ML19208D813
| ML19208D813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1979 |
| From: | Hawkins F, Marsh R, Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208D811 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-79-04, 50-341-79-4, NUDOCS 7910010037 | |
| Download: ML19208D813 (28) | |
See also: IR 05000341/1979004
Text
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION
'
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-341/79-04
.
Docket No. 50-341
License No. CPPR-87
Licensee: Detroit Edison Company
2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, MI 48226
Facility Name: Enrico Fermi 2
Investigation At: Enrico Fermi 2
Investigation Conducted: February 15-March 2, 1979
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Investigators:
F. C. Hawkins,
ea tor Inspector
(date)
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fR.J. Marsh, Investigator
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(date)
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H. S. Phillips, Reactor Inspector
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(date)
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H. M. Wescott, Reactor Inspector
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$ b. T tLL U
Reviewed By:
C. E. Norelius
7/Z7h 7
Assistant to the Director
(date)
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R. C. Knop, Chief
7
N
Projects Section 1
(date)
Investigative Summary
Investigation on February 15 - March 2, 1979 (Report No. 50-341/79-04)
Areas Inspected: Twenty allegations were made relative to management and
construction practice.
In many instances these allegations pertained to
non-safety related equipment or work.
This inspection involved 146
inspector-hours which includes 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> on site and 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> of investigation
time meeting with several allegers at appointed meeting places.
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7910010 @ l-
.
Results:
In most instances, the alleged deficiencies had been previously
,
identified by the NRC Inspection program or licensee's QA program with
appropriate corrective action in progress or completed. One allegation
was substantiated as an item of noncompliance with the provisions of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, regarding the presence of voids and
incomplete corrective action in repair of other nonconforming void. areas
of the sacrificial shield grout. This item of noncompliance is detailed
in the Details section, Paragraph 5, Allegation No. 16, of this report.
.
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..
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.
SUMMARY OF FACT
.
On February 8 and 9,1979, Mr. Frank Kuron was interviewed by Messrs.
Robert Marsh (NRC Investigator, Region III), and Shannon Phillips (NRC
Reactor Inspector, Region III), regarding his earlier statements before
the Fermi 2 Prehearing Conference.
Mr. Kuron provided the NRC representatives with information on twelve
areas which he considered as potential health and safety concerns regarding
the construction and future operational capabilities of the Fermi 2 site.
Through both question and answer and in narrative statements it was
disclosed that Mr. Kuron's concerns covered broad areas and in several
cases were dated or were of a nonspecific nature.
Mr. Kuron indicated
much of his information was second or third hand and/or founded solely on
heresay.
Mr. Kuron agreed to review his own records and contact his
" sources" in an attempt to provide the NRC more definitive information.
At the close of the interview, twelve (12) potential areas of investigation
were identified. Following a review of Mr. Kuron's allegations, an
investigation was . initiated on February 15, 1979.
On February 20, 1979, the investigation was continued at the Fermi 2
site. On February 21, 1979, Mr. Kuron was brought on site and in a
walking tour of the facility, further defined his allegations.
The orginal list of twelve allegations / areas of concern resulting from
the February 8 and 9,1979, interview of Mr. Kuron was expanded to twenty
(20) items and additional detail was aquired from Mr. Kuron and other
sources. The areas investigated and the conclusions reached are summarized
as follows:
1.
Lack of Quality Control - No evidence to support or substantiate
this allegation was identified.
2.
Destruction of two trailer loads of quality control records - In
1974, documents from two trailers that contained personal records
and copies of working drawings, specifications, and milestone charts
were burned. No permanent QA records were destroyed. The investigation
was unable to substantiate this allegation.
3.
A recent fire in Building 45A was more extensive than reported to
the NRC - No evidence to support or substantiate this allegation was
identified. Continued as open item (341/79-04-02) pending licensee
identification of records burned.
4.
Interference fit of a 24" G?obe Valve - No evidence to substantiate
this allegation or concern regarding improper construction practice
was identified.
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310
'
.
5.
Poor housekeeping in the drywell area - The investigation was unable
.
to substantiate that overall housekeeping (drywell area included)
was unacceptable at the time of this investigation.
6.
Improper installation of reflective shielding - The investigation
substantiated that this shielding is n>nsafety related and therefore
it is not a safety concern.
7.
Pipe hangers improperly installed - Allegation determined to be
valid and previously identified by the NRC.
Corrective action is
continuing.
8.
Reactor Feed Pump Turbine damaged in early fire not properly repaired -
Investigation disclosed concerned equipment to be QA Level II,
nonsafety related. Allegation considered a nonsafety construction
issue.
9.
Nozzles in main condenser improperly welded - Insufficient detail
available to identify specific piping involved.
Investigation
disclosed no safety related piping in area designated by alleger.
10.
Improper storage of turbine parts - Determined to be nonsafety
construction issue.
11.
Inadequate posting of work areas as required by 10 CFR 21 (Paragraph
21.6) - Allegation not substantiated.
12.
Improper welding of Main Steam Line spool piece - No evidence to
support or substantiate this allegation was identified.
13.
Use of improper weld rod - Allegation not substantiated. System
involved determined to be nonsafety related.
14.
Improper pipe whip restraint weld - Allegation was determined to be
unsubstantiated.
15.
Improper installation of concrete anchors (Red Heads) - The investigation
was unable to substantiate this allegation.
Continued as open item
(341/79-04-03) pending additional testing by licensee.
16.
Voids in grout of sacrificial shield wall - Allegation substantiated.
Two void areas identified by investigation and licensee DDR 1187
found to have been inadequately completed (incomplete repair).
These items cited as items of noncompliance (341/79-04-04).
17.
Improper cadweld sleeves in Reartor Building - No evidence found
to support or substantiate this allegation.
18. Hairline cracks in Reactor Building structural steel - No evidence
found to support ur substantiate this allegation.
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31I
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.
19.
Surplus structural steel from RHR Building considered by alleger to
represent construction "short cuts" - No evidence to support or
substantiate this allegation was identified.
20.
Cracks in the concrete of the base slab of the Reactor Building - The
investigation revealed that an ear? y history of cracking had existed
with the base slab but that this previously addressed matter had
been satisfactorily resolved by licensee action.
CONCLUSIONS
One item of noncompliance (341/79-04-04) was identified as a result of
this investigation of Mr. Kuron's allegations.
In the other nineteen
(19) instances, the allegations / areas of concern were found to be either
unfounded, previously identified, or addressing nonsafety related areas.
In the latter case, the available details of the allegation and findings
of the investigative team were provided to the licensee for their
information and corrective action as deemed appropriate.
In the identified item of noncompliance (allegation No. 16) the identified
voids in the grouting of the sacrificial shield and incomplete corrective
action previously initiated by the licensee under DDR 1186 were cited as
examples of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
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312
.
DETAILS
,
1.
