assurance requirements have been established for design, procurement, installation, testing, and administrative controls for fire protection in safety related areas. Quality assucance provides a high level of confidence that all fire pro-tection considerations have been thoroughly addrecsed and that all applicable codes and standards have been considered and incor-porated where appropriate.
Fire Brigade Training Program The Fire Brigade Training Program was developed to assure that the capability to fight potential fires is established and maintained.
The program is conducted yearly and combines classroom instructions with actual hands-on training to maintain a high level of confidence in fire fighting capability.
As described above, Northeast Utilities has committed extensive resources to provide a balance between active and passive systems and administrative control features in support of NRC's defense-in-depth concept associated with nuclear power plant fire protection.
Fire brigade staffing for nuclear power plants is an important feature of the defense-in-depth concept and must be integrated into the overall fire protection program.
10'!U 2 / 7
1 f The NRC Staff's requirement for fire brigade size was documented in a position paper entitled Manpower Requirements for Operating Reactors and is summarized as follows:
" Fire Brigade: The staff has concluded that the minimum size of the fire brigade shift should be five persons unless a specific site evaluation has been completed and some other number is justified. The five-man team would consist of one leader and four fire fighters and would be expected to provide defense against the fire for an initial 30-minute period."
Northeast Utilities has reviewed the above requirement for fire brigade staffing and has concluded that a three-man brigade consisting of a team leader and two additional men will be sufficient tc extinguish, control, or contain all fires in safety related/ safe shutdown areas until off-site assistance can be provided.
In establishing this minimum fire brigade shift size, the following factors were considered:
a)
Plant geometry, size, access and egress routes.
b)
Plant passive fire protection features such as fire walls, barriers, fire stops, coatings and fire doors, etc.
c)
Plant active fire protection features such as detection and suppression systems.
d)
Fire protection administrative controls and programs e)
Fire brigade training and drilling.
f)
Strategic location and availability of fire fighting and supporting equipment.
g)
Availability cf off-site assistance.
In conjunction with the above considerations, it is emphasized that the minimum fire brigade staffing of three fire fighters would exist during periods of minimal activity such as early morning hours or holidays and the plant is operating under normal conditions.
The greatest probability of fires in nuclear power plants exists during periods of high maintenance and testing activities. This could include cutting, weldine, burning or the transporting of transient combustibles.
It should be recognized that during those periods of high activity a reserve complement of maintenance, operations and engineering personnel are available to provide assistance.
In contrast to the normal working, higher probability shift, the back shifts typically involve a minimum of maintenance / testing activities and the probability of a fire is therefore greatly reduced.
For either situation (normal or back shift), if additional rssistance is required, the following options are available:
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I 1)
Assistance can be provided from the local fire departments.
Local volunteer fire companies are located within a few miles of the plants and can quickly respond to a fire call.
The local volunteer fire companies have met with NNECO and CYAPCO and have reviewed procedures for emergency access to the plant and method of escort to the fire scene. During a recent hydrogen truck fire incident at NNECO, the local volunteer fire department was notified for assistance and arrived at the fire scene within minutes (see Attachment 2, Chronological Events During Hydrogen Fire Incident).
2)
The plant recall system could provide whatever trained manpower is required. Emergency plan and emergency procedures provide guidelines for calling in plant personnel to assist in the emergency.
NRC's philosophy for brigade staf fing appears to origiuate, in part, from the career service, in which the minimum engine company manning considered to be effective for an initial attack on a fire scene is a five-man unit.
In support of the career service concept, the NRC defines the five-man brigade make-up as follows:
One Supervisor - This individual must have fire tactics training.
He will assume all command responsibilities for fighting the fire.
During plant emergencies, the brigade supervisor should not have other responsibilities that would detract from his full attention being devoted to the fire.
This supervisor should not be actively engaged in the fighting of the fire.
His total function should be to survey the fire area, command the brigade, and keep the upper levels of plant management in fo rmed.
Two Hose Men - A 1.5 inch fire hose being handled within a window-less enclosure would require two trained individuals.
The two team members are required to physically handle the active hose line and to prutect each other while in the adverse environment of the fire.
Two Additional Team Members - One of these individuals would be required to supply filled air cylinders to the fire fighting members of the brigade and the second to establish smoke ventilation and aid in filling the air cylinder. These two individuals would also act as the first backup to the engaged team.
Northeast Utilities believes that the rationale behind the career service concept is that a five man fire brigade unit is responding to a postulated 3 a.m.
warehouse or residential fire in which fire fighters have little experience and knowledge of building features or available fire protection equipment at the site. Along with these unknown variables, the career service responding team must also be concerned with life safety. Extra men and time must be allotted to perform search and rescue operations.
It should also be mentioned that the pumper, used by this responding unit, is a complex piece of equipment which requires several individuals to make primary connections. Also, the pumper requires the full attention of one individual to operate.
Based on uncertainties a fire can present, the unknown variables (features, layout, equipment, etc.), complexity of equipment involved (pumper), and the life safety concerns, the Staff's conclusion for the career service brigade size appears appropriate.
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t t
3 Northeast Utilities recognizes the noted rationale for the postulated career service fire, however, the suggested comparison with nuclear power plant fire protection is not appropriate.
Power plant brigade members are totally familiar with plant design, features, combustibles and fire fighting equipment available to them. No time or manpower is wasted in search and rescue operations because all individuals are accounted for.
No complex fire fighting equipment is required to per-manently occupy a brigade member. All fire fighting equipment is per-manently installed, trategically located and readily available.
These considerations are supportive of the smaller brigade size for the power plant situation.
Northeast Utilities is not in agreement with the Staff's specific re-quirement that two men are required to handle a 1-1/2" fire hose.
Recent trends in fire fighting has been to deviate from the traditional 2-1/2" hose to the 1-1/2" fire hose.
It har been shown that the 1-1/2" hose has higher maneuverability, is lighter, and is easier to use than the 2-1/2" hose. A current practice of fire departments, which makes the one-man 1-1/2" fire hose extremely practical, is the use of "precon-nected" hose lines directly connected to the pump discharge outlets. By loading the hose properly on the pumper, one man can advance 150 feet of 1-1/2" hose to a fire location and then operate the hose, discharging water on the fire for extinguishment (see Attachment 3 Handling 1-1/2" Hose line).
Interior hose stations at nuclear power plants can all be classified as "preconnected." Hose stations are strategically located and preconnected for case in removal by one brigade member. One individual can advance an uncharged hose from the rack to the fire location, _harge the hose, and return to operate.
The ability to operate a 1-1/2" charged fire hose line was demonstrated at Palisades Nuclear Power Plant by members of their fire brigade. The documented result was, "There was no question about a single brigade member's ability to individually handle a fire hose."
NU concludes that since one individual brigade member could actually advance, prepare and activate a 1-1/2" hose line, the fire brigade leader could assist in maneuvering the line during fire fighting.
It is NU's contention that periodic involvement or assistance by the brigade leader will not distract from his prime responsibility of directing fire fighting strategies.
With respect to NRC's position that two additional team members are required to establish smoke ventilation and provide air breathing cylinders, NU does not agree.
It is recognized that ventilation for aormal fire fighting applications has always been an essential part of fire fighting strategies but for the nuclear plant, ventilations could present serious problems.
Basic deterrents of portable ventilation for nuclear power plants include:
1.
Ventilation can spread fire vertically and horizontally.
2.
It will spread toxic gases, smoke and heat to other unaffected areas of the plant if not directed to atmosphere.
1090
')80 c
t 9 3.
Ventilation can increase the size and burning rate of a fire by increasing the available oxygen supply.
4.
It may be physically impossible to ventilate areas of a plant due to the amount of concrete and the lack of special tools to cut through it.
5.
Radioactive smoke and gases must be confined and/or released under controlled conditions.
Permanently installed air handling systems are normally designed to shutdown in times of fire to prevent smoke, heat and toxic gases from exhausting through the ventilation system to other areas of the plant.
Portable venting would actually defeat this purpose. A guideline issued by ANI entitled, " International Guidelines for the Fire Pro *.ection of Nuclea r Power Plants," discusses the problems associated wi h ventila-tion of toxic and corrosive gases given off by nuclear power plant type fires.
The guideline states that " Smoke, corrosive gases and the radio-active substances which might be freed by the fire should be led from their place of origin directly to a place where they cause the least damage or hindrance, which for the smoke and corrosive gases means outdoors, but for the radioactive substances means either confinement or release under controlled conditions, which is equivalent to at least a temporary confinement". As suggested the use of portable ventilation for nuclear power plants is not an essential part of fire fighting strategies and is considered a variable with total dependency on the fire situation as it developes.
NU concludes that portable ventilation would not be an immediate concern, and controlled portable ventilation would be used if required when additional support personel become available.
Scott air packs and spare bottles are strategically located throughout the plant to support fire fighting efforts.
In addition, a central storage facility has been established to store necessary additional fire protection supportive equipment.
Scott air pack and spare bottles will be stored in this centralized facility.
Fire Brigade Members are instructed to gather supportive gear, including, Scott air packs, enroute to the fire scene.
