ML18153A269
| ML18153A269 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1999 |
| From: | Haag R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Ohanlon J VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904020280 | |
| Download: ML18153A269 (28) | |
Text
Virginia Electric and Power Company ATTN: Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon March 23, 1999 Senior Vice President - Nuclear Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW-SURRY POWER STATION On February 5,.1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of the Surry Power Station. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance. The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources. PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting (SMM) reviews. PPRs examine information since the last assessment of licensee performance to evaluate long term trends, but emphasize the last six months to ensure that the assessments reflect current performance. The PPR for Surry involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period March 1998 through January 1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of April 27, 1998, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on May 11, 1998.
As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2, 1998, the PPR provides an assessment of licensee performance during an interim period that the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review period, the NRC will decide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.
During the last six months Unit 1 had a refueling outage which commenced on October 19.
Following restart on November 21, Unit 1 automatically tripped due to high steam generator water level. Unit 1 was restarted on November 24, but was manually tripped on November 26 due to a loss of feedwater flow to a steam generator. Unit 1 was returned to service on
- November 27 and remained at power for the remainder of the six month period. Unit 2 operated at power during the last six months.
- Overall, perf.ormance at Surry was acceptable. Performance in the operations area continued a long term trend of safe plant operations during both routine activities and in response to transients. In general, maintenance and surveillance activities were performed by knowledgeable personnel, in accordance with approved procedures. Performance in the engineering area remained consistent. Radiological control practices and chemistry control programs continued to be effective. The security organization continued to perform in a highly professional manner.
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2 During the assessment period, operations performance has been consistent. Operations personnel exhibited positive command and control, and professionalism within the control room.
Observed control room evolutions focused on plant safety with operators performing evolutions in a deliberate manner and in accordance with procedures. Plant operators effectively diagnosed and assessed off-normal conditions and completed infrequently performed evolutions in a safe manner. Configuration control deficiencies, although not large in number, continued to be identified. Core inspections are planned in the operations functional area.
Performance in the maintenance area has been consistent. Maintenance activities were generally performed in accordance with work instructions by knowledgeable personnel with appropriate technical and management support. Some maintenance deficiencies, including performance of a preventive maintenance activity on an incorrect component, were observed and were attributed to lack of attention to detail. Overall, plant material condition was good. A number of equipment problems that occurred during the period were immediately addressed and corrected. In general, surveillance testing was conducted in a thorough and professional manner, in accordance with approved procedures, by knowledgeable personnel, and test data met acceptance criteria. The post maintenance testing program was effective. In addition to the core inspection program, a Maintenance Rule followup inspection will be conducted to evaluate issues identified during the baseline Maintenance Rule inspection.
Engineering performance has been consistent. In general, engineering programs and processes continued to effectively support plant activities and meet requirements. Performance in the design and engineering support functions was mixed with some weaknesses noted during the assessment period. An Architect/Engineer (NE) inspection conducted at the beginning of the assessment period identified a number of design control problems. Inspection findings indicated examples of a willingness to accept degraded equipment performance.
Consequently, there is a need for focus on problem resolution. In addition to the core inspection program, a followup inspection is planned to address the remaining.NE inspection issues. A regional initiative engineering inspection is planned to focus on modifications and engineering resolution of degraded equipment. A safety issue inspection utilizing temporary instruction (Tl) 2515/139, "Inspection of Licensee's Implementation of Generic Letter 96-01 Testing of Safety Related Logic Circuits" is planned.
While insights were unavailable for some aspects of plant support due to the limited number of
- inspections *conducted in these areas during the assessment period, overall plant support performance in the areas reviewed was consistent and requirements were met. Plant support core inspections are planned. Evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise is planned as part of the core program. Based upon outstanding fire protection issues arising from your recent multi-utility Fire Protection Fu~ctional Inspection (FPFI) self-assessment, a follow up regional initiative fire protection inspection is planned. contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRG and Virginia Electric & Power Company. The NRG does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, the NRG only documents issues that the NRG believes warrant management attention or represents noteworthy*aspects of performance.
e 3
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Surry PPR review.
- It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next eight months. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at (404) 562-4550.
Docket Nos. 50-280, 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32, DPR-37
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection* Plan cc w/encls:
J.H.McCarthy,Manager Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Virginia Electric and Power Company 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 E. 8-. Grecheck Site Vice President Surry Power Station Virginia Electric and Power Company 5570 Hog Isl.and Road Surry, VA 23883 W. R. Matthews Site Vice President North Anna Power Station P. 0. Box402 Mineral, VA 23117 cc w/encls: Continued see page 4 Sincerely, Orig signed by Robert C. Haag Robert C. Haag, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
cc w/encls: Continued Chairman Surry County Board of Supervisors P. 0. Box 130 Dendron, VA 23839 Virginia State Corporation Commission Division of Energy Regulation P. 0. Box 1197 Richmond, VA 23209 Donald P. Irwin, Esq.
Hunton and Williams 951 E. Byrd Street Richmond, VA 23219-4074 State Health Commissioner Office of the Commissioner Virginia Department of Health P. 0. Box 2448 Richmond, VA 23218 Attorney General Supreme Court Building 900 East Main Street Richmond, VA 23219 4
Distribution w/encls:
S. Collins, NRA J. Zwolinski, NRA W. Dean, NRA T. Boyce, NRA G. Tracy, EDO G. Edison, NRA H. Berkow, NRA J. Lieberman, OE PU~LIC NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Surry Nuclear Power Station 5850 Hog Island Road Surry, VA 23883 NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1024 Haley Drive Mineral, VA 23117
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DATE TYPE(s)
SEC.SFA 7/25/98 Negative ENG 6/13/98 URI 6/13/98 Strength ENG 6/13/98 Positive 6/13/98 Positive 6/13/98 Positive_
FROM: 3/1/98 TO: 9/1/98 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUES MATRIX by SALP Functional Area SURRY 22-Mar-99 SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE{s)
SMM CODES IR 98-06 IR 98-05 281/98005-01 IR 98-05 IR 98-05 IR 98-05 IR 98-05 SELF Marine fouling of canal level probes which has caused slow instrument response times continues to be an operational concern. The licensee has implemented increased inspections, testing, and cleaning of the probes to ensure operability in the short term and has initiated a root cause evaluation to develop long term corrective actions.
LICENSEE An unresolved item was identified concerning non-conservative power calculations resulting from out of calibration feedwater resistance temperature detectors.