Background
Detroit Edison Company (Edison) began construction activites at the
Enrico Fermi 2 Site on June 1, 1969. General Electric is the nuclear
steam system supplier for one Boiling Water Reactor rated at 1123
MWe. Detroit Edison served as the Architect Engineers (AE), however,
they contracted a portion of the AE work to Sargent and Lundy.
The Ralph M. Parsons Company (Parsons) had constructor responsi-
bilities and held an N-stamp.
In addition, they were responsible
for quality assurance / control activites on site. The QA/QC organi-
zation was composed of Parsons and Edison personnel.
The Parsons'
Site QA Manager reported to an Edison Preject QA Director who was
located at the Edison offices offsite. Parsons was mechanical
contractor for piping installations
The Parsons' QA/QC organization
arrangement worked satisfactorily according to comment made by
licensee management.
In 1974, Edison halted construction activities until additional
finances could be obtained to carry on the project. Edison repre-
sentatives stated that this curtailment allowed Edison to change
from the general contractor concept to the construction manager
concept. As a result, Daniel Construction Company (Daniel) became
the consaruction manager and assumed Parsons' responsibilities for
overseej n construction on site as well as quality assurance responsi-
bility. Wismer and Becker (W&B) Contracting Engineers assumed
responsibilities for mechanical piping. This was considered a
management improvement and a more efficient operation.
2.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
- T. A. Allessi, Edison QA Director
- W. Everett, Project Superintendent
- R. W. Barr, Project QA Manager
- H. A. Walker, Project QA Engineer
C. J. Miller, QA Engineer
- G. Carter, QA Engineer
P. Cribbs, QA Engineer
- A. Alexiou, Assistant Project Superintendent
- W. F. Colbert, Project Engineer
- W. W. White, Assistant Project Manager and Plant Superintendent
- C. R. Bacon, Field Project Engineer
L. E. Schuerman, Licensing Engineer
E. P. Griffing, Assistant Plant Superintendent
A. Godoshian, Assistant Project Manager
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313
.
Other Personnel
- J. G. Bolt, Project QA Manager Daniel International Corporation (DIC)
- D. E. Seifert, Project Manager (DIC)
- C. B. Bliesener, Administrative Assistant to Project Manager (DIC)
- J. T. Blixt, QC Manager (DIC)
-
T. Crouse, QA Engineer, Civil, (DIC)
D. Ingmire, Civil Manager (DIC)
J. Gresham, Maintenance Engineer (DIC)
S. Cawood, QC Inspector, Civil, (DIC)
D. Richardson, Administrative Assistant Construction Manager (DIC)
H. Damerson, Documentation Specialist (DIC)
R. Madden, Documentation Specialist (DIC)
L. Osborne, QA Engineer, Wismer and Becker (WB)
- J. R. Dunkleberg, Field Engineer, Sargent and Lundy
The investigators also talked with and interviewed several other
licensee and contractor employees, including members of the quality,
technical, engineering staffs and craftsmen.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Problems
(Closed) Noncompliance (341/78-09-02):
Program adequacy not assessed
by higher management. The Director of QA stated that the program is
scheduled to be assessed by May, 1979.
(Closed) Noncompliance (341/78-09-03): Followup on Edison QA audits
was inadequate in several instances. The investigator reviewed the
most recent audit of Sargent and Lundy which closed the corrective
action loop.
(Closed) Noncompliance (341/78-09-04): Edison QA had not performed
adequate audits of Edison purchasing activities. The investigator
reviewed a recent audit (EF2-45020) performed December 21, 1978, and
an audit plan for an additional audit outlined in Edison document
EF2-45622.
Functional areas inspected during the investigation are recorded in
the Details section of this report.
4.
Introduction
Mr. Frank Kuron made a limited appearance statement at the Fermi 2
Prehearing Conference on December 18, 1978. At this conference he
indicated that he had knowledge of security problems, quality control
problems, poor quality of work, questionable licensee credibility,
potential radiation leakage, and deliberate destruction of records.
He repeatedly said be had stories to tell which would point the NRC
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314
in the right direction if they wished to act further. The information
provided at the Prehearing Conference was very general and did not
give specific information to support the general allegations.
5.
Allegations
.
Region III investigators subsequently contacted Mr. Kuron on
Februa ry 8-9, 1979, to gather ad?itional specific information. He
gave the same general information as was given at the Prehearing
Conference. However, as the interview progressed he started giving
general locations of equipment, piping, valves, hangers and material
that workmen had told him were deficient or questionable. At the
end of these interviews, Mr. Kuron was told that several of the
items he had described during the interview were not safety related.
A definition of safety essential systems was described to Mr. Kuron
as: The necessary design, fabricati"
construction, testing and
performance requirements for structures, systems and components
important to safety, that is, structures, systems, and companents
that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated
without undue risk to the public. Finally, Mr. Kuron was 1.old that
the NRC investigators needed more specific details such as exact
locations and identification of alleged deficiencies or concerns.
He was also told that the areas of concern would be looked at during
a routine inspection or a special investigation. Additional review
and evaluation of Mr. Kuron's allegations and concerns resulted in
the initiation of an investigation to determine their validity on
March 15, 1979.
A Region III investigation team went to the Fermi 2 site on February 20,
1979. The alleged deficiencies or concerns were described to the
licensee and their reaponse was that the allegations still lacked
specific details. The RIII project inspector asked that Mr. Kuron
be allow 3 to come onsite to point out the alleged deficiencies
since th:s was the only sure way to find the deficiencies since he
had been unat'e to give specific system and location identification.
The licensee aireed to give the alleger access and complete freedom
to identify deficient items,
i.e., structure, system, subsystem,
subassembly, component part or material.
On February 21, 1979, Mr. Kuron eatered the site at approximately
9:30 a.m.
In a meeting he again repeated the areas of concern to
Messers. R. J. Marsh, H. S. Phillips, H. M. Wescott and F. C. Hawkins,
NRC investigators. At approximately 10:50 a.m. a tour of the reactor,
auxillary and turbine building commenced to physically identify
items alledged to be deficient or questionable. The inspection
ended at approximately 5:00 p.m. resulting the identification of
alleged deficiencies as follows:
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1057
7.15
Reactor Feed Pump Turbine N21-02-C-014; N21-02-C-015 was damaged
-
,
in a fire.
RHR building structural steel
plui..
-
Pipe hangers, P43-3324-G06 improperly installed.
-
Condenser piping nozzles welds improper.
-
Turbine generator stop valve bearings improperly maintained.
-
Drywell reflective insulation improperly installed.
-
Spool piece, B21-3258-4 (2733-126) welding improper.
-
Pipe whip restraint welding improper.
-
Cracks in reactor basement floor repair quettioned.
-
Hairline cracks in steel embedded in concrete in drywall floor
-
an improper condition.
Cadwelds in fifth floor of reactor building questioned.
-
Anchors (Red Heads) in concrete improperly installed.
