05000280/LER-1995-007, :on 950912,boron Crystals & Corrosion Products Discovered Outside Diameter of Vessel.Caused by through-wall Leakage.Work Request Initiated,Engineering & Shift Supervisor Notified

:on 950912,boron Crystals & Corrosion Products Discovered Outside Diameter of Vessel.Caused by through-wall Leakage.Work Request Initiated,Engineering & Shift Supervisor Notified

ML18153A779
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/09/1995
From:	Christian D VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
95-515, LER-95-007, LER-95-7, NUDOCS 9510130342
Download: ML18153A779 (10)

LER-1995-007, on 950912,boron Crystals & Corrosion Products Discovered Outside Diameter of Vessel.Caused by through-wall Leakage.Work Request Initiated,Engineering & Shift Supervisor Notified

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2801995007R00 - NRC Website

text

October 9, 1995 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

10CFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station 5570 Hog Island Road Surry, Virginia 23883 Serial No.:

95-515 SPS:VLA Docket No.: 50-280 License No.: DPR-32 Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER 50-280/95-007 -00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours, D. A Christian Station Manager Enclosure pc:

Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 M. W. Branch NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station

~,- n.......,.~.~

l.:.'.l)Li.£.J 9510130342 951009 PDR ADOCK 05000280 S

PDR

e e

NRC FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160-4104 (5-92)

EXPIRES 6/31/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) 0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

II PAGE(3)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000-280 1 OF 7 TITLE(4)

Operation With Non-lsolable Leak in Pressurizer Instrumentation Nozzles EVENT DATE 6)

LER NUMBER 16 REPORT DATE I" 'l OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 18)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER Surry Unit 2 05000- 281 09 12 95 95 007 00 10 09 95 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000-OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITIED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR:(Check one or more) (11)

MODE (9)

N 20.402(b) 20.405(c)

50. 73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71 (c)

POWER 20.405(a)(1 )(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 0%

20.405(a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2)

50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

OTHER i/iisii'?'

20.405(a)(1 )(iii)

X

50. 73(a)(2)(i)

50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

(Specify in Abstract below and 20.405(a)(1 )(iv)

50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) in Text, NRC Form 366A) 20.405(a)(1 )(v)

50. 73(a)(2)(iii)

50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME I (804r357~31°8~~tg Area Code)

D. A. Christian, Station Manaoer COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13

CAUSE

SYSTEM OOMPO,em

"'""°'""" "'°'""-E -

CAOSE OOMeoN..-

""°'"""

REPORTABL TONPRDS ETONPRDS B

AB PZR W120 Y

~:~::ii:,.,.....,......

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

I EXPECTED I MONTH I DAY I YEAR XI YES

/If""" comolete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATEl I NO I

SUBMISSION DATE (16) 1 02 12a I 96 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 12, 1995, Unit 1 was at cold shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage. While insulation was being removed from the Unit 1 pressurizer for planned inspections, boron crystals and corrosion products were discovered on the outside diameter of the vessel where two of the four nozzles for the upper instrument nozzles exit. Boroscopic and liquid penetrant inspections were conducted in the four upper nozzles and in two of the five lower nozzles after the attached piping had been removed. These inspections revealed a circumferential crack located approximately 2.5 inches from the.inside end of the nozzle in each of the two suspect upper nozzles. The two nozzles were removed and replaced.

One nozzle was extracted from the pressurizer and a detailed metallurgical examination of the failure will be performed.

An analysis was performed that determined there were no potential safety consequences.

Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.

The identification of cracks in the pressurizer nozzle and the resulting deposits are evidence of through-wall leakage which is in violation of Technical Specifications (TS) section 3.1.C.4. Since Unit 1 was in cold shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage at the time of the discovery, no additional TS limiting conditions of operation were applicable. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to operation in a condition prohibited by TS.

NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

NRC FORM366 (5-92)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000-280 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT e

APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160-4104 EXPIRES 6/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB n14). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LER NUMBER 161 PAGE 131 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 95

- 007 -

00 2 OF 7 On September 12, 1995, Unit 1 was at cold shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage.