NRC NRC NRC NRC Although not required by regulations, the licensee performs monthly sampling of containment air to determine the hydrogen concentration. The sampling resulted in the identification and correction of a steam leak which had increased the Unit 2 containment hydrogen concentration from non-detectable to 0.72 percent. The containment air sampling program for hydrogen is considered a strength.
The Unit 1 startup was performed in a well controlled manner and in accordance with operating procedures. The operating crew was well focused on tasks throughout the evolution.
Operations demonstrated a good questioning attitude by identifying that normally closed containment isolation sample valves were leaking into a sample sink.
Declaring the containment isolation valves inoperable, securing the leak path from containment by closing manual valves and calculating the contribution to the total containment leakage adequately addressed the leakage through both containment isolation valves.
The licensee's sensitivity to a minor increase (approximate 0.20 gpm) in reactor coolant system leakage was noteworthy. The source of increased leakage was promptly identified as a non-isolable leak in the C reactor coolant pump seal injection line. Technical Specification requirements were complied with by placing Unit 1 in cold shutdown.
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ODD 1 2 3 4 5 121DDD 121 181DDD b ODD Page 1 of 10 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE C D Last Updated: 7/25/98
SURRY 22-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC.SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 5/2/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC
- The Unit 1 manual Auxiliary Feedwater System isolation valves inside containment 1 2 3 4 5 were properly aligned for normal operation and were properly identified.
A 181DDD D B DODOO C D D.D D 5/2/98 Negative IR 98-04 SELF The licensee performed an inadequate tagout on the bearing cooling water system 1 2 3 4 5 which demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to the tagout process. Based on this event and previous problems the inspectors are concerned with the declin.ing performance A 1810181D D by some operations department personnel in regards to the tagout process and DODOO -
configuration control.
B C D DOD 5/2/98 Positive ENG IR 98-04 NRC The licensee's actions related to spent fuel storage pool issues were in accordance 1 2 3 4 5 with commitments made to the NRC. The inspectors verified that a change to the pool high temperature alarm and operational procedural enhancements have been A DDDDD made. The one remaining commitment, providing emergency power to the spent DODD D fuel pool cooling pumps, was scheduled for completion by the end of February B
1999.
C D D 181 181 5/2/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC Unit 1 startup activities were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures 1 2 3 4 5 in a thorough and controlled manner. The operating crew exhibited good communications during the startup activities and distractions in the control room A l81Dl81DD were minimized DODOO B
C D 181 DD 5/2/98 VIO IR 98-04, VIO 98004-02 NRC A violation was identified concerning an inadequate operating procedure revision 1 2 3 4 5 which failed to properly adjust the steam generator power operated relief valve setpoints. The failure to identify the procedure inadequacy prior to and while A DDl81DD performing the procedure demonstrated a lack of attention to detail on the part of the DODD De operator, other members*of the operating crew involved with the setpoint change, B
and the procedure writers.
C D 121DD 5/2/98 Positive ENG IR 98-04
- NRC Licensee actions with respect to a residual heat removal system through-wall flaw 1 2 3 4 5 demonstrated a good safety perspective and conservative decision making.
Technical Specification requirements concerning decay heat removal loops were A 0181DD 181 met. The decision to remove the flaw intact to try to determine the root cause was Di:JDD D appropriate.
B C D DD 121 3/21/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-03 NRC The licensee's deficiency.identification and reporting and corrective action programs 1 2 3 4 5
.were effectively identifying issue~. and recommending and implementing appropriate corrective action. There were approximately 45 overdue responses to A DODD 181 deviation reports with the majority being assigned to engineering. The licensee has DDDl81 D initiated action to resolve this backlog. Licensee self-assessment effectively B
evaluated the corrective action program.
C D DD 181 FROM: 3/1/98 TO: 9/1/98 Page 2 of 10 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 7/25/98
SURRY 22-Mar-99 DATE TVPE(s)
SEC.SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 3/21/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-03 NRC The licensee's oversight process was effective in identifying programmatic 1 2 3 4 5 problems. With the exception of an audit finding that was not clearly characterized, the reviewed audits exhibited good self assessment techniques and met program A DODD 181 requirements.
DODOO B
C D DD D 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC Observed Unit 1 shutdown activities were conducted in accordance with approved 1 2 3 4 5 procedures. Command and control during unit stabilization at four percent power was good and operators controlled plant parameters well during generator voltage A 181DDD D regulator testing.
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7/25/98 NCV ENG IR 98-06, NCV 98006-01 LICENSEE A non-cited violation was issued for the licensee's failure to perform several 1 2 3 4 5 surveillance tests in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. A number of surveillance tests with a specified frequency of "Each Refueling A DODD 181 Shutdown* were performed with the unit on-line. Subsequent to this finding, a D181DDD Technical Specification amendment was approved to change the specified B
frequency for the tests to once per 18 months. This action closes Unresolved Item C D ODD 97010-04 (opened on 11/15/97).
7/25/98 Positive IR-98-06 NRC The A Reserve Station Service Transformer Load Tap Changer controller relay was 1 2 3 4 5 calibrated in accordance with approved procedures and all test acceptance criteria was met.
A DD181DD B D181DD D C D DOD 7/25/98 Positive ENG IR-98-06 NRC Canal level probe testing was conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
1 2 3 4 5 The control room was expeditiously notified of the unsatisfactory test results.
181-A DD181D B Dl8ID0D C D DOD 7/25/98 Positive IR-98-06 NRC Unit'2 reactor coolant pump undervoltage relay replacement activities were 1 2 3 4 5 conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with procedural requirements.
Reactor protection system testing after the relay replacement was conducted in A DD181DD accordance with approved procedures. No deficiencies were identified.
0181000 B
C D DOD FROM: 3/1/98 TO: 9/1/98 Page 3 of 10 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 7/25/98
SURRY 22-Mar-99 DATE TVPE(s)
SEC.SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 6/13/98 Negative IR 98-05 NRC Reactor coolant system valve 1-RC-6 was replaced in accordance with approved 1 2 3 4 5 procedures. A negative finding was identified, in that, following removal and prior to 001210 D installing the new valve, continuous monitoring of the freeze seal was not provided A
by maintenance personnel. This did not meet station management's expectations DODOO which had been conveyed to maintenance prior to the freeze seal installation.
B C D ODD 6/13/98 Positive IR 98-05.
NRC Unit 2 turbine governor valve maintenance was well coordinated between operations 1 2 3 4 5 and maintenance. The valve was repaired and returned to service expeditiously following Initiation of the work activity.