The possibility of reducing effective brigade size due to incapacitating injuries to brigade members is remote in a nuclear power plant.
Fire brigade members are thoroughly familiar with plant layout and access / egress routes.
Brigade members receive special instructions on how to proceed to the scene of the fire. Also, unique plant features such as concrete walls, floors, and ceilings minimize the effects of collapsing structures.
bith respect to a fire situation at our operating plants, brigade noti-fication and sequencing is as follows:
1)
Person discovering the fire shall immediately report the location and type of fire to the control room.
2)
Control room operator uses the in plant page system, announcing that a fire emergency exists and location of fire.
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i
< 3)
Fire brigade members proceed to scene of fire gathering supportive gear enroute to the fire.
4)
At NNECO, fire brigade trained persons not part of the shift response team, report to the control room and await instructions.
Fire brigade members of the unaffected unit also assemble in the control room.
At CYAPCO, all fire brigade members respond to a fire situation.
5)
Fire brigade leader coordinates fire fighting efforts and maintains telephone communication with the control room.
6)
If off-site assistance is determined to be necessary, the control room will notify the local fire departments and utilize the plant's recall system to obtain whatever trained manpower is required.
Security is also notified by the control room to establish a control point for responding local fire departments.
7)
When the fire is extinguished a fire watch is stationed until clean-up is completed.
NNECO's and CYAPCO's station procedure detailing fire brigade method of response to a fire situation is enclosed as Attachment 4 and 4A.
In the development of the five-man fire brigade for nuclear power plants, the staff has entertained discussions of a fire scenario involving the following sequence of events; a)
Assume a fire starts.
b)
Assume cxisting detection system fails to provide an alarm.
c)
Assume plant operators or patroling guard force does not detect the incipient fire.
d)
Assume automatic suppression system fails to actuate and alarm.
c)
Assume a brigade member becomes incapacitated enroute to fire scene.
f)
Assume inclement weather prevents off-site assistance to respond.
Northeast Utilities agrees that for the most severe or unusual situation, a combination of these assumptions could be postulated, but to assume that all can occur simultaneously is totally unrealistic.
In fact, the Staff's assumptions in this instance depart significantly from the single failure criterion established in 10 CFR 50.
The fire protection systems, equipment and personnel used in the make-up of these assumptions, are totally independent of each other. Failure of any noted detection or suppression system has no adverse affect on the remaining systems.
This again reflects the degree of redundancy established by nuclear power plants to maintain the defense-in-depth concept.
1090 282
4 7 To provide assurance that a 3-man fire brigade could handle any postu-lated fire that could occur, a fire scenario was developed for each individual operating plant. The scenario is intended to show that a 3-man fire brigade could contain, control or extinguish any postulated fire that could develop.
The fire area chosen for the postulated fire was the diesel generator room for all three operating units (NNECO & CYAPCO). This fire area was chosen for the following reasons:
1.
Room geometry restricts manual fire fighting.
2.
High flammable / combustible area (fuel oil).
3.
Normal diesel operation presents high temperature surfaces (possible ignition source).
4.
Live electrical hazard area.
5.
Diesel generitors significant to safe shutdown.
6.
Diesel generator rooms are not conveniently located with respect to response time (fairly remote frem control room).
Attachments 5 and 5A address the postulated fire areas and clearly demonstrate the ability of a 3-man fire brigade to control or extinguish the fire.
In conclusion, NU has technically justified and firmly believes that a three-man fire brigade is adequate in size co assure control or extin-guishment of fires in safety related areas.
This justification conserva-tively assumes the specific conditions of normal plant operation and a minimal amount of maintenance activity in progress.
Fire brigade size is only one factor in the overall fire protection program. All facets of the fire protection program must be considered when determining if proper assurance has been provided to protect the health and safety of the public. The NRC must realistically consider the extensive modifications agreed upon and their impact on the overall fire protection program. Early detection and extensive fire suppression virtually eliminates the run-away, out-of-control type fire which would require the extra manpower. To isolate one segment of the fire protection program, such as fire brigade size, and ignore the remaining segments of the program is not consistent with the defense-in-depth concept.
It should be noted that extensive plant modifications were proposed prior to the staff's site inspection. These modifications were the result of detailed inspections, reinspections and meetings by many qualified agencies and people which include American Nuclear Insurers, Industrial Risk Insurers, Johnson & Higgins, NUS, and a multi-discipline NUSCO task force. A brief profile of these independent agencies and individuals involved in evaluating NNECO and CYAPCO is documented in.
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' Northeast Utilities, therefore, concludes that a three-man fire brigade can adequately extinguish or control any fire to assure safe plant operation, achieve safe shutdown, and minimize radioactive release to the environment.
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a f
ATTAClfMENT 1 HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON FIRES AT NUCLEAR POWER PIANTS 1090 285
i e
Historical Information on Fires at Nuclear Power Plants The major source of information relating to fires at nuclear power plants was from the reference in " Recommendations Related to the Browns Ferry Fire." NUREG-0050. Those references indicate that a total of 46 fires had been reported prior to the Browns Ferry fire. A review of the NRC's computer based Licensee Event Fire has indicated that 14 additional fires have been reported since the Browns Ferry fire.
In each case the computer based files were reviewed to categorize the type of fire, cause and status of the plant at the time of the occurence.
In many instances the information was not sufficient; hence, a number of the reports as filed by the licensees were reviewed in the public document room to obtain further information.
In some of these instances the plant status (operating or shutdownT was not reported. From this background information one can make value judgements on the relative risk of fire initiation.
As evaluated, of the 60 fires reported, 38 (63%) of them occurred directly result of construction, maintenance or testing activities and, in as a most instances, the plant was in a shutdown status.
There were only eight instances (13%) identified where the fire occurred during a period of normal routine operation when no construction, maintenance or testing activities were in progress.
In 14 (24%) of the reported fires, the summaries were not sufficient to establish if the plant were in an operation or shutdown status.
In any event, the historical record shows that fires are the least likely to occur in those instances when the plant is in normal steady state operation. This is, of course, the period of time when there are the fewest persons on site and the NRC proposed requirement for a minimum fire brigade size of five is the most difficult.
The historical recori also shows that those fires of electrical origin (electrical cables on equipment) were in most cases promptly extinguished (a notable exception was the Browns Ferry fire).
In fact, many of the electrical fires were extinguished by merely removing electrical power from the affected equipment.
The Browns Ferry fire of March 22, 1975, precipitated a reopening of this issue for all operating plants. A number of problems were identified during the evaluation of the fire and there was little doubt that something needed to be done to prevent a reoccurrence of the events at other operating plants. On the other hand, it must also be remembered that the Browns Ferry fire persisted for many hours until the decision was made to use water af ter which the fire was promptly extinguished. Also significant are NRC evaluations of the overali risk from that fire as documented in the Reactor Safety Study. That evaluation states:
"To check the validity of its qualitative judgement, the study has made a quantitative assessment of the potential for the Browns Ferry fire to have caused a significant release of radicactivity.
The results of this analysis indicate that the potential for a core melt accident as a result of the fire is estimated to be about 20% of that obtained from all other causes analyzed in WASH-1400, it can be said that, if this fire is typical of the possible 1090 286
. gamut of large electrical fires at nuclear power plants, the Browns Ferry fire does not affect the validity of the overall WASH-1400 risk assessment. Furthermore, a lesson that emerges clearly from the examination of the fire that occurred is that rather straight-forward measures, such as may already exist at other nuclear plants, can significantly reduce the likelihood of a potentia? core melt accident that might result from a large fire."
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ATTACHMENT 2 CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS DURING HYDROGEN FIRE INCIDENT 1090 288
TECHNICAL REPORT ON HYDROGEN TRAILER FIRE MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION AUGUST 11, 1978 TIME (P.M. EDT)
MESSAGE OR EVENT 1:10 Issuance of alarm to fire stations and men of Jordan and Goshen Fire Departments for " oxygen or hydrogen truck fire".
1:10 Waterford Chief responding.
1:10 Waterford Fire Marshall responding.
1:10 Waterford Assistant Fire Marshall responding.
1:10 W-33, Goshen pumper, responding.
1:10 W-32, Goshen pumper, responding.
1:10 Ambulance responding.
1:10 W-11, Jordan pumper, responding.
1:11 W-12, Jordan pumper, responding.
1:11 W-31, Goshen pu:nper, responding.
1:11 Assistant Deputy Chief responding.
1:12 Assistant Fire Marshall reports fully involved high pressure trailer.
1:13 Chief requests response of W-25, Quaker Hill's snorkle.
NOTE:
Waterford normally has two ladder trucks which would have been closer to the scene and would have responded with the first alarm, but they were both out-of-service this day.
1:15 W-25 responding.
1:15 Ambulance at scene.
1:18 W-33 at scene.
1:20 W-42, Oswegatchie pumper, dispatched to Goshen Station to cover.
1:21 W-48, Oswegatchie Assistant Deputy Chief dis-patched Flanders to cover Oswegatchie Station.
- The purpose of providing this partial chronological listing of events is to show the response time of the local fire department as they reacted to a recent fire incident at NNECO.
