ML19162A403
| ML19162A403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/13/2019 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research |
| To: | |
| T. Rivera | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19162A398 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML19162A403 (18) | |
Text
TASK 7 - DEMONSTRATION METHOD 1 - BASIC EVENTS SET TO TRUE OR ONE Figure 1: FIRE SCENARIO RESULTS
SUMMARY
AND SYSTEM STATUS (METHOD 1)
Figure 2: SCENARIO TO BASIC EVENT MAPPING TABLE (METHOD 1)
Figure 3: SCENARIO DEFINITION (METHOD 1)
Figure 4: RESULTS PRESENTATION (METHOD 1)
METHOD 2 - FIRE INITIATING EVENTS INSERTED IN FAULT TREE LOGIC
- SINGLE-TOP CDF/LERF Figure 5: RISK MONITOR PANEL (METHOD 2)
Figure 6: FAULT TREE EXAMPLE (METHOD 2)
Figure 7: EXAMPLE RESULTS (METHOD 2)
METHOD 3 - EVENT TREE WITH FIRE COMPARTMENT HOUSE EVENTS INSERTED IN FAULT TREE Figure 8: EXAMPLE FIRE EVENT TREE (METHOD 3)
Figure 9: EXAMPLE BRIDGE TREE (METHOD 3)
Figure 10: INTERNAL EVENT TREE (METHOD 3)
Figure 11: FIRE EVENT TREE LINKAGE RULES
Figure 12: BRIDGE TREE LINKAGE RULES
Figure 13: FAULT TREE MODEL WITH INSERTED FIRE COMPARTMENT HOUSE EVENTS (METHOD 3)
Figure 14: EXAMPLE RESULTS (METHOD 3)
FIRE SCENARIO EXAMPLES
Target Set ID Items in the target set Basis for selecting target set MCR-01 AOV-4 Steam Generator Atmospheric Dump Valve AOV-1 PORV MOV-13 PORV Isolation Valve PT-1 Pressurizer pressure indication A fire affecting CB-2 and CB-4 can fail ability to depressurize the pressurizer and use of atmospheric dump valves for heat removal. A fire limited to these panels may have a significant CCDP.
MCR-02 AFW-A Motor driven AFW pump A AFW-C Motor driven AFW pump C MOV-10 AFW discharge valve MOV-11 AFW discharge valve MOV-14 AFW turbine steam line isolation valve MOV-15 AFW steam inlet throttle valve MOV-16 AFW test line isolation valve MOV-17 AFW test line isolation valve MOV-18 AFW C Pump Discharge MOV-19 AFW test line isolation valve A-1 AFW motor high temp CB-3 contains post shutdown secondary cooling equipment controls. A fire affecting the equipment controlled from this panel may have a significant CCDP.
MOV-16, MOV-17, MOV-19, and A-1 screened in component selection MCR-03 HPI-A High pressure safety injection pump A HPI-B High pressure safety injection pump B RHR-B RHR pump AOV-2 (SOV-2) Letdown isolation valve AOV-3 (SOV-3) Charging pump injection valve MOV-1 HPI valve MOV-2 VCT isolation valve MOV-3 Cont. sump recirc valve MOV-4 Cont. sump recirc valve MOV-5 RWST isolation valve MOV-6 RWST isolation CB-5 contains a large number of safety related component controls. A fire affecting the equipment controlled from this panel may have a significant CCDP.
Target Set ID Items in the target set Basis for selecting target set valve MOV-7 RHR inboard suction valve MOV-8 RHR outboard suction valve MOV-9 HPI valve LI-1 RWST level LI-2 RWST level LI-3 Cont. sump level LI-4 Cont. sump level TI-1 Letdown heat exchanger outlet temp MCR-04 HPI-A High pressure safety injection pump A HPI-B High pressure safety injection pump B AOV-2 (SOV-2) Letdown isolation valve MOV-2 VCT isolation valve LI-3 Cont. sump level LI-4 Cont. sump level AFW-A Motor driven AFW pump A AFW-C Motor driven AFW pump C MOV-14 AFW turbine steam line isolation valve MOV-15 AFW steam inlet throttle valve The shortest distance between the controls of the HPI and AFW systems that can render the pumps from both system inoperable is the distance from MOV-15 control switch to HPI-A control switch (i.e., CB-3 and CB-5 are affected by the same fire.) Loss of both systems may have a significant CCDP.
MCR-05 HPI-A High pressure safety injection pump A HPI-B High pressure safety injection pump B RHR-B RHR pump Control MOV-7 RHR inboard suction valve MOV-8 RHR outboard suction valve The shortest distance between the controls of the HPI and RHR systems that can render the pumps from both systems inoperable is the distance from HPI-B control switch to RHR Pump control switch. Loss of both systems may have a significant CCDP.
MCR-01 Quantification The farthest distance between the postulated control devices on the board is 4 ft.
d = 4 ft = 1.2 m
Assumed non-qualified cables since a portion of the cables are non-qualified. From Figure L-1 it is concluded:
[SFxPNS]MCR-01 = 3.0E-03 MCR-01 = 2.5E-03 x 3.0E-03 = 7.5E-06 per reactor year Results IGN: 2.50E-03 SF:
NSP: 3.00E-03 CCDP: 1.00E+00 CDF: 7.50E-06 Affected Equipment MCR-01 Zone AOV-1_FTC Basic Event AOV-1_FTO Basic Event AOV-1_TO Basic Event AOV-4_TO Basic Event MOV-13_FTC Basic Event MOV-13_TC Basic Event PT-1_FH Basic Event PT-1_FL Basic Event
MCR-02 Quantification The farthest distance between the postulated control devices on the board is 2 ft.
d = 2 ft = 0.6 m Assumed non-qualified cables since a portion of the cables are not qualified. From Figure L-1 it is concluded:
[SFxPNS]MCR-02 = 5.0E-03 MCR-02 = 2.5E-03 x 5.0E-03 = 1.25E-05 per reactor year Results IGN:
2.60E-03 SF:
NSP:
3.00E-03 CCDP: 4.80E-04 CDF:
3.74E-09 Affected Equipment MCR-02 Zone AFWA-FTR Basic Event AFWA-FTS Basic Event AFWC-FTR Basic Event AFWC-FTS Basic Event MOV-10_FTO Basic Event MOV-11_FTO Basic Event MOV-14_FTO Basic Event MOV-15_FTO Basic Event MOV-18_FTO Basic Event
HRA Recovery Rule Example
- RECOVERY RULES**
- MAX RECOVERIES** 1
- CLEAR RECOVERY FLAGS**
- HRA Dependency Rules
- RECOVERY** x-HRACOMB 1.0E-05 OPER-1 OPER-5
- HRA - Independent Probability assignement rules
- RECOVERY** X-OPER-1 1.0E-03 OPER-1
- RECOVERY** X-OPER-2 2.0E-02 OPER-2
- RECOVERY** X-OPER-4 8.0E-03 OPER-4
- RECOVERY** X-OPER-5 1.0E-02 OPER-5
- RECOVERY** X-OPER-7 1.0E-02 OPER-7
- SET EVENT PROBS**
OPER-1 1.0 OPER-2 1.0 OPER-4 1.0
OPER-5 1.0 OPER-7 1.0 Example Cutsets with HRA Dependency Combination Events