ML19206A917
| ML19206A917 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1969 |
| From: | JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19206A907 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904210612 | |
| Download: ML19206A917 (21) | |
Text
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- 0 BEFORE THE UNI"'ED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY CO:GIISSION In the Metter of:
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO!!PANY JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, Docket No. 50-320 UNIT NO. 2 SUPPLEMENT TO SUIG1ARY DESCRIPTION OF APPLICATION FOR REACTOR CONSTRUCTION PERMIT AIID OPERATING LICENSE DATE:
October 1, 1969, 7 9 0 4 '310 6/ Z G3 -et:4
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INTRODUCTION This Supplement to Summary Description of Applica-tion for Reactor Construction Permit and Operating License is submitted in response to questions asked by members of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board at the Pre-Hearing Conference held on September 19, 1969, in Washington, D. C.
This Supplemqnt constitutes a portion of the Appli-cant's prepared testimony for the public hearing on the Application for a construction permit and is sponsored collectively by the sponsors of the Applicant's Summary Description of the Application for Reactor Construction Permit and Operating License, dated September 3, 1969.
63--055 M'
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J T BLE OF COI;TE*;TS Pre-Hearing Conference Transcript Subject Page Reference I
Alternatives to Centalu=ent Purging 1
- p. 47 to Relieve Eydrogen Generation Problem II Discussion of Status of Iodine Removal 1
pp. 47 48 Research and Development Pro 6 ram Discussion of Protection to be Afforded 3 pp. 48, 53 Against the Probable Maxim =, Flood IV Femry of Applicant's Discussions 5
9 49 d ch the Pennsylvania Department of Health V
Discussion of Effluent Releases and 5
pp. 49-50; Cu=ulative Effects of Tritium and 51-52; Krypten Discharges frca a number 59 of Reactor Plants Including Three Mile Isinnd Unit 2 VI quality Assurance Dur: ig 7
- p. 50 Construction VII Co: cent en the Fish and Wildlife 8
- p. 50 Letter Dated June 17, 1969 VIII Discussion on how Three Mile Island 9
- p. 51 Units 1 and 2 vill be Operated with Regard to the Relears of Effluents IX Discussica en how the Effluent 10
- p. 51 Releases will be cade Batch or
- Continuous Release X
Discussion of Centrol over Water 11
- p. 52 Bodies Intersecting the Exclusica Area g
XI Discussion of Adequacy of Greuted 11
- p. 52 Tendons XII Discussica of the Positive 14 pp. 59-60
._Moderr. tor Coefficient 63--05G
s' TABLE OF CO'Tl'E'iTS (Contd.)
Pre-Hearing Conference Transcript Subject Page Reference XIII The Validity of Assumptions 15
- p. 60 Underlying the Accident Analyses XIV Report on the Present On-Site 15
- p. 60 Monitoring Program 4
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Sub'j ect: Alternatives to Containment Purcing to Relieve Hydrogen 2
Generation Problem B&W has reviewed various potential methods of assurin6 that the
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b hydrogen concentrations do not exceed safe levels.
Included in this 5
review were a study of the effects allcwing hydrogen to accumulate to 6
variou3 ccncentrations, the use of flame and catalytic recombiners, 7
hot surface contustion, and the use of chemical additives to the spray 8
solution for scavenging hydrogen.
9 mW concluded from this review that purging is a safe, depend-10 able means of preventin6 excessive hydrogen buildup.
11 With purging, the active equipment required for a purge system 12 is located outside of the reactor building, thus being separated from 13 the LoCA environment. Also, the purging system equipment is simple, 114 consisting of standard components whose satisfactory perfomance has 15 been demonstrated t; extensive operating experience. Following the 16 initial study, our efforts are being devoted to a more detailed evalua-17 tion and design of the purging system.