While insulation was being removed from the Unit 1 pressurizer {EIIS-AB-PZR} for planned inspections, boron crystals and corrosion products were discovered on the outside diameter of the vessel where two of the four nozzles for the upper instrument nozzles exit.

The deposits were localized in a band approximately 0.5 inch to 0. 75 inch in width, 360 degrees around the nozzles.

The degraded pressurizer nozzles are piped to the instrument root valves 1-RC-130, Pressurizer Level Channel 1 Upper Isolation Valve {EIIS-AB-ISV}, and 1-RC-126, Pressurizer Level Channel 3 Upper lsoiation Valve, and lead to pressurizer level transmitters {EIIS-AB-L T}. These nozzles exit just above the transition region between the shell and dome of the pressurizer vessel (see Figure 1 ). These stainless steel instrument nozzles were welded to the stainless steel cladded inside wall of the pressurizer as part of the original design.

There is no weld on the outside of the pressurizer wall for these nozzles.

A visual inspection was performed using a remote camera inserted through the pressurizer manway opening. This inspection revealed what appeared to be a rust stain on the vessel's inside circumference under the two suspect nozzles, apparently originating inside the nozzles. Boroscopic and liquid penetrant inspections were conducted from the outside of the pressurizer after the attached piping had been removed. This inspection revealed a circumferential crack located approximately 2.5 inches from the inside nozzle end of each of the two suspect upper nozzles. The cracks are centered at the 12 o'clock position and cover an arc of approximately 100 degrees. These cracks were in the circumferential direction with respect to the nozzle except at the ends which turn 1 axially toward the outboard end of the nozzle.

During removal of the nozzle that was piped to 1-RC-126, a liquid penetrant inspection revealed six axially oriented linear indications inside the nozzle 0.375 inch to 0. 75 inch from the inboard end of the nozzle. The indications ranged from 0.28 inch to 0.34 inch in length.

This nozzle will undergo detailed metallurgical examination. After the nozzle for 1-RC-130 was removed from the pressurizer by boring, the small remaining piece, approximately 0. 75 inch long, was liquid penetrant inspected. A single axial linear indication approximately 0.09 inch long was identified on the inside diameter.

NRC FORM366 (5-92) e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME 11 l DOCKET NUMBER 121 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000-280 TEXT (~ more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366A) (17) e APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160-0104 EXPIRES 6/31/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LER NUMBER 161 PAGE13l YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 95

- 007 -

00 3oF7 The identification of cracks in the pressurizer nozzle and the resulting deposits are* evidence of through-wall leakage. Technical Specifications (TS) section 3.1.C.4 states, "If it is determined that leakage exists through a non-isolable fault which has developed in the Reactor Coolant component body, pipe weld, vessel wall, or pipe weld, the reactor shall be brought to a cold shutdown condition and corrective action taken prior to resumption of unit operation." Since Unit 1 was in cold shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage at the time of the discovery, no additional TS limiting conditions of operation were applicable. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to operation in a condition prohibited by TS.

2.0

SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

Testing and monitoring activities that would identify a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak are performed routinely as a part of normal plant operations.

The RCS leak rate is calculated daily to ensure the TS allowed leakage is not exceeded. The containment {EIIS-NH} atmosphere is continually monitored by particulate and gaseous radiation monitors

{EIIS-MON}, which provide an early indication of a small RCS pressure boundary leak.

Containment air samples are also taken on a weekly frequency and analyzed for isotopes indicative of RCS leakage.

These monitoring measures are conservatively based and ensure that RCS integrity concerns are identified promptly, enabling timely Operator action.

During the previous refueling outage, visual inspections of the pressurizer found no evidence of leakage at instrument connections. The RCS leakrate calculations performed during the unit operation since the previous refueling outage indicated less than 0.3 gallons per minute (gpm) unidentified leakage. This leakage is well below the 1 gpm unidentified leakrate allowed by the TS.

The existing accident analysis for the small cold leg break loss of coolant accident condition discussed in the Surry Power Station UFSAR would bound a catastrophic failure of the two nozzles. An analysis was performed by the pressurizer vendor and by the Nuclear Analysis and Fuel Department to determine the potential safety consequences of catastrophic failure of both nozzle lines. This analysis determined that, based on the identified size of the flaw, it is highly unlikely that a catastrophic failure of either of the nozzles would occur.

Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.

e NRC FORM366 (5-92)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER (2)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000-280 TEXT (ff more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 3.0

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

e APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB n14), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE 131 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 95

- 007-00 4oF7 Boron and corrosion deposits around the upper instrument nozzles for the pressurizer were evidence of through-wall leakage. Visual and liquid penetrant inspections identified cracks in specific pressurizer nozzles as described in Section 1.0. The nozzle that was piped to 1-RC-126 was extracted from the pressurizer and a detailed metallurgical examination will be conducted. The results of this examination will be reported in a supplement to this LER.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

When the boron crystals and corrosion products were noted on the outside of the pressurizer in the vicinity of the instrument nozzles, a station deviation report was submitted. A work request was initiated and Engineering and the Shift Supervisor were notified.

Unit 1 was at cold shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage at the time of this event.

Therefore, no additional TS limiting conditions of operation were applicable.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

Upon discovery of the boron crystals and corrosion products on the outside diameter of the vessel, Engineering examined and photographed all nine instrument connections to the pressurizer. No additional indications of leakage were found.

An inspection of the pressurizer's instrument nozzles was performed using a remote camera inserted through the manway opening. This inspection revealed what appeared to be a rust stain on the vessel's inside diameter under two of the upper nozzles, originating inside the nozzle. A liquid penetrant test and boroscopic visual inspection revealed the cracks in the nozzles.

A liquid penetrant test and boroscopic visual inspection were performed on the remaining two upper instrumentation nozzles and on two of the five lower nozzles. The attached piping had been previously removed from the ends of these nozzles. There were no cracks identified in two of the upper nozzles or in the two lower nozzles that were examined.

NRC FORM366 (5-92) e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME 11)

DOCKET NUMBER 121 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000 -280 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) e APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160-0104 EXPIRES 6/31/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LER NUMBER 161 PAGEl3l YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 95

- 007 -

00 5oF7 The pressurizer's vendor was contacted concerning this event.

This event was the first notification to the vendor of this type of cracking.

The vendor performed an on-site inspection. Vendor recommendations were incorporated into a design change package to repair the nozzles. The design change package specified that repairs were to be completed to the pressurizer nozzles in accordance with ASME Section Ill.

The nozzles were removed and the holes in the vessel were remachined to a diameter of sufficient size to remove the corrosion products. The nozzles were fabricated and installed in a fashion similar to the originals with the exception that the roll transition on the inside of the pressurizer vessel is closer to the weld.

Following repairs, the welds were inspected by liquid penetrant examinations from inside the pressurizer in accordance with ASME Section Ill requirements.

6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE A detailed metallurgical examination of the nozzle that was piped to 1-RC-126 will be conducted. Actions to prevent recurrence will be developed based on the failure analysis after it is completed.

7.0

SIMILAR EVENTS

There were no similar events identified.

Based on searches of the INPO Operating Experience on the Nuclear Network, NPRDS and discussions with the pressurizer vendor, this event appears to be the first report of any cracks in a stainless steel Westinghouse pressurizer instrument nozzle connection.

8.0

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Operating Report #7 490 was made on the Nuclear Network to inform other utilities of this event.

The pressurizer vessel is carbon steel with 309 stainless steel (SS) inner cladding and the NRC FORM366 (5-92) e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME 11 l DOCKET NUMBER 121 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000-280 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) e APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160--0104 EXPIRES 6/31/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON,.DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LER NUMBER (6)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 95

- 007 -

REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE13) 6oF7 nozzles are SA-213. Type 316 SS. The unit was supplied by Westinghouse as part of the original design, fabricated to ASME Section Ill. The design at the instrument nozzle is a combination of a J groove weld and a fillet weld which forms the structural weld inside of the pressurizer vessel. The nozzle design is a rolled tube inserted in the vessel. The vessel wall thickness in the vicinity of the nozzles is approximately 4.625 inches nominal. The cladding is a minimum of 0.130 inch thick near the nozzle region. The nozzles have a wall thickness of approximately 0.113 inch.

