ML19206A266
| ML19206A266 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1978 |
| From: | GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NYO-78-002, NYO-78-2, NUDOCS 7904180448 | |
| Download: ML19206A266 (37) | |
Text
,
4 FmE PROTECTION PROGRAM EVALUATION Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit No. 2 CONDUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS SUPPLEMENT
\\
EDS NUCLEAR nE ato :cus av ao.. c4 a te =tacs. N Ew v c a < 115t- *
.5 t o m-3' 10 f3' -008 i
7 $ OflSod4 %
D
FIRE PROTECTION PROGRA31 EVALUATION Three 3111e Island Nuclear Station Unit No. 2 CONDUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS SUPPLE 3IENT Prepared for GPU SERVICE CORPORATION Prepared by EDS NUCLEAR E?C.
AIay,197 8 EDS Ilerort No. NYO-73-002, Revision 1 G'd "009
EDS NUCLEAR INC.
REPORT APPROVAL COVER SHEET Client:
GPU Service Cormration Project:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station. Unit 2 Job Number:
3700013 Report
Title:
Conduit Failure Analysis Supplement Report Number:
NYO-78-002
- pey, 0
The work described in this Report was performed in accordance with the EDS Nuclear Quality Assur.mec Program. The signatures below verify the accuracy of this Report and its compliance with applicable quality assurance requirements.
M[
Prepared By:
./*&
Date: /
9//3/7F Reviewed By:
.A.
T. R 4+ -
Date:
u v Approved By:
M f.
Date: Y f3 b
g REVISION RECORD Rev.
Prepared Reviewed Approved Approval Revisica No.
Date 1
RAC G.T.R LO. "J. E Sho/7s Minor Revision to Page 29 S -010
NYO-78-002 T' vision 0 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRA31 EVALUATION
~
Three 3111e Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2 CONDUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS SUPPLEMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Pace Report Approval Cover Sheet
- 1. O locroduetion 1
- 2. 0 Method of Analysis 2
2.1 Preliminary Review 2
- 2. 2 Detailed Review 2
- 2. 3 Review of Unacceptable Conduit Failures 2
- 3. 0 Results of Analysis 4
3.1 FA-007 - Fuel Handling Building 8
- 3. 2 FA-009 - Auxiliary Building 11
- 3. 3 FA-020 - River Water Pump House 19
- 3. 4 FA 13 - Control Building 21
- 3. 5 FA-041 - H&V Duct and Cable Tray Area 25
- 3. 6 FA-045 - Cable Rcom 27
- 3. 7 FA-047 - Service Building and Control Building Area 28
- 3. 8 FA-049 - Reactor Building 30 4.0 Conclusion 32
- 5. 0 References 33 UD011
NYO-78-002 Revision 0
- 1. 0 INTRODUCTION This report supplements EDS Reports NYO--77-002 and NYO-77-004 for the perform-ance of additional Fire Hazard Analysis as described within. These additional anal-yses were requested during an NRC meeting at the site the week of January 3,1978.
The effort involves the consideration of conduit and armored cable failures which previously were assumed to maintain their integri:y. It should be noted that all armored cable is not sm, elated and as such, the loss of these cables will not prevent the plant from uahir ving a safe shutdown.
1
NYO-78-002 Revision 0
- 2. 0 METHOD OF ANALYSIS The following assumptions were used during the conduit failure analysis, a.
Cables in conduit do not add to Area fire loadings, b.
There are no safety related cables in BOP conduits.
c.
Administrative procedures have been established for cortrolling the location of transient combustibles througheut the plant. Transient combustibles have not been considered in evaluating separation be-tween conduits containing reduncant circuits necessary for safe shut-down.
The following reviews were performed utilizing the Burns and Roe Conduit Layout Drawings as input and were confirmed by a site visit on March 27-20, 1978.
2.1 Preliminarv Review Each of the Fire Areas listed in Table No. 'I were reviewed for the presence of safety related conduits. Where no safety related conduits exist, or only one train of safety related conduits exist in an Area, this Area was considered acceptable. (Other Areas received the detailed review described below. )
- 2. 2 Detailed Review Where both trains of safety related conduit exist in an Area, the functions of the circuits contained in the conduits were further reviewed to determine the capability of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown following the loss of all conduits in the Area. If the conduits did not contain redundant circuits neces-sary for safe shutdown (as determined by utilizing the SSLD), the Area was considered acceptable. If the conduits did contain redundant circuits neces-sary for safe shutdown, the Area was considered unacceptable and a reevalua-tion was performed as indicated in Paragraph 2. 0 below.
- 2. 3 Review of Unaccentable Conduit Failures Where unacceptable conduit failitres are indicated as a result of ie review performed in Paragraph 2. 2 above, a reevaluation was performed to deter-mine the capability of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown after factoring in the availability of the active prctection in the Area. The active protection considerations were as follows: S2-013
NYO-78-C02 Revision 0 a.
Quantity, Location and Type of Combustible b.
Separation of Redundant Conduits necessary for Safe Shutdowm c.
Fire Detection and Suppression Equipment Available.
d.
Fire Barriers /Eccasement Refer to Sections 3.1 thru 3.8 for a discussion of the Areas requiring this type of review.
NYO-78-002 Revision 0
- 3. 0 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS The results of the conduit failure analysis are documented on Table No. I of this report and the associated report Paragraphs 3.1 thru 3. S.
These paragraphs de-scribe the detailed evaluation that was performed on those Areas that contain re-dundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown.
o
_.i _
52-015
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 TABLE NO.1 CONDUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS RESULTS Design Basis Fire Area Conduit Report Fire No.
