ML19208B388
| ML19208B388 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1979 |
| From: | Lewis S NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909200140 | |
| Download: ML19208B388 (12) | |
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NRC PUBLIC ROO.%
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0"JtISSION 8/27/7 M /j, g#
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT )
Docket No. 50-312
)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
)
Station)
)
NRC STAFF'S BRIEF ON SCOPE OF THE PROCEEDING
Background
In its Prehearing Conference Order (August 3, 1979) the Licensing Board, inter alia (b) directed all parties, including the California Energy Commission, to submit to the Board no later than August 27, 1979, briefs on the scope of this Board's jurisdiction in this proceeding.
In theii-briefs, the parties were requested to address the effect, if any, of a commission rulemaking, either in pro-gram or planned, on the admissibilit.j of any contentions.
This pleading constitutes the NRC Staff's respease to the Board's order.
This proceeding had its genesis in the roay 7,1979 order of the Commission, which (1) confirmed the shutdown of the Rancho Seco facility; (2) directed that the facility remain in a shutdown condition until certain actions were completed by the licensee to the satisfaction of the Director of the Office of Nuclear d
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ReactorRegulagon(hereafterreferredtoasthe"short-term" actions;- and directed the licensee to accomplish as promptly as practie-(3) able certain identified "long-term" modifications.2 If Tnese actions (set forth in Section IV of the order) are:
(a) Upgrade the timeliness ano reliability of delivery from the Auxiliary Feedwater System by carrying out actions as identi-fled in Enclosure 1 of the licensee's letter of April 27, 1979.
(b) Develop and implement operating procedures for initiating and controlling auxiliary feedwater independent of Integrated Control System control.
(c)
Implement a hard-wired control-grade reactor trip that would be actuated on loss of main feedwater and/or turbine trip.
(d) Complete analyses for potential small breaks and develop and implement operating instructions to define operator action.
(e) Provide for one Senior Licensed Operator assigned to the control room who has had Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 (TMI-2) training on the B&W simulator.
y These actions (set forth in Section II of the Order) are:
The licensee will provide to the NRC Staff a proposed schedule for implementation of identified design modifications which specifically relate to items.1 through 9 of Enclosure 1 to the licensee's letter of April 27, 1979, and would significantly improve safety.
The licensee will submit a failure made and effects analysis of the Integrated Control System to the NRC Staff as soon as practicable.
The reactor trip following loss of main feedwater and/or trip of the turbine to be installed promptly pursuant to this Order will thereafter be upgraded so that the components "are safety grade. The licensee will submit this design to the NRC Staff for review.
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The licensee will continue operator training and have a minimum of two licensed operators per shift with TMI-2 simulator training at B&W by June 1, 1979. Thereafter, at least one licensed operator with TMI-2 simulator training at S&W will be assigned to the control room. All training of licensed personnel will be completed by June 28, 1979 g 4 g 3 } }
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That order provided that the license's or any person whose interest might be affected by the order could request a hearing with respect to the order.
Following requests for a hearing filed by Friends of the Earth and associ-ated groups.(collectively "F0E") and Messrs. Gary Hursh and Richard D. Castro, the Commission issued an order on June 21, 1979 directing that a Licensing Board be designated to pass upon the standing of the requesters and to con-duct any hearing that might be required. The Commission further directed that the " subjects to be considered at any such hearing shall include":
1.
Whether the actions required by subparagraphs (a) through (e) of Section IV of the Order are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the facility will respond safely to feedwater transients, pending completion of the long-tenn modifications set forth in Section II.
2.
Whether the licensee should be required to accomplish, as promptly (s practicable, the long-tenn modifications set forth in Section II of the Order.
3.
Whether these long-tern modifications are sufficient to provide continued reasonable assurance that the facility will respond safely to feedwater transients.
Following the formation of this Licensing Board'it issued an " Order for Filing of Amended and Supplemented Requests for and Notice of Prehearing Conference" (July 3,1979).
In foonote 3 to that order the Board stated:
The Commission has already identified in its June 21, 1979, Order the broad issues to be ccrsidered.