-
Reactor building closed cooling water piping, P42-3338-3 misaligned.
-
-
Sacrificial shield grouting voids.
-
Poor housekeeping in the drywell.
24" Globe valve, E11-50F048B interference fit.
-
The above items were reviewed with Mr. Kuron at the end
.f the
investigation to assure all deficient items were identined. He was
told that several areas still lacked specifics which would allow
positive identification of items. He agreed that the above listed
items were the total he was able to identify at that time. He
stated that other personnel contacted during the tour would contact
the NRC after work hours and give additional detcils which would
specifically identify items in the general areas he had pointed out.
The NRC did obtain additional information regarding these items from
anonymous contacts and personnel interviews.
The above sixteen (16) areas combined with the following four (4)
remaining from the original twelve (12) provided by Mr. Kuron on
February 8 and 9,1979, produced a total of twenty (20) areas to be
investigated. The four areas not redundant with the sixteen provided
by Mr. Kuron on February 21, 1979, were:
-
Until recently, there has been no quality control program.
-
Two trailer loads of QC records were burned in 1974.
-
A recent fire in Building 45A was more severe than reported.
-
Posting of signs advising workers where the NRC can be contacted
is inadequate.
Allegation No. 1:
Lack of a " quality control" program.
Mr. Kuron stated that his conversations with crafts people at the
Fermi 2 site had created a concern over what he perceives to be a
lack, ur.cil recently, of an adequate quality control program.
Mr. Kuron bases this concern on the general statements of his associates
that they remember OC programs to be "better" at previous work
sites.
Mr. Kuron was unable to provide any detailed specifics.
_9-
1057 316
Finding:
Since the construction permit was issued, the NRC has
performed approximately fifty inspections of construction activites.
QA epecialists and engineers have reviewed quality control procedures
'
and the implementation of procedures. The reviews in each case
established that each contractor performing safety related work had
a satisfactory quality control program or if not, a noncompliance
was issued and corrective action was required. These reviews are
documented in NRC reports dating back to 1972.
Information from interviewing NRC, licensee and contractor personnel
associated with the Fermi 2 ,roject substantiated that quality
control has always been in effect since the beginning of this project.
The overwhelming majority of contractor personnel expressed the
opinion that the quality of work and the inspection of work is
satisfactory.
Based on the above information, the investigator found no evidence
to support or substantiate the allegation.
Allegation No. 2: An Edison official asked top supervision to burn
two trailer loads of quality records.
Mr. Kuron stated that, "This Edison purP3n asked the top supervision
to take those records out in the back 40 and burn them and the man
was very skeptical about such an order. After three months this man
would not burn those records up.
He was then told to either burn
them or he would have them burned up.
Within four months after they
were burned up, the Edison people were in there lock:ng for those
records."
In addition to the above information given at t% Pre: hearing Conference,
Mr. Kuron gave the name of the person who burn d the records and
stated that Edista may not have meant to burn permanent QA records
that should have been retained but they simply bungled. he stated he
did not know who ordered the burning. He emphasized they were
looking for piping records (Parsons).
Finding: Licensee representatives stated that in 1974 the
Ralph M. Parsons Company was leaving the site after construction on
Fermi 2 stopped. Two trailers that contained personal records as
well as copies of working drawings, specifications and milestone
charts were burned; however, no permanent QA records were destroyed.
They admittedly looked for milestone charts concerning scheduling
but these were not QA records.
Personnel who worked in the record center during the time the records
were burned and personnel who work there now were interviewed. The
individual who worked in the center at the time of the burning
stated that no permanent QA records were burned but he did say that
personal records and r;ther nonpermanent records were burned. The
individuals who work in the record center now stated they know of no
problem with missing records.
- 10 -
1057
317
,
The NRC investigators went to the record center and reviewed QA
records that must be maintained for a specified time or for the life
of the plant. The following contractor records were found to be on
file:
Nonconformance Log listing project nonconformances starting
-
with No. I da*.ed October 9, 1970, through No. 2614 dated March 1,
1979. Nos. 41, 255, 389, 468 and 543 generated during the
period February,1971, through January,1973, were retrieved
and reviewed.
Parsons QA Manual and the Field QA Plans and Procedures Manual
-
were retrieved and reviewed.
-
Chicago Bridge and Iron Company letter dated August 30, 1974,
referenced the transmittal of all records to the QA center.
Some of these records were also retrieved and reviewed during a
previous inspection documented in NRC Report No. 50-341/78-18.
Although retrieval was slow in some cases, records were retrieved
dating back to 1971.
Documentation to Monitor Cracks in the Reactor Building Basement
-
Floor Slab and Walls, March, 1973, was retrieved.
-
Records on " Slab Over Torus" Forming Edison letters dated
May 5, 1972, June 5, 1972, September 11, 15 and 20, 1972;
Parsons DDR 474 and 488; Field Instruction No. 45 dated July 28,
1972.
Proposed Grout Specification May, 1972; Edison letters dated
-
July 3, 10 and 13, 1972, June 23 and 30, 1972; S&L letters
dated May 1 and 9, 1972; and The R. H. Dewey Company letter
dated September 10, 1971. This correspondence contained all
information available regarding the identification, and evaluation
and correction of cracks in the base slab of the reactor building.
Repair procedures were also inclosed with this correspundence.
Ralph M. Parsons Records dated 1973.
-
Hydrostatic Test Reports No. 46, 24, 25, 26, 18 and 19.
.
ASME Code,Section III, Pipe Erection Records for RER
.
(E11-3177-9W10; E11-3181-7W8); Core Spray (E21-3144-0W3;
E21-3145-3W4; E21-3149-6WO). The file included process
control sheets, weld materials issue slips, NDE reports,
repairs and material release reports.
Receiving Inspection Report Nos. 737-1, 778-9A, 805-3 and
.
762-5.
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1057
7.18
Daniel Construction Company letter to Edison dated August 28,
1974, and Report of Audit of Status of QA Records and Docu-
mentation of ASME,Section III, Pipe fabrication / work. This
audit documented two audits of QA records performed by Parsons.
This audit also documented a very thorough review to assure
that all pipe welding records were adequately completed and
accounted for.
Daniel Construction Company letter to Edison dated September 16,
-
1974, and Audit Followup Report. This report documented corrective
action of findings in the report previously described above
except welding records is still considered an open item.
Detroit Edison letters dated August 8 and 13, and September 4,
-
1974, document Edison's control of the QA record transfer and
audit of records.
Audit and Documentation of Records Turnover (Parsons to Daniel).
-
Ralph M. Parsons letter to Edison dated September 27,
.
1974, listed records of ASME Section III work performed by
Parsons. This letter stated that all welding records
except six nuclear welds were accounted for.
These six
welds were subsequently radiographed and were found acceptable.