A 012100 D B 012100 D -!
c *o ODD 5/2/98 NCV IR 98-04, NCV 98004-04 LICENSEE A non-cited violation was identified for application of a higher than specified torque 1 2 3 4 5 for the body to bonnet fasteners on two safety injection check valves._ An incorrect pressure/torque conversion chart for the torquing device was used to apply an A DDl21D D approximate torque valve of 4500 foot-pounds in lieu of the specified 2600 foot-012100 D pounds of torque.
B C D ODD 5/2/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC Surveillance activities for a containment radiation monitor were performed in 1 2 3 4 5
accordance with procedure requirements and the instrumentation and control technicians performing the procedure were knowledgeable of the procedure A 0012100 requirements.
0018100 B
C D DOD 5/2/98 Positive
. IR 98-04 NRC Emergency Diesel Generator Number 3 alarm relay replacement activities were 1 2 3 4 5 accomplished in accordance with the work package instructions. The electricians performing the work were knowledgeable of how to. perform the activities. The A 0121121D 0 tagout for the work was acceptable.
00121[] oe B
C D DD D 5/2/98 NCV IR 98-04, NCV 98004-03 LICENSEE A non-cited violation was identified concerning maintenance personnel failing to 1 2 3 4 5 verify that they were working on the proper component before starting preventive maintenance activities. As a result, work to be performed on the B charging pump A 001210 D normal suction valve was performed on the pump's normal discharge-valve.
DODOO Identification and corrective actions for this matter were prompt and thorough.
B C D ODD 3/21/98 NCV IR 98-03, NCV 98-003-.
LICENSEE A Non-Cited Violation was identified for failure to obtain valid vibration data during an 1 2 3 4 5 01, LEA 98-001 auxiliary feedwater pump surveillance test. Faulty test equipment resulted in the Technical Specification Violation.
A DDl21D D B 01211210 D C D DOD FROM: 3/1/98 TO: 9/1/98 Page 4 of 10 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 7/25/98
SURRY 22-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC.SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMMCODES 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump testing was performed in accordance with approved procedures, and the pump met all acceptance criteria prior to return to 1 2 3 4 5 service. The pre-job briefing was thorough.
A DD~DD B DODOO C D [ID D 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC Uninterruptible power supply 1 B-2 maintenance activities were performed in 1 2 3 4 5 accordance with approved procedures, and the technicians performing the work activities were knowledgeable and used good electrical work practices.
A DD~DD B oo~ooe C D DD D 7/25/98 Positive IR-98-06 NRC Temporary Modifications (TMs) for installing a mechanical jumper to a reactor 1 2* 3 4 5*
coolant pump oil system and an electric jumper to the reactor protection system were reviewed. Both TMs provided adequate safety evaluations and work A DODOO instructions to implement the TMs.
DODOO B
C D D~D 6/13/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The safety evaluation assessments of two modifications were thorough. The use of 1 2 3 4 5 mock-ups for training of personnel on modification installation and system operation was an excellent practice.
A DDDDD B 00012:10 C D D~D 6/13/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Modification procedures and guidelines provided an effective process for 1 2 3 4 5 modification implementation. Updated drawings were placed in the control room, the DODD oe document control system, the Technical Support Center, and the Simulator Control A
Room before modified systems were placed in operation. The drawing change process included a second verification to ensure drawings were updated prior to a B DODOO modified system being declared operable.
C D D~D 5/2/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC Safety Evaluation 98-0040 and Engineering Transmittal 98-0058 adequately justified 1 2 3 4 5
a temporary modification to plug a leaking reactor coolant pump thermowell.
A DI8JDD D B DDD~D C D DOD 3/27/98 Negative ENG IR 98-201 LICENSEE A weakness in design control regarding the intake canal level instrumentation 1 2 3 4 5 existed where instrument uncertainties were not accounted for in the setpoints and
- Tech Spec and non-conservative use of water temperature in determining instrument A DDD~D uncertainty. The instrument safety limit is 23' and the TS setpoint is 23'6". The.
DODOO calculated instrument uncertainty was 6.49'. Based on a licensee review of B
calibration data no immediate operability concern existed.
C D ODD FROM: 3/1/98 TO: 9/1/98 Page 5 of 10 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 7/25/98
DATE TYPE(s)
SEC.SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd 3/27/98 Negative ENG IR 98-201 NRC 3/27/98 URI ENG IR 98-201/URI 98201-09, NRC IR 98-07 3/27/98 URI ENG IR 98-201/URI 98201-08, NRC IR 98-07 FROM: 3/1/98 TO: 9/1/98 Page 6 of 10 SURRY ISSUE(s)
The licensee did not have a robust amount of electrical calculations to support the AC and DC system design basis. The following documents were unavailable during the design inspection: cable ampacity calculation to verify cable sizing; calculations to demonstrate that the penetration circuits were within design limits; evaluations to show the adequacy of breaker-to-breaker or breaker-to-fuse coordinations; analysis which justified the sizing of the DC penetrations; analysis which examined the fault currents to the DC components and their distribution circuitry; and analysis which showed that the DC voltage at the component level was adequate to operate the devices.
The design inspection team identified concerns with licensee's practice of connecting the DC busses with both batteries still tied to the busses. This alignment had not been analyzed nor was it reflected in the present version of the UFSAR. The determination of whether shutting the DC tie breaker with both batteries connected to the DC busses constitutes a potential Unreviewed Safety question.
Update From IR 98-07, 9/5/98:
In the response to the design inspection report (98-201) the licensee committed to perform an evaluation to determine whether modifications were required to comply with Safety Guide 6. The licensee also committed to develop design change packages to support implementation by the end of Unit 2 2000 RFO and by the end of Unit 1 2001 RFO. The inspectors verified that this item had been incorporated in the licensee's commitment tracking system and CTS No. 4262 had been assigned for monitoring closure of all corrective actions. However, final disposition of this manner is pending evaluation of the USO.
The design of the emergency diesel generator (EOG) battery transfer which provided the ability to transfer DC power between EOG 1, 2, and 3 was not supported by the existing design bases or the UFSAR. The design of the EDG battery transfer-scheme was weak in that it could potentially lead to common mode failure of the EDGs associated with one unit. The determination of whether the design of the EOG transfer switch constitutes a potential Unreviewed Safety question.
Update From IR 98-07, 9/5/98:
In the response to the design inspection report (98-201) the licensee stated the switch has been disabled by locking them in the 'open* position. A Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) has been su~mitted for preparation of a design change package to either physically remove or physically secure the throw over switches to prevent their use in the future. Although these corrective actions were adequate to address the issue, the URI will remain open pending review by the NRC to determine whether an unreviewed safety question was involved during past operation.