Each requester for hearing can, of course, assert in its-
[ amended and supplemented request for a hearing] that further issues should be specified as long as they are related to the action taken by the Commission in its May 7, 1979, Order.
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The above three orders provide the boundaries for this proceeding.
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Limitations on Scoce of Proceedina As seen in the d'escription of the background of this case, the Commission specifically identified the issues to be considered in this proceeding.
While it is-true that the Commission used the words "shall include" in identifying the three issues to be considered, we nonetheless believe that the Licensing Board correctly interpreted these words in its footnote (quoted above) as limiting any further issue sought to be raised in this proceeding to matters expressly "related to the action taken by the Commission in its May 7,1979, Order." The action taken by the Commission is defined in the list of short-tera actions and long-term modifications set forth in its order. The Commission's. action was aimed at providing reasonable assurance that "the facility will respond safely to feedwater transients."
We believe this is the touchstone which the Board had in mind.
By virtue of its orders then, the Commission has directed that any hearing which the Board might conduct would be limited to the issues identified by the Commission.
It is clear, of course, that the C'~ mission may limit the juris-om diction it confers upon a licensing board in a particular proceeding.O The 3f June 21, 1979 order at 2.
In identifying the issues which could be considered should a proceeding be held, the Commission had before it, and apparently did not adopt, pleadings suggesting a. broader scope for the proceeding.
See F0E's May 15, 1979 letter request for hearing, spe-cifically pp. 9-10 of the statement of " Generic Problems with Babcock &
Wilcox PWR's" attached thereto; Hursh-Castro May 25, 1979 telegram requesting a hearing.
y Section 191 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2241) provides that the Commission may convene licensing boards "to conduct such hearings as the Commission may direct." See Public Service Comoany of Indiana (Marble Hill), ALAB-316, 3 NRC 167, 17) (1975); harthern IMiana Public Service Company (Bailly), ALAB-249, 8 AEC 980, 987 (1974); Consumers Power Comoany (Midland) ALAB-235, 8 AEC 645, 645 (1974).
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notice of hearing or of opportunity for hearing governing a proceeding is the proper place to look in detemining the scope of that proceeding.E In a prueeding, such as this one, where a hearing is not mandatory there are particularly stro*ng reasons for limiting the issues to those which the Comission has stated may be raised.6,f In more precisely defining the subject of this proceeding, we have looked at the documents available to the Ccmission when it issued its May 7 order.
It appears that the basis for the Comission's order is found in "NRR STATUS REPORT ON FEEDWAT? TRANSIENTS IN B&W PLAT 1TS - April 25, 1979."
In this report, it is quite clear from the statement of'the problem found on page 1-1 that the total scope of concern was the sensitivity of B&W plants to feedwater transients and the role that this sensitivity might play as a precursor or contributor to a TMI-2 type of accident.
In evaluating the B&W plants' response to feedwater transients, the Staff specified improvements which would be necessary to provide reasonable assurance of protection of the public health and safety for continued operation of these facilities. The Staff considered three alternative ways of implementing these design changes, one of which was to shutdown the B&W plants until the changes were corrpleted. The Staff evaluated these alternatives solely on the basis of safaty considerations. The Staff recommanded to the Commission that the plants be shutdown until the required actions were completed, based on two major con-siderations: (1) this action was the most conservative and (2) this action would allow time for the Staff and industry to work in a more orderly fashion. The 5/
Marble Hill, suora, 3 NRC at 170-71.
6f See 10 CFR 52.760a; Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (Zimmer), ALAB-305, 3 NRC 8, 12 (1976. We would note that if any person believed that enforce-ment action additional to that. required here should be imposed on Rancho Seco, that position could be asserted via 10 CFR 62.206.
See Conmission's -
June 21, 1979 order at 2-3.
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i Commission acted upon this recommendation and issued orders to all of the'C&ti operating plants, directing them to shutdown (or remain shutdown) until the l actions necessary to insure that the plants could safely respond to feedwater s
transients had be;n accomplished by each licensee to the satisfaction of the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
As noted above, the May 7 order with respect to Rancho Seco provided that any hearing to be held with respect to this facility would include as issues whether the short and long-term actions are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the facility will respond safely to feedwater transients. At this time it does not appear that any party challenges whether 4
the short or long-term actions are necessary. However, thare is concern on Mether the actions specified are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of protection of the pub'lle health and safety for the continued operation of Rancho Seco.