Number Fire Area Title Loading Parastrach 001-1 001 Turbine Building (2) 002-1 002 Oil Drum Storage (1) 003-1 003 Elevator 3Iachinery Room (1) 004-1 004 Stair Toiver (1) 005-1 005 DELETED 006-1 006 Electrical Equipment Room (2) 007-1 007 Fuel Handling Building (5) 3.1 008-1 008 Oil Drum Storage (1) 009-1 009 Auxiliary auilding (5)
- 3. 2 010-1 010 Stair Towcr (1) 011-1 O l'.
Elevator (1) 012-1 012 31C C-2-11EB (3) 013-1 013 31C C-2-21EE (3) 014-1 014 USS-2-11E (3) 015-1 015 USS-2-21 E (4) 016-1 016 31CC-2 liEA (3) 017-1 017 31CC-2-21EA (3) 018-1 018 SG-2-1E (3) 010-1 019 SG-2-2E (3) 020-1 020 River Water Pump House (5)
- 3. 3 021-1 021 SG-2-4 E (3) 022-1 022 USS-2-41 E (3) 023-1 023 USS-2-31 E (4) 024-1 024 SG-2-3 E (4) 025-1 025 Fire Pump House (2) GZ --016
9 NYO-78-002 Revision 0 Design Basis Fire Area Conduit Report Fire No.
Number Fire Area Title Ioadine Paracrach 026-1 026 Emergency Diesel Generator (4)
No. 2 Building 027-1 027 Emergency Diesel Generator (4)
No.1 Building 028-1 028 MCC-2-21EC (3) 023-1 029 SG-DG-2 (3) 030-1 030 MCC-2-11E C (3) 031-1 031 SG-DG-1 (3) 032-1 032 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage (4) i 033-1 033 Control Building (5)
- 3. 4 034-1 034 Stai. rower (1) 035-1 035 Cable Chase (3) 036-1 036 Transformer Room (3) 037-1 037 Battery Room No. 2 (3) 038-1 038 Battery Room No.1 (3) 039-1 039 DC Switchgear Room No. 2 (3) 040-1 040 DC Switchgear Room No.1 (3) 041-1 041 H&V Duct and Cable Tray Area (5)
- 3. 5 042-1 042 DELETED 043-1 043 USS-2-22E (4) 044-1 044 USS-2-12E (3) 045-1 045 Cable Room (5)
- 3. 6 04G-1 046 Control Room (4) 047-1 047 Service Building and Control (5)
- 3. 7 Building Area 048-1 048 Stair Tower (1) 049-1 049 Reactor Building (5)
- 3. 8 050-1 050 Stair Tower (1) G2-017
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 Design Basis Fire Area Conduit Report Fire No.
Number Fire Area Title Loading Paracraoh 051-1 051 Elevator (1) 052-1 052 Circulating Water Pump (2)
House 053-1 053 Coagulator Building (2) 054-1 054 Circulating Water (2)
Chlorinator House 055-1 055 Mechanical Draft Cooling (2)
Tower Pump House Auxiliarf Transformers (3) 05G-1 & 2 2A and 2B Air Intake 'ntnnel (1) 057-1 LEGEND (1)
This Fire Area does not contain any conduits and is, therefore, acceptable.
(2)
This Fire Area contains only BOP conduits and is, therefore, acceptable.
(3)
This Fire Area contains only one train of safety related conduits and is, therefore, acceptable.
(4)
This Fire Area contains both trains of safety related conduits.
However, after reviewing the functions of the circuits contained in the conduits, it was determined that the conduits did not con-tain redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown. Therefore, this Fire Area is acceptable.
(5)
This Fire Area contains conduits which contain redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown. Refer ta the indicated Report Para-graph for the detailed evaluation that was performed on this Area. LZ^018
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 3.1 FA-007 - Fuel Handling Building A.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation Without Active Protection The evaluation determined that both trains of safety related conduit would become unavailable due to a DBF in this Area. However, it was determined that except for the following, the conduits did not contain redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown.
1.
Elevation 280'-6" a.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pumps DC-P-1A and DC-P-1B.
b.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Valves DH-V4A and DH-V-4B.
c.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Valve DH-V3.
d.
Feeders from SG2-1E to SG2-3E and from SG2-2E to SG2-4E.
2.
Elevation 305'-0" a.
Feeders from SG2-1E to SG2-3E and from SG2-2E to SG2-4E.
B.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation with Active Protection The following paragraphs describe the evaluation that was performed on this Area to determine the capability of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown after taking intu consideration the separation of redundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown, the quantity, location and type of combustibles present, the existing fire barriers /encasements, and the fire detection and suppression equipment available in the Area.
1.
Senaration of Redundant Circuits Necessarv for Safe Shutdown On Elevation 280'-6", the separation between red and green conduit is generally about 5 feet. Separation between red conduit and green cable trays and vice versa is generally about 5 feet throughout. Exceptions to the separation indi-cated above do not involve redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown. Separation between the conduits containing redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown indicated in Paragraph 3.1. A above are as follows. G2-019
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 a.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pumps DC-P-1 A and DC-P-1B are separated by at least 5 feet.
b.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Valves DH-V4A and DH-V4B are separated by at least 5 feet, c.
Feeders from SG2-1E to 'SG2-3E and from SG2-2E to SG2-4E are separated by at least 20 feet.
On Elevation 305'-0", the separation between red and green conduit is only 6 inches at points. However, the separation between feeders from SG2-1E to SG2-3E and from SG2-2E to SG2-4E which are the only conduits containing redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown is 20 feet.