Walter G. House, Parsons Project QA Manager, (Certificate
of Authorization: NA-N-723; NPT-N-724) and F. A. Williams,
State of Michigan Authorized Inspector certified that Pipe
Erection Status Sheets numbers 1 through 138 conformed to
ASME Code,Section III. The ANI certified that work had
been accomplished in accordance with the Code.
Ralph M. Parsons letter to Boiler Division, Department of
.
Labor, dated September 27, 1974, closed out the documentation
of work performed by Parsons.
In addition to record reviews indicated above, the NRC has periodi-
cally reviewed QA records pertaining to safety related work performed
onsite from the start of the project to date. No real significant
problems have been found where large amounts of records were missing.
During this investigation, Mr. Wescott, an NRC inspector, found that
a Hydro Test Record for E11-2852 could not be retreived. This matter
is considered unresolved (341/79-04-01).
Based on the above, the al??gation that QA records were burned in
1974 was not substantiated.
Allegation No. 3: The fire that occurred in building 45A was more
extensive than was reported to the NRC.
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10G7
19
'
J . 6
Mr. Kuron also raised a new issue regarding the burning of records.
He stated that there were also QA records burned in a fire in building
45A on December 16, 1978. The NRC inspector responded that Edison
had notified the NRC that the fire had occurred and a few welding
process traveler sheets and NDE reports which were in the process
of being reviewed were burned.
Mr. Kuron stated that the fire was
much more extensive than reported to the NRC because whole desks had
been burned in the fire.
Finding: The inspector interviewed Mr. H. A. Walker, Edison Project
QA Engineer, who inspected the area damaged by the fire immediately
after the fire was extinguished. Most of the records were in a
steel cabinet and they were protected. Damaged records mainly
consisted of Wismer and Becker welding process sheets and NDE test
reports that were left in "in baskets" over the weekend.
The records on top of the desks were burned but, even in this case,
only records on the top of the stack were severly burned.
Records
near the center of the stack were salvagable. Wismer and Becker
Company is in the process of reviewing the master files where a copy
of the welding and NDE records are kept, to determine which records
were lost. A Detroit Edison letter from QA directed Wismer and
Becker to determine which records were burned. The missing records
will be reconstructed to the extent possible.
If a record cannot be
reconstructed, the weld in question will be nondestructively tested
to assure an adequate weldment was made.
An Edison letter was also issued directing all contractors onsite to
assure that all QA records, including those in the review process,
be stored in steel cabinets instead of leaving them in "in baskets"
overnight or over the weekend.
The investigator inspected the area where the fire occurred. The
area had been rebuilt or repaired. File cabinets are now being used
to store records overnight.
Some nonsafety related piping that was
in the fire was still stored in the building and appeared to have no
damage. Since the building was metal and floor wts concrete slab
only a limited amount of highly combustibles were in the building
when this fi re occurred. The fire was caused by a faulty gas heater
which was located in the south end of the building.
This fire was reported to the NRC on the same day it occurred. The
report appeared to be accurate and the licensee is now taking appro-
priate steps to have Wismer and Becker identify missing records and
prevent similar occurrences. No evidence was found to support the
allegation that the fire was more extensive than reported; however,
this matter is considered unresolved pending identification of
records burned.
(341/79-04-02)
- 13 -
1057 320
Allegation No. 4: The installation of a 24" Globe Valve and the
associated piping could not be installed because of interferences
with the concrete wall resulting from poor construction practices.
Mr. Kuron was concerned that the 24" Globe Valve, E11-50F048B (#V82140)
QA Level I, ASME II, located at line B-10 and elevation 588',- could
not be installed because it would interfere with the concrete wall
by five inches. He stated that a workman had come down off the
scaffolding stating that the whole layout was a mess and would
require five or six cuts to install the piping.
Finding: The inspector noted the 1ccation and valve identification
that Mr. Kuron pointed out.
The inspector reviewed the QA records regarding this allegation and
found that Design Cnange Request No. P-1456 had been issued because
there was an interference fit.
Engineering had reviewed the request
and approved the request on December 21, 1978. The change to the
drawing was also controlled as required. An Operation Process
Traveller was issued on submittal number 35207 along with accompanying
Weld Process Control Sheet Travelers 19561, 19562 and 19563. The
welding was specified to be in accordance with Welding Procedure
Number 103. The Design Change Notice No. 1508 was issued authorizing
the work. All changes were controlled.
The inspector found no evidence to substantiate the allegation or
concern regarding improper construction practices.
Allegation No. 5: The housekeeping in the drywell is very bad
especially in the area between the reflective insulation and the
vessel wall.
Mr. Kuron stated that the crews who installed the reflective shielding
were required to wash all the metal surfaces with demineralized
water prior to installing the panels. Now all kinds of debris and
dirt has gotten into this area and the crew wondered why it should
have been cleaned in the first place. During the walk through
investigation, he pointed out several pieces of lumber and debris on
top of the cover which seals o_f and protects the inside of the
Finding: The inspector visually inspected the entire drywell area.
Some debris was found between the vessel wall and the reflective
shielding. A sand blasting operation had been performed on the
fifth floor of the reactor building and this dust had drifted down
into the drywell and on top of the platform sealing the vessel as
well as down the sides of the spaces between the vessel walls to
reflective shielding and between the shielding and the outer most
wall of the drywell.
- 14 -
.
1057 321
The inside of the vessel is sealed and entry into the vessel is
,
controlled.
When one enters the vessel a pass is required and
protective clothing must be worn.
In the past, NRC inspectors have
inspected this area repeatedly and have found no housekeeping problems
in this arec.
.
Mr. Kuron's comments concerning housekeeping were unsubstantiated.
Although housekeeping has deteriorated somewhat, the housekeeping
constitued no noncompliance. Prior to operation all areas will be
given a final cleaning.
Presently, the licensee has a 30-40 Len
crew who are cleaning each day. The inspectors will continue to
monitor housekeeping to assure that it does not fall below an
acceptable level.
The investigator could not substantiate that overall housekeeping is
unacceptable at this time.
Allegation No. 6: The reflective shielding was improperly installed.
Mr. Kuron stated that the crews installing this shielding had left
out screws which joie adjacent shielding panels.
Finding: The investigator visually inspected the shielding which
had been installed.
In some cases, there were approximately 1/4 to
1/2 inch gaps where the shielding panels join.
The investigator was
unable to confirm that screws 5:ere missing without having the licensee
remove the panels.
The investigator reviewed the requirements regarding the subject
shiel"ing and found that the reflective shielding is not considered
safety related. Detroit Edison Specification 3071-51 (issued May 1,
1971), Paragraph 11.4, classified the shielding QA Level II nonsafety
related. Since this item is not safety related, no further action
was taken except to advise the licensee that installation may be
incorrect.
The investigator substantiated that this shielding is nonsafety
related and therefore it is not a safety concern.
Allegation No. 7:
Big bore pipe hangers were improperly installed.
Mr. Kuron identified hanger P43-3324-C705 at the 653' elevation in
the turbine building as the hanger which was improperly installed.
