ML18153C766
| ML18153C766 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1991 |
| From: | Decker T, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153C764 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-91-28, 50-281-91-28, NUDOCS 9110080236 | |
| Download: ML18153C766 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1991028
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
IEP23 t99J
Report Nos.:
50-280/91-28 and 50-281/91-28
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA 23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
August 27-30, 1991
Inspector:
~
YL L) a,, 1 /t
F. N.
right
Oat~ Signed
Approval
Scope:
By: ~-RdtaL
9/;~h/
T. R. Decker
Date Signed
Radiological Effluents and Chemistry Section
Radiological Protection and Emergency
Prepardness Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
This special inspection of the licensee's program for
transportation of radioactive material was made to review the
activities associated with a shipment of radioactive material
involved in a transportation accident on August 27, 1991, in
Norfolk, Virginia.
Results:
One violation was identified for failure to properly identify the
physical form of the radioactive material involved in a
transportation accident. The inspector determined that the
licensee did not have a program that would require persons
knowledgeable of the physical characteristics of complex
components or articles to assess and specify the physical form of
radioactive material presented to the radioactive material
transportation staff for shipment.
9110080236 910923
ADOCK 05000280
Q
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
- M. Bechman, Radioactive Material Control
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- M. Biron, Supervisor Radiological Engineering
- H. Blake, Superintendent, NSS
- W. Cook, Supervisor, Health Physics Operations
- D. Erickson, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
- B. Garber, Supervisor, Health Physics
- B. Guritney, Superintendent, Maintenance
- M. Haddock, Supervisor, Maintenance
- D. Hart, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- M. Olin, Supervisor, Decontamination Services
- J. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- E. Smith, Manager, Quality Assurance
- W. Thorton, Director Health Physics and Chemistry
Services
Other licensee personnel contacted during this inspection
included engineers, mechanics, technicians, and
administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview
2.
Transportation Accident Overview
On the morning of August 27, 1991, a contaminated Reactor
Coolant Pump Motor (RCPM) and package, being transported on
a flatbed trailer from the Surry Power Station to a
Westinghouse facility, struck the Jefferson Avenue overpass
as the transport vehicle was attempting to enter onto
westbound Interstate 64 (I-64) in Newport News, Virginia.
The height of the package on the trailer was greater than
the clearance of the overpass it entered, causing the
package to come in contact with the overpass and fall from
the trailer onto the road.
The RCPM had been contaminated with low level radioactive
material during its use at the plant and was being
transported as Low Specific Activity (LSA) radioactive
material. The RCPM was contained in a strong tight container
(package) for the transport. The RCPM package was severely
damaged and the RCPM was resting on its side in the road,
outside it's package. A small amount of radioactive fluids
2
spilled from the RCPM onto the road surface. The fluid
migrated down into the damaged road surface and out to the
outside (right) road shoulder. At the shoulder the concrete
road surface joined with an asphalt berm. The contaminated
fluid reached that joint and traveled along it for a couple
of hundred feet, seeping into the fissure as it advanced.
Since the load was oversized and required a permit, the
transport vehicle was being escorted by other transport
company personnel in vehicles to it's front and rear when
the accident occurred at about 09:38 a.m. Both lanes of the
east and west roads were blocked for about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The east
bound lanes were opened about 1:00 p.m. and one lane going
west on I-64 was opened for traffic later that afternoon.
Two cranes were moved to the accident site and the motor was
lifted from the road and moved onto another trailer for
transport back to the Surry site. Since the transport
package for the RCPM was destroyed in the accident, the
licensee proposed the use of two impermeable Herculon
"socks" as strong tight containers for transporting the RCPM
back to Surry site. The licensee contacted the Department of
Transportation (DOT) about the proposed repackaging plan and
was advised that the proposal appeared to be acceptable for
meeting the requirements of 49 CFR 173.425(b). on August 28,
1991, the licensee departed the accident scene with the RCPM
about 2 a.m. and arrived at the Surry site approximately
4 a.m.
VEPCO volunteered to perform the decontamination of the road
and sent considerable equipment as well as numerous
personnel to the site to begin the task. Recovery workers
included representatives from decontamination, health
physics, maintenance, and other Surry staffs. The licensee's
personnel began decontamination activities the afternoon of
the accident and worked around the clock for about 2 1/2
days until the task was completed in the early hours of
August 30, 1991. The Commonwealth of Virginia, Bureau of
Radiological Health radiological control personnel released
the area as clean (background radiation levels) before
sunrise that day. The Commonwealth highway department began
repair of the road at sunrise and was able to open all
westbound lanes of I-64 later that day. The licensee
dispatched sufficient resources and personnel to perform the
task effectively and safely.
3
3.
Inspection Findings
a.
Requirements
10 CFR 71.5(a) requires a licensee, who transports any
licensed material outside the confines of his plant or
other place of use, or delivers any licensed material
for transport, except where such transport is subject
to the regulations of the U.S. Postal Service, to
comply with the applicable requirements of the DOT
regulations presented in 49 CFR Parts 170 through 189
insofar as such regulations relate to the packaging of
byproduct, source, or special nuclear material, marking
and labeling of the packages, loading and storage of
packages, placarding of the transportation vehicle,
monitoring requirements, accident reporting, and
shipping papers.