II 18
Subject:
Discussion of the Status of Iodine Removal Research and 19 Development Program 20 The MW research and development program on alkaline sodium 21 thiosulfate research and develcpment has been completed. This work is 22 reported in proprietary Topical Report PAW-lC017, "Research and Develop-23 ment Report on the Stability and Compatibility of Sodium Thiosulfate Spray 2!+
Solutions," which van submitted to the Staff on August 6,' 1969 This 25 report includes test data on storace, radiation and thermal stability; 26 iodine retention capability; and materials ccmpatibility.
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1 The test data substantiates that:
2 a.
The solution is stable under long term storage.
3 b.
Under accident cenditions the alkaline sodium thiosulfate has 4
sufficient stability to perform its iocine removal and retention 5
function.
6 c.
The solution is compatible with the materials and functions of 7
the containment and safeguards systems.
8 In the past tw years, a large number of spray tests (more than 25) have 9
besa conducted in the Nuclear Safety Pilot Plant (USPP) by Oak Ridge 10 National Laboratory and in the Containment Systems Experiment (CSE) 11 by Battelle Northwest Laboratory. These tests have demonstrated that 12 radioactive iodine is effectively removed by alkaline thiosulfate chemi-13 cal sprays.
14 Using an NSPP run =ade at accident conditions closely approximating
.15 those predicted by Th ce Mile Island Unit 2, the measured iodine half-life 16 was 31 see; that is, half of the radioactive iodine was removed from the 9 17 steam-air atmosphere in 31 seconds after starting the sprays. These data 18 have been scaled to the Three Mile Island Unit 2 design. They result in 19 an iodine half-life of 36 seconds with the full spray installed capacity 20 operating and a half life of 72 seconds at half capacity. The iodine half-21 life reported in the PSAR is 103 seconds at full capacity and 206 seconds 22 at half capacity.
23 On the basis of calculations prescated in Chapter 14 of the PSAR, the 24 iodine removal half-life required to reduce the 2-hour thyroid dose at the 25 exclusion distance to the 300 ren limits of 10 CFR 100 is 905 seconds. Thus, 26 only about 1/8 of the available spray effectiveness reported in the Pudt 27 andonly1/25oftheavailableeffectivenessasindicatedbyNSPPtestsis 28 required to meet the 10 CFR 100 site acceptability requirements.
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III 1
Subject:
Discussion of Protection to be Afforded Acainst the Probable i
i 2
Maximum Flood 3
The site as developed for Generating Unit 1 was de::igned to be 4
esfe from a flood of 1,100,0C0 cfs including wave run-up. This is a flood, 5
which, conservatively, has a probability of occurrence in any one year of 6
approximately 1 chance in 30,c00, and is slightly in excess of the then current 7
Probable Maximum Flood (RE) as calculated by the Corps of Engineers. On this 8
basis the plant could continue operation at the peak of the flood.
9 A revised RF study has since been completed by the Corps of 10 Engineers and, subject to review and approval, will indicate a calcuhted 11 E7 discharge of 1,750,000 cfs at Three Mile Island assuming natural river 12 conditions and 1,600,0C0 cfs censidering flood control projects operative 13 in 1969 The rainfall intensities and areal extent of the storm necessary 14 to cause this revised RF are known and are published by Hydroceteorolegical s
15 Report No. 40 by the U. S. Weather Eureau. Rainfall records are co:mtantly 16 available frc= Weather Eureau gagin6 stations. Based en preliminary hydro- ~
17 graphs of the proposed new RE furnished by the Corps of Engineers, the 18 river level veuld exceed the design river level for a period of approrimtely 19 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Warning of such a flood would be avaihble for about 20 four days prior to the occurrence of the peak.
21 Co=plete protection of the plant against this flood could be provided by raising the elevation of the 31 miles of dike systen and sand-22 23 baggins a shcrt section where the access road ad rail-cad cross the dike.
24 Considering the extrcre i=prcbability of such a nood oc ur-ing and the 25 ass'=nce of aiepate advance nr.ing of its occurrence, it was decided 26 to p=tect the pinnt so that it eculd r-"
in cperatien th cugh the iesign 27 ficod of 1,200,000 cfs, but, for a flood of creatcr =ag.itude, to =aintain 23 the P -t in a nafe shu 5 r. ceciition.63-060
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The specific provisions for protectica to be applied te cach 2
system and each item of equipment required for maintaining the plant in a 3
safe shut-doun condition will be developed during detailed design. Wherever 4
feasible, the equipment and systems will be elevated above flood level.