22-Mar-99 SMM CODES 1 2 3 4 5 A DODD D e DDD!El D cD DIEJD A
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DATE TYPE(s) 3/27/98 Licensing 3/27/98 Negative 3/27/98 URI FROM: 3/1/98 TO: 9/1/98 SEC.SFA ENG ENG ENG SOURCE(s)
IR 98-201/IFI 98201-01, IR 98-07 IR 98-201/IFI 98201s2ci, IR 98-07 ID'd NRC NRC IR 98-201/URI 98201-03, NRC IR 98-07 Page 7 of 10 SURRY ISSUE(s)
The design inspection team had concerns with the use of containment over pressure to satisfy net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for the Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) and Recirc Spray (RS) pumps. Although team found that VEPCO had always credited the use of containment overpressure in determining the available NPSH for the LHSI pumps, based on the small amount of NPSH margin available and the potential negative impact of unqualified coatings in containment an IFI has been opened.
Update From IR 98-07, 9/5/98:
The NRC is reviewing information on this issue supplied by the licensee in response to the design inspection report (IR 98-201), in response to generic letter 97-04,
'Assurance of Sufficient Containment Heat Removal," and in response to a request for additional information.
The design inspection team identified concerns with the effect on the net positive suction head (NPSH) for the Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) and recirculation spray pumps because of unqualified coating on the reactor coolant pump (RCP) motors. Licensee's preliminary review indicated that the sump blockage from the RCP motor coatings would not result in operability concern for the. LHSI and the RS pumps. Because there maybe additional unqualified coatings inside containment that could delaminate and migrate to the containment sump screens, additional analysis is necessary to ensure adequate NPSH for the LHSI and the Recirc Spray (RS) pumps. IFI 50-280/98201-20 has been opened to track this issue.
Update From IR 98-07, 9/5/98:
In their response to the design inspection report (IR 98-201), the licensee outlined their program for resolving the issue of whether debris from unqualified coatings and other debris could clog the containment sump screens. The licensee presented a detailed program flow chart which depicted 22 specific activities arranged in three phases. The inspectors concluded that implementation of the coatings/debris program should resolve this issue. IFI 98201-20 was closed in IR 98-07, Section E8.22.
A safety injection (SI) system design deficiency could result in potential dead heading of the low head safety injection (LHSI) pumps. The SI systems for both units were susceptible to the pump-to-pump interaction, although only 2SI-P-1A was found to be operating near dead head conditions.
Update From IR 98-07, 9/5/98:
The licensee in their response letter to the design inspection (IR 98-201) committed to implement a plant modification during the 1999 Refueling Outage (RFO) for Unit 2 and the 2000 RFO for Unit 1 in order to resolve this issue. The licensee also committed to review their response to NRC IEB 88-04, 'POTENTIAL SAFETY-RELATED PUMP LOSS,' to ensure that there are no other invalid assumptions regarding pumps that are susceptible to potentially harmful interactions. The review will be completed by October 1, 1998, and a revised response submitted if necessary. The URI remains open pending evaluation of other potential design basis issues.
2.2-Mar-99 SMM CODES 1 2 3 4 5 A DDD121D B DDD1210 c D DD D 1 2 3 4 5 A D1210121 D e DDD121 D c D DD D 1 2 3 4 5 A DDD121 D B DDD121 D c D DD D e
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SURRY 22-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC.SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMMCODES 3/27/98 Positive ENG IR 98-201 NRC The design inspection team found that safety injection (SI) system, the recirculation 1 2 3 4 5 spray (RS) system, and their support-interface systems were capable of performing their design-basis safety functions. Adequate AC and DC power supply systems A 01810181 D were available for both normal and accident conditions.
DODOO B
C D DOD 3/21/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-03 NRC The engineering self-assessment program was comprehensive with good procedural 1 2 3 4
- 5.
controls. Audit reviews revealed a good ability to perform audits, be self-critical and address concerns with timely corrective actions. The environmental qualification A DODD 181 area seal-assessment was well performed.
DD.DD De B
C D D 181 D 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC The licensee's plans and procedures for the installation of a freeze seal on a 12-inch 1 2 3 4 5 safety injection accumulator discharge line were thorough. Adequate contingencies were implemented prior to the placement of the freeze seal.
A DODOO B 01810181 D C D D 181 D l!fAN.
7/25/98 Negative MAINT IR 98-06 NRC The inverter to the security uninterruptible power system has been out of service 1 2 3 4 5 since February 1998. The removal from service was prompted by the fact that the inverter continued to experience failures. The licensee plans to install a new inverter A D18100 D by the end of December 1998. In the event primary power is lost to security DODOO essential loads, compensatory measures have been incorporated in the Operating B
Procedure.
C D DOD 7/25/98 Positive MAINT IR-98-06 NRC The personnel search equipment, and perimeter intrusion detection and assessment 1 2 3 4 5 aids functiqned in compliance with Physical Security Plan and implementing D~DD oe procedures. The licensee employed appropriate compensatory measures when A
security equipment failed or its performance was impaired.
DODOO B
C 181 ODD 7/25/98 Positive IR-98-06 NRC Based on a review of 12 instrumentation preventive maintenance inspection records 1 2 3 4 5
for security-related equipment and observations of seven-day tests of the detection and assessment aids at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI),
A 012100 D site perimeter intrusion detection equipment, and access f\\earch equipment, the 018100 D inspector concluded that the licensee's security testing and maintenance program B
adequat~ly ensured the reliability of the security equipment and devices.
C 181 DOD 7/25/98 Strength IR-98-06 NRC.
The licensee's alarm stations, communications, and personnel and package access 1 2 3 4 5
. control to the protected and vital areas met the criteria of the Physical Security Plan and appropriate security procedures. The personnel access control program was A DODOO considered a strength in the security program.
DODOO B
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SURRY 22-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC.SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMMCODES 3/21/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-03 NRC The licensee has complied with the program requirements for conducting audits of 1 2 3 4 5 radiological protection and chemistry activities. Extensive documentation of supporting details fqr the audit conclusions was provided. The audits were of A DODD 181 sufficient scope and depth to identify potential problems. Corrective actions were DODOO documented and tracked for completion.
B C 121 DOD 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC The licensee has effectively implemented the radiological environmental monitoring 1 2 3 4 5 program. The sampling, analytical and reporting program requirements were met and the sampling equipment was being well maintained.
