ML19208D184
| ML19208D184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1979 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208D179 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909280091 | |
| Download: ML19208D184 (8) | |
Text
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Do:ket No. 50 289 Metro::olitan Edison Company, Three Mile
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Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 g,,
Or. h G y p[
b bb udb ORDER AND NOTICE OF HEARING L..-
e The Metropolitan Edison Company (the licensee) is holder of Facility Operating I.
License No. DRR-50 which authorizes the operation of'the nuclear power reactor Lt.cwn as Three Mile Island, Nuclear Station, Unit No.1 (the facility or THI-1),
at steady state power levels not in excess of 2535 megawatts thermai (ra7ed The facility is a Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) designed pressurizeo water power).
reactor (PWR) located at the licensee's site ten miles southeast of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.,
On July 2,1979, the Commission ordered that the facility.emain in a cold 11.
shutdown condition until further order of the Comission and stated that a hearing will be conducted prior to any restar: of the faci _lity.
The,Comission herein the basis for its con'cerns and the procedures to govern specifies For the reasons later set forth, the Com-further proceedings in this matter.
mission has determined that satisfactory completion of certain actions and resolutr of;various concerns described herein are required to provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without endangering the health and safety of The Comission has determined that certain additional long-term the public.
actions are, for the reason's given below, required to be completed as promptly as practicable in order to provide reasonable assurance t. hat the facility can This Order and notice of earing further be operated safely over the long term.
establishes procedures for a hearing and decision on the particular issuer
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_a identified in Section IV of this Order.
The Cormission has determined that w,'
hearing and decision (with review thereof) on the issues relating to the actions j
required prior to restart of the, facility must be completed prior to any.Com-mission Order lif ting the suspension of operation.
Accordingly, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board designated to conduct this proceeding should give priority to consideration of those issues which are relcted directly to suspension of operation.
To the extent feasible, the Board should defer on the issues related to the longer-term actions until af ter the rencerirg of a partial initial decision regardirig the suspension-related issues.
The Commission's July 2,'1979 Order recited that "the Commission presently
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lacks t'he requisite reasonable assurance that the... Licensee's Three Mile Island Unit No.1 Facility... can be operated without endangering the health
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and safety of the public." The bases for that conclusion (which remains valid) are:
s....'.
i.
D In the course of its evaluation to date of the accide..t at the Tru ee Mile Island Unit No. 2 facility, which utill:es a asw de. signed M., the f
Nuclear reg'ulatory Comission.st.aff has ascertairr$d t..at EsW designed
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re. actors apsar to 62 unusually sen.sitive to cert.: In eff-nor:.:1 tre.sient t
. conditions cricimting in the r-2:endcry sys:ct...
7.w f u. u. es of the
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2M deafcyn th t centrib.rm tc this emsitivity t re:
!'.) 6: sign of C.2 e
ptes: egerators to e :ctc with reltt.vely : n21 15
!d vde.u: in. m y
g st.:or,d:ry sider (2) the lack of direct initiatica ot rece:or trip up:n I
the cccurrer!ce of off-n:.m.a1 cerditier.s in :.% fe262.er syst:=: (2) re--
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11ance on an inte7 rated control system (ICS) to :.::.:.:tically're?.:. late 1051 335
i feed.ater flow; (c) acttutica t>afore reactor trip of a pilot-sperated relief velvc cn tJn Frichry system pressurl:er (d..ic., if tha valvr.
Otichs opin, can (7gravots F5e event); tn3 (5) a low stesm generator O)
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elevation (relative to the racetor ves.sel) shich pro.-ides a maller drivirg head for retural circblation.
Because of these features, !4W dssigned re Obrs place =: ore relia x:e c,
the reliability and perforrance characteristics of the a.silia./ fped-
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veter @c=, the integrated control syster.., ::n3 the carger,cj core c:el--
porfor=arree to recover free. fresae.c anticip:tod ing system (CCS) less of rc:=1 feed.ater,
, transients, such as loss of offsite power and than do other pr 3 designs.
Tnis, in turn, plices a la.rge burden en the n
L-9.wier du: irs such
' plant operators in the event of off-nerral ryste 1
anticipated transients.
As a result of a preliminary review of the Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 accident chronology, the NRC staff initially identified s.everal human errors that occurred during the accident and contributed significantly All holders of operating licenses, except Metropolitan to its severity.
Edison, whose plants were already shutdown, were subsequently instructed to take a number of immediate actions to avoid iepetition of errors, in accordance with bulletins issued by the Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE).
In addition, the NRC staff began an immediate reevaluation of the design features of B&W reactors to detemine whether additional safety corrections or improvements were necessary with respect This evaluation involved numerous meetings with B&W to these reactors.
and certain of the affected licensees.
1051 336 e..
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g Tae evaluation identified design features b discussed cbove which indl-cated that B&N designed reactors a re unusually sensitivu to certain off-
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norr.:1 transient conditions originating in the secondary syste n.
As a result, an additional tr.111etin,was issued by E which instru::cd holdern
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of op2reting licensas for MW designed resctors to tche furcer e.etien=,
incitSing it..v. dicto chinges to decrease the rsector higt pressure trip i
P nt and in:rees: the pressuri er pilot-operatOd ruliGf valve setting.
Also, as a result of this evaluation, the IGC staf f ic'.:ntific.d cert.ain -
other safety concerns that wctrented additional short-t.crm design' end pro:cdure.1 che.nges at operating facilitics h.ving MW de. signed reactors.