Therefore, any party challenging the sJfficiency of the actions taken must limit their contentions to Rancho Seco's ability to respond to feedwater transients. A feedwater transient either reduces the amount of feedwater provided to the steam generators or provides too inuch feedwater to the steam generators. A reduction or loss of feedwater reduces the asunt of heat removed from the primary system by the secondary system and will resu't in increasing the pressure in the reactor. coolant system, Too much feedwater increases the amount of heat removed from the primary system by the secon'dary and will. result in decreasing the pressure in the reactor coolant system. Either of these situa-tions if not acted upon by operator action and/or automatic plant design features can itad to inadequate cooling of the reactor core and subsequent damage to the reactor fuel.
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In order for a plant to respond safely to a feedwater transient, there must be reasonable assurance that operator acticns and/or automatic plant responses are 7
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such that any resultant inadequate core cooling (described above) does not lead to core damage. Therefore any cententions that deal with the following areas appear to b,e within the scope of the phnt's ability to respond safely to feedwater transients (including small break loss of coolant accidents):
1.
operator training and qualifications which are required for insuring that promot and correct action are taken during the course of a feedwater transient, 2.
any plant design feature, control system or equipment which can lead to or aggravate the consequences of a feedwater transient, 3.
any plant design' feature, control system or equipment which is relied upon to mitigate the consequences of a feedwater transient prior to experiencing core damage, 4.
any supporting analyses upon which items in 2 or 3 above are
- designed, 5.
any supporting analyses deve;oped for the purpose of determining plant response to feedwater transients, and 5.
any supporting analyses developed for the purpose of providing operator guidelines and/or emergency procedures for coping with,
Our position with respect to the specific contentions put forward by F0E and by Messrs Castro and Hursh ano the issues put forward by the California Energy
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Commission are set forth in separate filings. We wili comment here, however, about one co=en theme asserted by all three.
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Both Intervenors and the Energy Commission have asserted that th'e Board mus*;
consider all information generated regarding the accident at TMI-2 subsequent to the May 7,1979 order, and have specifically identified two documents which 7) 8_/
they seek to have considered, namely, NUREG-0560 and NUREG-0578.
The Staff has objected to this assertion as being legally insufficient.-9/ For, while the Intervenors and the Energy Comission have identified these docu-ments, they have failed to focus on which of the numerous recommendations contained in these reports are relevant to this proceeding. The;1aw is now abundantly clear that in circumstances such as the present, the Intervenors and the Energy Comission have an express duty to demonstrate the connection, 1f any, between the specific recommendations in NUREG-0560 and NUREG-0578 which they desire consi[fered by this Board and the subject matter of this proceeding.
In rejecting similarly vague contentions, the Appeal Board in Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 5 NRC 760, 773 (1977), expressly observed that given the generalized nature of the studies identified in the TSAR [ Technical Safety Activities Report], cnd the status of regulatory guides, it was not erroneous for the Licensing Board to have imposed its nexus requirement. Unlike in the case of the SER, where the relationship to the facility is perforce' established by its introduction into evidence in connection with the application, there is no necessary con-nection between the safety of a facility and any particular TSAR item or regulatory guide.
Some connecting link must therefore be supplied.
7f Staff Report on the Generic Assessment of Feedwater Transients in Pressurized Water Reactors Designed by the Babcock & Wilcox Company, N 1979.
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TMI-2 Lessens Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommen-dations, July 1979.
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See, e.g., " Response of NRC Staff to Contentions of Intervenors and to Issues of Interested State," August 20, 1979, at 5-6.
