ML19209A355
| ML19209A355 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1979 |
| From: | Cook R, Knop R, Vandel T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19209A339 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-329-79-15, 50-330-79-15, NUDOCS 7910030646 | |
| Download: ML19209A355 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000329/1979015
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-329/79-15; 50-330/79-15
Docket No. 50-329; 50-330
License No. CPPR-81; CPPR-82
Licensee:
Consumers Power Company
1945 West Parnall Road
Jackson, MI 49201
Facility Name: Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: Midland Site, Midland, Michigan
Inspection Conducted- Ju 6 1-July 11, 1979
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Inspectors:
R. J. Cook
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T. E. Vandel (June 5-7, 1979)
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Approved By:
'R. C. Knop,' Chief
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Projects Section 1
Inspection Summary
Inspection on June 1-July 11, 1979 (Report No. 50-329/79-15; 50-330/79-15)
Areas Inspected: Review of previously identified noncompliance and
unresolved matters; follow up on 50.55(e) reports and other old items for
close out; review scheduling and status of construction for future program
inspection coverage; examination of site conditions, settlement of diesel
generator foundations and structures; modifications to seismic braces for
Class IE battery racks; inadequate cooling water flow to containment
recirculation coolers; investigation into purge paper found in Unit 2
reactor building spray system piping; calculated inadequate cooling water
flow to containment recirculation air coolers; post weld heat treatment
of Ua.it 2 reactor coolant system; corrosion of buried stainless steel
piping; presence of fluid found in 350 MCM-3/C-B-11 power cable; qualifica-
tion of seal and oil coolers used in the auxiliary feed water pumps;
decay heat removal pump baseline inservice inspections; qualification
testing of cable ties; assembly of unit reactor coolant ; ump 2P-51B;
installation of Unit 2 prestress tendons; licensee QA overview inspections
for instrument and control installations; coverage of a fatal industrial
accident initiated from inhalation of argon purge gas; complete loss of
offsite power, and possible existance of an unauthorized weld in the
Unit 2 letdown cooling system. This inspection effort involved a total
of 167 inspector hours by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
Persons Contacted
Consumers Power Company Personnel
D. Miller, Site Manager
- T. Cooke, Project Superintendent
- J
Corley, QA Section Head IE & TV
- D. Keating, QA Group Supervisor
- B. Peck, Construction Supervisor
- R. Whitaker, QA Engineer
B. Wollney, Field QA Engineer
M. Schaeffer, QA Engineer
- J. Balazer, Lead Electrical Engineer
L. Howell, Quality Assurance
R. Ostrowski, Technical Specialist
D. Martin, Quality Assurance
Bechtel Power Corporation Personnel
- L. Dreisback, Project QA Engineer
- J. Russell, Assistant Project Field QC Engineer
- E. Smith , QA Engineer
W. Fish, QC Inspector
J. Smith, QC Inspector
B&W Personnel
- R. Shope, Project Engineer
G. Cooper, Piping Superintendent
J. Jones, QC Inspector
G. Navratil, ISI Group Leader
- Denotes those present during at least one of the five exit interviews
conducted during the report period including the one conducted by Mr. T. Vandel.
Numerous other principal staff and personnel were contacted during the
reporting period.
Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings
(open) Noncompliance Item (50-329/78-17-01; 50-330/78-17-01):
Personnel
airlocks weld cracking. Review of the completed NCR's CPCo NCR M-01-9-8-096
and Bechtel NCR No. 1636, established that the NCR's have been dispositioned
" accept as is" and had been approved. During discussions with licensee
representatives, it was pointed out that such a disposition overlooks the
fact that the change:1 configuration voids the stress analysis of the
airlocks and nothing was found that established that this was considered
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in the disposition. The licensee representative indicated further that
negotiations are underway currently regarding weld size, post-weld heat
treatment, and tolerances. Further review is planned during future
inspections.
(Closed) Unresolved Matter (50-329/78-07-01; 50-330/78-07-01): Radiography
reader sheet is inadequate. A radiography reader sheet for core flood
tank MK No. ICF-TIA, drawing No. C 1100-sheet 24 failed to indicate
acceptance or rejection for area 13-14.
Records presently at the site
show that the film of area 13-14 was rereviewed and that a supplemental
reader sheet had been provided that indicated the area was acceptable.
This item is resolved.