"Ibtse were identified as iter.s (a) throu-h (e) on page 1-7.of the office t
of lb: lear P.e.acter P.=gulation Status Reprt to the Co:.=ission of April 25, -
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1979.','
In addition to the items identified for the other B&W reactors, the unique circumstances at TMI require that additional safety concerns identified by the NRC staff be resolved. These concerns result from (1) potential inter-action between Unit 1 and the damaged Unit 2, (2) the impact of the Unit 2 accident on the management and technical resources of Metropolitan Edison, (3) the operat' 'ns necessary to decontaminate the Unit 2 facility, and (4) recognized deficie'ncies in emergency plans and station operating procedures.
Assurance must be provided that these items,1-4, which could have an impact on the safety of operating Unit 1 in addition to the technical features already identified for the other B&W plants, be resolved prior to restart'.
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Based on the above, the Commission's Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-(NRR) has recommended that the~ following actions (the "short-term actions")
be required of.the licensee to resolve the concerns stated herein and pennit a I'"
finding of reasonable assurance that the facility can safely resume operation.
1.
The licensee shall take the fo11owing actions with respect to TMI-1:
(a) Upgrade the timeliness and reliability of.the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system by performing the items specified in Enclosure 1 of the t
licensees June 28, 1979 letter. Changes in design will be submitted to the NRC staff for review.
(b)
Develop and implement operating procedures for initiating and controlling EFW independent of Integrated Control System (ICS) control.
(c)
Install a hard-wired control grade reactor trip on loss of main feedwater and/or on turbine trip.
(d)
. Complete analyses for potential small breaks and develop and implement operating instructions to define operator action.
(e)
Augment the retraining of all Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor dperators assigned to the control room including training in the areas of natural circulation and small break loss of coolant accidents includ-
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ing revised procedures and the TMI-2 accident.
All operators will also receive training at the B&W simulator on the TMI-2 accident and the licensee will conduct a 100 percent reexamination of all operators in NRC will administer complete examinations to all licensed these areas.
personnel.
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2.
The licensee shall provide for NRC review and approval all' applicable actions specified in IE Bulletins79-05A and 79-058.
3.
The licensee shall improve his emergency preparedness in accordance with the following:
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(a) Upgrade emergency plans to satisfy R'egulatory Guide 1.101 with special atte~ntion to action level criteria based on plant parameters.
(b) Establish an Emergency Operations Center for Federal, State and Local Officials and designate a location and an alternate location and provide communications to plant.
(-c) Upgrade offsite monitoring capability, including additional l
l thermo-luminescent dosimeters or equivalent.
(d) Assess the relationship of State / Local plans
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to the licensee plans so as to assure the t
capability to take emergency actions.
(e) Conduct test exercise.
4.
The licensee shall take actions required to demonstrate that planned decon-tamination and/or restoration operations at TMI-2 will not impact safe operations at TMI-1. The licensee shall provide separation and/or isolation of TMI 1/2 radioactive liquid transfer lines, fuel handling areas, ventila-tion systems, and sampling lines.
Effluent nonitoring instruments shall have the capability of discriminating between effluents resulting from Unit 1 or Unit 2 operations.
1Q51 339
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MS gwpe aweg g
7 The licensee.shall demonstrate that the waste management capability, includ-5.
ing storage and processing., for solid, liquid, and gaseous wastes is adequate to assure safe operation of TMI-1, and that TMI-l waste handling capability is not relied on by operations at THI-2.
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6.
The licensee shall demonstrate his managerial capability and resources to operate Unit 1 while maintaining Unit 2 in a safe configuration and carrying out planned decontamination and/or restoration activities.
Issues to be addressed include the adequacy of groups providing safety review and operational advice, the management and technical capability and training of Operations. staff, the adequacy of the operational Quality Assurance program
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and the facility procedures, and the capability of..fmportant support organizations such as Health Physics and Plant Maintenance.
7.
The licensee s' hall demonstrate his financial capability to operate TMI-l at
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the TMI 1/2 complex.
8.
The licensee shall comply with the Category A recommendations as specified in Table B-1 of NUREG-0578.
t The Commission has additional concerns, which, though they need not be resolved prior to resumption of operation at Three Mile Island Unit 1, must be satisfactorily addressed in a timely manner. The Commission's Director of Nuclear Reactor Reg.lation (NRR) has recommended that the following actions (the "long-term actions")
be required of the licensee to resolve these concerns and permit a finding of reasor.able assurance of the safety of long-term operation. These are:
1.
submit a failure mode and effects analysis of the ICS to the NRC staff as soon as practicable; 2.
give continued attention to transient analysis and procedures for management of small breaks by a formal program set up to assure timely action of these 1051 340 n
r_a tters ;
3.
comply with the Category B recommendations as specified in Table B-1 of
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HUREG-0578; and, 4.
improve emergency preparedness in accordanc.e with the following:
(a) modify emergency plans to address changing capabilities of plant instrumenta tion, (b) extend the capability to teke appropriate emergency actions for the population around the site to a distance of ten miles.
Ir, addition, the licensee shall also provide, but not prior to restart, timely responss and implementation of longer term rec 6mmendations which may result from the Lessons learned Task Force as well as recommendations that may arise from the Presidential Commissioni the NRC's ongoing investigations, and other studies unless s ch recom-
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mendations are determined by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to be required prior to restart.
III. Accordingly, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 C.F.R.,
it is hereby ordered that:
the licensee shall maintain TMI-1 in a cold shutdown condition until satisfactory resolu-tion of the concerns, identified above, which led the Commission to suspend the licensee's authority to operate.
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e 1051 34.1
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