A DDDDD B DODD o9 C 121 DD D 3/21/98 Positive JR 98-03 NRC The licensee has maintained an effective program for the control of liquid and 1 2 3 4 5 gaseous radioactive effluents from the plant. The radiation doses resulting from those releases were a sm_all percent of regulatory limits.
A DDDDD B DODOO C 121 DOD 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC The licensee closely monitored annual and outage collective dose and was generally 1 2 3 4 5 very successful in meeting established as low as is reasonably achievable goals.
Maximum individual radiation exposures were controlled to levels which were well A DODOO within the licensee's administrative limits and the regulatory limits for occupational DODOO does specified in 10 CFR 20.120(a).
B C 181 DOD FROM: 3/1/98 TO: 9/1/98 Page 9 of 10 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 7/25/98
SURRY 22-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC.SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMMCODES SMM Template Codes:
1A 1B 1C 2A 28 3A 38 3C 4A 48 4C SA SB SC OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Normal Operations OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Operations During Transients OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Programs and Processes MATERIAL CONDITION - Equipment Condition MATERIAL CONDITION - Programs and Processes HUMAN PERFORMANCE - Work Performance HUMAN PERFORMANCE - KSA HUMAN PERFORMANCE-Work Environment ENGINEERING/DESIGN - Design ENGINEERING/DESIGN - Engineering Support ENGINEERING/DESIGN -
Programs and Processes PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Identification PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Analysis PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION-Resolution SALP Functional Areas:
ENG
. MAINT OPS PLTSU
, SAQV ENGINEERING MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS PLANT SUPPORT SAFETY ASSESSMENT & av ID Code:
LICENSEE NRC SELF LICENSEE NRC SELF-REVEALED EEis are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for
- NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEis and the PIM.
entries may be modified when the final decisions are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation.
However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
FROM: 3/1/98 TO: 9/1/98 Page 10 of 10 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 7/25/98 e
Page: 1 of9 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Date: 03/22/1999 Time: 09:16:11 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX SURRY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 01/16/1999 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: SC A negative observation was identified In that the licensee did not expeditiously address a low pressure alarm Sec:
Sec: 2A on a spent fuel cask. Subsequent licensee actions demonstrated that cask integrity was Intact ahd adequately returned the alarm function to service.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 1B Unit l plant response following a reactor trip and inadvertent safety injection was satisfactory. The control Sec:
Sec: 3A room operators correctly terminated the safety injection and stabilized th~ plant at hot shutdown.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 3A Licensee actions to repair the Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator excitation cabinet following an a Sec:
Sec:4B electrical fault were thorough and conducted In a methodical manner.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009 Prl: OPS NRC POS Pri: 4C The licensee successfully provided service water to the component cooling water heat exchangers via a Sec:
Sec: lA jumper during the Unit l, cycle 15 refueling outage. All of the requirements specified in Technical
- Specification Amendment 216 were met.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 3A Poor communications resulted in operations personnel not initially understanding that the oxygen Sec: MAINT Sec: 2A concentration In the A waste gas decay tank exceeded 4 percent. As a result, entry into the applicable technical specification (TS) action statement was not recognized, however, actual steps taken by the
- Ter: SB operator satisfied the TS requirements. An Inoperable oxygen analyzer that had not been repaired for three days contributed to the waste gas decay tank high oxygen concentration.
12/05/1998 1998009 Prl: OPS NRC POS Pri: lB A retaining clip failure in the B steam generator main feedwater regulating valve positioner resulted in the Sec: MAINT Sec: 2A valve failing shut and a loss of feedwater to the B steam generator. Operator.action to manually trip the reactor was appropriate and the unit was stabilized at hot shutdown.
Ter:
e 12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 2A The licensee's preparation of the Unit l containment prior to restart from the-refueling outage was Sec: MAINT Sec:
satisfactory.
Ter:
10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC NEG
- Pri: SC The Inspectors determined that the Component Cooling Water system valve alignment procedure did not Sec:
Sec: lA address all the valves In the system. The licensee issued a deviation report after the inspectors informed management that some of these problems had been identified in June 1997 and no permanent procedure Ter:
change had been initiated.
10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: lA Reactor coolant system draindown activities to flange level were well controlled and_ accomplished in Sec:
Sec: 3A accordance with the procedural requirements.
. Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,Follow(!p,Other), From 07/01/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page: 2of9 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Date: 03/22/1999 Time: 09:16:11 Region II
.PLANT ISSUE MATRIX SURRY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/24/1998 1998008 Prl: OPS NRC POS Prl: lA The shutdown of Unit l for a scheduled refueling outage was well executed. During a problem with an Sec:
Sec: 3A electrical breaker. plant conditions were well managed by the control room operations staff.
Ter: 2A 10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 3A The reactor operator restoration brief for unlnterruptible power supply 2B2 was thorough. Operators Sec:
Sec: lA exhibited a good questioning attitude by asking questions to ensure that requirements were understood and by discussing previous restoration problems. The operators correctly used simultaneous verification. verified Ter:
expected system response and adhered to procedures during the restoration.
10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5A Management Safety Review Committee members exhibited a questioning attitude and utilized open Sec:
Sec:
discussion to effectively identify. assess and recommend solutions to technical issues. The inspectors also verified that a quorum was present.
Ter:
10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Prl: 2A The Inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the Unit l containment following plant shutdown. Overall Sec: MAINT Sec:
condition of the Unit l containment was observed to be very good with minimal leaks noted.
Ter:
10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 2A Portions of the Unit l Component Cooling Water system which support spent fuel pit cooling and residual Sec: MAINT
.Sec: lA heat removal and the Unit 2 Low Head Safety Injection system were properly aligned and material condition of the equipment was good.
Ter:
09/05/1998 1998007 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 28 During review of procedure 2-0P-51.5A. "Charging Pump CC and SW Systems Valve Alignment. the Sec:
Sec:
Inspectors determined the Charging Pump Component Cooling Water surge tank sight glass isolation valves were not verified open by the valve alignment procedure. The licensee revised the procedure to require Ter:
that the valves be verified open.
II 09/05/1998 1998007 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: lA The Unit l Auxiliary Feedwater system was properly aligned for standby operation. The Unit 2 charging pump Sec:
Sec:
component cooling system was properly aligned for normal operation.
Ter:
09/05/1998 1998007 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: lA Licensee actions In preparation for the potential arrival of Hurricane Bonnie were conservative and station Sec:
Sec: lB operation was not Impacted by the storm.