(0 pen) Noncompliance Item (50-329/78-03-02; 50-330/78-03-02): This item
was also reviewed and reported in report 50-329/79-12, 50-330/79-12 (see
Section IV, Paragraph 4) for the welding demonstration at Ohio State
University that was observed by NRC inspectors. During this inspection,
licensee representatives were contacted regarding the procedure for
monitoring and the experience to date of this activity.
It was learned
that some NCR's have been generated, as a result of voltage monitoring,
concerning rod size.
In addition it was learned that the procedure
(FPW-6.000) is under further revision.
Further review is planned during
future inspections.
Reportable Deficiencies - 50.55(e) Items
Settlement of Diesel Generator Foundations and Structures
(0 pen) Item No. (329/78-15-03; 330/78-13-03): *ihe sand preloading
of the diesel generator building has been mair.iained during the
reporting period and monitoring of the settlement has been conducted.
Test pits have been dug at different locations of the site. On
June 7, 1979, four representatives from NRR were on site to discuss
the site and settlement monitoring program.
Class 1E Battery Racks, Seismic Braces
During the reporting period the Resident Inspector was informed that
the design change to upgrade Class 1E Battery Racks to withstand a
seismic event and limit buildup of horizontal momentum had been
accepted and parts were delivered to the s:.te.
Installation of the
modification is delayed until installation of the ventilation system
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for the battery rooms is completed.
Inadequate Cooling Water Flow to Containment Recirculation Coolers
On July 9, 1979, the licensee informed the Resident Inspector that
the calculated essential service cooling water supply pressure to
the containment recirculation air coolers will not meet the minimum
design requirements of the FSAR (Section 6.2.2.2.3) for heat removal
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during accident conditions. This reduction in cooling water pressure
to the air coolers is attributed to a decreasei pump suction head
from an assumed decreased cooling pond differer.cial level and addi-
tional loads being applied to the system than were origin,11y intended.
This item has been considered reportable to the NRC under the provi-
sions of 10 CFR 50.55(e) ' d appears to have safety implications if
gone undetected.
10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.55(e) reports reviewed during the inspections
include the following:
1.
Babcock and Wilcox Company (B&W) Weld Filler Certification. B&W
Topical Reports BAW-1402 and BAW-1403 were submitted to NRC offices
(then AEC) in January and April, 1973. The AEC office of Directorate
of Regulatory Operations responded with a letter dated June 19,
1973, expressing satisfaction with the reports as prepared and
concluding thet the tensile and impact values of the 80XX and 70XX
materials used in the manufacture of major NSSS components will be
within acceptable tolerance and that these major comp ~'ents involved
(Midland Units 1 and 2 Steam Generators among others) are acceptable
for their intended service. The inspection concluded that this is
sufficient information to close this report item.
2.
Unit 2 Tendon Sheathing Ommission Review covering this matter is
included in NRC reports 50-329/77-07 and 50-329/77-08 with the
latter report indicating that the licensee final report was scheduled
to be issued by August 15, 1977. The corrective actions to complete
repairs has been reviewed and considered to be adequate. The corrective
actions regarding preventing rgeurrence were reviewed as part of the
NRC review of the license response to the NRC Immediate Action
Letter dated April 29, 1977, which is reported in inspection report
50-329/77-10. This item is considered closed.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected
1.
Site Tours
At periodic intervals during the report period, tours of essentially
every area of the site were performed. These tours were intended to
assess the cleanliness of the site, storage condition of equipment
and piping being used in site construction; the potential for fire
or other hazards which might have a deleterious affect on personnel
and equipment and to witness construction activities in progress.
It was noted during one of these tours that " housekeeping" activities
associated with drilling support anchor bolt holes at the Mesonine
for the east core flood line for Unit 2 were deteriorating. The
licensee took immediate steps to improve the situation and protect
piping in the area.
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2.
Purge Paper in Unit 2 Reactor Building Spray System Piping
During the reporting period the Resident Inspector became aware that
a foreign object had been detected in the Unit 2 reactor building
spray system while radiographing Field Weld No. 13 on Drawing No.
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M-613-2 at the 724 flood elevation. The weld had been cut and a
"soccerball" sized wad of soluble purge paper was removed. No
nonconformance report (NCR) was generated at the time.
Consumers
Power Company representatives did not appear to have any knowledge
of this incident nor did the radiographers "readersheet" contain any
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information regarding the fact that the film could not be read
because of paper inside the pipe.
The NRC Regional Office was
notified and an investigation into this matter was conducted on
June 12-14, 1979, by a Regional Based Investigator.