2.
Quantity, Location and Tvre of Combustibles On Elevation 280'-G", the cuantity of combustible material is small and combustibles are distrituted throughout the Area.
31uch of the combustible material is located in enclose ~d scaces such as lubricating oil contained within pump and motor casings and cables routed in cable t'ays covered by top and bottom tray covers and will not contribute to the propagation of a fire. All cable insulation is fire retardant.
On Elevation 305'-0", the quantity of combustible material is small and consists primarily of fire retardant cable insulation.
31uch of this cable is routed it. cable trays covered by top and bottom tray covers and will not contribute to the propagation of the fire.
3.
Fire Detection and Suncression Ecuioment Available Elevation 280'-6" is covered by Zone 16 of the Zoned Fire Detec-tion System. It contains two dry chemical portable extinguishers rated at S0 B:C and 40 B:C.
Elevation 305'-0" is covered by Zone 17.
_g.
52'020
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 C.
Conclusion On Elevation 2S0'-6", since the separation of redundant conduits necessary for safe shutdcwn is commensurate with the low fire loading of the permanent combustibles located on this elevation, it is concluded that at least one train of conduit necessary for safe shutdown will be available and fire detection and suppression systems are available to prevent a fire from damaging redundant systems. The only exception to this separation involves the feed-ers and controls to Decay Heat Valve DH-V-3 which is not redund-ant. It was determined that due to the time available before the operation of this valve becomes necessary, the low fire loading of the permaner_t combustibles located in the Area, and the fire detection and suppression available, sufficient time exists to ex-tinguish the fire in the Area and restore manual operation to the valve.
On Elevation 305'-0", since the separation of redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown is commensurate with the low fire loading of the permanent combustibles on this elevation, it is concluded that at least one train of conduit necessary for safe shutdown will be available and fire detection and suppression systems are available to prevent a fire from damaging redund-ant systems. G2-021
NYO-78-002 Revision 0
- 3. 2 FA-009 - Auxiliary Buildine A.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation Without Active Protection The evaluation determined that both trains of safety related conduit would become unavailable due to a DBF in this Area. However, it was determined that except for the following, the conduits did not contain redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown.
1.
Elevation 25S'-G" a.
Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Pumps DH-P-1A and DH-P-1B.
b.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-ViOOA and DH-V100B.
c.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V102A and DH-V102B, d.
Feeders and controls to Cccay Heat Removal Valves DH-V12SA and DH-V12SB.
Feeders and controls to Deday Heat Removal Valves e.
DH-V5A and DH-V5B.
2.
Elevation 2S0'-G" a.
Feeders and controls to RC AIakeup and Purification Pumps SIU-P-1A and SIC-P-1C.
b.
Feeders to the 3Iain Bearing Lube Oil Pumps, the Auxiliary Bearing Lube Oil Pumps, and the Auxiliary Gear Lube Oil Pumps associated with SIU-P-1A and 31U-P-1 C.
c.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-VSA and DH-V5B.
d.
31akeup discharge pressure indication for 31U-P-1A and 31U-P-1 C.
c.
Feedars to Decay Heat Renoval Pumps DH-P-1A and DH-P-1B. b2-022
NYO-75-002 Revision 0 f.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V100A and DH-V100B.
g.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V102A and DH-V102B.
h.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V12SA and DH-V1283.
1.
Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Valve DII-V3.
J.
' Feeder to Decay Heat Removal Valve DH-V1.
k.
Feeder to Decay Heat Removal Valve DH-V171.
3.
Elevation 305'-0" a.
Feeders and control to RC 31akeup and Purification Pumps 31U-P-1A and AIU-P-1C.
t b.
Feeders to the 31ain Bearing Lube Oil Pumps, the Auxiliary Bearing Lube Oil Pumps, and the Auxiliary Gear Lube Oil Pumps associated with 3IU-P-1A and 31U-P-1 C.
]
c.
Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V5A and DH-V5B.
d.
Feeders to Letdown Valves SIU-V-376 and 31U-V-377.
Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Pumps DH-P-1A and e.
DH-P 1.E.
f.
Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V100A and DH-V100 B.
g.
Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V102A and DH-V102B.
h.
Fecders to Decay Heat Rcrl. oval Valves DH-V12SA and DH-V12S B.
I.
Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V4A and DH-V4B.
J.
Feeder to Decay Heat Removal Valve DH-V3.
k.
Feeder to Decay Heat Removal Valve DH-V2.
1.
Feeder to Decay Heat Removal Valve DH-V171.
4 G2-023
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 m.
Feeder to Decay Heat Removal Valve DH-V1.
n.
Feeders and controls to Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Pumps NS-P-1A and NS-P-1B.
o.
Feeders from SG2-1E to SG2-3E and from SG2-2E to SG2-4E.
p.
Feeders to Core Flooding r.nk Valves CF-V-1A and C F-V-1B.
q.
Feeders to Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pumps DC-P-1 A and DC-P-1B.
r.
Feeders to E.nergenc,r Feedwater Valves EF-V12A and EF-V12E.
s.
Feeders to Emergency Feedwater Valves EF-V4A and EF-V4B.
t.
Feeders to Emergency Feedwater Valves EF-V32A and E F-V32 B.
u.
Feeders to Emergency Feedwater Valves EF-V33A and EF-V33B.
v.
Feeders and controls to Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps SF-P-1A and SF-P-1B.
B.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation With Active Protection The following paragraphs describe the evaluation that was performed on this Area to determine the capability of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown after taking into consideration the separation of redundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown, the quantity, location and type of combusticles present, the er.lsting fire barriers /encasements, and the fire detection and suppression equipment available in the Area. G2"024
NYO-7S-002 Revision 0 1.