5 Where this approach is not feasible, other approaches will be used, cuch 6
as the furnishing in the original plant construction, of bulkheads and 7
prepared slots to seal off to above flood level, buildings or portions of 8
building.: enclosing equipment and systems required for decay heat removal.
9 Access ways including roof hatches, ladders and walkways as 10 required will be included in the original pInnt construction to permit 11 operating personnel travel above flood level between all protected enclos-12 ures. Access to the plant can be maintained by heliocopters or boats.
13 The integrity of the existing dikes will be preserved during 14 the flood by opening the plant drainage gates, after providing interior 15 protection, and allowing the water to rise to the elevation of the river 16 so that the dikes will be gradually submerged, rather than overtopped.
17 Any damage to the dikes would thus be restricted to local conditions 18 susceptible to immediate repair following the passage of the flood.
19 All structures enclosing systems that are essential to a safe 20 shut-doun of the plant are supported on bedrock and are designed to with-21 stand the hypothetical aircraft impact or tornado borne missiles and thus 22 are inherently protected agtinst structural damage as a result of flood 23
~c fic>od borne missiles.
4-63 061
IV 1
Subject:
Su=ary of Applicant's Discussions with the Pennsylvania 2
_ Department of Health 3
In January of 1968 there was a meeting with the Pennsylvania 4
Department of Health reGarding the prcposed environmental program for 5
Three Mile Island Unit 1.
There were comments on the program and a 6
mutual agreement was reached regarding how to proceed. This included 7
an agreement to provide the Department of Health with water sa :ples taken 8
from the Susquehanna River simultaneously with the samples analyzed by 9
Met Ed so the Department of Health could perform an independent analysis.
10 There was a subsequent visit by the Department of Health and representatives 11 of U.S.P.H.S. to the site to further discuss the program.
12 In July of 1969 there was a meeting with the Pennsylvania 13 Department of Health to discuss the draft of the Three Mile Island Emer-14 gency Plan. Cc=ents were generated which resulted in mutually agreed 15 upon provisiens to the Plan.
16 To the best of our knowledge, the Pennsylvania Department of 17 Health has not formalized these meetings with written minutes.
18 V
19 Subject; _ Discussion of Effluent Releases and Cumulative Effects of 20 Tritium and Krypton Disceirres from a Nu:aber of Reactor 21 Plants Includinr, Three Mile Island Unit 2 22 Tritium concentration in the river attributable to the cperatica 23
'of two' units at the Three Mile Island site is expected to average less than 24 1/100 of MFC thepointofdischargetotheriverandlessthan1/50,0C0 25 of MFC after being mixed with the river several miles below the site. This 26 estimate of expected average concentrations is based on average annual river 27 flows at Three Mile Island of 34,000 cfs and expected relcases of about 17, 28 of fission product tritium through the fuel c]ndding and 100% of all other (1) MFC means Maximum Permissible Concentration as defined in 1CCFRPO 63'062
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tritium totalling about 1,300 curies per year for both units taken together.
1 2
Even if all tritium generated by both units at Three Mile Island 3
including 100% of the fission product tritiu= (=ost of which would be 4
expected to stay inside the fuel cladding) were released, average tritium 5
concentration, as the point of discharge to the river would be less than 6
ene-third MFC and would be less than 1/200 of MFC after being =ixed with 7
the average river flow several cia.as downstream from the site. This esti-8 cate is based on the assu=ption that each unit produces a total of about 9
11,500 curies of tritium per year.
A discussion of tritium generation and centrol is given starting 10 11 at Page 12.6-A-1 of Suppl._ tent 3 of the PSAR.