The results of +his investigation are contained in a separate report.
As a result of this event Quality Action Request Nos. SD-207, SD-208
and SD-209 vere initiated.
3.
Post Weld Heat Treatment (PWHT) of Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System
During the report period, the licensee performed PWHT on the cold
leg weld joints at the Unit 2 reactor vessel nozzles. These joints
are designated WJ4-1, WJ4-2, WJ4-3, and WJ4-4.
The weld joints are
heat treated in pairs. Both sets of weld joints were heated twice
because of a power failure or equipment malfunction. The licensee
has experienced some difficulty in controlling PWHT temperatures
within 1100 F to 1150 F as specified in weld procedure qualification
No. 3259 for procedure WIN-102-3.
The inability to control tempera-
tures within these limitations is addressed in B&W NCR No. WN Nos.
1618,1619,1622, and 1623 for joints WJ4-1, WJ4-2, WJ4-3, and WJ4-4
respectively. Because of the difficulty in maintaining temperature
control, the licensee has modified their field procedure to require
QC inspection to monitor stress relieving (PWHT) every two hours
while temperatures are above 600 F.
Modifications to internal
heaters and insulations have also been performed to aid in developing
more even control heating. During the installation of PWHT equipment
in the cold leg side of the north steam generator, some laxity was
noted in the control of uncovered street shoes inside the reactor
coolant system. The licensee informed shift superintendents, workman
and QC personnel to be more cognizant of contaminating the reactor
coolant system.
4.
Corrosion of Buried Stainless Steel Piping
During the reporting period, a nominal 18 inch section of 6" SCH 10
stainless steel piping which was heavily corroded and appeared to
have been buried was examined by the Resident Inspector.
It was
learned that this section of piping had been removed from the discharge
of the condensate storage tank - a nonsafety related system.
Piping
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to the boric acid storage tank - a safety related (Q) system is
fabricated from similar stainless steel piping and is buried and
unprotected from a galvanic corrosion aspect. The licensee has sent
the 6" piping from the condensate storage tank system to their
labroatories in an attempt to determine the cause of this corrosion
and the effects on similar buried stainless steel safety related
systems. Preliminary results have shown that attack of the stainless
steel condensate storage system piping may be due to electro-chemical
attacks.
5.
Presence of Fluid in 350 MCM-3/C B-11 Power Cable
Daring the reporting period, the Resident Inspector was informed
that analyses of fluid removed from one phase of selected reels of
350 MCM Power Cable supplied by ESSEX showed evidence of sulfate,
calcium, magnesium, sodium and a detectable Ph of 6.5 (reference NRC
Inspection Report 50-329/79-13; 50-330/79-13).
Engineering disposition
for the use of this cable in safety re;ated systems is continuing
and is being tracked by Noncompliance Report No. NCR 2175.
Some of
this cable is presently still installed in some safety related
circuits. The Resident Inspector informed the licensee that should
their engineering evaluation show this cable is acceptable, the
results of their evaluation would be referred to other expertise
within the NRC.
6.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Seal and Oil Coolers
As stated in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-329/79-16; 50-330/79-16,
Paragraph 6, more review of the qualification documentation for the
auxiliary feedwater pump seal and oil coolers was performed. A
review of Quality Surveillance Reports No. 37 through 46 pertaining
to vendor inspection of these coolers revealed some confusion with
regard to test performed and items shipped. The licensee has prepared
Nonconformance Report No. 2236 which addresses the more confusing
aspects of the associated Quality Surveillance Reports. The licensee
has requested clarification of this documentation from the Bechtel
Power Corporation. The response of Bechtel Power Corporation has
not been completely submitted and/or rcviewed by the Re:ident Inspector
at the completion of the reporting period. Therefore, this item
considered unresolved until such time that clarification can be made
available for review. Unresolved Items (329/79-15-01; 330/79-15-01).
7.
Decay / Heat Removal Pump Inservice Inspection
During the reporting period, the Resident Inspector witnessed a dye
penetrant baseline inservice inspection of the welded pump casing
supports for Decay Heat Removal Pump 2P-60A. All penetrant indications
are being photographed and recorded for future reference. The
licensee stated that 5 to 6 baseline NDE crews would be working on
baseline inservice inspection by August, 1979.
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8.