This information is an excerpt from a NU report on the incident.
10,10 289
ATTACHMENT 3 HANDLING 1-1/2" HOSE LINE 1090 290
The nozzle should be checked for proper gasket, for operation of control valves, and for dents or obstructions that might interfere with the proper flow of the fire streams (periodic inspection).
The nozzle should be kept closed while the firefighters are mating up hose lines, hoisting or advancing lines, and changing operation positions.
The nozzle shou d never be dragged or dropped. If tips are removed, they should be carried in the firefighters' clothing and returned to the apparatus.
Trapped air should be released through the nozzle, and the stream checked or fog pattern properly set before firefighters enter to attack a fire.
The flow of water should be controlled by slowly opening and closing all nozzles, valves, and clamps. Slow operation prevents sudden surges of pressure upon the hose and equipment and is a precaution against injury to firefighters and damage to equipment.
If there is more than one man handling a nozzle, place a backup man about an arm's length behind the nozzleman to relieve tne nozzleman of nozzle reaction.
If a nozzle should get out of control, the firefighter(s) should step in front of the nozzle to prevent being struck by it.
ONE-MAN METHOD (11/2. INCH HOSE)
A hose line and the nozzle must be kept under control at all times. When one man is required to handle a 1-1/2-inch hose and nozzle, some means must be provided for bracing and anchoring the hose line. To accomplish this, a nozzleman should hold the nozzle with one hand and with the other hand hold the hose just back of the nozzle. The hose line should be straightened for at least ten feet behind the nozzleman, and he should face the direction in which the stream is to be projected. Permit the hose to cradle agai.ist the inside of the closest leg and brace or hold it against the front of the body and hip. Anchor the hose to the ground or floor by placing the foot of the supporting leg upon the hose. If the stream is to be moved or directed at an excessive angle from the center line, close the nozzle, straighten the hose, and resume the operation position. The method is illustrated in Figure 33.
138 1070 291
l divided into three 2-1/2 inch hose lines and thus permit 200 gpm to ficw through each line. As a result, the friction loss is still 10 psi per 100 feet of hose.
The prepred chart shown on the following page illustrates how various flows can be similarly divided into siamesed hose lines to reduce friction loss it is suggested that an individual should study those flows that pertain to the nozzles which are used by his department. From this study, the number of hose lines required to produce master streams with a minimum of friction loss can be established.
When a firefighter is using the chart to determine pump pressure, an allowance should be added for friction loss in the master stream device. Allowances for elevation should also be added when a ladder pipe is used. Allowance for elevatinn is exactly the same as that for hand lines,5 psi per story or 1/2 psi per foot of elevation above ground level.
i EDITOR'S NOTE:
The friction loss in each mastei s tream device is different. An average figure of 10 psi is used in the problem. The friction loss in each master stream device used by a fire departmeni, should be determined.
i PROBLEM 5:
Find the Engine Pressure when two lines of 2-1/2-inch hose 600 feet long feed a master stream device with a 400 gpm fcg nozzle at 100 psi.
h each 300 feet of 2-1/2-inch hose T
400 spm Fog Nozzle 100 psi The flow of 400 gpm can b'e divider 3 equally between the two siamesed lines which will give a flow of 200 gpm. A flow of 200 gpm through 2-1/2,nch c.r.l. fire hose gives a F L of 10 psi per 100 feet of hose.
FL in 300 feet of 2-1/2 inch hose = 3 x 10 = 30 psi FL EP = NP + FL EP = 100 + Loss in hose and device EP = 100 4 30 + 10 (loss in device)
EP ' 140 psi 130. HANDLING THE NOZZLE Water that is being dischargd from a nozzle under pressure produces a reaction or "kic!:back."
The largs-the volume, tha greater the reaction, and the greater the nozzie pressure, the greater the reaction. The reaction is measured in total pounds " kickback" and not in pounds per square inch. To safely and successfully control this reaction, the firefighter should use certain techniques for handling fire stream nozzles.
GNE-MAN METHOD (11/2 Inch Hose) l When one man is required to handle a 1-1/2-inch hose end nozzle,some means must be provided for bracing and anchoring the hose line. To accomplif h this, c nozzleman should hold the nozzle with one hand and with the other hand hold the hose just Sack of the nozzle.The hose line should be straightencd for at least ten feet behind the nocleman, and he should face the direction in which the stream is to be projected. Permit the hose to cradle against the inside of the closest leg cnd brace or hold it against the front of the body and hip. Anchor the 149 10M 292
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Fig. 97 Fig. 98 hose to the ground or floor by placing the foot of the supporting leg upon the hose, if the stream is to be moved or directed at an excessive angle from the center line,close the nozzle, straiohten the hose, and resume the coeration posi+ ion. This method is illustrated in Fiq. 97.
TWO-MAN METHOD (11/2 inch Hose)
The two man method is usually necessary when the nozzle needs to be advanced. The nozzleman holds the nozzle with one hand and with the other holds the hose just back of the nozzle. He then rests the hose line'against his waist and across his hip. The backup man takes his position on the opposite side of the hose about 3 or 4 feet back. He then holds the hose with both hands and rest it against his waist and across his hip. One important function of the backup man is to keep the how straight behind the nozzleman. The method is illustrated in c ig. 98.
TWO-MAN METHOD (21/2 Inch Hose)
When only two men are available to handle a nozzle on a 2-1/2-inch hose line, some means of anchoring the hose must be provided because of the kickback. One rr ethod is for the nozzleman to hold the nozzle with one hand and the hose, just back of the nozz!e, wis., the other hand. He then rests the hose line against his waist and across his hip. The backup man, in this case, must serve as an anchorman and his position is on the opposite side of the hose and about 4 feet back. Here the backup man places his closest knee upon the hose line. In this position he should be kneeling on one knee with both hands on the hose line near the other knee which prevents the hose from moving back or to either side. Should the hose in front of the anchorman try to come back or up, he is in a position to push it forward. This method is illustrated in Fig. 99.
THREE-f.1AN METHOD (2-1/2-inch Hose)
There are some differences of opinion concerning the location of the backup and the anchorman when the three men are used. Some prefer a backup man directly behind the nozzleman with the anchorman on one knee behind the backup man.Others prefer both men to serve as anchormen kneeling side-by side on opposite sides of the hose line. The positions of the men have been described in previous methods, and both threa-man methods are illustrated in Fig.100, it is suggested that both methods be tried by the local department before a selection is made.
146 1090 293
FLOW CAPACITY OF SOLID STREAMS water will fill to a height of 115 feet. In other he rate of discharge of a fire stream is words, if one psi will raise water in the pipe 2.3 measured in gallons per minute or gpm. Flow f rom feet, then 50 psi will raise tb water 115 feet. If a nozzle is largely determined by the velocity of the same stream of water is not encased in a pipe the stream and the size of the discharge opening.
but is directed verticar - into the air, the These two factors are influenced by other forces performance changes. Af te leaving the tip, the and, for this re-they will be considered stream tends to hold its s u.pe for a considerable separately.
distance and then begins to flare out and break Velocity is the speed of an object in a riven into drops. The broken drops of water soon lose their momentum and fall to the ground. This direction. In relation to a stream of water, the speed is developed by pressure upon the water.
breaking away continues until only the inner part f the column reaches the maximum height. The Since water is practically incompressible, the water friction of the air on the outer surface of the water will flow at a certain rate of speed.
column breaks the stream, and the force of gravity Gallons per minute flow capacity of nozzle h pulls the drops to the ground.
increases by four times when the diarr.eter of the discharge opening is doubled. It might appear that HANDLING FIRE STREAMS the capacity of two 1-inch nozzles is equivalent to One-Man Method (1-1/2 inch Hose) the capacity of a 2-inch nozzle. This, however, is A hose line and the nozzle must be kept under not true. Four 1-inch nozzles are required to allow control at all times. When one man is required to the same capacity under the same condition as a handle a 1-1/2-inch hose and nozzle, some means 2-inch nozzle. On the other hand, if two 1-inch must be provided for bracing arid anchoring the nozzles are being used and if a larger nozzle of the hose line. To accomplish this, a nozzleman should same capacity is desired. a 1-3/8-inch nozzle would hold the nozzle with one hand and with the other be the proper size. A nozzle of a certain size will hand hold the hose just back of the nozzle. The discharge just so much water at a definite stream hose line should be straightened for at least ten velocity. To increase the discharge, a firefighter feet behind the nozzleman, and he should face the must either use a larger nozzle or increase the direction in which the stream is to be projected.
stream velocity. One basic rule concerning flow Permit the hose to cradle against the inside of the capacity of a solid fire stream states: THE closest leg and brace or hold it against the front of NOZZLE TIP SIZE SHOULD NOT BE LARGER the body and hip. Anchor the hose to the ground THAN ONE-HALF THE DIAMETER OF THE or floor by placing the foot of the supporting leg HOSE. For example, the maximum size of the upon the hose. If the stream is to be moved or "ozzle tip for ' -1/2-inch hose is 1-1/4-inch.
directed at an excessive angle from the center line.
close the nozzle, straighten the hose, and resume EFFECTIVE REACH OF A SOLID ETREAM the operation position. The method is illustrated in Just as a solid fire stream will deliver a lefinite Figure 6.11.
discharge under given conditions, it will also travel Two Man Method (1-1/2-Inch Hose) a predetermined distance from the nozzle. The The tv o method of handling a nozzle on a reach of a solid fire stream u the distance which a 1-1/2-inci.
se should ue used whenever possible, stream can be effectively thrown from a nozzle.
because it p. vides a greater degree of safety than Two forces, gravity and friction of the air. tend t the one-man method. The two-man method is decrease this reach. These opposing forces must be usually necessary when the nozzle needs to be overcome by the forward velocity and the volume advanced. The nozzleman holds the nozzle with of the stream. Since the stream is beyond one hand and with the other holds the hose just mechanical control after it leaves the nozzle, its back of the nozzle. He then rests the hose line speed while passing through space and the distance against his waist and across his hip. The backup it will travelis determined by these two factors.
man takes his position on the opposite side of the If the stream is encased within a pipe and put hose about 3 or 4 feet back. He then holds the under 50 psi pressure at the base of the pipe, the hose with both hands and rests it against his waist 170 ld90 294
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N 1 1/2-inch hose line.