Seoaration of Redundant Conduits Necessarv for Safe Shutdown _
On Elevation 258'-6", conduits containing circuits necessary for safe shutdown are separated by a concrete wall. The only excep-tions to this separation are the conduits containing the feeder and control cables to DH-V5B (green) which are located in the red compartment three feet from the feeder and control cables to DH-VSA.
On Elevations 2S0'-6", 305'-0" and 32S'-0", the separation be-tween red and green conduit is generally at least 5 feet. Separa-tion between red conduit and green cable trays and vice versa is also generally at least 5 feet. There are exceptions to the separa-tion indicated above involving conduits which do not contain redund-ant circuits necessary for safe shutdown. On Elevation 280'-6",
separation between the conduits containing redundant circuits neces-sary for safe shutdown indicated in Paragraph 3.2. A.2 above are as follows.
Feeders and controls to RC SIakeup and Purification Pumps a.
31U-P-1A and 31U-P-1C are separated by at least 3 feet, b.
Feeders to the 3Iain Bearing Lube Oil Pumps, the Auxiliary Bearing Lube Oil Pumps and the Auxiliary Gear Lube Oil Pumps associated with SIU-P-1A and 31U-P-1C are separated by at least 3 feet.
c.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V5A and DH-V5B are separated by at least 25 feet.
d.
3Iakeup discharge pressure Mdication for 31U-P-1A and MU-P-1C are separated by at least 40 feet, Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Pumps DH-P-1A and DH-P-1B e.
are reparated by at least 25 feet.
f.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V100A and DH-V100B are separated by at least 25 feet.
g.
Fceders and controls to Deccy Heat Removal Valves DH-V102A and DH-V102B are separated by at least 25 feet.
h.
Feeders and controls to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V12SA and DH-V12SB are separated by at least 25 feet.
- i. -k.
Feeders to '.hese Decay Heat Removal Valves are not redundant. rnw 025
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 On Elevation 305'-3", separation between conduits containing redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown indicated in Paragraph 3. 2. A. 3 above are as folicws.
a.
Feeders and controls to RC 31akeup and Purification Pumps 31U-P-1A and 31U-P-1C are separated by at least 40 feet.
b.
Feeders to 3Iain Bearing Lube Oil Pumps, the Au: ciliary Bearing Lube Oil Pumps, and the Auxiliary Gear Lube Oil Pump associated with 31U-P-1 A and 3IU-P-1C are separated by at least 40 feet.
c.
Feeders to D2 cay Heat Removal Valves DH-V5A and DH-V5B are separated by at least 40 feet.
d.
Feeders to Letdown Valves 3IU-V-376 and AIU-V-377 are separated by at least 20 feet.
e.
Faaders to Decay Heat Removal Pumps DH-P-1A and DR-P-1B are separated by at least 40 feet, f.
Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V100A and DH-V100B are separated by at least 40 feet.
g.
Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V102A and DH-V102B are separated by at least 40 feet.
h.
Feeders to Cecay Heat Removal Valves DH-V128A and DH-V12SB are separated by at least 40 feet.
I.
Feeders to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V4A and DH-V4B are separated by at least 20 feet.
J. -m.
Feeders to these Decay Heat Removal Valves are not rdundant Feeders and controls ';o Nuclear Services Closed Cooting n.
Water Pumps NS-P-1A and NS-P-1B are separated by 3 inches.
o.
Feeders from SG2-1E to SG2-3E and from SG2-2E to SG2-4E are separated by at least 20 feet, p.
Feeders to Core Flooding Tank Valves CF-V-IA and CF-V-1B are separated by at least 30 feet.
. b2-026
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 q.
Feeders to Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pumps DC-P-1A and DC-P-1B are separated by 6 inches.
r.
Feeders to Emergency Feedwater Valves EF-V12A and EF-V12B are separated by at Icast 60 feet.
s.
Feeders to Emerg:ncy Feedwater Valves EF-V4A and EF-V4B are separated by at least 60 feet, t.
Feede. to Emergency Feedwater Valves EF-V32A and EF-V32P are separated by at least 40 feet.
u.
Feeders +> Emergency Feedwater Valves EF-V33A and EF-V33B are separated by at least 40 feet.
Feeders and controls to Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps v.
SF-P-I A and SF-P-1B are separated by at least 6 inches.
It should be noted that in the Auxiliary Building, red conduit and ca ?!; trays are routed primarily on Elevations 2F0'-6" and 32S'-0" and green conduit and cable trays are routed primarily on Eleva-tion 305'-0".
Tnis rule applies to conduit which terminates in the Auxiliary Building and to conduit th t is routed to the Fuel Handling l
Building, the Service Building and the Control Building Area. This procedure results in increased separation between redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown.
2.
Cuantitv Location and Tvne of Combustibles On Elevation 25S'-6", the quantity of combustible mate.
' is small.
Most of the combustible material is located in enclosed -paces such as lubricating oil contained within pump and motor casings and will not contribute to the propagation of a fire.
On Elevations 280'-6", 305'-0" and 32S'-0", the quantity of combus-tible material is mcderate, but the combustibles are distributed throughout the Area. SIost of the combustible material is located in enclosed spaces such as lubricating oil contained within pump and motor casings and cable routed in cable trays covered by top and bottom tray covers with "3I" Eoard and will not contribute to the propagation of a fire. All cable insulation is fire retardant..
DE -02'?
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 3.