Finding: The subject hanger identified has been reworked or repaired
and was now acceptable.
The hanger was supporting a vertical pipe
run in the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System.
This
hanger was a part of a nonsafety related system.
- 15 -
1057 322
.
Although Mr. Kuron did not point out other deficient hangers, an NRC
,
inspector had previously identified hanger problems in Report No.
50-341/78-03 dated April 27, 1978, and subsequently in Report No.
50-341/78-14 dated September 19, 1978.
The first report documented
a noncompliance relative to Wismer and Becker Constracting Engineers'
failure to establich measures to inspect 375 hangers installed by
the Ralph M. Parsons Company.
Inspection of hangers installed by
Wismer and Becker was considered inadequate because checklists with
appropriate qualitative / quantitative acceptance criteria had not
been developed. The second report documented Wismer and Becker's
failure to take timely corrective action relative to the installation
of hangers and as a result, the W&B Project Quality Manager issued a
" Halt Work Directive No. 7 which stopped work on the installation
of QA Level I hangers. During the interview, Mr. Kuron was told
that this problem had been identified by the NRC. He was also tc14
that an Edison program was in progress to correct hangers which had
been improperly installed and to prevent recurrence of improper
installation.
The allegation concerning improper installation of pipe hangers was
valid; however, the NRC had identified this problem nearly a year
ago and the problem is being corrected.
Allegation No. 8: A Fire occurred in the Radwaste Area some years
back and equipment was not properly repaired.
Mr. Kuron stated that he was aware of a fire that occurred in the
radiation waste area. All Edison did was repaint equipment which
was damaged in the fire. They did not disassemble pumps and inspect
for damage.
Finding:
During the walk through investigation, Mr. Kuron identified
Reactor Feed Pump Turbine, N21-02-C-014 and 015, located at column
P6 elevation 583'6" as equipment that was involved in the fire.
The investigator found this equipment to be QA Level II, nonsafety
related.
Since this equipment does not perform a safety function,
it is not a safety concern. The radiation waste area does not
contain safety related equipment. The only parts of the system that
are safety related are the isolation valvaa located in the drywell.
The investigator substantiated that equipment in the area pointed
out and in the radwaste system is not safety related. Therefore,
this allegation is not a construction safety issue.
Allegation No. 9: Nozzles located east of the main condenser in the
turbine building were welded with the wrong weld rod.
Mr. Kuron stated during the first interview that nozzles located
east of the condenser had been welded sometime in 1974, just prior
to the project shutdown. He stated that he was told that the wrong
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323
.
rod had been used.
When construction on the project resumed, this
.
deficiency was pointed out to the appropriate personnel but instead
of removing the weld "they" just " doctored" up the paper work. At
the time of the interview, the investigator indicated these welds
would probably be considered nonsafety related but the investigator
would followup to assure that was the case.
-
Finding:
Mr. Kuron, during a walk through investigation pointed out
an area where he thought the deficient welds were located. There
were so many pipes in the area, he said he was unsure where the
alleged deficient welds were. The investigators interviewed another
individual and substantiated Mr. Kuron's story concerning the weld.
He attempted to describe the area. He was asked to give the number
of the spool piece by calling the investigator after work hours,
however, the investiastors never received the call.
The investigator inspected the area east of the main condenser twice
to insure that the pipe was not safety related. All pipes visually
inspected in this area were nonsafety related. The investigator
found that the piping could only be identified as safety related or
nonsafety related by reviewing the following drawings which showed
all pipes in the condenser area:
Basement Drawings No. 7M-721-2981, 3634, 3100, 3265, 3609,
3621, 3608, 2208, 2616, 3820, 3645, 3637, 3819, 3818 and 3822.
First Floor Drawings No. , 583; elevation, 7M-721-2372, 3106,
3218, 3223, 3222, 3214, 3219, 3211, 3635, 3213 and 3216.
Second Floor Drawings No. 7M-721-2376, 3220, 3212, 3221, 3393,
3396, 3394, 3395, 3397, 3967, 3198, 3810, 3199, 3638 and 3813.
None of the above drawings showed safety related piping.
Mr. B. Buchanan,
Detroit Edison Engineer, stated there was no safety related piping
in the area. Regardless, Edison was advised that t here may be
improper welding ou nonsafety related piping in the subject areas.
The investigator found that the alleged deficient welding is non-
safety related. Therefore, this matter is not a construction safety
issue.
Allegation No. 10: Stop valves for the turbine generator had been
improperly stored and maintained resulting in major repair.
Mr. Kuron stated that the throttle valves (stop valves) had not been
properly stored and protected resulting in major maintenance problems.
The investigator informed the alleger during the first interview
that this item is not a safety related piece of equipment.
- 17 -
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324
Finding:
Mr. Kuron could not identify the item by number so he was
,
requested to point out the equipment he knew to be a problem. This
was done to eliminate potential misidentification. He pointed out a
Turbine Stop Valve in the turbine building that was being reworked.
Valve Aesembly No. 5 A30-00-0-000-QX-049 was identified as a nonsafety
,
related piece of equipment. This matter was brought to the attention
of the licensee.
The inspector substantiated that rework was in progress, however,
this valve did not constitute a construction safety issue.
Allegation N(. 11: Signs are not posted telling workers where the
NRC can be reached to report contruction deficiencies.
During the first interview, Mr. Kuron stated that signs should be
posted prominently to let workers know where and how constructions
deficiencies could l e reported
He did not think such notices were
posted.
Finding: The investigator verified that notification was posted at
37 locations as required by 10 CFR 21, Paragraph 21.6.
All of these
were located at licensee and contractor offices; however, none were
posted in the Reactor, Auxillary and RER Service buildings.
The
investigator questioned this practice. The licensee volunteered to
post the notification in the lunch area inside the Reactor / Auxillary
building.
The investigator found that the subject notifications were posted,
however, the investigator recommended that posting be more prominent
in certain areas. The allegation cannot be substantiated.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified concerning
the allegation findings described under Allegations No. 1-11.
Allegation No. 12: Weldment of Main Steam Line spool to inlet of
the external Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV).
A verbal allegation was made on February 21, 1979, by Mr. Kuron
-
stating that a weld in the steam tunnel had been " doctored."
He further pointed out the location ;f the weld in question to
the investigation team.
Finding: The investigation identified the weldment to be weld
identification number B21-3258-4WO to F02SC.
This weldment is
a twenty-six inch (26")' main steam pipe spool to the 26" external
MSIV. The investigation included a review of weld records and
documentation as follows:
Review of the Detroit Edison Company, Design Change Request
.
(Field), written on July 17, 1978, Document Control-Site
No. B21-01-0 and N30-11-0.
