ML19170A268

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NRR E-mail Capture - State Notification of Amendments to Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section for Fission Gas Gap Release Rates
ML19170A268
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/17/2019
From: Michael Mahoney
Plant Licensing Branch II
To: Nair-Gimmi A
State of SC
References
L-2018-LLA-0300
Download: ML19170A268 (3)


Text

NRR-DRMAPEm Resource From: Mahoney, Michael Sent: Monday, June 17, 2019 4:30 PM To: 'Nair-Gimmi, Anuradha'

Subject:

State Notification of Amendments to Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 -

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section for Fission Gas Gap Release Rates Attachments: 2019-00358 - FRN 1-31-19 84 FR 811.pdf Mrs. Nair-Gimmi, We are near completion of amendments for the Oconee Nuclear Station (Oconee), Units 1, 2 and 3 (I am the backup project manager for Oconee, just working on this amendment), to revise their Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Specifically, the amendments would revise the dose consequences for the facility, as described in the UFSAR, to provide fission gas gap release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods that exceed the linear heat generation rate limit detailed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183, Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors (ADAMS Accession No. ML003716792), Table 3, Footnote 11. The amendments would allow a higher bounding rod power history and the removal of a restriction on the number of rods per assembly that can exceed the rod power burnup criteria of Footnote 11 in RG 1.183.

The application is dated November 1, 2018 as supplemented by letter dated March 7, 2019 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML18318A320 and ML19066A316, respectively).

The no significant hazards consideration determination was noticed in the Federal Register on January 31, 2019 (84 FR 811), attached.

Please respond if you have any or no comments.

Thanks Mike Michael Mahoney McGuire and Catawba Project Manager, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Desk: (301)-415-3867 Email: Michael.Mahoney@NRC.GOV 1

Hearing Identifier: NRR_DRMA Email Number: 60 Mail Envelope Properties (SN6PR09MB3040E4CDD04247D7D04CDD98E5EB0)

Subject:

State Notification of Amendments to Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 -

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section for Fission Gas Gap Release Rates Sent Date: 6/17/2019 4:29:57 PM Received Date: 6/17/2019 4:29:59 PM From: Mahoney, Michael Created By: Michael.Mahoney@nrc.gov Recipients:

"'Nair-Gimmi, Anuradha'" <nairgia@dhec.sc.gov>

Tracking Status: None Post Office: SN6PR09MB3040.namprd09.prod.outlook.com Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 1502 6/17/2019 4:29:59 PM 2019-00358 - FRN 1-31-19 84 FR 811.pdf 44631 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:

Recipients Received:

Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 21 / Thursday, January 31, 2019 / Notices 811 information related to this document, The probability remains unchanged since the These conservative assumptions ensure that see the Obtaining Information and accident analyses performed and discussed the radiation doses calculated pursuant to Submitting Comments section of this in the basis for the UFSAR changes involve Regulatory Guide 1.183 and cited in this LAR no change to a system, structure or are the upper bounds to radiological document.

component that affects initiating events for consequences of the fuel handling accidents Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket any UFSAR Chapter 15 accident evaluated. analyzed. The analysis shows that with Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Therefore, the proposed change does not increased gap release fractions accounted for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and involve a significant increase in the in the dose consequences calculations there probability or consequences of an accident is margin between the offsite radiation doses 3, Oconee County, South Carolina previously evaluated. calculated and the dose limits of 10 CFR Date of amendment request: 2. Does the proposed change create the 50.67 and acceptance criteria of Regulatory November 1, 2018. A publicly-available possibility of a new or different kind of Guide 1.183. The proposed change will not version is in ADAMS under Accession accident from any previously evaluated? degrade the plant protective boundaries, will No. ML18318A320. The proposed change involves using gap not cause a release of fission products to the Description of amendment request: release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods public, and will not degrade the performance (i.e., greater than 54 GWD/MTU) that exceed of any structures, systems or components The amendments would revise the dose the 6.3 kW/ft LHGR limit detailed in Table important to safety.

consequences for the facility, as 3, Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Increased gap Therefore, the proposed change does not described in the Updated Final Safety release fractions were determined for certain involve a significant reduction in a margin of Analysis Report, to provide fission gas isotopes, and were accounted for in the dose safety.

gap release fractions for high-burnup analysis for ONS. The dose consequences fuel rods that exceed the linear heat reported in the ONS UFSAR were reanalyzed The NRC staff has reviewed the generation rate limit detailed in for fuel handling accidents only. Dose licensees analysis and, based on this Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183, consequences were not reanalyzed for other review, it appears that the three Alternative Radiological Source Terms non-fuel-handling accidents since no fuel rod standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are that is predicted to enter departure from satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at nucleate boiling (DNB) will be permitted to Nuclear Power Reactors (ADAMS proposes to determine that the operate beyond the limits of RG 1.183, Table amendment request involves no Accession No. ML003716792), Table 3, 3, Footnote 11.