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Pri: 2A The licensee has taken action to resolve a problem with decreasing lube oil temperatures for the Number 2 Sec:
Sec:5B EDG while In a standby condition. However. these actions have not been successful and the licensee has periodically run the diesel to increase lube oil temperatures to the normal level for standby conditions. The Ter:
Inspectors have noted that operating shift personnel have displayed an appropriate level of sensitivity to the lube oil temperature Issue.
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 07/01/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page: 3of9 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Date: 03/22/1999 Time: 09: 16: 11 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX SURRY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type
- . Codes Item Description 01/16/1999 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 2A Low Head Safety Injection system reclrculation flow testing was performed in accordance with approved Sec:
Sec: 3A procedures and all test acceptance criteria were met.
Ter: 28 01/16/1999 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 2A The Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) excitation cabinet inspection was thorough and Sec:
Sec: 3A conducted In accordance with the procedural requirements. No deficiencies were noted during the Inspection. The llcerisee has completed visual Inspections of the EDG excitation cabinets initiated In Tar: SC response to a catastrophic component failure in the Number 3 EDG excitation cabinet.
e 01/16/1999 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3A The lncore flux mapping system was properly used to measure the incore power levels and adequately Sec:
Sec:38 demonstrated that the core power distribution met thermal requirements. The engineers demonstrated detailed knowledge of the operation and limitations of the flux measurement equipment and the effects of.
Tar: 28 the testing on plant operation.
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Pri: 38 Mechanics performing emergency diesel generator injector rack adjustments were knowledgeable of the Sec:
Sec: 3A work activity, however. inconsistencies In the sequencing of procedure steps were noted.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 28 The Inspectors concluded that the licensee's lnservice Inspection, repair and replacement activities were Sec:
Sec:
being conducted In accordance with required fabrication and inspection codes and ~tandards.
Ter:
12/05/1998
- 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 28 An Emergency Diesel Generator Number 1 excitation cabinet Inspection was conducted In accordance Sec:
. sec: 3A with the procedural requirements. No deficiencies were noted during the inspection.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3A Emergency Diesel Generator Number 3 exciter field breaker maintenance activities were accomplished in Sec:
Sec:
accordance with the procedural requirements and the breaker met the acceptance criteria specified in the procedure.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009 Prl: MAINT NRC
- pos Prl: 3A Flow*accelerated corrosion inspections were effectively conducted and evaluated in accordance with Sec:
Sec:
procedures.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009-01 Pri: MAINT NRC VIOIV Pri: 3A Failure to follow procedure requirements during the testing of the control room filtration system. Contrary to Sec:
Sec:
procedural requirements, painting was being conducted near the filtration system Intake during testing.
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 07/01/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page: 4 of9 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Date: 03/22/1999 Time: 09:16:11 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX SURRY*
By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Pri: 58 The licensee's method of returning a safety-related main steam flow transmitter to servic_e, "".'hile ultimately Sec: ENG Sec:48 successful. was unconventional and lacked a thorough technical basis.
Tar:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Pri: 58 Testing of the Unit 1 B charging pump revealed marginal performance with respect to deliverable flow Sec: ENG Sec: 5C during a postulated accident scenario. The licensee had been aware of lower flows on B pump, as compared to the other two charging pumps, yet had not planned or scheduled any maintenance during Tar: 2A the refueling outage to Improve pump performance. As a result of the degraded performance of the pump, the licensee plans to initiate a task team to recomm13nd actions to Improve pump performance.
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 28 Based on the review of the licensee* s steam generator inspection program, and the results of the eddy Sec: ENG Sec:
current Inspections, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's program was acceptable for providing reasonable assurances against steam generator tube ruptures.
Tar:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3A The October 1998 power operated relief valve overhaul was accomplished in accordance with procedures Sec: ENG Sec: 3C by qualified personnel and with the assistance_ of a valve vendor representative.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3A Pipe replacement was accomplished by qualified welders In accordance with qualified welding procedure Sec: ENG Sec: 3C specifications using certified welding filler material and Inspected by qualified quality control inspectors. The licensee continued to implement an effective program to maintain high energy carbon steel piping systems Ter:
within acceptable wall thickness limits.
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 5C. The licensee satisfactorily repaired a leaking reactor coolant pump thermowell with the installation of a Sec: ENG Sec:40 different type (pressure retaining) resistance temperature detector assembly.
Ter:
12/05/1998
- 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Pri: lA The Unit 1 startup from a refueling outage was performed in a well-controlled manner and in accordance Sec: OPS Sec: 2A with operating procedures. Pressurizer power operated relief valve leakage, resulting In closure of the block valve, continued to occur following Unit 1 refueling outages.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009 Prl: MAINT NRC NEG Prl: 2A Emergency diesel generator (EDG) Number 3 testing was conducted in accordance with the procedure Sec: OPS Sec: 5C requirements and the test acceptance criteria was met. During manual loading operations, the governor exhibited erratic behavior In that load would continue to Increase after the operator released the contr<?I Ter:
switch. The licensee accepted this degraded condition and declared the EDG operable. The licensee subsequently replaced the EDG governor to correct the problem.
10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3A Service water strainer maintenance activities were completed in a thorough and professional manner.
Sec:
Sec:38 Maintenance personnel were knowledgeable of the assigned task, procedures were detailed and actively used on the job, and cooperation and coordination between the various plant groups were good.
- Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 07/01/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page: 5of9 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Date: 03/22/1999 Time: 09:16:11 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX SURRY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Dale Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3C Control room leakage testing using the Unit 1 cable tunnel air bottles was performed in accordance with Sec:
Sec:20 procedural requirements and demonstrated the ability to maintain the control room envelope at positive pressure for one hour. Additionally, senior reactor operator oversight was detailed.
Tar:
10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3C Maintenance personnel completed the reactor coolant filter replacement using approved procedures.
Sec:
Sec:28 Appropriate coordination. pre-Job preparation, and supervisory oversight enabled the maintenance crew to successfully replace the filter while giving appropriate consideration to as-low-as-is-reasonably achievable Ter:*3A principles.
The post maintenance testing (PMT) program was effective for its intended function and was implemented e 10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 5A Sec:
Sec:28 properly. The PMT program self-assessment identified valuable recommendations. which were being Implemented. for Improving the program. Deviation reports related to PMT were adequately dispositioned.
Tar: 3A
- Post maintenance tests were performed as stated In work orders.
09/05/1998 1998007 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 28 Unit 2 turbine inlet valve freedom testing was accomplished in accordance with the procedure requirements Sec:
Sec:
and the test results were acceptable.