- 18 -
1057
325
This document stated that "The inside diameter of spool
,
pieces B21-325-1 through 4 do not match the ID's of their
MSIV's. Field requests permission to weld build-up the
ID's of the spools to match the MSIV's to allow proper
fit-up of the MSIV to spool joint." This request was
approved by the Daniel Discipline Engineer, Daniel -
Engineering Manager, Edison Field Engineer, and the Edison
Field Project Engineer to allow joint fitup to meet the
ASME Code tolerances.
Review of Wismer and Becker Weld Process Control Sheet
.
Traveler, Submittal No. 16975, dated May 2, 1978, for weld
build-up of I.D. for Weld Identification No. B21-3258-4WO(A)
including:
(a) Liquid Penetrant Examination Record (Wismer and
Becker) 000916 dated November 29, 1978, s! awing the
build-up to be acceptable.
(b) Review of seven (7) Wismer and Becker Weld Filler
Material Issue (Nuclear) slips used for brild-up of
ID.
Review of Wismer and Becker Weld Process Control Sheet
.
Traveller, Submittal No. 20762, dated August 14, 1978,
which supersedes WPCS submittal No. 13663, including
nineteen (19) Wismer and Becker Weld Material Filler
Material Issue (Nuclear) slips.
Review of Nuclear Energy Services, Incorporated, Radiography
.
Reports of the root pass Report No. 1993 dated January 16,
1979, and the final report of the completed weldment,
Report No. 2274, dated February 13, 1979.
Both were
considered acceptable. The final radiographs were accepted
by the Level III Wismer and Becker examiner on February 15,
1979.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified
Mr. Kuron also expressed concerns as to length of time it took
-
to complete this weldment.
Finding: The investigator discussed this concern with Detroit
Edison QA personnel. As a result of the discussion, it was
learned that a stop work order was in effect for two (2) weeks
in September, 1978, due to welding problems.
When welding
resumed, the major effort was concentrated in the drywell area.
The welding problem is discussed in NRC Region III Report No.
341/78-18,Section IV, Paragraph 1.d.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations were identified.
- 19 -
1057 326
Mr. Kuron also stated that the subject main steam pipe spool
-
had beca removed from this location in the steam tunnel to be
cut and tLit he was not certain that the spool installed was
the same apool. The alleger related a story wherein the
individual cutting the spool was lax while performing the cut
and made an error, and that the individual was fired as a
result.
Finding: The investigator discussed the above with the Foreman
of Pipe Cutting Incorporated (PCI), and was informed that the
piece of pipe being cut was not for the main steam line, however,
it was for the RHR system. The individual performing the cut
was ser.t back to PDI's home offices. This section of pipe was
recoverable. No items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified.
Allegation No. 13:
Improper weld material used in the Chemical
Cleaning and Flushing System.
A verbal allegation was made by Mr. Kuron on February 21, 1979, by
pointing at a system and stating that weld rod had been used in the
system that was not supposed to be.
The alleger could not identify
any specific weldments where incorrect weld filler material had been
used.
Finding: The investigator identified the system as Job No. 4500, A
35-3628-40, which was later identified as the " Chemical Cleaning and
Flushing System." This system was being built to ANSI B31.1 Pressure
Piping (Class D) and is a QA Level II and III system. Therefore, as
this system is not nuclear safety related, the investigator did not
pursue this allegation further. However, the investigator made this
allegation known at the exit meeting held on February 23, 1979.
It
was stated at that time that this was a temporary system and would
eventually be removed. No items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified.
Allegation No. 14:
Improper weldment of pipe whip rertraints.
A verbal allegation was made on February 21, 1979, by the alleger
stating that stainless steel weld rod was used that should not have
been used in a weld which was pointed out to the investigators.
Finding: The investigation identified the weld as FW7E, a weld
joint in a pipe whip restraint structure.
Weld records and doctmen-
tation vere reviewed as follows:
Review of Wismer and Becker Weld Process Control Sheet (WPCS)
-
Submittal No. 12446 for weld identification No. FW7E, dated
December 12, 1977. This WPCS specified E-7018 filler material.
The Weld Filler Material Issue (Nuclear) slips were attached
and indicated that E7018 filler material was used.
- 20 -
1057
327
.
Review of Wismer and Becker DDR No. 175, date issued October 13,
-
1978. This DDR notes a deviation in that during a repair of
FW7 a 1" linear indication was discovered adjacent to FW7. The
final disposition of this weld is to excavate the indication
its full depth and reweld. During this investigation, the
final disposition had not been completed.
,
The inspector requested the licensee to obtain a sample of weld FW7E
to be analyzed to assure that components of stainless steel were not
present in the weld. Results of this analysis indicated that no
stainless steel is present in the weld. No items of noncompliance
or deviations were identified.
Allegation No. 15:
Improper installation of concrete anchors.
A verbal allegation was made on February 21, 1979, by Mr. Kuron
stating that Red Head concrete anchors had not been properly installed.
The anchors were sometimes substituted with shorter anchors (Dutchman
Anchors) because of rebar interference and in some cases the anchors
were not installed at all but that bolts were tack welded in place
to make it look as if they had been properly installed. The majority
of these bad installations were alledged to be in the turbine room
with some in the reactor building.
Mr. Kuron could not point out
any specific anchors where the above had been done.
Finding: The inspector reviewed anchor installation records, documents
and observed testing of installed anchors, as follows:
Review of thirteen (13) Wismer and Becker, Concrete Anchor Test
-
Reports, retrieved from the records storage vault.
These
reports had been accepted by Daniel International.
Review of approximately thirty-five (35) Wismer and Becker
-
Concrete Anchor Test Reports that had not been turned over to
Daniel International for final acceptance.
Review of Daniel International Procedure No. WP-I-01 " Installation
-
and Testing of Concrete Anchors," Revision 5, dated January 11,
1979, including Appendix I and Wismer and Becker Revision 8.
This procedure states that the testing requirements apply to QA
Level I system structures unless directed otherwise by Daniel.
The procedure further states that QA Level I installations, 10%
of the anchors shall be tested at the time of installation.
Wismer and Becker personnel stated that 100% testing was being
performed as evidenced by item (2) above.
The inspector observed the testing of four (4) anchors for
-
installation No. IW-P50-7001-G25. These met the required test
pressure.
- 21 -
1057
328
At the exit meeting held on February 23, 1979, the licensee stated
.
that approximately 50% of the hangers would be replaced due to
updating of the hanger design a,d. at that time the anchors would be
re-inspected visually and by the ase of ultrasonic testing to verify
the length of anchor installations. No items of noncompliance or
deviations were identified, however, this item is considered to be
unresolved pending the satisfactory completion of testing of the
anchors by the licensee.
(341/79-04-03)
Allegation No. 16: Voids in the grouting of the sacrificial shield
wall.
Based on information given him by Fermi 2 craft personnel, Mr. F. Kuron
expressed his concern to the RIII ir.vestigators that voids existed
in the sacrificial shield wall grout. He maintained that several
areas in the shield wall were devoid of grout due to the inaccessability
of the placement areas and improper placing / consolidation techniques.
