ML18153B448
| ML18153B448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1994 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153B447 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 NUDOCS 9401280031 | |
| Download: ML18153B448 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES N_UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. :;.osss--0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION CONFORMANCE TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281
- 1. 0
- INTRODUCTION On May 14, 1993, the staff issued to the Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee} its Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER} on the review of the licensee's conformance to Regulatory Guide (R.G.} 1~97, Revision 3 for the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2.
The staff found the licensee's design for post-accident monitoring instrumentation acceptable with the exception of the instrumentation for monitoring containment sump water temperature.
Closure of this latter issue will be the subject of a separate evaluation.
Following issuance of the SSER of May 14, 1993, the licensee, in a letter dated August 5, 1993, documented additional deviations from the guidance in R.G. 1.97, that had not previously been identified. Resolution of these deviations is discussed below.
2.0 EVALUATION The staff reviewed the licensee's August 5, 1993 submittal, which identified deviations and exceptions for the instrumentation that monitors 1} heat removal by the containment heat removal system, 2} high-head safety injection flow, 3} containment isolation valve position, and 4} recirculation spray pump discharge pressure. The licensee also identified deviations on the subject of 5} equipment identification. These issues are discussed below.
1}
R.G. 1.97 recommends Category 2 instrumentation for monitoring heat removal by the containment heat removal system.
The licensee previously identified the containment recirculation cooler fan subsystem monitoring instrumentation for this purpose.
Based on further review, the licensee determined that the containment recirculation cooler *fan subsystem is not relied on for accident mitigation. Cooling and depressurization of the containment after a loss-of-coolant accident is accomplished by the containment spray and recirculation spray systems.
The containment spray and recirculation spray systems are monitored by Category 2 instrumentation. Therefore, monitoring of heat removal by the containment recirculation cooler fan subsystem is not applicable at this plant, and the identified exception is acceptable.
e 2)
R.G. 1.97 recommends Category 2 high-head safety injection flow instrumentation.
The licensee identified the high-head safety injection flow instrumentation as Type A instrumentation that is required to meet Category 1 qualification criteria. The licensee provided instrumentation
- that meets the Category 1 qualification criteria except for recording.
The licensee states that since flow trend information is not needed for operator action, the high-head safety injection flow information is recorded by the emergency response facility (ERF) computer.
The ERF computer is powered by an uninterruptable power supply (UPS) that is backed by a battery. Therefore, the loss of UPS power would not cause a loss of the data previously recorded by the ERF computer.
Since trend information is not relied on by the operator for proper post-accident actions, the above deviation is acceptable.
- 3)
R.G. 1.97 recommends Category I containment isolation valve position indication.
The position indication for nine containment isolation valves in each Surry unit does not meet the Category I criteria for environmental qualification, power supply, and redundancy.
These valves are administratively controlled and are either closed or locked closed; when the reactor coolant system temperature is above 200°F.
Therefore,:
position indication for these containment isolation valves is not required, and this deviation is acceptable. Specifically, this applies to the following valves:
Containment Purge Surry, Unit 1 Valve VS-MOV-IOOA VS-MOV'-100B VS-MOV-IOOC VS-MOV-IOOD VS-MOV-101 VS-MOV-102 Loop Fill Header Valve CH-FCV-1160 e Surry. Unit 2 Valve VS-MOV-200A VS-MOV-2008 VS-MOV-200C VS-MOV-200D VS-MOV-201 VS-MOV-202 Loop Fill Header Valve CH-FCV-2160 Containment Vacuum Air Ejector Suction CV-HCV-100 CV-HCV-200 RHR to RWST Cross connect RH-MOV-100 RH-MOV-200 Status During Accident {1)
. Closed (breaker locked open)
Locked Closed Closed (breakeY locked open)
Locked Closed Locked Closed Locked Closed Status During Accident Closed Status During Accident (2)
Locked Closed Status During Accident (3)
Locked Closed (1) These valves are also required to be locked closed with RCS temperature above 200°F, per Technical Specification 3.8.A.2. These valves are also deenergized.
(2) This valve is required to be locked shut when RCS temperature is above 200°F, per Technical Specification 3.8.A.3.
(3) The moto~ operator has been removed and the valve is locked closed above 200°F.
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' ** 4)
R.G. 1.97 recommends Category 2 containment spray flow instrumentation.
The licensee provided recirculation pump motor current and recirculation pump discharge pressure instrumentation in lieu of containment spray flow instrumentation. However, the existing recirculation pump discharge pressure transmitter is not qualified for post-accident conditions inside containment. Therefore, the licensee committed to replace this transmitter with an environmentally qualified transmitter. The licensee's commitment to provide environmentally qualified recirculation pump discharge pressure instrumentation is acceptable.
5-) *.
- R~G. 1.97 recommends that Type A, 8, and C instruments designated as Category 1 or 2 be specifically identified (labeled) with a common designation on the control panels so that the operator can easily discern that these instruments are intended for use under accident condttions.
- The licensee*has not completed the identification of R.G. 1.97 control room instrumentation.
The licensee committed to complete this identification under the Station Operations Labeling Program and/or the Nuclear Design Change Program.
The licensee's commitment to complete the identification of R.G. 1.97 control room instrumentation is acceptable.;
- 3. 0 CONCLUSION Based on our review of the licensee's submittal, the staff concludes that the licensee has provided appropriate justification for deviations and exceptions, and therefore, the Surry Power Station Unit, Nos. 1 and 2 instrumentation*that monitors 1) heat removal by the.containment heat removal system, 2) high-head safety injection flow, 3) containment isolation valve position, and 4) recirculation spray pump discharge pressure, is acceptable with respect to R.G. 1.97, Revision 3.
In addition, the staff concludes that the licensee's commitment to complete identification of R.G.
- l.97 instrumentation is also acceptable.
Principal Contributor: 8. Marcus I
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