ML18152B112
| ML18152B112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1988 |
| From: | Cruden D VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 87-707D, NUDOCS 8809020227 | |
| Download: ML18152B112 (29) | |
Text
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 D.S.CRUDEN VICE PRESIDENT-NUCLEAR August 31, 1988 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS I AND 2 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CONTAINMENT PENTERATION EVALUATION 10 CFR 50.12 Serial No.
NO/ETS:vlh Docket Nos.
License Nos.
87-707D Rl 50-280 50-281 DPR-32 DPR-37 In letters dated February 29 and August 15, 1988, we submitted an evaluation that justified certain penetrations are normally operating and filled with water under accident conditions.
That evaluation provided the basis for not venting or draining these lines during Type A testing and therefore, excluding the Type C 1 eakage results of these penetrations from the over a 11 "as-found" containment leakage rate.
In an August 24-25, 1988, meeting at Surry Power Station, Mr. H. Whitner and Mr. J. Pulsipher of your staff, and members of my staff discussed the technical basis of our penetration evaluation and the applicable system's configuration and operation.
This letter provides the supplemental information requested in attachments 1 and 2.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Thomas Shaub of my staff at (804) 273-2763.
Very truly yours, Penetration Evaluation Station Drawings Ir 8809020227 880831 PDR ADOC~ 05000280 P
PNU i
I
cc:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N. W.
Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. W. E. Holland NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station Mr. Chandu P. Patel NRC Surry Project Manager Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II I
1 ATTACHMENT 1 I. Safety Injection The safety injection system provides for the charging of borated water to the reactor coolant system following a LOCA.
Makeup to the reactor coolant system is provided by the charging pumps, operating in the safety injection mode, and the low-head safety injection pumps.
Both the charging and low-head safety injection pumps are located outside the containment, are driven by an electric motor, are capable of being rapidly energized or operated, and are powered from the emergency power buses.
The pumps also ensure an adequate supply of borated water for an extended period of time by recirculating water from the containment sump to the reactor core through two separate flow paths.
A.
Safety Injection System Component Design
- 1.
Pumps Three safety injection charging pumps, which are used as safety injection system pumps, supply borated water to the reactor coolant system.
The pumps are of the horizontal centrifugal type, driven by electric motors.
Two low-head safety injection pumps also supply water to the reactor coolant system.
Table 1 lists the design parameters for the safety injection charging and low-head safety injection pumps.
The pressure-containing parts of the pumps are castings conforming to ASTM A351 Grade CF.8 or CF8M.
Stainless steel forgings are procured per ASTM Al82 Grade F304 or F316, or ASTM A336, Class F8 or F8M.
Stainless steel plate is constructed to ASTM A240, Type 304 or 316.
The bolting material conforms to ASTM Al93.
Materials such as weld-deposited Stellite or Colmonoy are used at points of close-running clearances in the pumps to prevent galling and to ensure continued performance capability in high-velocity areas subject to erosion.
Pump design is reviewed with special attention to the reliability and maintenance aspects of the working components.
Specific areas include the
2 evaluation of the shaft seal and bearing design to determine that adequate allowances have been made for shaft deflection and clearances between stationary parts.
- 2.
Valves (General)
The parts of valves used in the safety injection system in contact with borated water are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion-resistant material.
The motor operators on the injection line isolation valves are capable of rapid operation.
The valves required for the initiation of safety injection or isolation of the system have remote position indication in the control room.
Leakage constraints are specified for the valves and, where possible, packless diaphragm valves are used (e.g., for instrument valves).
The valves, except those that perform a control function, are provided with backseats that are capable of limiting leakage to less than 1 cm3/hr/in. of stem diameter, assuming no credit is taken for valve packing.
Those valves that are normally open are backseated.
Normally closed globe valves are installed with pressure under the seat to prevent the leakage of recirculated water through the valve stem packing.
Relief valves are totally enclosed.
Modulating control valves that are exposed to normally radioactive fluid are provided with double-packed stuffing boxes and stem leakoff connections that are piped to the vent and drain system.
The check va 1 ves that isolate the safety injection system from the reactor coolant system are installed adjacent to the reactor coolant piping to reduce the probability of a safety injection line rupture causing a LOCA.
- a.