Fire Detection and Sunnression Ecuinment Available Elevation 25S'-6" is covered by Zone 2 of the Zoned Fire Detec-tion System. The portable extinguishers and hose stations lo-cated in the vicinity on Elevation 2S0'-6" may be used for manual fire fighting.
Elevation 280'-G" is also covered by Zone 2.
It contains five dry chemical extinguishers rated 40 B:C and a CO,, extinguisher rated 10 B:C. There are also three hose reel statio?ns located at this elevation.
Elevation 305'-0" is covered by Zone 0.
It contains four dry chemical extinguishers rated at 40 B:C and five CO,, extinguishers rated at 10 B:C. There are aise.our hose reel stanons located at this elevation.
Elevation 32S'-0" is covered by Zones 4A, 4B, 4C and 4D. It contains seven dry chemical extinguishers rated 40 B:C and five CO,, extinguishers rated 10 3:C. There are also three hose reel stanons located at this elevation.
The hydrogen curge exhaust charcoal filter unit, the Reactor Build-ing purge exhaust charcoal filter unit, the Fuel Handling Building exhaust charcoal filter unit and the Auxiliary Building exhaust char-coal filter unit are each protected by a diluge system.
C.
Concl'usion On Elevation 25S'-6", since conduits containing circuits necessary for safe shutdown are separated by a concrete wall, it is concluded that at least one train of conduit necessary for safe shutdown will be available and fire detection and suppression systems are available to prevent a fire from damaging redundant systems. However, modifications shall be implemented to protect feeder and control cables to DH-V5B which is the only exception to the separation stated abose.
On Elevations 230'-6", 305'-0" and 32S'-0", since the separation of re-dundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown is generally commensurate with the fire loading of the permanent combustibles located on these cle-vations, it is concluded that at least one train of condui: necessary for safe shutdown will be available and fire detection and suppression sys-tems are available to prevent a fire from damaging redundant systems. GWO28
NYO-78-002 Revisica 0 For those cases indicated below where separation is not adequate, modifications sha!1 be implemented to assare that at least one train of conduit necessary for safe shutdown will be available.
1.
Feeders and ccatrols to RC 31akeup and Purification Pumps 31U-P-1A and 31U-P-1C.
2.
Feeders to t'4e 3Iain Ecaring Lube Oil Pumps, the Auxiliary Bearing Lub 3 Oil Pumps and the Auxiliary Gear Lube Oil Pumps associated with 3IU-P-1A and 31U-P-1C.
3.
Feeders and controls to Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Pump s NS-P-1A and NS-P-1B.
4.
Feeders to Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pumps DC-P-1A and DC-P-1B.
5.
Feeders and controls to Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps SF-P-IA and SF-P-1B.
Also, feaders to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V1, DH-V2, DH-V3 l
and DH-V171 run through Elevations -2SO'-G" and 005'-0" of this Fire Area, are not redundant, and may be incapiteltated by a fire. However, the valves themselves are leccted in other Fire Arcas and may be man-ually oper tted if necessary.
-1S-U2"023
NYO-78-002 Revision 0
- 3. 3 FA-020 - River Water Pumo House A.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation Without Active Protection
'Ihe evaluation determined that both trains of safety related conduit would become unavailable duc to a DBF in this Area. However, it was determined that except for the following, 'he conduits did not contain redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown.
a.
Feeders and controls for Nuclear Services River Water Pumps NR-P-1A, NR-P-1B, NR-P-1C and NR-P-1D.
B.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation With Active Protection The following paragraphs describe the evaluation that was performed on this Area to determine the capability of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown after taking into consideration the separation of redundant conduits necessarf for safe shutdown, the quantity, location and type of combustibles present, the existing fire barriers /encasements and the fire detection and suppression equipment available in the Area.
i 1.
Secaration of Redundant Conduits Necessarv for Safe Shutdown The separation between red and green conduit in this Area is generally at least 20 feet. The few exceptions to this separation
. involve conduits containing HVAC circuits hich are not required for safe shutdown. The separation between feeders and controls for Nuclear Services River Water Pumps NR-P-1A and NR-P-1B, and NR-P-1C and NH-P-ID, which are the only conduits contain-ing redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown, is 30 feet.
There are no safety related cable trays in this Area.
2.
Cuantity, Location and T'zna of Combustibles The quantity of combustib!c material located in this Area is small and combustibles are distributed throughout the fire Area. 31uch of the combustible material is located in enclosed spaces such as lubricating oil contained within pump avi motor casings and will not contribute to the propagation of a fire. All cable insulation is fire retardant. It should be noted that the fit a loading of the Nu-clear Services River Water Pumps is high, but the combustible material associated with these pumps is located in enclosed spaces. 02'030
NYO-7 S-002 Revision 0 3.
Fire Detection and Sucoression Ecuinment Available The River Water Pump House is covered by Zone 23 of the Zoned Fire Detection System.
This Area contains one portable dry chemical extinguisher rated 40 B:C, one portable dry chemical extinguisher rated 4A:40 B:C and three CO extinguishers rated 10 B:C.
There are also two hose reel stations located in this Area.
C.
Conclusion Since the separation of redundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown is commensurate with the fire loading of the permanent combustibles located in this Area, it is concluded that at least one train of conduit necessary for safe shutdown will be available and fire detection and suppression systems are available to prevent a fire from damaging redundant systems.
. hC'031
NYO-78-002 Revision 0
- 3. 4 FA-033 - Control Buildinz A.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation Without Active Protection The evaluation determined that both trains of safety related conduit would become unavailable due to a DBF in this Area. However, it was determined that except for the following, the ccnduits did not contain redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown.