Footnote 11. The amendments would The proposed change does not involve the significant hazards consideration.

allow a higher bounding rod power addition or modification of any plant Attorney for licensee: Kate Nolan, history and the removal of a restriction equipment. The proposed change has the Deputy General Counsel, Duke Energy on the number of rods per assembly that potential to affect future core designs for Carolinas, 550 South Tryon Street, can exceed the rod power burnup ONS. However, the impact will not be Charlotte, NC 28202.

criteria of Footnote 11 in RG 1.183. beyond the standard function capabilities of NRC Branch Chief: Michael T.

the equipment. The proposed change Markley.

Basis for proposed no significant involves using gap release fractions that hazards consideration determination: would allow high-burnup fuel rods (i.e., Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Docket Nos.

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the greater than 54 GWD/MTU) to exceed the 6.3 50-325 and 50-324, Brunswick Steam licensee has provided its analysis of the kW/ft LHGR limit detailed in Table 3, Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick issue of no significant hazards Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Accounting for County, North Carolina consideration, which is presented these new gap release fractions in the dose analysis for ONS does not create the Date of amendment request: October below:

possibility of a new accident. 18, 2018. A publicly-available version is

1. Does the proposed change involve a Therefore, the proposed change does not in ADAMS under Accession No.

significant increase in the probability or create the possibility of a new or different ML18291A628.

consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

kind of accident from any accident Description of amendment request:

previously evaluated. The proposed amendments would The proposed change involves using gap

3. Does the proposed change involve a revise the allowable value associated release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods significant reduction in a margin of safety? with Function 1.b (i.e., 4.16 kiloVolt (i.e., greater than 54 GWD/MTU [gigawatt The proposed change involves using gap days per metric ton of uranium]) that exceed Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of the 6.3 kW/ft [kilowatt per foot] linear heat release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods (i.e., greater than 54 GWD/MTU) that exceed Voltage)Time Delay) of Table 3.3.8.1-generation rate (LHGR) limit detailed in 1, Loss of Power Instrumentation, in Table 3, Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Increased the 6.3 kW/ft LHGR limit detailed in Table 3, Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Increased gap Technical Specification 3.3.8.1.

gap release fractions were determined and accounted for in the dose analysis for ONS release fractions were determined for certain Basis for proposed no significant

[Oconee Nuclear Station]. The dose isotopes, and were accounted for in the dose hazards consideration determination:

consequences reported in the ONS Updated analysis for ONS. The dose consequences As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) were reported in the ONS UFSAR were reanalyzed licensee has provided its analysis of the reanalyzed for fuel handling accidents only. for fuel handling accidents only. Dose issue of no significant hazards Dose consequences were not reanalyzed for consequences were not reanalyzed for other consideration, which is presented other non-fuel-handling accidents since no non-fuel-handling accidents since no fuel rod that is predicted to enter departure from below:

fuel rod that is predicted to enter departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) will be nucleate boiling (DNB) will be permitted to 1. Does the proposed change involve a permitted to operate beyond the limits of RG operate beyond the limits of RG 1.183, Table significant increase in the probability or 1.183, Table 3, Footnote 11. The current NRC 3, Footnote 11. consequences of an accident previously requirements, as described in 10 CFR 50.67, The proposed change has the potential for evaluated?

specifies [sic] dose acceptance criteria in an increased postulated accident dose at Response: No.

amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1 terms of Total Effective Dose Equivalent ONS. However, the analysis demonstrates The proposed change does not involve a (TEDE). The revised dose consequence that the resultant doses are within the physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new analyses for the fuel handling events at ONS appropriate acceptance criteria. The margin or different type of equipment will be meet the applicable TEDE dose acceptance of safety, as defined by 10 CFR 50.67 and installed). The proposed change revises the criteria (specified also in RG 1.183). Regulatory Guide 1.183, has been Allowable Value for the Time Delay Loss of The changes proposed do not affect the maintained. Furthermore, the assumptions Voltage relays to resolve a design precursors for fuel handling accidents and input used in the gap release and dose vulnerability potentially impacting the analyzed in Chapter 15 of the ONS UFSAR. consequences calculations are conservative. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:21 Jan 30, 2019 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00166 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\31JAN1.SGM 31JAN1