49 CFR 173.425 specifies the transport requirements for
LSA radioactive materials. Paragraph (b) of 173.425
specifies the requirements for shipments consigned as
exclusive use and Paragraph (b) (1) requires the
materials be packaged in strong tight packages so that
there will be no leakage of radioactive material under
conditions normally incident to transportation.
49 CFR 172.200 specifies the requirements for shipping
papers. Paragraph 172.203(d) (ii) requires that the
shipment of radioactive material must include a
description of the physical and chemical form of the
material.
VEPCO Operational Quality Assurance Program Topical
Report -
VEP 1-5A describes the licensee's commitments
to various Regulatory Guides including Regulatory
Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Requirements (Operation),
Revision 2, February 1978.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, 1978, requires
written procedures for control of radioactivity (for
limiting materials released to the environment and
limiting personnel exposure).
b.
RCPM Description
The RCPM had four major coolers, two air and two oil.
All of the coolers used site component cooling water
(CCW) as a cooling media. The largest cooling system is
the upper bearing oil cooler which cools approximately
175 gallons of oil with a heat exchanger holding
approximately 10 gallons of ccw. The remaining coolers
hold less than 2 gallons of CCW each.
4
c.
RCPM Replacement
The inspector determined that when the CCW lines were
disconnected from the RCPM in the Reactor Building
containment and at that time those lines and the fluid
from the RCPM where these lines are connected were
allowed to drain by gravity.
However, those ccw system
connecting points on the RCPM were not necessarily low
points in it's cooling systems. Therefore, simply
disconnecting the CCW lines to the RCPM could not drain
its cooling system inventory alone.
Additionally, the
licensee did not block the influent or effluent ccw
ports on the RCPM before shipment. Therefore, in
positions other than a normal upright position,
remaining CCW fluids could flow by gravity out of the
coolers. The motor was disconnected from the pump in
April of 1991 and moved to the crane building. The RCPM
remained there until it was loaded onto the flat bed
trailer for shipment.
d.
ccw
The licensee had experienced recent problems with their
CCW system in that it had become significantly
contaminated with reactor coolant system leakage. The
inspector learned that the radioactivity of the ccw
system in April 1991, was on the order of
1 E-03 microcuries per milliliter (µCi/ml). A small
sample of the radioactive liquid collected at the
accident scene was analyzed and indicated approximately
1 E-3 µCi/ml of Cs-137. This analysis agreed closely to
the radioactivity measured in the CCW system at the
time the RCPM was disconnected from the system,
indicating that the spilled water's source was CCW from
the upper bearing oil cooler heat exchanger.
e.
Package
f.
The inspector determined that the licensee had utilized
a steel container that fully enclosed the RCPM and that
included gaskets at package joints to prevent any
release of radioactivity under conditions normally
incident to transport. The steel package built for
transporting the RCPM met the requirements of a strong
tight package as required by the regulations.
Shipping Papers and Physical Assessment
The licensee identified the physical and chemical form
of radioactivity on the RCPM shipping papers as
solid/oxides. However, when_the RCPM turned over onto
5
I-64 a small amount of liquid, estimated to be from 5
to 10 gallons, drained from the motor to contaminate
the roadway indicating that the physical form of the
radioactive material was both a liquid and solid.
The radiation protection group responsible for
preparing radioactive material for transport was
unaware that liquids could be internal to the RCPM. The
transportation staff used a written procedure to
estimate the radioactivity of the RCPM from a
combination of radioactive contamination swipes taken
from external surfaces and direct radiation
measurements. However, the transportation staff did not
have a procedure for preparing the RCPM for shipment
nor easy access to the RCPM internals. In interviews
with licensee personnel the inspector determined that
various members of the health physics staff were not
aware of the potential for a RCPM to contain water and
oil when presented for shipment and therefore did not
request information concerning fluids from
knowledgeable sources prior to shipping. As a result,
the transportation staff was not aware that the RCPM
was a mixture of solid and liquid/oxide form at the
time of shipment.
The inspector determined that the licensee did not have
a system that would require persons knowledgable of the
technical details and conditions of articles presented
to the transportation group to assess and determine the
physical and chemical form of the radioactive material.
Failure to have appropriate controls and procedures to
properly determine the physical form of radioactive
material in accordance with the requirements of DOT
regulations was identified as a violation of the
licensee's commitments for having written procedures as
specified in the licensee's Topical Report
(50-280/91-28-0l).
g.
Shipper Qualifications
The inspector reviewed the qualifications of the person
authorizing the transport of the RCPM involved in the
accident and determined that the individual worker was
an ANSI qualified health physics technician that had
completed the licensee's transportation qualification
program and was qualified to authorize the shipment of
radioactive materials.
One violation was identified.
.,
4.
6
Exit Meeting
The inspection scope and results were summarized on
August 30, 1991, with those persons indicated in
Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and
discussed in detail the inspection results as listed below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Item Number
50-280/91-28-01
Description and Reference
VIO - Failure to develop and
implement procedures and controls
to properly assess the physical
form of radioactive material
offered for transportation
(Paragraph 3.f).