1.
Elevation 290'-G" a.
Feeders from DC Bus 2-1DC to DC Panel DCA-1A and from DC Bus 2-2DC to DC Panel DCA-2A.
2.
Elevation 205'-0" a.
Feeders from DC Bus 2-1DC to DC Panel DCA-1A aad from DC Bus 2-2DC to DC Panel DCA-2A.
b.
Feeders to Emergency Feedwater Pumps EF-P-2A and E F-P-2B.
3.
Elevation 351'-6" a.
Feeders and controls to the Control Room, Cable Room and Mechanical Room fans.
B.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation With Active Protection The following paragraphs describe the evaluation that was performed on this Area to determine the capability of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown after talung into consideration the separation of redundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown, the quantity, location and type of combustibles present, the existing fire barriers /encasements, and the fire detection and suppression eculpment available in this Area. b2-032
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 1.
Senaration of Redundant Conduits Necessat r for Safe Shutdown On Elevatica 230'-6", the separation between red and green conduit is generally at least 10 feet. Separation between red conduit and green cable t ays and vice versa is generally at least 5 feet throughout. The notable exception to the separa-tion indicated above is the Cable Tray 4201 (red) comes within about one foot of green conduit. Separation between the con-duits containing the feeders from DC Pus 2-1DC to DC Tonel DCA-1A and from DC Bus 2-2DC to DC Panel DCA-2A which are the only conduits containing redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown, is about 10 feet.
On Elevation 305'-0", the separation between red and green conduit is generally at least 10 feet. Separation between red conduit and green cable trays and vice versa is generally at least two feet throughout. Separation between the conduits containing redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown indicated in Paragraph 3.4. A. 2 above are as follows.
n.
Feeders from DC Bus 2-1DC to DC Panel DCA-1A and from DC Pts 2-2DC to'DC Panel DCA-2A are separated by acout 10 feet.
b.
Feeders to Emergency Feedwater Pumps EF-P-2A and EF-P-2B are separated by about 10 feet.
On Elevation 331'-G", there are no green conduits.
On Elevation 351'-G", the separation ' atween thi fe2ders and controls to the Control Room, Cable Room and 3techanical Room fans is only one-inch at points.
2.
Quantitv, Iocation and T'me of Combustibles On Elevations 280'-6" and 305'-0", the combustibles consist of fire retardant cables routed in cable trays located in the Cable and Tray Area and Open IIatch Area. Some of the cable trays are fitted with top and bottom tray covers and "5I" Board and will not contribute to the propagation of a fire. m --
=
C 033
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 On Elevation 3:'1'-6", there is a significant amount of combus-tibles located in the office, kitchen, toilet and storage room ad-jacent to the Control Room. It should be noted, however, that these are transient combustibles.
On Elevation 351'-6", the quantity of combustibles is moderate, but most of the combustibles are associated with fans, coil units, pumps, panels and cabinets and as such are located in enclosures or encasements which will inhibit the propagation of such fires.
3.
Fire Detection and Sucoression Ecuioment Available Elevation 280'-G" is covered by Zones 8A, 8B, SD and SE of the Zoned Fire Detection System. It contains two portable CO,, ex-tinguishers rated 10 A:B and two portable dry chemical extinguish-ers rated 40 B:C.
Elevation 305'-0" is covered by Zenes 9 and 9A. It contains two portable dry chemical extinguishers rated 40 B:C and two portable CO, extinguishers rated 10 A:3. There is also a hose reel station at Cais elevation.
Elevation 331'-6" is covered by Zone 10 of the Zoned Fire Detection System. It contains two portable Jry chemical extinguishers rated 2A:30 B:C.
Elevation 351'-6" is covered by Zones 11A and IIB. It contains one portable dry chemical extinguisher rated 40 B:C and one port-able CO,, extinguisher rated 10 A:B. The Control Room bypass charcoarfilter unit is protected by a deluge system. In addition, two hose reel stations have been added to increase the protection available at this elevation.
k.
7 52-034
NYO-73-002 Revision 0 C.
Conclusion On Elevations 2SO'-6" and 305'-0", since the separation of redundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown is not commensurate with the fire loading of the permanent combustibles located on thesc elevations, modifications shall be implemented to assure that at least one train of the following ecmponents necessary for safe shutdown will be avail-able.
1.
Feeders from DC Bus 2-IDC to DC Panel DCA-IA and from DC Bus 2-2DC to DC Panel DCA-2A.
2.
Feeders to Emergency Feedwater Pumps EF-P-2A and E F-P-2B.
Also, modifications shall be implementated to prevent the simultaneous loss of Cable Tray 4201 and redundant green conduit in its proximity.
On Elevation 351'-G", it is concluded that at least one train of conduit necessary for safe shutdown will be available for the following reasons:
1.
Most of the combustibles are located within enclosures or encase-men ts.
2.
Two additional hose reel stations have been added to increase the protection available at this elevation.
3.
The promity of this Area to the Control Room allows for prompt manual fire fighting to limit fire prepa:;ation and reduce equipment damage.
I
)
e
(
e 3'i 035
NYO-78-002 Revision 0
- 3. 5 FA-041 - Hav Duct and Cable Trav Area A.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation Without Active Protection The evaluation determined that both trains of safety related conduit would become unavailacie due to a DBF in this Area. However, it was determined that except for the following, the conduit did not contain redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown.
a.
Feeder and control circuits associated with Safety Features Actuation System "A" and "B".