12 From the above estimates one can cenclude (even without account-13 ing for further dilution beyond a point several miles downstream from 14 Three Mile Island) that the average fraction of MFC contributed by Three s
15 Mile Island to the river is very small. Therefore, it would seem that 16 a number of downstrea a plants could be acco==odated without approaching 17 even small fractions of MFC in the Susquehanna River or the Chesapeake 18 Bay.
19 Krypten 85 concentrations in the air, attributable to the opera-20 tion of both units at Three Mile Island, is expected to average less than 1/200 of MFC at the point of caximum exposure at the site boundary.(1)..ithi n
21 two miles the average cencentration is expected to be less than 1/2,000 22 23 of MPC,and within twenty-five miles to be less than 1/100,000 of MPC. This 24 esticate is based on the assumptien that each unit would release 8,500 curies 25 of krypton 85 per year, which is a censervative estimate of K-85 release 26 assuming one percent of the fuel is leaking.
(1) For these purposes this means the boundary of uncontrolled land 1.e., the eastern edge of the Susquehanna River or the edge area:
of any island other than Three Mile Island..
3--
The average fraction of MFC for krypton 65 contributed by Three 1
Mile Island is very cmall and it would seem that a number of other plants 2
could be accommodated in the same general area without approaching even 3
4 small fractions of MFC limits.
It is AEC policy to limit radioactivity from each nuclear facility 5
6 so as to provide reasonable assurance that the exposure of the public to ionizing radiation from cumulative effects of multiple facilities and
.7 8
other sources do not exceed radiation protection cuides recommended by This is 9
the Federal Radiation Council and approved by the President.
done by requiring confor.ance to 10CFR20 and by establishing specific 10 limits for release in operating licenses. If it appears that daily intake 11 of radioactive materials from air, water and/or food by a suitable sample 12 13 of an exposed population group would otherwise exceed applicable FRC 14 radiological protection guides, the AEC may limit quantities released to 15 maintain exposures within these guidelines.
16 VI 17
Subject:
Quality Assurance During Construction 18 "he quality assurance effort at Three Mile Island Unit 2 includes 19 inspectiva, non-destructive testing, etc., and is in continuous effect while the constructor or fabricator is performing work on the nuclear portions 20 21 of the plant.
The Architect-Engineer or Construction Manager, as applicable, will 22 have full-time on-site quality accurance personnel who will provide sur-23 24 veillance of the quality control effort of site contractors. Further, the owner has full-time re.ident quality accurance percouncl at the site who n
25 26 are charged with monitoring both the quality accurance program of the 27 Architect-Encineer and the Construction Manager and the quality control 28 program of the cite contractors. 63-~0G4 i
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1 In addition, in order to obtain ar independent evaluation of 2
the effectiveness of the entire site quality effort during the construction 3
of the plant, periodic site audits will be conducted by personnel iron 4
the G20-ITPAG Q,uality Assurance Group, Metropolitan Edisen Cor.pany, and 5
6 VII 7
Subject:
Comments on the Fish and Wildlife Service Letter Dated 8
June 17, 1969 9
Applicant has reviewed the letter of June 17, 1969 from the 10 Fish and Wildlife Service to the AEC Director of Regulations and has the 11 following comments with respect to each of the recommendations listed 12 starting cn Page 2 of that letter: -
13 1.
As indicated in a letter from the Applicant to the 14 AEC dated July 25, 1969, the Applicant has stated 15 he will continue to cooperate with interested govern-16 ment agencies in respect to matters concerning radio-17 logical surveys and other concerns of the Fish and 18 Wildlife Service.
19 2.(a) It is planned to take gamma radioactivity analyses 20 of water prior to its entry to the river and downstream 21 several miles from the site at a location just below the 22 York Haven Dam. The reasca for taking samples at these 23 places is that it is expected that radioactivity will 24 be well mixed with the water stream in the first in-25 ctance a:.d with the river in the second instance.
26 Sediment samples collected at several points in the 27 river to date have had activity below the limit of 28 detection by the methods now used to assay them and it 63 Otii) 8-
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is expected such samples taken by these conventional 2
methods, if measurable, will be erratic.