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Figure 6.13 One man method for handhng a charged 2-1/2 in hnT '*"
and across his hip. One important function of the backup man is M keep the hose straight behind the nozzleman. The method is illustrated in Figure 6.12.
One-Man Method (2-1/2-Inch Hose)
I Whenever a fog or sota stream nozzle is used
- b-connected to a 2-1/2-inch fire hose, a minimum of N.-> N
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J two, and preferably three. men should be
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employed. One man may, however, find himself alone with a 2-1/2-inch charged hose line that Ilgure 6.1d harge'd 212 ib kose line properl[lashea for needs to be used. A re asonably safe way by which op,,,,;on, this task can be performed is illustrated in Figure 6.13. The firefighter secures slack hose from the line, forms a large loop and crosses the loop over Two-Man Method (2-1/2-inch Hose) the line about two feet back of the nozzle. He then When only two men are available to handle a sits where the hose crosses and directs the stream.
nozzle on a -l/2-inch ho e line, some means of This method does not permit much maneuvering of anchoring the hose must be provided because of the nozzle, but the nozzle can be operated from the kickback. Ore method is for the nozzleman to this point until help is available. If the operation is hold the nozzle with one hand and the hose, just to be of a, considerable duration and other back of the nozzle. with the other hand. He then ecluipment or manpower is not available, lash the rests the hose line against his waist and across his hose at the cross to permit case of operation and hip. The backup man,in this case, must serve as an
) Freater safety as shown in Figure 6.14.
anchorman, and his position is about 4 feet back.
1090 295 ivi e
a e
ATTACHMENT 4 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE FIRE NNECO 1090 2(16
.~
Plant Super!...andent
' STATION PROCEDURE COVER SHEET A.
IDENTIFICATION Number OP'505/2511 Rev.
'4 Title EMERGENCY PROCEDURE FIRE Prepared By C. Gilbert B.
REVIEW I have reviewed the above procedure and have found it to be sa.tisfactory.
TITLE SIGNATURE DATE DEPARTMENT HEAD C.
UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION EVALUATION DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED:
(Significant change in procedure method or scope as described in FSAR)
YES [-]
NO DG (If yes, document in PORC/SORC meecing minutes)
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT (Adverseenvironmentaiimpact)
~
YES [ ]
NO T,)d (If yes, document in PORC/SORC meeting minutes)
~
D.
P3EC/SORC APPROVAL E /SORC Meeting Number s
E.
APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION The attached procedure is hereby approved, and effective on the cates below:
hd FM 3/t/7?
3 /f/757 Plantyup)rint.>nddnt/ Unit Superintendent Approved Date Effective Date L
SF-301 Rev. 2l 1090 29/
OP305/2511 Page 1 Rev. 4 Dat.e:
3/9/79 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE FIRE Page No.
Effective Revision Date 1
4 3/9/79 2
4 3/9/79 3
4 3/9/79 4
4 3/9/79 5
4 3/9/79 6
4 3/9/79 7
4 3/9/79 8
4 3/9/79 9
4 3/9/79 10 4
3/9/79 1070 298
(
OP 505/2511 Page 2 Rev. 4 Date: 3/9/79 1.
OBJECTIVE To provide a procedure for reporting, containing and fighting a fire occurring within the confines of the Millstone site, and for ensuring the accountability and safety of all plant personnel during a fire emergency which includes maintaining the plant in a safe operating condition at all times.
2.
DISCUSSION The potential danger to personnel and equipment presented by a fire emergency is self evident.
It is, therefore, essential to provide a fast and c. /icient means of detecting and combating this type of emergency.
The installed fire detection system utilizes both smoke and themal d etectors. Appropriate detectors are located strategically throughout the plant which will actuate an audio-visual alam locally and in the Control Room when they are triggered.
The fire htinguishing system consists of sprinkler units, deluge
~~
~
units, Halon units, CO2 units, and fire hose stations, as well as dry chemical and CO2 fire extinguishers located throughout the plant.
The sprinkler, Halon, CO2 and deluge units are either automatically or manually initiated as predetermined by the relative hazard of a particular area and by the function of the equipment located in that area. The hose stations and dry chemical or CO2 fire extinguishers are providu to supplement the sprinkler and deluge units and to service areas not otherwise covered.
Water for the fire extinguisher system is supplied by two 250,000 gallon storage tanks, three full capacity fire pumps, and yard piping. A city water line provides makeup water for the tanks.
1090 299
N OP 505/2511 Page 3 Rev. 4 Date:
3/9/79 There are two full capacity electric motor-driven pumps and one diesel engine-driven pump.
All three pumps discharge to a 12" yard main that extends around both units.
A jockey pump is provided to maintain the fire extinguishing water supply piping full and pressurized between 100-115 psig. The Unit 2 electric fire pump will start if pressure drops to 96 psig and the Unit 1 electric fire pump will start if pressure drops to 85 psig. The diesel-driven fire pump will start if pressure drops to 75 psig.
3.
SYitPT0ils 3.1 Major Symptoms 3.1.1 Alarm on Unit 2 Control Room fire panel C-26 or Unit 1 Control Rooa Panels 903 or 908.
a.
Fire b.
Fire Protection Operating c.
Fire Protection Trouble d.
High Temperature Alarms 3.1. 2 Alam on Unit 2 Control Panel C0-6.
a.
Fire Systen trouble.
3.1. 3 Alam on Unit 1 Control Panel 907, a.
Diesel Fire Pump running.
3.1. 4 Any local fire panel alarm.
3.1. 5 Visual indication of smoke or flames.
3.1. 6 Explosion 3.2 Other Symptoms 3.2.1 Unit 2 electric fire pump running (Control Room 2 Panel C-26).
3.2.2 Unit 2 and/or Unit 1 electric fire pump running (Control Roon 1 Panel 907).
4.
IMMEDIATE ACTION 4.1 Person Discovering Fire 4.1.1 Report the location and class of fire to the Control Room.
1090 300
(
OP St,5/2511 Page 4 Rev. 4 Date: 3/9/79 NOTE: Classes of fire:
A - Solid Combustible Material such as rags, wood or paper.
B - Gasoline, Oil, Combustible Fuels C - Electrical 4.1. 2 Start to fight the fire.
4.2 Control Room Operator 4.2.1 Using in-plant page systen, announce " flow hear this, now hear this.
Fire In (floor, elevation, room, e tc. ).
Fire crew proceed to scene of fire." All personnel stand fast.
4.2.2 If fire is affecting plant equipment or operating systems, initiate action to place all equipment in a safe condition.
If necessary, refer to Plant Shutdown or Emergency Shutdown Procedures for the affected uni t(s).
4.2.3 Actuate /confim that the appropriate fire fighting systems are operating.
4.2.4 If the -situation warrants, call, and request Waterford Police and Fire Department assistance (911).
4.2.4.1 flotify the Security Shift Supervisor of their pending arrival and provide Information such that they will be escorted promptly to the scene or nearest building access, e.g., security door number.
4.2.5 Notify the Unit Duty Officer; if during normal hours, notify his Operations Supervisor.
4.2.5.1 If the Operations Supervisor is unavailable, contact one of the Superintendents in the following order:
His Unit Superintendent Station Superintendent Alternate Unit Superintendent Unit 3 Superintendent Station Services Superintendent 1090 301
A OP 505/2511 Page 5 Rev. 4 Date:
3/9/79 4.2.6 As directed, call backup fire crew members per SF-101, Fire Brigade List.
4.2.7 As directed, make necessary announcements on the P.A. system to facilitate area evacuation.
Ensure the page announcements include instructions not to use elevators and that smoking is prohibited.
4.3 Brigade Leader (Normally the S.S.)
4.3.1 Proceed to the scene of the fire.
4.3.2 Assess the situation, assure personnel safety and immediately communicate with the Control Room by radio or in-plant telephones.