B.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation With Active P otec' ion The 3owing paragraphs describe the evaluation that was performed on this Area to determine the capability of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown after taking into consideration the separation of redundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown, the quantity, location and type of combustibles present, the existing ' ire barriers /encasements and the fire detection and suppression equipment available in the Area.
1.
Senaration of Redundant Conduit Necessarv for Safe Shutdown The separation between red and green conduit is generally 3 feet or greater. The separation of green conduit and red trays in the Area is about one-inch at the closest point of intersection. How-ever, the green conduit and red trays do not contain redundant circuits for safe shutdown equipment and the trays are provided with tray covers and "31" Board at points or mtersection. Separa-tion between the conduits containing redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdowa indicated in Paragraph 3.5. A are as follows, n.
Fceder and control circuits associated with Safety Fea*ures Actuation System "A" and "B" are separated by at least 3 feet.
2.
Cuantity, Iecation and Tvne of Combustibles The combustibles located in this Area consist of fire retardant cable insulation distributed throughout the Area. 31any of the cable trays are fitted with top and bottom tray covers and "31" Board and will not contribute to the propagation of a fire. b2-036
NYC-78-002 Revision 0 3.
1 e Dete tion and Suncression Ecuicment Available This Area is covered by Zone SC of the Zoned Fire Detection System. Two portable dry chemical extinguishers rated at 40 B:C and two portable CO, extinguishers rated at 10 A:B are easily retrievable fromT1evation 280'-G".
C.
Conclusion Since the separation of redundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown is commensurate with the low fire loading of the permanent combusti-bles in this Area, it is concluded that at least one train of conduit neces-sary for safe shutdorm will be available and fire detection and suppres-sion systems are available to prevent a fire from damaging redundant systems.
-2G-b'4"037
NYO ~8-002 Revision 0
- 3. 6 FA-045 - Cable 'com_
A.
Safe Shutdown exaluati-a Wit. cut Af ' Je Protection The-n!uation det, ained that both trains of safety related equipment nec.:sary for safe s Avn would become unavailable due to a DBF in this...e1.
B.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation '.Vith Active Protection Aa analysis is presently being perform ed to determine the modifications regtfred to provide remote shutdown capability independent of the Cable Room. This capability will make it possible to bring the plant to a cold shutdovn without depending upon any Cable Room equipment or cables.
b2-038
NYO-78-002 Revision 0
- 3. 7 FA-047 "arvice Buildine and Control Building Area A.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation Without Active Protection The evaluation determined that both trains of safety related conduit would become unavailable due to a DBF in this Area. However, it was determined that except for the following, the conduit does not contain redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown.
1, Control Building Area Elevation 250'-6" a.
Feeders and controls for the Emergency Feed 3Iotor Driven Pumps EF-P-2A and E F-P-2B.
b.
Feeders and controls for steam inlet valves 31S-V-11A, 31S-V-11B r.d 31S-V207 to the Emergency Feed Turbine Driven Pump EF-F-1.
Feeders and controls for the following Emergency Feed c.
Valves:
E F-V4A E F-V4B E F-V32A E F-V32 B E F-V33A E F-V33B E F-V12A E F-V12B B.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation With Active Protection The following paragraphs describe the evaluation that was performed on this Area to determine the cap tbility of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown after taking into consideration the separation of redundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown, the quantity, location and type of combustibles present, the existing fire barriers /encasements and the fire detection and suppression equipment available in the Area.
1.
Senaration of Redundant Conduit Necessarv for Safe Shutdown On Elevation 2S2'-6" of the Control Building Area, the separation between red and green conduit is generally one-foot or greater.
Separation between red conduit and green cable trays and vice versa is alsc about one-foot or greater. Separation between the conduits containing redundant circuits for safe shutdown indicated in Paragraph 3.7. A above are as follows.- 52-039
NYO-78-002 Revision 1 a.
Feeders and controls for 3Iotor Driven Emergency Feed Pumps are separated by at least 5 feet from each other and by a concrete wall and approximately 10 feet from the feeders and controls for the Emer-gency Feed Turbine Driven Pump.
b.
Feeders and controls for redundant Emergency Feed Valves listed in Paragraph 3. 7. A.1.c. abc"e are separated by about 1 - 5 feet.
2.
Cuantitv, Locat'on and Tvee of Combustibles The amount of combustibles in the Control Building Area, Elevation 282'-6" is low consisting mainly of lubricating oil contained within pump and motor casings and fire re-tardant cable insulation. The combustibles in this Area are distributai throughout the Area.
3.
Fire Detection and Suonression Ecuioment Available The Control Building Area, Elevation 282'-6" is covered l'y Zones 12A and 12B of the Zoned Fire Detection System. The Area contains two portable dry chemical extinguishers rated at 40 B:C, one portable CO, extinguisher rated at 10 B:C and three hose reel stations.
~
C.
Conclusion Although the amount of combustibles in this Area is low and the fire detection and suppression systems available are capable of combating any potential fire in the Area, it was deter:rined that the separation of redundant conduit necessary for safe shutdown is not commensurate with the fire loading and, therefore, the Arca is unacceptable. Stodi-fications will be implemented in this Area to prevent a fire from in-capacitating the following redundant conduit necessary for safe shutdown.
1.
Feeders and controls for the Emergency Feedwater 3Iotor Driven Pumps EF-P-2A and EF-P-2B, 2.
Feeders and controls for Emergency Feedwater Valves EF-V33A, E F-V33B, EF-V4A, E F-V4B, E F-V32A, EF-V32B, E F-V12A and E F-V12B.