Tar:
09/05/1998 1998007 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 28 Ventilation damper maintenance activities were properly documented and procedures were present at the Sec:
Sec: 3A job site during work activities.
Tar:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC MISC Pri: 48 For the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). a violation 72-0002/98001-02 of 10 CFR 72.11 was Sec:
Sec: 4C Identified. The license application was not complete. in that. the application did not describe all the components to be stored in the ISFSI casks.
Tar:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC MISC Pri: 48 For the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). a violation with two examples was identified for Sec:
Sec: 4C failure to comply with 1 O CFR 72.48. One example was for failure to perform a written safety evaluation before storing burnable poison rods and thimble plugs in ISFSI casks. The second example was for failure to Tar:
perform adequate safety evaluations. in that. two safety evaluations failed to identify that storing burnable poison rods and thimble plugs In ISFSI casks required a license amendment.
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC MISC Pri:5A
_For the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. a violation 72-0002/98001-01 was identified for storing Sec:
Sec:48 burnable poison rods and thimble plugs in Independent Spent Fuel storage installation cask.
Tar:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: SC The modification to resolve Thermo-lag issues inside the Unit 1 containment was implemented during the Sec:
Sec:
scheduled refueling outage.
Tar:
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 07/01/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page: 6of 9 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Date: 03/22/1999 Time: 09:16:11 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX SURRY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Jtem Description 12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 28 Work scheduling and planning allowed a degraded arcing contact in a safety-related 4160 V circuit breaker Sec: MAINT Sec:
not to be replaced at the earliest opportunity, even thought there were two previous opportunities to do so.
Ter:
12/05/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: SA Based on a review of 65 Potential Problem Reports (PPRs). the Inspectors concluded that the PPR process Sec: OPS Sec: SC met the requirements for timeliness of corrective actions, reporting and resolution of degraded conditions.
The PPR process, which was outside the formal corrective action process. did not appear to bypass or Ter:
degrade the corrective action program.
e 10/24/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 48 An informal process was used to ensure an adequate water thermal barrier was being maintained on the Sec:
Sec: 4C containment side of the safety Injection containment suction gate valves to prevent pressure locking of these valves during an accident. Once the Inspectors Identified this to the licensee, a procedure change Ter: lA was Issued to give specific formal guidance to plant operators. A l O CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed which supported the revision.
09/05/1998 1998007 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prl:4C The Maintenance Rule periodic assessment met the requirements of paragraph (a)(3) of the Mainter:iance Sec:
Sec:
Rule.
Ter:
09/05/1998 1998007 Pri: ENG NRC WK Pri: SB There was a weakness, acknowledged by the licensee, In the area of documenting how significant Sec:
Sec:48 Information such as information notices is disposed when that disposition involves closure without a detailed review by an Operating Experience group reviewer.
Ter:
09/05/1998 1998007-01 Pri: ENG NRC VIOIV Pri: SC A violation was Identified for not correcting design problems, conditions adverse to quality, in a timely Sec:
-Sec: 4A manner. In 1992 the licensee Identified that the setpoint for the overcurrent protection of the inside recirculation spray pump motors could result in spurious tripping upon motor starting, and that there was no Ter: 4C analysis or test to demonstrate that the components in the 125 VDC station Battery Distribution System woule receive rated voltage for all design basis scenarios. However, these conditions were not corrected as of August 1998. This item was previously Identified In IR 98-201.
09/05/1998 1998007-03 Pri: ENG NRC
.URI Pri:4C Failure to submit LER within 30 days. The licensee stated the interpretation that 10 CFR 50.73(a)(l), which Sec:
Sec:
requires that LERs be submitted within 30 days after discovery of the event allows for evaluation time in the case of design basis Issues. Their practice has been to start the 30 day clock upon final determination that Ter:
the condition is in fact reportable.
09/05/1998 98007-00 Pri: ENG NRC NOED Pri:4A Violations of 10 CFR 50.7l(e) for failure to update the UFSAR and 10 CFR 50.59 for the facility not being as Sec:
Sec:
described In UFSAR were Identified. However, the NRC Is exercising discretion and refraining from issuing a Notice of Violation In consideratiq!l of the licensee having a good UFSAR review program in progress. This Ter:
item was previously Identified In IR 98-201.
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 07/01/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page: 7 of 9 Region U SURRY Date 09/05/1998 01/16/1999 01/16/1999 01/16/1999 01/16/1999 01/16/1999 01/16/1999 01/16/1999 01/16/1999 Source 1998007-02 1998010 1998010 1998010 1998010 1998010 1998010 1998010 1998010 Functional Area Pri: ENG Sec: MAINT Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
ID United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Type Codes Item Description Date: 03/22/1999 Time: 09:16:11 Licensee NCV Pri: 58 A Non-Cited Violation was Identified concerning surveillance test control. When in the test alignment, the Emergency Ventilation Filtration System was outside the design basis. The cause of this problem was that the test procedure OPT-ZZ-001 did not adequately control the test in that it did not specify restoring the normal alignment immediately following the test, nor did it initiate an Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) clock when the test alignment was entered.
NRC POS NRC POS NRC POS NRC POS NRC POS NRC POS NRC POS NRC STR Sec: SC Ter:
Pri: lC Sec:
Ter:
Pri: lC Sec:
Ter:
Pri: lC Sec:
Ter:
Pri: lC Sec: 3A Ter: 3C Pri: lC Sec:38 Ter:
Pri: lC Sec: 5A Ter: SC Pri: 38 Sec: lC Ter:
Pri: lC Sec:-3A Ter: 2A The licensee's water chemistry control program for monitoring primary and secondary water quality had been implemented in accordance with the Technical Specification requirements and industry guidelines for PWR water chemistry.
The licensee's contamination control practices were consistent with the requirements of the Radiation Protection Program manual and were effective in minimizing the spread of contamination.
Radiological surveys and controls for work to resolve an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) cask low differential pressure alarm were sufficiently comprehensive to control worker radiation exposure.
The Inspector verified that response capabilities of the security organization to security threats, contingencies, and routine response situations were consistent with the security procedures, the Physical Security Plan and Security Contingency Plan. The total number of trained security officers and armed personnel immediately available to fulfill response requirements met the number specified in the Physical Security Plan.
The licensee effectively implemented a program for transportation of radioactive materials pursuant to Department of Transportation and NRC regulations. Individuals involved In preparing shipments of radioactive materials were adequately trained. The licensee effectively characterized and classified radioactive waste and properly prepared radioactive material for safe transport.
e Audits In the areas of chemistry, radiological controls, and transportation were of sufficient scope and depth to identify potential problems. Corrective actions for identified issues were documented and tracked for completion of warranted follow-up. The licensee complied with the program requirements for conducting audits of those activities.