Finding: The history of the sacrificial shield wall grout mix
de ign, development, approval and in-process testing was reviewed by
.
the NRC investigative team.
Specific items reviewed were as follows:
-
Initial test performed by Erlin, Hime and Associates of the
four proposed grout mix designs were reviewed cad found to
include test for Flow (ASTM C109-75, Paragraph 8.3), Density
(ACTM C138-75), Air Content (ASTM C138-75 and C231-75),
Compressive Strength (ASTM C109-75), Shrinkage (ASTM C157-75),
Early Volume Change (ASTM C827-75T) and Bleeding Characteristics
(ASTM C232-71).
Final approval of the mix designs for project use was given by
-
Sargent and Lundy.
In-process compressive strength test results of grout as required
-
by Daniel International Corporation (DIC) QCP-IV-118, Rev. O
were reviewed and found in each case to exceed the minimum 6000
psi compressive strength requirement.
Initially, the NRC representatives were given no specific location
of the potential void areas.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1979, an
investigation of the sacrificial shield wall was initiated by NRC
and licensee personnel. Utilizing a " sounding technique," four
potential void areas were identified.
(Wall skin plates No. 613PL1,
631PL1, 643PL3 and 651PL5A.) DIC DDR No. 2600 was then issued to
identify and request investigation of these areas.
Six 3/8" diameter
holes were drilled at the request of DIC Engineering in the skin
plates at specified locations. All holes drilled revealed that the
shield wall compartmentc were filled with grout and that the hollow
sound was attributable to minute shrinkage of the grout mix away
from the wall skin plate.
- 22 -
1057
329
.
.
The inspector requested and was given copies of all SIC DDR's which
,
identified compartments in the sacrificial shield wall which were
not properly filled w.'th grout during placement. Following is a
chronological list of the shield wall DDR's and a brief description
of each:
DDR No. 1187, Rev. A, October 7 1977.
Identified a voiIl area
-
6
in Placement No. 2 (Azimuth 286 -30' to 329 -30', elevation
598'-4" to 604'-10") and a void area in Placement No. 4 (Azimuth
342 -30' to 17 -45', elevation 598-4" to 610'-7").
Disposition
stated that the voids were to be filled using various grouting
methods, depending on location.
-
DDR No. 1226, October 12, 1977. Stated that the repair to
Placement No. 4 was incomplete due to the inaccessability of
the shield wall compartment in which the void existed. A3
inch grout access hole was drilled per DCR No. D-0037 and the
repair of Placement No. 4 completed in accordance with DIC
WP-I-03, Rev. 1.
DDR No. 1402, February 7, 1978.
Identifies a void area in
-
Placements No. 7 and 8 at Azimuth 225 , elevation 615'-0",
located behind wall skin plate No. 648PL1 and the adjacent
column No. 210 C1.
A 3" grout access hole was provided per DCR
No. C-0393 and the area was satisfactorily repaired in accordance
with DIC WP-I-03, Rev. 1.
DDR No. (C)2610, February 28, 1979.
Identifies two void areas
-
confirmed to exist on Feburary 28, 1979, during investigations
associated with this allegation. The first area is located at
Azimuth 49 -15', elevation 619'-8 1/2" (this area was greviously
unidentified) and the second is located at Azimuth 286 -30' to
approximately 316 -30', elevation 598'-4 1/16" (previously
identified on DDR 1187 as Placement No. 2).
The following
paragraphs discuss these two void areas in detail.
During interviews with selected crafts personnel on February 28,
1979, the inspector was informed of one area in which voids were
alledged to exist in the sacrificial shield wall grout.
Subsequent
investigation, on that date, revealed two void areas, one located at
Azimuth 49 -15', elevation 619'-8 1/2" and another at Azimuth 286 -30'
to approximately 316*-30', elevation 598'-4 1/16".
The investigator reviewed the DIC procedure of Testing and Inspection
of Sacrificial Shield Grout, No. QCP-IV-118, for requirements to
assure that shield wall compartments are completely filled during
grout placement. QCP-IV-118, Rev. O, Section 3.6 states that, " Placing
procedures and inspection points shall be in accordance with DIC
WP-I-03."
WP-I-03, Rev. O, Section 4.2.8, requires that during
grout placement the contractor's QC representative will monitor
" breather" or " weep" holes for evidence of concrete or grout.
- 23 -
1057 330
.
Review of the Sargent and Lundy shop drawings indicated that " weep
'
holes" and 1 1/16" bolt holes, to monitor the progress of grout
placement and facilitate trapped air removal were specified as part
of the wall skin plate, girder and column fabrication requirements.
In addition, the licensee issued DCR No. C-0169B to require additional
3/8" " weep holes" in congested areas to assure complete grout. placement.
DECO representatives confirmed that the first void area addressed by
DIC DDR No. 2610, located at Azimuth 49 -15;, elevation 619;-8 1/2",
had not been previously identified as nonconforming by the responsible
inspection personnel.
Consequently, no corrective action was scheduled
to adequately repair the nonconforming area.
This failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as
failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material
and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and
corrscted is considered an item of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI (341/79-04-04) as described in Appendix A.
DECO representatives also confirmed that the second void area addressed
by DIC DDR No. 2610, located ut Azimuth 286 -30' to approximately
316 -30;, elevation 598'-4 1/16", was Placement No. 2 which was
originally identified by DIC DDR No. 1187.
DECO representatives
stated further that both Placement No. 2 and Placement No. 4 were
incompletely repaired per DIC DDR No. 1187. DIC DDR No. 1226 was
then issued to complete the repairs, however, it included only
Placement No. 4 for final disposition. DIC DDR No. 1187, which
identifies Placement No. 2 as nonconforming, was observed to be
closed prior to completion of the specified repair. No corrective
action was scheduled to repair this nonconforming void area, prior
to its identification during this investigation.
This failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly
identified and corrected is considered another example of noncompliance
as cited previously in this section.
(341/79-04-04)
,
Detroit Edison Company representatives stated in a phone conversation
with the inspection team on March 6, 1979, that it is their intent
to inspect 100% of the " weep" holes and 1 1/16" bolt holes present
in the outer surface of the sacrificial shield wall to verify that
all shield wall compa-:tments are completely filled with grout. The
NRC investigative team was also informed that subsequent inspections
by the licensee had identified at least one additional void area in
the shield wall.
Allegation No. 17:
Improper cadweld splicing of Reactor Building
Rebar.
This allegation concerns the mechanical splicing of No. 18 bars in
the fifth floor of the Reactor Building at elevation 684'-6".
Mr. F. Kuron stated that several reinforcing bars " pulled out" of
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.
1057
331
.
.
the cadweld sleeves and failed to meet the minimum yield strength
,
requirements during physical testing of splices representative of
this area in the reactor building.