However, the 3
Applicant is aware of studies now in progress to develop 4
an underwater gamma probe capable of assaying radio-5 activity in place. Should this device prove to be satis-6 factory, it will be used in the environmental monitoring 7
program to me'.sure the radioactivity of sediment at loca-8 tions where sediment is most likely to be deposited.
9 2.(b) Beta and gnemn radioactivity analyses of selected 10 organisms located near the reactor effluent outfall will 11 be taken insofar as appropriate organisms can be located.
12 3
A report of the pre-operational radiological surveys will 13 be provided to the Atomic Energy Co==ission in sufficient 14 numbers so that five copies can be made available to the 15 Secretary of the Interior.
16 4.
Reports of post-operational radiological surveys will be 17 submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission in sufficient 18 numbers so that five copies can be provided to the Secre-19 tary of the Interior.
20 VIII 21
Subject:
Discussion on hov Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2 will be 22 Operated with Regard to the Release of Effluents 23 The combined releases of radioactivity from both units at the e
s 24 Three Mile Island site will be in ecnformance with 10 CFR 20 just as though 25 there were only one unit at the site.
26 More specifically, the long-term (i.e., annual) average radio-27 activity concentration in liquids as released to the river from Unit 1 28 outfall will not exceed those specified by Table 2 of 10 CFR 20.
- Likcwise, 9-G3-Qgg
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1 such concentrations as released from the Unit 2 outfall will not exceed 2
those specified by Table 2 of 10 CFR 20.
3 Release rate limits for gases from Unitn 1 and 2 will be proposed 4
taking account of atmospheric dispersion between.ae release points and 5
the boundary of uncontrolled land area, so that considering releases from 6
both units taken together, the long-term (i.e., annual) average concen-7 tration anywhere at this boundary will not exceed that specified for gases 8
in Table 2 of 10 CFR 20.
9 The shorter term average concentrations will be treated in the 10 same way such that the average concentration in liquids or the average 11 release rates of gases will not exceed about ten times the long-term 12 average release rate or concentration limits discussed above.
13 IX 14
Subject:
Discussion on how the Effluent Releases will be made 15 Batch or Continuous Release 16 Liquid and gaseous plant wastes will be released in batches.
17 Radioactive liquid wastes from each unit will be diluted in the services 18 cooling water which is discharged to the river. Radioactive gaseous 19 wastes will be dispersed in the atmosphere through separate vents for 20 each unit.
21 All releases of radioactive liquid wastes from either unit will 22 be made from an evaporator condensate tank in an average batch size of 23 10,000 gallons. Prior to release each tank will be mixed, sampled for 24 radioactive content and certified for relcase. Each release will be moni-25 tored as it is discharged.
It is expected that there will be an average 26 of one batch release per week.
27 All releases of radioactive cascous waste will be made from a 28 cas decay tank after it has been sampled and certified for release. Each
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'l release will be monitored as it is discharged to the vent. It is expected
,2 that a number of small batches would be released./ery year.
3 In any event, both liquid and gaseous releases will be controlled 4
within limits discussed in answer to question VIII (pre-hearing trans-5 cript, Page L, Line 12.)
6 x
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Subject:
Three Mile Island Exclusion Area 8
The Susquehanna River passes through the exclusion area on both 9
sides of the site, but is sufficiently far away that any expected use of 10 the river would not interfere with normal operations.
11 Responsibility for exercising exclusion requirements, should 12 they become necessary, on the river within the exclusion area, lies with 13 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Three Mile Island emergency pro-14 cedure provides for a unique signal to be sounded, along with announce-15 ments heard within the exclusion boundary, and notification of appro-16 priate governmental authoritics which are designated by the Commonwealth.
17 The appropriate Governcental authorities will effect the necessary exclu-.
18 sion or evacuation.
19 XI
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Subject:
Discussion of Adecuacy of Grouted Tendons 21 There are ample precedents for both grouted and a grouted ten-22 dons. In bridge and building construction, grouted tendons have been 23 used for over twenty years, ungrouted for over fifteen years. In nuclear 24 applications, French practice has been to grout as at Chinon, St Laurent-25 des-Eaux, Bugey, Brennilis. Ungrouted tendons have been used in the United 26 Kingdom at Oldbury and Wylfa. The Canadian structure at Gentilly is grouted.