1 -
52-040
NYO-78-002 Revision 0
- 3. 8 FA-049 - Reactor Building A.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation Without Active Protection The evaluation determined that both trains of safety related conduit would become unavailable due to a DBF in this Area. However, all conduit in this Area does not contain redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown. The following lists the circuits for nonredund.us components necessary for safe shutdown.
1.
Elevation 282'-6" a.
Feeders and controls for Decay Heat Valves DH-V1.
DH-V2 and DH-V171.
2.
Elevation 305'-0" 2.
Feeders and controls for Core Flooding Tank Isolation Valves CF-VIA and CF-V1B.
b.
Feeders for Decay Heat Valve DH-V2.
B.
Safe Shutdown Evaluation With Active Protection The following paragraphs describe the evaluation that was performed on this Area to determine the capability of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown tfter taking into consideration the separation of redundant conduits necessary for safe shutdown, the quantity, location and type of combustibles present, the existing fire barriers /encasements and the fire detection anc suppression equipment available in the Area.
1.
Secaration of Redundant Conduits Necessary for Safe Shutdown On Elevation 282'-6" the separation between red and green conduit is generally about 5 feet or greater. Exceptions to this separation exists between Columns R13A and R11A, how-ever, conduit in this Area does not contain redundant circuits necessary for safe shutdown. There are no safety related cable trays in this Area. _
b2-041
NYO-78-002 Revision 0 On Elevation 305'-0", the separation betveen red and green conduit is generally abo 2t 5 feec or greater. There are no safety related cable trays in this Area.
2.
Cuantity, Location and Tvnes of Combustibles On Elevations :'32'-6" and 305'-0", the quantity of combustibles is small and combustibles are distributed throughout the Area.
Much of the combustible material is located in enclosed spaces such as lubricating eil contained within pump or motor casings and Type "B" wiring insulation contained within pump motors and cabinets. The amount of cable insulation within cable trays in thic Arca 1 insignificant.
3.
Fire Detection and Suoaression Ecuioment Available Elevation 2S2'-6" is covered by Zone 22F of the Zoned Fire Detection System. This elevation is covered by two hose reel stations. Elevation 305'-0" is covered by Zone 32D. This elevation is covered by two hose reel stations.
C.
Conclusion The feeders and controls to Decay Heat Removal Valves DH-V1, DH-V2 and DH-V171 and Core Flooding Valves CF-VIA and CF-V1B run through Elevations 282'-6" and 305'-0" of this Fire Area, are not redundant, and may be incapacitated by a fire. However, it was determined that c'ue to the time available before the operation of these valves becomes necessary, the low fire loading of the permanent combustibles located in the Area, and the fire detection and suppression systems available, sufficient time exists to extinguish the fire in the Area and restore manual cperation of these valves. bZ 'b-d2
NYO-7S-002 Revision 0
- 4. 0 CONCLUSION The conduit failure analy. tis was performed in three phases as described in Paragraphs 2.1, 2. 2 and 2. 3 of this report. The results of the Preliminary Review indicated that in thirty-nine (39) of the fifty-five (55) Areas evaluated, the plant maintained the capa-bility to safely shutdov.n, and therefore, were considered acceptable.
In the sixteen (16) remaining Areas, a Detailed Review was performed. The results of the Detailed Review incicated that eight (S) of the sixteen (16) Areas maintained the capability to cafely shutdown, and therefore, were considered acceptable.
In the eight (8) remaining Areas, a reevaluation was performed to determine the capa-bility of the plant to achieve a safe shutdown after factoring in the availability of active protection within the Areas. The results of the reevaluation indicated that four (4) of the eight (8) Areas maintained the capability to safely shutdown, and therefore, were considered acceptable, Plant modifications will be implemented for portions of the Auxiliary Building, Control Building, Cable Room and Service Building, and Control Building Area found unaccept-able. The schedule and design of modifications intended will be provided by GPU.
- 3 2-b2-043
hT O-78-002 Revision 0 5.0 RE FERENCES a.
EDS Reprt No. NYO-77-002, Revision 1.
b.
EDS Report No. NYO-77-004, Revision 1.
c.
Burns and Roe Conduit Layout Drawings:
Burns and Roe Drawint No. / Sheet No./ Revision No.
3170(1)/14 3174(3)/13 3130(1)/12 3202(1)/13 3170(2)/10 3174(4)/11 3180(2)/16 3202(2)/15 3170(3)/14 3174(5)/11 3181u)/12 3202(3)/5 3170(4)/12 3174(G)/11 3181(2)/13 3205(1)/12 3171(1)/16 3174(7)/9 3192(1)/16 3205(2)/10 3171(2)/14 3174(S)/
3182(2)/11 3206(1)/14 3171(3)/
3176(1)/15 3183(1)/14 3206(2)/10 3171(4)/
3176(2)/12 3183(2)/14 31's2(1)/14 3176(3)/13 3183(3)/11 3172(2)/
3176(4)/10 3183(4)/14 3173(1)/14 3176(5)/7 3184(1)/11 3173(2)/14 3177(1)/13 3184(2)/13 3173(3)/11 3177(2)/12 3184(3)/12 3174(1)/13 3178/13 3184(4)/11 3174(2)/11 3179(1)/6 3184(5)/
318S/
3169/12
- 3 3-b2-044
NYO-7S-002 Revision 0 d.
Summary of Circuits dated January,197S.
e.
Additional Suppression as india:ated in GPU Letter No. T31I-2/3777 dated February 17, 1978.
f.
EDS Supplementary Procedure for I fre Hazards Analysis 3700013-002, Supplement 1, Januar r,1978.
. rd2'045