Finding: The 684'-6" elevation in the Reactor Building contains 327
No. 18 cadwelds located in Placements No. 428 North, 428 South, 429
and 430.
Inspector and crew qualifications, inspection, sample
frequency and testing were accomplished in accordance with Regulatory
Guide 1.10, Rev. 1.
Review of the tensile test results of No. 18 reinforcing bar cadwelds
representative of theie placements did reveal that two individual
splices failed to equal or exceed 125 percent of the minimua yield
strength (75,000 psi) as specified in ASTM A615. This observed rate
of failure did not exceed one for each fifteen consecutive test
samples and at no time did the average tensile strength of each
group of fifteen consecutive samples fail to equal or exceed the
quaranteed ultimate tensile strength (90,000 psi). This meets the
requirements specified in Regualtory Guide 1.10, Sections 3 and 5
for mechanical splice tensile test results. No items of noncompliance
or deviations were identified.
Allegation No. 18: Hairline cracks in Reactor Building structural
steel.
Mr. F. Kuron stated that through trades and labor personnel, he had
learned of " hairline cracks present in some of the Reactor Building
structural steel." He was unable to identify specific areas in
which these " hairline cracks" existed. Through discussions with the
licensee, the investigator learned of a previously identified problem
concerning the cracking of clip angles in the slab-over-torus-
substructure of the reactor building. When approached, Mr. Kuron
stated that these areas "must be the ones."
Finding: The structural steel framing for the " Slab-Over-Torus"
(elevation 536'-6") of which the clip angles are a part, consists of
radial girders which are shop welded from heavy plates.
In the
field, the ends of these girders are welded to clip angles which in
turn are welded to embedded plates in the inner (circular) and outer
(octogonal) wall of the reactor building concrete structure.
During routine QA inspection, it was noted that certain clip angles
had developed cracks. The following actions were taken by DECO to
resolve the clip angle cracking problem:
Sargeht nd Lundy re-evaluated the design of the welded connections
-
of the clip angles to the steel girders and confirmed that the
design was adequate. Excessive weld metal on certain clip
angles was removed by arc-air gouging and chipping to assure
compliance with Taylor and Gaskin drawing FWI, Rev. 2.24-72.
- 25 -
1057 332
.
The cause of the cracking of the rolled angles was determined
-
,
by metallographic and chemical analysis performed by DECO
Reasearch Department to be defective hot rolling.
All welded clip angles which were not embedded in cencrete were
-
tested by liquid penetrant for cracks.
-
Clip angles waich were not embedded in concrete were replaced
-
or repaired in the field.
Sargent and Lundy designed 27 saddle supports to be installed
-
under girders where concrete had been placed. These supports,
detailed in S&L drawing No. B-56 are designed to bear the full
load of the girders.
Approximately ten clip angles were visually investigated by the RIII
team. No evidence of cracking was found. The installation of the
27 saddle supports in the specified locations was also verified.
Allegation No. 19: Excess structural steel after completion of the
RHR Building.
The allegation concerned approximately 40-50 tons of excess reinforcing
steel left over after the comp 12 tion of the RHR Building.
The
alleger was concerned this excess might represent essential structural
components that were left out of the RHR building during construction.
Mr. Kuron was unable to provide any specific location in the RHR
Building in which reinforcing steel was known to have been left out.
Finding: During construction of the RHR Building, DECO requested
that Daniel International QA take photographs of the placement area
to verify proper size and spacing of in place reinforcing steel.
DECO representatives stated that this policy was initiated due to
similiar allegations being rade at another nuclear power plant under
construction.
The NRC team compared the photographs taken of RHR Placements No.
SS2, W-1-15 and WP-10 with the appropriate reinforcing steel design
drawings.
In each case, the investigator was able to correlate the
design drawings and photographs to verify that no major errors were
made during reinforcing placement.
An investigation of the steel laydown areas revealed approximately
20 tons of RHR Building stock reinforcing steel and one 45 bar
bundle of reinforcing steel tagged for use in the 617', elevation
RER slab.
It is common construction practice to have this amount of
stock steel for field fabrication of miscellaneous steel shapes and
to accomodate reinforcing design changes. The 45 bar bundle oas
determined to be excess reinforcement due to a design change which
deleted these bars for the 617' slab.
- 26 -
1057 333
.
The investigation associated with this allegation did not reveal any
,
evidence that would lead to the conclusion that reinforcing steel
was omitted from the RHR Building. No items of noncompliance or
deviations were identified.
Allegation No. 20:
Cracks in the concrete base mat of the Reactor
Building.
Mr. Kuron expressed his concern of the concrete cracks which developed
in the reactor building base mat at elevation 540' . He felt that
the cracking might " allow radiation to leak out of the reactor
building" and that the structural integrity of the base mat may have
been impaired.
Finding: DECO had previously identified the cracks in the reactor
building base slab in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Paragraph 50.55(e)(3).
The final technical report from DECO was dated November 8, 1974, No.
EFZ-29,537.
DECO summarized the reactor building base mat cracking problem as
being one of ground water, which was seeping through the radial and
circumferential cracks present in the base slab. Evaluation and
disposition of the cracking problem by the licensee included the
following actions:
-
Building Outleakage - In the case of a pipe rupture in the
Reactor Building, t'ere would be no outward leakage of radioactive
a
water through the cracks in the floor of the building unless
the basement areas became flooded to cuch a depth that the head
of water inside was equal to or higher than that of the ground
water outside. Under normal plant operation conditions, this
would require flooding in the basement to a depth of approximately
30 feet before reaching the same head at the normal external
ground water.
If this flooding began to occur, the reactor
would be brought to a safe shutdown and the water contained
within the building would be processed through the radwaste
system.
It should be noted that this case is only valid if the
cracks were not repaired.
Sargent and Lundy, the structural designers for the reactor
-
building, performed a thorough anlysis and concluded that the
observed cracks did not impair the structural strength of the
base slab.
A program was initiated to monitor the width and length of
-
selected cracks for an increase in length or width and to
identify any new cracks which might develop.
Crack width and the penetration into the base slab was determined
-
by taking random concrete cores at various specified locations.
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e
j
Developed, approved and execute procedures for the drilling,
-
pressure testing and grouting of all cracks present in the base
mat.
As of the date of this investigation, DECO personnel indicated that
-
they felt the grouting program had effectively sealed the cracks in
the base slab due to the lack of infiltrating ground water. The NRC
team toured the elevation 540 base slab on February 22, 1979, and
found no evidence of continued water seepage. No items of noncompliance
or deviations were noted.
6.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required
in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of
noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the
investigation are discussed on pages 12 and 13 (Allegations 2 and 3),
and on page 22 (Allegation No. 15) of this report.
7.
Exit Interview
The investigators met with site staff representatives (denoted in
the Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the investigation
on March 2, 1979. The investigators summarized the scope and findings
of the investigation, including the apparent items of noncompliance
identified in the Results section of this report. The licensee
acknowledged the findings.
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