4.3.2.1 Request assistance of the backup fire crew and/or call for outside assistance.
4.3.2.2 Provide direction to Control as to the fire's possible effect on safety related equipment.
4.3.2.3 Consider building evacuation which can be accomplished using the in-plant page system.
Provide for escort to meet outside assistance 4.3.2.4 upon arrival.
4.3.3 Secure or maintain ventilation at the scene of the fire based on the following considerations:
4.3.3.1 Secure ventilation if the fire is located in close proximity to exhaust ducts which could propagate the hot gases and fire to other areas.
4.3.3.2 Secure ventilation if the fire occurs in an area that uses a recirculation system which will spread smoke and products of combustion to clean areas.
1090 302
OP 505/2511 Page 6 Rev. 4 Date: 3/9/79 4.3.3.3 Maintain ventilation as long as possible in areas of fire that use a once-through ventilation system so that smoke and products of combustion will be removed to aid in extinguishment of the fire.
4.3.3.4 Use ventilation as little as possible in area with a potential for spreading radioactive contamination. Secure ventilation once the fire is knocked down.
NOTE:
If the fire is on Unit 2 turbine deck and the Unit 2 turbine building ventilation is secured, Unit 1 turbine building ventilation should also be secured to prevent spread
. of smoke and combustion products.
4.3.4 If outside assistance was requested, provide technical support (applicable Health Physics, Security and safeguards information) to the fire chief upon his arrival at the scene of the fire.
The fire chief will, howev,er,._be in charge of __ extinguishing the fire.
4.4 Fire Brigade Members NOTE:
The Fire Brigade, consists of the on shift operators except the C.0. and S.C.0. who are to remain in control during a fire.
The Brigade shall consist of at least 3 persons and shall include a brigade leader, normally the S.S.
4.4.1 Proceed to the scene of the fire.
Obtain self contained breathing apparatus (Scott Air Pack) for use on arrival at the scene.
4.4.2 Fire Brigade trained persons, not part of the shift response, report to the Control Room and dress in full protective equipment should assistance be r~1u i red.
1090 303
t OP 505/2511 Page 7 Rev. 4 Date: 3/9/79 4.4.3 Fire Brigade members of the other unit, will assemble in the Control Room, dress in full protective equipment and standby to provide assistance.
4.4.3.1 Assure each man is properly outfitted, including Scott Air Packs.
4.4.3.2 Assure the remaining emergency radios are brought to the scene with a call for his assistance.
4.5 Personnel Not Involved in Fire NOTE:
Employees who automatically leave their work areas may interfere with the Fire Brigade.
Unless in the area affected by the fire, await instructions over the P.A. system.
4.5.1 Employees remain in their work areas until specifically told to evacuate or assemble over the P.A. system.
4.5.2 Supervisors should notify the Control Room of persons assigned work or who are suspected to be in the fire affected area.
4.5.3 -
If; instructed to evacuate the fire affected area,s, leave using the nearest exit, and proceed around the building to front office lobby area.
4.5.3.1 The senior staff person present will assess assembly area conditions and direct complete lobby area evacuation as warranted.
4.6 Security Shift. Supervisor (only if outside assistance is requested in Step 4.2.4.)
4.6.1 Dispatch a security vehicle with two security officers, one to escort the first fire vehicle to the proper access area and one to remain with the vehicle to establish a control point north of the railroad overpass.
4.6.2 Ensure that the first Waterford Police vehicles arriving on the site assist the security personnel at the vehicle control point in controlling traffic to and fran the site.
l090 Ok
OP 505/2511 Page 8 Rev. 4 Date:
3/9/79 4.6.3 Ensure that the first fire vehicle arriving on site proceeds to Gate 1 if the firc is in Units 1/2 or to the Stone & Webster Gate if the fire is in Unit 3.
Ensure that the guard at the gate escorts the fire vehicle inmediately to the scene of the fire.
If the fire is in Unit 1/2, ensure the guard issues film badges before escorting the firemen to the scene.
4.6.4 Unless otherwise directed by the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor, ensure the guard at the vehicle control point allows plant personnel, as identified by their Northeast Utilitief, Civil Defense card, police personnel, as identified. by their unifom, badge or vehicle and fire personnel, as identified by their vehicle or personnel identification card to proceed without delay beyond the vehicle control point.
(Authorized fire personnel are either personnel riding in authorized fire vehicles or personnel possessing G~dsh'birFire Depa~rtmeit? Waterford Fire Co. #1, Oswegatchie, Cohanzie or Quaker Hill Fire Company fjentification cards. Authorized fire vehicles are fire trucks or veilicles which display a "Waterford Fire Co. #1", "Goshen Fire Dept.", "0swegatchie Fire Company", "Cohanzie Fire Company", " Quaker Hill Fire Conipany", or "Niantic Fire Dept." identification plate on the front bumpers.
Ensure authorized fire personnel passing through the vehicle control point park their vehicles in the parking lot located west of the Wye and proceed to the scene, if requested by the Fire Chief, in groups and/or in authorized fire vehicles to prevent any delays at the security access point at Gate 1 or the Stone & Webster Gate.
1090 505
OP' 505/2511 Page 9 Rev. 4 Date:
3/9/79 If assistance is required and no authorized fire vehicles are available at the Wye, ensure that fire personnel proceed to Gate 1 or the Stone & Webster Gate in a private car.
Ensure such personnel, however, park their car (s) outside of L.te 1 or the Stone & Webster Gate and are driven to the scene in a Millstone security vehicle.
4.6.5 Ensure additional fire trucks and police vehicles proceed to the traffic light area located at the Wye of the Millstone access road and await further instructions from their personnel.
(If additional fire vehicles are required, ensure that the (outside assistance) Fire Chief at the scene radios for more of the vehicles located at the Wye.
Ensure that the guard at Gate 1 issues film badges to all additional personnel driving to the scene (Unit 1 or 2 fires only). Ensure that a guard immediately escorts additional fire vehicles to the scene of the fire.)
4.6.6 Af ter the (outside-assistance) Fire Chief detemines that there is no further need for their assistance, ensure he infoms the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor prior to leaving the Hillstone Site with the other support vehicles.
4.6.7 Unless another emergency exists off-site, ensure that the security guard at Gate 1 ensures that the fironen, issued film badges upon entering Gate 1, complete film badge issue foms before leavir., the Gate 1 area (Units 1 or 2 fires only).
If ano d er emergency exists off-site as detemined by the i-ire Chief, allow the fire vehicles and personnel w leave the site immediately after all personnel successfully pass through the portal radiation monitor in the Gate 1 AAP.
1090 306
OP' 505/2511 Page 10 Rev. 4 Date:
3/9/79 (Following the off-site emergency, the fire personnel will return to the site to return the film badges and canplete the film badge issue forms.)
5.
SUBSEQUENT ACTION 5.1 When the fire is extinguished, station a fire watch and proceed with cleanup.
5.2 Determine the cause of the fire.
CG/jj 10'10 307
ATTACHMENT 4A EMERGENCY PROCEDURE CYAPCO 1090 308
S* S Ae J"LU Rev.2 i
P11dd* OPI2ATIO:;G 1.F.VIC.1 Co:"t1TTES APPR0'.$
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Connecticut Yanvec gh1l:~'/ <i; [ [p.
Dacrgency Procedure EP 1.5-18
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1.0 PUKPOSE 1.1 Te outline responsive actir.n r
,:,t red in the event of fire.
2.0 M PLI CAB 7 t.IT_.Y 2.1 This procedure chal? apply to ell firer occurring on-site.
3.0 P.Er cqENC nc, 3.1 Station Policy CYSP ad, Fire Protection and Preventive Program.
4.0 R ESPON SIBII.1 T' ES 4.1 The Shif t Supervicor is tesponsible for directing the overall fire fightinc effort, ensuring the safety of the public, personnel and plant; aise, for evaluating the need for outside assistence 5: hen initial inforte.ation is inadequate.
4.2 The rire Brigade Captain is responsibic for directing fire fighting effort at the scene of the fire and taports to the Shift Sepcrvisor (during of f-normal hours the Shif t Supervisor shall act as Fire Brigade Captain until such titae as a qualified replacen:ent arrives).
4.3 In the absence of the Sh!ft Supervisor the Supervising Control Operator has the responsibility and authority to initiate such action as may be required to place the plant in a safe ccnditior should fire conditions adversely affect plant equipment.
1090 309
'" k I
7 i
5.0 PROCEDURE 5.1 The presence of a fire may be indicated by any of the following depending on the nature and location:
5.1.1
!.larns in the Control Room and/or locally 'from installed detection cnd suppression systems 5.1.2 Autonatic initiation of fire suppression systens and/or autouatic start of fire pumps.
5.1.3 Visitic smoke and/or fla:.ies.
5.1.4 Odors fren hot, burning or smoldering raterials and over-heating of electrical equipment or cabling.
5.2 Individm.ls deteccing a fire or noticing any indication that a fire danger exists shall ir=cdiately notify the Control Roon (dial 211, 212 or 213) reporting the location, type, extent and inten<ity of the fire and ascistar.cc required, then attempt to extinge th or centrol tha fire uith all.wniinbic mean:, until help i
arrives.