Unit 2 was at 100% power during this event. An analysis of the continued operation of Unit 2 was conducted. It was determined that continued operation was justified due to no similar leakage being exhibited during the last refueling examinations conducted in 1995. If a crack would develop in Unit 2, it would be bounded by the analysis that has been performed for Unit 1. Increased RCS leakage would be identified by testing and monitoring activities that are performed routinely as a part of normal plant operations.

LER 81-95-007-00 Verification of Accuracy

1.

UFSAR Section 4.2.2.2, 4.2.7.2, 4.2.7.3, 14.5.2

2.

11448-FM-0868 Sheet 1 of 3

3.

NCRODP-74

4.

DR S-95-2098, S-95-2333, S-95-2338, S-95-2353

5.

Outage Shift Coordinator Logs dated 9/12/95

6.

Unit 1 control room logs dated 9/12/95

7.

TS 3.1.C.4

8.

WR 047722

9.

OE Search by V. Gaw addressed to S. Semmes dated 9/21/95

10. ET-NAF-95122 Memo from K. Basehore, dated 9/22/95, -"Through Wall Cracks of Pressurizer Level Instrument Lines"

11. VPA-95-053 Memo from Westinghouse, dated 9/22/95, "Pressurizer Instrumentation Nozzles"

12. MSE-SMT-95-400 Memo from Westinghouse, J. K. Visaria, to T. B. Sowers, dated 9/22/95, "Continued Operation of Surry Unit 2, in Light of Pressurizer Level Tap Cracks at Unit 1"

12. Memo from A Fletcher to T. Sowers, dated 9/22/95, "Pressurizer Level Nozzle Integrity Assessment". Discussion on 10/5/95 between VLA and AF verified that insulation was removed and NOE exams took place on the prz on Unit 2 similar to the exams on Unit 1.

13. Memo to S. Semmes from L. Spain, dated 9/22/95, "Pressurizer Level Tap Boroscopic Inspection Surry Unit 1"

14. DCP 95-036

15. ET No. CEM-95-0054 Memo to T. Sowers from C. Sorrell, dated 9/22/95, "Pressurizer Level Indicator Leak"

16. OE 7490, dated 9/26/95, "Pressurizer Upper Level Instrument Tap Nozzle Leakage"

17. Attachment to VPA-95-059, dated 9/29/95, "Continued Operability of Surry Unit 2, in Light of Pressurizer Level Tap Cracks in Unit 1"

COMMITMENTS

The nozzle that was piped to 1-RC-126 was carefully removed from the pressurizer and a detailed metallurgical examination will be conducted. The results of this examination will be reported in a supplement to this LER.

ACTION PLAN A visual inspection of the instrument nozzles of the pressurizer will be conducted during the next Unit 2 forced outage to cold shutdown.

Responsibility:

Engineering CTS:

The nozzle that was piped to 1-RC-126 was carefully removed from the pressurizer. A detailed metallurgical examination of the nozzle will be conducted to determine the failure cause and recommend future actions for Units 1 and 2.

Responsibility:

Engineering CTS:

The results of this examination will be reported in a supplement to this LER.

Responsibility:

Licensing CTS:

Due: 2/28/96

~..

e NRC FORM366 (5-92)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME 1 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Ferm 366A) (17)

DOCKET NUMBER 2 05000-280

°"=

5:~

u.J I

__, L....J

-=

I

=-

=

I I

I I

I I

I I

/

/

/

\\

\\

---

+-u.J I

_JL....J

-=

,._. I

=-

=

\\

\\

I I

I I eg

'l I

I I

I I

I EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB n14), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31~104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20503.

LERNUMBER 6 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 95

- 007 -

I I

I

/

I

/

/

I I

I I

I I

I

/

/

I I

I

/

I

' ' \\

I I

I REVISION NUMBER 00 u,

Cl)

~

z C

0..

(1J -

C G>

PAGE 3 7oF7 E..-

2 G> -....

u, ::J

..5.Q>

.... u.

Cl) a.

a.

)

Cl)

N "i::

J u,

u,

~

a.