27 Post tensioned nuclear ccntainment structures previously planned or under 28 construction in the United States are to be ungrouted with'the exceptions
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1 of the vertical tindons at Robinson and the tendons providing rock anchor-2 age at Ginna.
3 The selection of grouted tendons for this structural applica-4 tion over the alternative of unbonded greased tendons was made primarily 5
to provide corrosion protection through the passivating environment 6
characteristic of the alkalinity of portland cement grout, not avaihble 7
with the alternative, plus the permanent exclusion of corrosive agents.
8 Secondary structural benefits in resisting the design loadings result 9
from the use of bonded tendons. The basis for some prior reservatica 10 concerning the use of grouted tendons in similar structures in this 11 country had been the question as to whether the continuous curvature 12 required of the tendons in the shell structure and the consequent unavoid-13 able packing of the tendon elements at the inside radius of the duct would 14 preclude the injection of grout into intimate contact with all elements 15 of the tendon. This question has been satisfactorily answered for strand 16 tendons by the grouted tendon test program undertaken for this project, 17 hence there is no further technical reservation concernin6 de use of
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18 grout.
19 1.
Corrosion Protection 20 Continuity of coverage with grout is desirable to provide corro-21 sion protection. This feature was the principal objective of the grouted 22 tendon test program, and was achieved with strand tendons. The work with 23 wire t,endons in the test program demonstrated that normal grouting pro-24 cedures would not yield continuous coverage, hence in all probability the 25 grouted curved wire tendons which have performed satisfactorily in other 26 applications for many years do not have continuous grout coverage. Thus, 27 it may be concluded that the passivating environment of grout is effective 28 in inhibiting corrosion even without continuity of coverage. The continuity Q Ggg i
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1 demonstrate.. co be obtainable with strand tendons will provide greater 2
assurance of protection.
3 2_. Exclusion of Corrosive Agents 4
Corrosive agents; principally chloride, nitrate and sulphate 5
ions; will be excluded by a series of barriers between the tendon and 6
the environment and by the filling of the closed metal duct system, includ-7 ing end caps, with portland cement grout from which corrosive agents have 8
been excluded.
9 3
Bond 10 The use of portland cement Grout allows the development of bond 11 between the tendon and the concrete structure through the grout and ducts.
12 In Phases I and II of the grouted tendon test program, it was apparent 13 during the cutting out of intermediate test specimens that the steel 14 remained stressed after having been separated from the anchorages despite 15 the packed condition of the tendon elements.
16 Tests designed to provide a quantitat$ve measure of bond develop.
17 ment, included in Phase III of the program, demonstrated transfer of the 18 usual assigned prestress force of 60% of ultimate strength from tendons to 19 the concrete in a length of 7 to 10 feet.
20 a.
Anchorage 21 Development of bend at the anchorages is further 22 assured by the separation of the strands at the anchor 23 in those prostress systems employing wedge type anchor-24 age. Bond will not be relied upon as a means of stress 25 transfer in this application; the anchorages be 26 required to pass static and dynauic test' to Grout-27 ing, more severe than could occur in '
ructure. The 28 demonstrated bond length of 7 t
. is less than the 133-070
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1 planned dimensions of the buttresses, foundation mat 2
and ring girder, where the tendons are to be anchored, 3
thus, the anchorage developed by bond provides redund-4 ancy.
5 b.
Crack Control 6
Flexural tension and stress concentrations such 7
as will occur at discontinuities and structure pene-8 trations can be resisted by the bonded prestressing steel 9
at the po'nt of discontinuity or concentration thus limit-10 ing the size of cracks in the concrete.
11 c.
Ruptured Tendon 12 Before the effectiveness of grouting of strand 13 tendons had been denonstrated, there existed a reason-14 able question as to whether stress transfer other than 15 at anchorages could be achieved. Now it can be con-16 cluded that a ruptured grouted tendon will be IMlly 17 effcetive at 7 to 10 feet from the point of rupture.