5.3 Should t.n actual fire condition es:ist Control Room personnel rhall:
5.3.1 Sound the station fire alarm.
5.3.2 Centrol Rece permnnal
~tm! the pl mt emergencyalarmandmakethel following announcec2ent over the public address system twice:
"TilIS IS A PLANT E:ERCENCY.
TilERE IS A FIRE (GIVE LOCATION).
FIRC BRIGADES RESP 02:D. OTHER PLANT PERSONNEL REPORT TO THE LOBBY."
- N0tE:
PERSON';EL IN Tile RADII. TION CONTROL AREA VdLN A PLA'iT DIERGENCY 1S ANNOUNCED SHALL STOP AT Tile CONTROL POINT, IF ACCESSI:h E. OR USE AL1 ER'; ATE CONTROL POINT AS DIRECTED, AND MO::I' LOR Tl!EMSELVES BEFORE PROCEEDING TO Tile LOLLY.
5.3.3 Confirm fire suppression systers are operating.
5.3.4 af apparent from initial report that offsite assistance will be,needed, request fire fighting assistance frou the lladdam Neck Fire Department via the Control Di ipatcher who i.
30cated at the Trcop K, State Police.btracks, in Colchester and also noLify the Security Shift Supervisor.
1090 310 Page 2 of 3
Rev. 2
- 4.
h 5.3.5 If the fire is adversely affecting or has the potential for cauning adverse affects upen plant equipment or structures take whatever steps that are deened necessary
.to provide protection essential for ensuring the safety of the plant, its personnel and the public.
5.4 Fire Brigades 5.4.1 Uhen the fire alarm is sounded nembers shall,obtain and put on protective appare!, acquire self-contained breathing apparatus and promptly report to the fire location.
5.4.2 rire conditions t.hould then be evaluate.1 and undct the direction of the Brigade Captain or Assistant Brigade Captain acquire, assenb!c or leyc.ut the necerrary equipment, establish corcunicaticas with the Conttol Roo a awl co=r:cuce fire fighting cfforts.
S.4.3 Durir.g off-normal hours the Shift Supe /Jcor and Aun*11ary Operators shal] cen*:titute the fire 1rigade and ti.e Shift Supervisor shall act as Br iga.'e Cap ta n.
Provisions of 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 sliall apply.
Evaluation of the fire situation and need for off-site arsistance nuct be promptly determined. No unnec?::rarf dolcys r,bruld be alleeed to occur. Action shall be taken irr.:cdiately to obtain any assistence required to ef f ectively fight or ccc.L a.'
a prevailir.g fire cor.ditica.
5.5, Specific fire situations or localicne.
5.5.1 For fires in the nadiation Control Area (RCA) preventing tha sprecd of rz.dicacti'.'e M rbunn c en tse ! nant s Anf.,ntica ry impor t atic e. Fire locations in the RCA ch:11 be considered frou this standpoint; 11 necessary ventilation vill be stopped and doors closed to prevent spread of contaninants.
5.5.2 For fires in the Control noom,in addition to steps out-lined in this procedure,ini inte E0P 3.1-32, Control Room Fire.
5.5.3 For fires in the primary Auxiliatf Building ventilation systen liepa-licca rilter initiate E0P 3.1-36, Fire in liopa -licca Fil-ter in addition to any steps in this procedure pertinent to the situation.
1090 31l' Page 3 of 3
ATTACHMENT 5 CONNECTICUT YANKEE DIESEL ROOM POSTULATED FIRE 1090 312
Connecticut Yankee Fire Hazard Analysis El. 21'6" Diesel-Generator Building Diesel Room 2A Fire Area No. D-l Major Equipment Diesel generator 2A (S.R.)
Emergency 4160-V bus 8 (S.R.)
Generator control panel (S.R.)
Cables (S.R.)
Fire Protection Existing:
(1)
A 20-lb dry chemical extinguisher is located beside each access door.
(2)
There are five smoke detectors located in this area.
The detectors are on a common circuit with the other diesel room and the cable spreading area.
Proposed:
(1)
The existing detector circuit will be modified to provide individual zoning.
(2)
An automatic fire suppression.. system,_the type to be spe-c i f i ed._la te r.,- wi ll-be'Tns t a ll ed.
f-Design Features Existing:
The reinforced concrete building, designed to meet seismic loading, houses two diesel generators, their control cabinets, and corresponding emergency 4160-V buses.
Within the building, each diesel and switchgear are separated from the other by a 12-in.-thick concrete fire wall.
The metal doors at each end of each diesel room are 3-hour rated and are magnetic key locked and alarmed.
Emergency buses are completely redundant, and each feeds the engineered safeguards equipment; i.e.,
high pressure safety injection pump, low pressure safety injection pump, charging pump, and the 4160/480 V 1500-kVA transformer, which in turn feeds safeguard equipment on the 480-V bus and MCC5.
The cable tray that extends nearly the length of the room has fire-retardant fire stops at intervals.
All penetra-tions are sealed with silicone foam.
The level of diesel fuel in the day tank is maintained automati-cally by a fuel transfer pump from underground outside storage tanks with overflow back to the underground tank.
The transfer pump cannot operate unless the diesel is running or the manual
- pushbutton is continuously held in to fill the day tank.
The 4-39 lgtjg 3l3
day tank is located bcneath the diesel's steel floor plate, and any leak would be at the ground floor level.
The diesel lubricating-oil system is an integral part of the diesel.
The storage reservoir for diesel Jubricating oil is the diesel crankcase.
Proposed:
None.
Fire Logd Combustible Material Quantity (Btu /ft )
Diesel oil 500 gal 49,700 Lubricating oil 465ggi 48,400 25 ft 12,700 Cables Maximum Fire Severity:
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 23 minutes.
Postulated Fire Combustion of contents of day tank and lubricating oil.
Consequences of Postulated Fire The diesel-generator function will be lost.
A fire in the diesel room will not prevent safe plant shutdown because there are redundant power supplies from station service transformers 389 and 399 and from the other diesel generator.
The fire detection system will quickly detect any fire and the automatic suppression system will extinguish the fire at an early stage, limiting the extent of damage.
4-40 10(10 314
CONNECTICUT YANKEE DIESEL ROOM POSTULATED FIRE The Fire Hazard Analysis Report for CYAPCO details the existing fire protection features for the Diesel Generator Room (fire zone D-1).
To supplement these features, additional fire protection modifications will be incorporated in this fire zone to assist the 3-man brigade in con-trolling, containing, or extinguishing the fire.
The following represents a listing of the additional modifications:
1.
Detection system will be modified to provide individual zonint.
2.
An automatic water suppression system will be installed.
3.
An oil spill curb will be provided to separate the diesel rocm and the emergency switchgear.
4.
A curb will be provided at outside door opening.
5.
Diesel generator exhsust duct penetration will be sealed.
6.
All electrical penetrations will be 3-hr. sealed.
7.
A drainage system will be provided at floor elevations to remove flammable fuel from curbed area.
As coted, CYAPC0 has committed to providing active and passive fire protection features for this area to restrict, control, or extinguish a fire. With these modifications incorporated into the fire fighting strategies, the following sequence of events can be expected from a responding 3-man fire brigade.
The 3-man fire brigade would respond to the fire scene as directed by the control room.
Brigade leader would assess the fire situation and advise the control room.
Brigade leader can request outside assistance if required. Following initial instructiocs to the control room, the brigade leader and a brigade member would enter the fire area with scott-air packs to accurately evaluate the fire situation. During this evaiuation the third brigade member can begin laying out hose, obtain additional extinguishers, and air packs as necessary.
If the fire is small (cable, switchgear, motor, etc.) and the decision to use portable extinguishers is made then the two brigade members (lesder and member) investigating the fire would attempt to extinguish with available portable extinguishers, while the third member prepares for entry (Scott-air pack). He then enters the fire scene, replaces the team leader, and assists in fighting the fire. Brigade leader would direct the effort and advise the control room.
If the fire
= well advanced (fuel oil, lube oil), some of the noted modificatio-s become very useful tools to the 3-man brigade. The noted modifications assist the fire brigade in the following manner:
1090 315
. 1.
Automatic wates suppression could handle the bulk of the extinguish-ment allowing =anual involvement to be minimal.
2.
The oil / fuel spill curbing allows fire fighting persor.nel to get closer to the fire scene without excessive danger.
3.
Drainage system will drain off most of the flammable liquid thus reducing combustible loading and restrict fire size to a manageable level.
These modifications (active and passive fire protection features) actually allow a trained fire brigade to function more efficiently as a unit with less confusion.
For the larger postulated fire the method of investigation and communica-tion would be the same.
Actual fire fighting would involve (1) brigade members advancing a 1-1/2" hose line into the fire scene under the direction of the brigade leader. Should additional equipment (air-packs, tools, foam, etc.) or services (ventilation) be required to continue fire fighting, a brigade member can be dispatched to perform 'r.e required function. The remaining two members (brigade member and lea. r) would contin e fire fighting. Brigade leader can assist fire fighting by becomi.g the second man on the hase.