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In seeking to apply this standard to the present proceeding, it is instructive, we believe, to observe that the T'4I-2 Lessons Learned Task Force (the authors of NUREG-0578) were charged with making a much broader and more generic in-quiry than the authors of NUREG-0560.-10/
NUREG-0578, therefore, deals with the reactors manufactured by all four principal light water reactor vendors.-11/
One of the recomendations (2.1.5.b - Inerting Boiling Water Reactor Contain-ments) is, on its face, not applicable to B&W plants because it applies only to boiling water reactors. Other recomendations, which apply to pressurized water reactors, may not apply specifically to Rancho Seco.
l While many, if not most, of the matters addressed in NUREG-0560 relate to the ability of B&W plants to respond safely to feedwater transients, there are some recommendations can'tained therein which are beyond the scope of this proceeding.
For example, various recommendations are rel&ted to internal actions which the NRC Sta.ff should undertake, such as updating Standard Re-view Plans and developing new Regulatory Guides.-12/
As noted above with respect to NUREG-0578, the Intervenors and Energy Commission must establish a nexus between.the recour.endations of NUREG-0560 which they believe should be con-sidered by the Board and the subject matter of this proceeding Effect of Pending or Proposed Rulemaking on Admissibility of Contentions in This Proceeding 13/
In response to a point raised by Staff counsel at the prehearing conference,---
the Board directed the parties to treat in their briefs the effect, if any, 10f NUREG-0578, p. 2.
11/
Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering, Babcock & Wilcox, and General Electric.
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NUREG-0560 at 4.
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Tr. 16.
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of a rulemaking, "either in program [ sic] or planned", on the admissibility of contentions in this proceeding. The Staff has not identified any rulemaking, either in progress or formally planned, which deals with subjects within the scope of this proceeding. The Commission has published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking regarding "Ao'equacy and Acceptance of Emergency Planning Around Nuclear Facilities."
Since we view the subject of radiological emergency response plans as beyond the scope of this proceeding, we do not believe the Board need reach the question of whether this advance _ notice would have the effect of precluding consideration of this subject in this proceeding.
Conclusion This proceeding is a limited one, with its boundaries deriving from the Com-mission's orders of May 7 and June 21, 1979, as interpreted by the Licensing Board in its order of July 3,1979. Certain of the contentions and issues raised by the Intervenors and by the California Energy Commission are beyond the scope of this proceeding and should be rejected by the Board. As to others, no nexus has been established between the_ matters sought to be raised and the subject of this proceeding. The Board may wish to afford Intervenors and the Energy Comision an opportunity to cure these defects.~15/
Respectfully submitted, I
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Stephen H. Lewis Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 27th day of August, 1979.
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44 FR 41483 (July 17, 1.979).
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Staff intends to offer M meet further with Intervenors and the Energy Comission for discussions regarding their contentior.s or issues.
Should any definitive progress be made toward agreement on contentions or issues, we will promptly so notify the Board.
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UtlITED STATES OF AMERICA HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO!1 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY A!!D LICENSIf;G BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
SACRAMENTO MUf!ICIPM. UTILITY
)
Docket No. 50-312 DISTRICT
)
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
)
Station
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF'S BRIEF ON SCOPE OF THE PROCEEDING",
in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or, as indicated by a single asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Connission's internal mail system, or, as indicated by a double asterisk, by delivery to the Office of the identified person, this 27th day of August, 1979:
- Michael L. G' laser, Esq., Chairman Gary Hursh, Esq.
1150 17th Street, N.W.
520 Capitol Mall Washington, D.C.
20036 Suite 700
- Dr. Richard F. Cole Sacramento, California 95814 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mr. Richard D. Castro U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2231 K Street Washington, D.C.
20555 Sacramento, California 95816
- Mr. Frederick J. Shon
James S. Reed, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Michael H. Remy, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reed, Samuel & Remy Washington, D.C.
20555 717 K Street, Suite 405 Sacramento, California 95814 David S. Kaplan, Esq.
General Counsel Christopher Ellison, Esq.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District Dian Grueneich, Esq.
P. O.
Box 15830 California Energy Commission Sacramento, California 95813
.1111 Howe Avenue Sacramento, California 95825
. Timothy V. A. Dillon, Esq.
Suite 380 1850 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20006 845 340 w_ _.
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- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washingtcn, D.C.
2,0555
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
- Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555
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Stephen H.
Lewis Counsel for NRC Staff
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