Qualification Testing of Cable Ties
During the reporting period, qualification testing of nylon cable
ties being considered for lashing Class IE cables to vertical cable
trays was being conducted on site. The testing is being conducted
per specification 7220-C-85Q, Technical Specification for Cable Tie
Testing Program. Test 11C for TY-409 Tefzel cable tie was witnessed
and the tie failed at a test stand loading of 245 pounds.
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Assembly of Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump
During the reporting period, the Resident Inspector witnessed insertion
of the impeller assembi.y into the lower seal housing for Unit 2
Reactor Coolant Pump 2f'-51B.
The pump is being assembled in a Class
B clean room with material and equipment control being maintained.
Pump vendor represent.itives are on-site to advi;e in the assembly of
the reactor coolant pumps.
10.
Installation of Unit 2 Containment Prestress Tendons
During the reporting period, the Resident Inspector witnessed
installation of vertical tendons from the top of Unit 2 containment.
These activities are being monitored by Bechtel QC and licensee QA
personnel.
11.
QA Overview Inspections For Instrument and Control Installations
During the reporting period, the Resident Inspector discussed with
the licensee their intended QA overview inspection for the installation
of instrument and control (I&C) systems and equipment. The licensee
stated that there was no I&C Group established for the overview of
I&C installations and that mechanically qualified personnel would
monitor the " hardware oriented" aspects of the installation. The
Resident Inspector stated that adequate overlap between the two QA
disciplines (electrical and mechanical) would be expected.
12.
Fatal Industrial Accident
On June 14, 1979, the B&W Project Engineer became overcome with
argon purge gas and subsequently fell into the Unit 2 Incore
Instrument Tank, 2T-87 while attempting an examination of the inside
of the tank. The source of the gas was from purge gas used while
velding on the tank drain line. The accident proved fatal.
13.
Complete Loss of Offsite Power
On June 20, 1079, at 1:45 p.m.,
the site experienced a complete loss
of offsite poscr because of tornado strength winds in the area
between Saginaw and Midland, Michigan. At 2:30 p.m., the site was
evacuated to enhance industrial safety while the power was off. At
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approximately 3:00 p.m. some partial power was restored to the site.
All power was essentially restored by midnight.
No accidents occurred
during this loss of offsite power and site operations were returned
to normal by the following morning.
14.
Questionable Existance of Unauthorized Weld in Unit 2 Letdown
Cooling System
During the reporting period, the Resident Inspector and a Regional
Based Inspector were informed that an apparent additional weld was
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noted during radiographir. testing of field weld No. 8 on pipe spool
designated 2CCA-19-S-604-3-2B located in the Unit 2 Letdown Cooling
System. The above referenced spool is fabricated from 3 inch schedule
160 stainless pipe and was supplied by Southwest Fabricators. Field
weld No. 8 was made at a 90' elbow.
No. 1606 was prepared to track this condition.
Subsequent to this
discovery the weld was cut at the weld cap and the open sections
were examined by the Resident Inspector. Only one root pass, which
had shown inferior weld quality indications, could be detected on
the inside of the pipe. Physical measurements of the elbow indicated
that the external weld cap was not placed over the location of the
weld. This gave the appearance on the radiograph that one satisfactory
weld located undn the cap and anoth~r weld (an unacceptable weld in
this instance) ensted in close proximity to each other when actually
only one weld existed.
The radiographs for field weld No. 8 and
No. 9 (on the same spool) were examined. The radiographs for field
weld No. 9 clearly indicated that the outside weld cap was placed
over a weld root. Weld record documentation for both wel k (field
weld Nos. 8 and 9) indicated that the same welder (B&W No. 441)
installed both welds. The Certificates of Performance for B&W
welder No. 441 were examined and the welder was considered qualified.
A single digit error was noted between the Social Security number
used on the Certificates of Performance and personnel records for
welder No. 441.
It appears that this may be a typographical error.
The licensee has agreed to examine all welding performed by welder
No. 441 and compare these welds to .he existing radiographs to
determine any irregularities.
Unresolved Matters
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance
or deviations. One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is
discussed in Paragraph 6.
Exit Interviews
The Resident Inspector attended the Exit Interview conducted by T. Vandel,
J. Creed, and E. Lee, Region III Reactor Inspectors and Investigator on
June 7, June 14, and June 18, 1979, respectively.
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The Resident Inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted under
Persons Contacted) on June 12, June 25, June 29, and July 11, 1979. The
inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection effort to
date. The licensee acknowledged the findings reported herein.
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