The Inspector concluded through.observation and Interviews of security force personnel. and reviews of procedures that the security force had the requisite knowledge to cope with the design-basis threat described in 10 CFR 73. l (a) and the Physical Security Plan.
Material. package, and vehicle access controls for items entering the protected and vital areas met the criteria of the current Physical Security Plan and appropriate security procedures. The vehicle barrier system was functional. well maintained, and effective in its intended purpose. The licensee's vehicle barrier system met the Physical Security Plan commitments and regulatory requirements and was considered a strength in the security program.
Item Type {Compliance,Followup,Other), From 07/01/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page: 8 of9 Region II SURRY Date 01/16/1999 10/24/1998 10/24/1998 10/24/1998 09/05/1998 09/05/1998 09/05/1998 09/05/1998 Source 1998010-01 1998008 1998008 1998008 1998007 1998007 1998007 1998007 Functional Area Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Pri: PLTSUP Sec: MAINT Pri: PLTSUP Sec: MAINT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX Date: 03/22/1999 Time: 09:16:11 ID Type Licensee NCV Licensee NEG NRC POS NRC POS NRC
- POS NRC POS NRC POS NRC POS Template Codes Pri: 3A Sec: lC Ter:
Pri: lC Sec:
Ter:
Pri: lC Sec:
Ter:
Pri: lC Sec:
Ter:
Pri: lC Sec:28 Ter:
Pri: lC Sec: 3A Ter: lA
. Pri: lC Sec: 2A Ter: 28 Pri: lC Sec: 2A Ter: 28 By Primary Functional Area Item Description A Non-Cited Violation was identified for the failure to terminate a contractor employee's protected area access after access authorization was no longer required. The station badge coordinator failed to deactivate the contractor's badge and a subsequent verification failed to identify the discrepancy.
Improper pre-staging of some personnel during c:in emergency drill resulted in a failure to demonstrate, by one position, that minimal staffing in the Technical Support Center could be accomplished within the required time frame.
e The licensee was properly monitoring and controlling personnel radiation exposure during the Unit l Refueling Outage and posting area radiological conditions in accordance with l O CFR Part 20. The licensee had implemented an effective shutdown chemistry control plan and closely monitored primary coolant chemistry during the shutdown for the Unit l Refueling Outage.
The overall performance of the emergency response organization during an emergency drill demonstrated the licensee's ability to adequately execute the emergency plan.
The onsite meteorological measurements' program was implemented in accordance with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
Health physics practices were observed to be proper and high radiation doors were found to be In good
- condition and locked.
The licensee was maintaining radioactive effluent monitoring instrumentation in an operable condition and performing the required surveillances to demonstrate their operability.
The licensee was maintaining the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System in an operable condition and performing the required surveillances to demonstrate operability of the systems.
Item Type (Compliahce,Followup,Othar), From 07/01/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page: 9 of 9 Type Codes:
BU Bulletin CDR Construction DEV Deviation EEi Escalated Enforcement Item IFI Inspector follow-up Item LER Licensee Event Report LIC Licensing Issue MISC Miscellaneous MV Minor Violation NCV NonCited Violation NEG Negative NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion NON Notice of Non-Conformance P21 Part 21 POS Positive SGI Safeguard Event Report STR strength URI Unresolved item VIO Violation WK Weakness United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Legend Template Codes:
lA Normal Operations lB Operations During Transients lC Programs and Processes 2A Equipment Condition 28 Programs and Processes 3A Work Performance 38 KSA 3C Work Environment 4A Design 48 Engineering Support 4C Programs and Processes SA Identification 58 Analysis SC Resolution ID Codes:
NRC NRC Self Self-Revealed Licensee Licensee Functional Areas:
OPS Operations MAINT ENG PLTSUP OTHER Maintenance
. Engineering Plant Support Other Date: 03/22/1999 Time: 09:16:11 EEis are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEis and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.
URls are unresolved items about which more Information is required to determine whether the issue In question Is an acceptable item. a deviation.-a nonconformance. or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However. the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues. and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
Item Type {Compliance,Followup,Other), From 07/01/1998 To 01/31/1999
SURRY
- INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED PROCEDURE/
TITLE/PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION -
TEMPORARY DATES COMMENTS INSTRUCTION Tl 2515/139 Inspection of Licensee's 1
March 1999 Safety Issue inspection Implementation of Generic Letter 96-01 Testing of Safety Related Looic Circuits NUREG-1021 Operator Licensing Examiner 3
March-April 1999 Core inspection - Prep and initial Standards/ Initial Examinations
- exams for 14 candidates IP 82701 Operational Status of the 1
April 1999 Core inspection Emergency Preparedness Program IP 83750 Occupational Radiation 2
April 1999 Core inspection Exposure IP 73753 lnservice Inspection 1
April-May 1999 Core inspection (During Unit 2 Refueling Outage): Focus includes Residual Heat Removal e
pipino IP 37001 1 O CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation 1
May 1999 Core inspection Program IP 37550 Engineering 1
May 1999 Regional Initiative: Focus on modifications and degraded eauioment conditions
2 INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED PROCEDURE/
TITLE/PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION -
TEMPORARY DATES COMMENTS INSTRUCTION IP 62707 Maintenance Observations 2
May 1999 Core inspection and Followup inspection for issues identified IP 92902 Followup - Maintenance during the baseline inspection and use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment IP 92903 Followup - Engineering 1
May 1999 Followup inspection for A/E inspection report open items (Inspection Reports98-201 * &
98-07)
IP 92904 Followup - Plant Support 1
May 1999 Regional Initiative: Focus on fire protection issues IP 71001 Licensed Operator 1
August 1999 Core inspection Requalification Program Evaluation IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for 3
August 1999 Core inspection Power Reactors IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives Evaluation of the biennial.
and Scenarios for Power exercise Reactors
3 INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED PROCEDURE/
TITLE/PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION -
TEMPORARY DATES COMMENTS INSTRUCTION IP 84750 Radioactive Waste Treatment, 1
August 1999 Core inspection and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring.
IP 86750 Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials IP 81700 Physical Security Program for 1
September 1999 Core inspection Power Reactors IP 40500 Effectiveness of Licensee 3
To Be Determined Core inspection: Focus on Controls in Identifying, configuration management Resolving, and Preventing PrnhlPm~