Performing this minimal assistance would 11ow active fire fighting to continue without distracting from the leider's prime responsibility of directing the fire fighting effort.
If the origade leader leaves the fire scene, the remaining fire fighter would not actively attack the fire but would safely position himself to control and contain the fire until assistance arrives.
With this fire fighting approach and a working knowledge of existing fire protection features, a 3-man brigade can extinguish or as a minimum control and contain any fire that can develop.
Other areas in which the Fire liazard Analysis identified a significant fire loading at CYAPCO were as follows:
Screenwell Pumphouse Storage Room (Fire Zone P-3, Fire Severity a.
1 hr. 12 min.).
b.
Service Building RCA Locker Room (Fire Zone S-15, Fire Severity 1 hr. 36 min.).
c.
Service Building Equipment Decontamination Room (Fire Zone S-20, Fire Severity 1 hr. 26 min.).
d.
Service Building Warehouse (Fire Zone S-26, Fire Severity 3 hrs. assumed).
Turbine Building Lube Oil Room (Fire Zone T-1A, Fire Severity c.
3 hrs assumed).
f.
"urbine Building Lube Oil Reservoir Area (Fire Zone T-1B, Fire Severity 3 hrs. assumed).
g.
Turbir.e Building H Seal Oil Unit (Fire Zone T-1D, Fire Severity 2
3 hrs. assumed).
A fire scenario for all of the above areas could be developed involving a 3-man fire brigade.
But, similar to the diesel room scenario all of the above areas have been reviewed with respect to the hazard involved and 1090 316
3-modifications will be implemented to assist the 3-man brigade in controlling or extinguishing the fire.
10'90 317
4 4
9 ATTACHMENT SA NORTIEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPAhT DIESEL ROOM POSTULATED FIRE 1090 318
Millstone 1 Fire Hazard Analysis El. 14'6" Turbine Building Diesel-Generator Room Fire Area No. T-7 Major Equipment Emergency diesel generator and associated equipment (S.R.)
Motor control center 22A (S.R.)
Cables (S.R.)
, Fire Protection Existing:
This room is provided with one 10-lb type B/C portable dry pow-der extinguisher (No. 173) and a manually initiated, wet-pipe sprinkler system.
Heat rate-of-rise sensors are installed, alarming locally and in the main control room.
Additional fire-fighting equipment is available in zone T-5C (hose station and portable type B/C extinguishers) and in area T-9, machine shop (portable extinguishers).
Proposed:
None.
Design Features Existing:
(1)
The walls are 1-tt-thick reinforced concrete block.
Two 3-hour rated fire doors are provided for access from areas T-5C and T-9.
(2)
The floor is a concrete slab at ground level.
(3)
The ceiling is a 6-in. reinforced concrete slab on steel Z-decking supported by transverse I-beams.
(4)
Vertical I-beam supports are protected by 8-in. concrete block furring enclosures.
(5)
The ceiling beams are sprayed with a fireproofing insula-tion.
(6)
Two 24 x 12-in. supply ducts are installed in the north I
wall.
Proposed:
(1)
Automatically closing dampers will be installed in the air supply ducts.
(2)
!!easures will be taken to protect the adjacent areas f rom the effects of excess oil and water.
} (J'j()
3 j ()
4-60
Fire Logd Combustible Material Quantity (Btu /ft )
Fuel oil 1600 gal
- 162,100 Cables 12.5 ft3 4,400 Lubricating oil 450 gal 47,800 Pipe insulation 3
(sponge rubber) 1.7 ft 900 3
Wooden items **
2 ft 600
- Maximum credible spill.
- To be removed as per Sections 2.2 and 3.1.1.
Maximum Fire Severity:
2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 41 minutes.
Postulated Fire The postulated fire is a lubricating oil or fuel oil fire caused by a spill and ignited by the heat of the exhaust sys'em or a transient source.
Consequences of Postulated Fire The fire would be contained within the confines of the diesel-generator room, with little or no effect on the remainder of the plant.
The diesel generator and associated equipment in the room could be damaged.
Such damage, however, would be lim-ited by the initiation of the room sprinkler system.
'~
1090 320
~
Millstone 2 Fire Hazard Analysis El. 38'6" Auxiliary Building Diesel-Generator Oil Day Tank Fire Area No. A-47 Major Equipment Diesel-generator oil day tank for DG 15G-13U (S.R.)
Fire Protection Existing:
There is an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system in this area.
Proposed:
None.
Design Features Existing:
The area is contained by reinforced concrete and 12-in. con-crete block walls, reinforced concrete floor and ceiling, and a 3-hour rated fire door that is kept locked.
The curb at the door is sufficiently high to retain 1800 gal.
Penetrations to the diesel room below and the adjacent day tank room are in the process of being sealed.
Proposed:
None.
Quantity Fire Logd Combustible Material (gal)
(Btu /ft )
Oil 14,070 4,626,200 Maximum Fire Severity:
3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (assumed).
Postulated Fire The postulated fire is an oil fire resulting from leaks and a transient ignition source.
Consequences of Postulated Fire The fire suppression system will extinguish the fire.
The re-dundant diesel day tank is protected.
The associated diesel generator would become inoperable due to the loss of its fuel supply, but the fire would not spread to other areas of the plant.
1090 321 4-81
DIESEL ROOM POSTULATED FIRE The Fire Hazard Analysis Report for NNECO's two operating plants, details the existing fire protection features for the Diesel Generator Rooms (MP-1 fire zone T-7 and MP-2 fire zone A-28 and 29).
To supplement these features, additional fi-e protection modifications will be incor-porated in these fire zone to assist the 3-man brigade in controlling, containing, or extinguishing the fire. The following represents a listing of additional modifications for both units:
Millstone Unit #1 Diesel Roor; 1.
Fire rated damper will be provided for air supply dacts
,d exhaust ducts.
2.
Curbing will be provided for doorway to room.
3.
Piping penetrations to the room will be sealed.
4.
Fire water supply valving will be modified.
5.
A dry chemical extinguisher will be provided.
Millstone Unit #2 Diesel Room 1.
Per-trations between diesel rooms will be sealed.
2.
A curb will be provided for doorway leading to fire zone A-27D.
3.
Ceiling penetrations will be sealed.
4.
A 3-hr. rated door will be provided between the diesel rooms.
As noted, NNECO has committed to providing additional active and passive fire prc tection features for the diesel room areas to assist the 3-man fire brigade by restricting, controlling, or extinguishing the fire.
With tnis in mind, the mechanics involved in extinguishing a diesel room fire at NNECO would be similar to that of CYAPCO.
Other areas in which the Fire Hazard Analysis identified a significant fire loading at NNECO were as follows:
Millstone Unit #1 Turbine Lube Oil Room (Fire Zone T-4, Fire Severity 3 hrs.
a.
assumed).
b.
T.B. Station Service Area (Fire Zone T-12, Fire Severity 1 hr.
43 min.).
c.
T.B. Cable Vault (Fire Zone T-16, Fire Sererity 3 hr.s assumed).
1090 322
. d.
T.B. Mezzanine Area (Fire Zone T-17, Fire Severity 1 hr.
29 min.).
T.B. Diesel Day Tank Room (Fire Zone T-24, Fire Severity e.
3 hrs. assumed).
f.
Gas Turbin Building (Fire Zone GT, Fire Severity 1 hr.
34 min.).
g.
Fire Pumphouse (Fire Zone FP-1, Fire Severity 1 hr. 6 min.).
n Millstone Unit #2 a.
Auxiliary Building Spent Resin Shipping Cask Room (Fire Zone A-1A, Fire Severity I hr. 2 min.).
b.
Auxiliary Building - 5'0' Elevation (Fire Zone A-14, Fire Severity I hr. 2 min.).
c.
Auxiliary Building QA Storage Room (Fire Zone A-16, Fire Severity 3 hrs. assumed).
d.
Auxiliary Building Cable Vault (Fire Zone A-40, Fire Severity 3 hrs. assumed).
e.
Auxiliary Building Records Storage (Fire Zone A-44 Fire Severity 3 hrs. assumed).
f.
Diesel-Generator Oil Day Tank (Fire Zone A-47 and 48, Fire Severity 3 hrs. a s s ume'd).
g.
T.B. Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit (Fire Zone T-1, Fire Severity 3 hrs. assumed).
h.
T.B. Lube Oil Room (Fire Zone T-2, Fire Severity 3 hrs.
assumed).
i.
T.B. D.C. Switchgear Room (Fire Zone T-3, Fire Severity 1 hr. 9 min.).
j.
T.B. Cable Vault (Fire Zone T-5, Fire Severity 1 hr.
16 min.).
k.
T.B. Cable Vault (Fire Zone T-6, Fire Severity 1 hr.
49 min.).
A fire scenario for all of the above areas could be developed involving a 3-man fire brigade.
But, similar to the diesel room scenario all cf the above areas have been reviewed with respect to the hazard involved and modifications will be implemented to assist the 3-man brigade in controlling or extinguishing the fire.