18 XII 19
Subject:
Discussion of the Positive Moderator Coefficient 20 The core for Three Mile Island Unit 2 is expected to have a 21 positive moderator coefficient not in excess of +1.0 x 10~
(6,k/k)/F 22 over the first part of the initial fuel cycle. The positive reactivity 23 associated with this coefficient was used in the evaluation of accidents e
24 analyzed in the PSAR. Even with the inclusion of the reactivity effect, 25 the accident analyses resulted in acceptable condition.
26 Analyses are proceeding to determine the effect of a positive 27 moderator coefficient on the stability of the reactor core with respect 28 to potential for xenen oscillations.
If the conclusion of the analyses 63- 071
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is that the +1.0 x 10'
([ k/k)/ F coefficient is not desirable, then 2
it. vill be reduced by the use of fixed shims - such as burnable poison 3
rods. These fixed shims would allow a reduction in the soluble poison 4
concentration and thus a reduction in the positive moderator coefficient.
5 XIII
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Subject:
The Validity g Assumptions Underlying the Accident Anal'jses 7
Environmental doses resulting from the rod ejection, loss of 8
coolant and taximum hypothetical accidents were calculated accusing that 9
finy percent of the iodine released plated out on equipment and structures 10 located within the reactor building. This assumption of fifty percent 11 plate out is suggested by the Atomic Energy Cummission in its guide line 12 document TID-14844. Review of experimental data generated in experiments 13 in which iodine was released indicate that the assumption of fifty per-14 cent plate out is conservative. For example, tests conducted in the 15 Contain=cnt Research Installation and reported in ORNL-4071, demon-16 strated that more than 95 percent of the released iodine was deposited 17 on the tank wall. More than 70 percent of the iodine plate out occurred 18 in less than 30 seconds.
19 XIV 20
Subject:
Report 3 the Present On-Site Monitoring Prorram 21 The attached tables summarize the radioactivity measurements 22 of various kinds of samples in additicn to those reported in the PSAR 23 measured from January 1,1969 to August 1,1969, by Met-Ed and the Commen-24 wealth of Pcnnsylvania. (1) Nuclear Safety Program Annual Progress Report for the period endinC December 31, 1966, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, W. B. Cottrell, Program Director.
63~072
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TABLE I
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Ccx:monwealth of Pennsylvania Environmental Data of the Susquehanna River at Three Mile Island (1)
Month 1968 Gross Beta Gross Alpha February 3pc/1 41pc/1 March April 9pe/1 1pc/1 May 3Pc/1 41pc/1 June 4pc/1 4 1 /:c July 6 pc/1 1pc/1 August 6pc/1 4 1 pc/1 September 4pc/1 Z1pc/1 October 5pc/1 4.1pc/1 November 8pc/1 2pc/1 December 3pc/1 1pe/1
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(1) Data reported by M. A. Reilly, Radiation Health Physicist, Commonwealth of Penncylvania 63 073 O
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TABLE II ENVIRO::'EITAL IATA FRCM THE SUSQUDRIi::A RIVER AliD TEREE MILE ISIAIID Analysis Performed by Isotepes, Inc.,
Westwood, lie 1 Jersey July 8, 1968 Suscuehanna River Water at Three Mile Island K-40 500pe/1 zn-65
<5.6pe/1 cs-137 6.1 pe/1
~
I-131 44.0pe/1 5
( 70 pe/1 co-58 (5 0 pe/1 September 5, ic68 - Vegetatien at Three Mile Island K-40 8.9 pe/gr Cs-137
.05pe/gr I-131 d.002 pe/gr Co-60
(.003Pc/gr Co-58
(.003pe/sr i
June, lo69 - Fish Cs-137
.11pe/gr co-60 139pc/sr co-58
.13pe/gr "n-65 38pe/gr Sr-90
.05pe/gr I-131
.07pe/gr 63 C'pq o-