O ((j
ATTACIDfENT - 6 CONSULTANT PROFILES 1090 324
WILLIAM H. D0YLE CONSULTANT TO NUS EDUCATION Worcester Polytechnic Institute, B. S. in Chemistry, 1930 EXPERIENCE Consultant, 1972-Present Factory Insurance Association, 1930-1972 Factory Insurance Association - As chief chemical engineer, was responsible for analyzing and d armining the probability of plant fires and explosions for insuram e purposes. Work (d on loss preven-tion with Allied Chemical, Monsanto, Dow, Celanese, American Cyanamid and many other large corporations.
Authored numerous articles pertinent to fire hazards due to the handling, storage, and processing of chemicals and provided methods to control and avoid these hazards. Aided in the preparation of decontami,ation procedures following insulation fires and provided assistan. e to the General Adjustment Bureau in connection with the recent Nec York Telephone Company cable fire.
As a member of the NFPA Chemicals and Explosives Correlating Com-mittee, partakes in the policy making for sectional committee and for those on chemistry laboratories, electrical equipment in chemical atmospheres, explosives, hazardous chemical reactions, and properties of hazardous chemicals. Also a member of the NFPA Committees on classification, labeling and properties of flammable liquids, fire hazards of materials, fuel gases, general storage of flammable liquids, industrial and medical gases, liquefied natural gas and liquefied petroleum gases.
MEMBERSHIPS National Fire Protection Association Chairman, " Storage, Handling, and Transportation of Hazardous Chemicals" Member, Chemicals and Explosives Correlating Committee American Institute of Chemical Engineers Member, Loss Protection Committee Past Co-Chairman, Loss Protection Symposium 1090 325
MEMBERSHIPS (Cont'd)
Society of Fire Protection Engineers Charter and Life Member Member, Executive Comnittee Member, Committee on Research Member and Past Chairman, Publication Committee Member and Past President, New England Chapter American Society for Testing and Materials Member, Committee E-27, Hazard Potential of Chemicals National Academy of Sciences Past Member, Chemical Hazards Committee National Society of Professicnal Engineers Member AWARDS National Fire Protection Agency, Distinguished Service Award PUBLICATIONS Doyle, W.
H.,
" Minimizing Serious Fires & Explosions in the Distillation Process," SFPE Technology Report No. 74-2.
Doyle, W.
H., " Storage and Handling of Oxidizing Chemicals,"
Minutes of the 14th Annual Explosives Safety Seminar, D0D Explosives Safety Board, 8, 9, 10, November 1972.
Doyle, W.
H., " Instrument Connected Losses in the CPE,"
Instrumentation Technology, Vol. 9, No. 10, October 1972.
Doyle, W. H., " Storage of Liquid and Solid Oxidizers,
Fire Journal, Vol. 66, No. 2, March 1972.
Doyle, W.
H.,
and Schwab, R.
F.,
" Hazards in Phthalic Anhydride Plants," Chemical Engineering Progress, Vol. 66, No. 9, September 1970.
Doyle, W.
H.,
" Process Hazards - Chemicals," Section 7, Chapter III, Thirteenth (1969) Edition, N.F.P.A. Fire Protection Handbook.
Doyle, W. H., " Industrial Explosions and Insurance," Loss Prevention (a CDP Technical Manual), Vol. 3, 1969.
90 326
PUBLICATIONS (Cont'd)
Doyle, W.
H.,
and Mercurio, A.
J.,
" Adverting Disasters in Industrial Processes," Actual Specifying Engineer, Vol. 20, No. 3, September 1968.
Doyle, W.
H.,
und Schwab, R.
F.,
" Hazards of Electrolytic Chlorine Plants," Electrochemical Technology, Vol. 5, No. 5-6, May-June 1967.
1090 327
EDWARD S. KRUPINSKI SENIOR ENGINEER INDUSTRIAL RISK INSURERS EDUCATION Associate Degree in Fire Science and Safety Associate Degree in Nuclear Technology Engineering Bachelor of Science in Occupational Safety SPECIAL TRAINING Attended a special course in Property Damage Protection for Nuclear Power Plants presented by AN1 Engineering Staff, I.R.I. National Engineering Staff and Dr. Rasmussen, M.I.T.
(November 1974).
Completed a 24-week course in Fire Protection and Insured Perils offered by I.R.I.
(December 1970).
EXPERIENCE Engaged in Loss Prevention since 1970 As a Senior Engineer for Industrial Risk Insurers (I.R.I.), my responsibilities include making loss prevention inspections at NNECO, Connecticut Yankee, Yankee Atomic, and Vermont Yankee.
Responsibilities also include making loss prevention inspections of industry in general that includes manufacturing plants, hospitals, high hazard chemical plants, hydroelectric and fossil fuel power plants.
SOCIETIES Member of the New England Chapter, Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
WILLIAM E. DOCKERY FIRE PROTECTION ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATIVE TRAINER INDUSTRIAL RISK INSURERS SPECIAL TRAINING Completed a 44-week course in Industrial Fire & Loss Prevention offered by I.R.I. (1967).
Attended a 52-week training program offered by U.S. Navy on Retetor Operations.
Special courses in Life Safety Codes, Sprinkler lay-out and design and Fire Protection Hydraulics.
EXPERIENCE Twenty years with the U.S. Navy of which ten years were as a qualified Reactor Operator.
The past eleven years were with Industrial Risk Insurers as a Field Supervisor with I.R.I.
Responsit411ty included loss prevention inspection of nuclear power planta and general industry.
My recent position, as an Assistant Administrative Trainer, involves teaching industrial fire protection for I.R.I.
)Oh
FREDERICK J. LORINSER VICE PRESIDENT CASUALTY LOSS CONTROL HARTFORD EDUCATION University of Connecticut - B.S. Mechanical Engineering Western New England College - MBA EXPERIENCE Began working in casualty loss control in 1948. His experience includes 20 years as the Loss Prevention Manager (Western Massachu-setts and Vermont) and Technical Director of Products Liability Control with the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Worked 4 years with Chapman-Lorirmer Safety Engineers, Inc. as Vice President of diis consulting engineering firm specializing in accident cases in-volving litigation. He joined Johnson & Higgins in 1972.
He is a Professional Engineer and a Certified Safety Professional.
His loss control experience is broad and varied. He has had extensive experience servicing large industrial companies as well as product liability risks of industrial machinery manufacturers.
SOCIETIES American Society of Safety Engineers -
Professional Member Past Chairman of the Connecticut Valley Chapter (1960)
National Society of Professional Engineers Member Connecticut Society of Professional Engineers -
Member Connecticut Society of Engineers in Private Practice -
Member Western Massachusetts Safety Council -
Member ACTIVITIES Published articles include " Environmental Hazards of Inner Cities" in the Journal of the American Society of Safety Engineers.
ROBERT G. PLANER VICE PRESIDENT ASSISTANT MANAGER PROPERTY LOSS CONTROL NEW YORK EDUCATION Newark College of Engineering (New Jersey Institute of Technology) 3.S. Civil Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology -
Graduate Courses Newark College of Engineering -
Graduate Courses EXPERIENCE Since 1948 engaged in property loss control, including 20 years with the Graham Inspection Bureau as a Partner. He has been with Johnson &
Higgins since 1968.
His experience in property loss control includes work in the Communica-tions, Food, Paper, Rs.ilroad, Power Generating, Electronics and Construc-tion Industries and spacial studies of high rack storage and data processing protection problems.
He is a Professional Engineer and Certified Safety Professional.
SOCIETIES Society of Fire Protection Engineers -
Member - New York Chapter Officer American Society of Safety Engineers -
Professional Member National Fire Protec tion Association Affiliate Member - Railroad Section 10'11) 331
ROBERT W. MEYER PROPERTY LOSS CONTROL NEW YORK EDUCATION Worcest er Polytechnic Institute -
B..i. Mechanical Engineering EXPERIENCE Engaged in property loss control since 1954 which includes 2 years with the Factory Insurance Association and 8 years with Marsh &
McLennan. Joined Johnson & Higgins in 1965.
His property loss control experience includes work in the mining, transportation, telephone, electronics and nuclear industries for foreign and domestic properties.
SOCIETIES Society of Fire Protection Engineers -
Member ACTIVITIES Participated on the National Fire Protection Association General Storage Committee.
ANSI Committee on Fire Protection for nuclear f acilities.
1090 332
ACTIVIIIES Lecturer on Fire Protection at New Jersey Institute of Technology Originated and headed Fire Protection Technology program Author of soon to be released publication, " Managing Fire Losses."
1090 333
=
THOMAS R. GERMANI ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR LOSS CONTROL NEW YORK EDUCATION U.S. Naval Academy -
B.S. Mathematics and Electrical Science U.S.N. Nuclear Power School U.S.N. Nuclear Prototype - SIC U.S.N. Nuclear Engineer School EXPERIENCE Five years experience in the U.S.N. Submarine Nuclear Power Program including the operation, supervision, and maintenance of a power plant.
Responsibilities in reactor controls, nuclear and steam plant machinery, plant chemistry, radiological controls and quality assurance.
SOCIETIES American Nuclear Society -
Member iU70 334