Motor-Operated Valves The pressure-containing parts (body, bonnet, and disks) of the valves employed in the safety injection system are designed according to criteria established by the USAS B16.5 or MSS SP-66 specifications.
The materials of construction for these parts are procured as per ASTM Al82, F316, or A351, Grade CF8M or CFS.
3 The seating design is of the Darling parallel disk design, the Crane flexible wedge design, or the equivalent.
These designs have the feature of releasing the mechanical holding force during the first increment of travel. Thus, the motor operator has to work only against the frictional component of the hydraulic imbalance on the disk and against the packing box friction.
The disks are guided throughout their full travel to prevent chattering and provide ease of gate movement.
The seating surfaces are hard-faced (Stellite No. 6 or equivalent) to prevent galling and reduce wear.
The stem material is ASTM A276, Type 316, condition B, or precipitation-hardened 17-4 PH stainless, procured and heat-treated to Westinghouse specifications.
These materials are selected because of their corrosion resistance, high-tensile properties, and their resistance to surface scoring by the packing.
The valve stuffing box is designed with a lantern ring l eakoff connection with a minimum of a full set of packing below the lantern ring and a maximum of one-half of a set of packing above the lantern ring; a full set of packing is defined as a depth of packing equal to 1.5 times the stem diameter.
The experience with this stuffing box design and the selection of packing and stem materials has been very favorable in both conventional and nuclear power stations.
The motor operator is extremely rugged.
The unit incorporates a hammer-blow feature that allows the motor to impact the disks away from the seat or backseat upon opening or closing.
The hammer-blow feature not only impacts the disk but allows the motor to rapidly attain its operational speed.
For those valves that must function on the safety injection signal, the following requirements apply:
for valves up to and including 8 in., the valve operator completes its cycle from one position to another in 10 sec maximum and, for valves over 8 in., the valve cycling operation occurs at a rate of 49 in./min.
For the other valves in the system, the following requirements apply:
for valves up to and including 8 in., the valve cycling operation occurs at a rate of 12 in./min and, for valves greater than 8 in., the valve operator completes its cycle from one position to another in 120 sec maximum.
-j
\\.j 4
Valves that must function against system pressure are designed so that they function with a pressure drop equal to full system pressure across the valve disk.
- b.
Manual Valves The stainless steel manual globe, gate, and check valves are designed and built in accordance with the requirements outlined in the motor-operated valve description above (Section 2a).
The carbon steel valves are built to conform with USAS B16.5.
The materials of construction of the body, bonnet, and disk conform to the requirements of ASTM AIOS, Grade II; Al81, Grade II; or A216, Grade WCB or wee.
- c. Valve Leakage Limitations Leakage constraints are specified for the valves, and packless diaphragm valves are used where possible (such as for instrument valves).
Normally open valves have backseats that limit leakage to less than I cm3/hr/in. of stem diameter, assuming no credit for packing in the valve.
Normally closed globe valves are installed with pressure under the seat to prevent stem leakage from the more radioactive fluid side of the seat.
Motor-operated valves exposed to recirculation flow are provided with double-packed stuffing boxes and stem leakoff connections, which are piped to the vent and drain system.
The specified leakage across the valve disk required to meet the equipment specification and hydrotest requirements is as follows:
I. Conventional globe valves - 3 cm3/hr/in. of nominal pipe size.
- 2.
Gate valves - 3 cm3/hr/in. of nominal pipe size.
L_
5
- 3. Motor-operated gate valves - 3 cm3/hr/in. of nominal pipe size.
- 4.
Check valves - 3 cm3/hr/in. of nominal pipe size; 10 cm3/hr/in. for 300-lb and 150-lb USA standards.
Leakage from components of the recirculation loop, including valves, is given in Table 2.
- 3.
Pump and Valve Motors Electrical insulation systems for motors outside containment are supplied and tested in accordance with USASI, IEEE, and NEMA standards.
Temperature rise design selection is such that normal long life is achieved even under accident loading conditions.
Motors for the valves inside the containment are designed to withstand containment environment conditions following the LOCA so that the valves can perform the required function during the recovery period.
Containment motors that must operate during and/or after the postulated accident are designed for continuous service in the postaccident containment environment.
Periodic operations of the motors and tests of the insulation ensure that the motors remain in a reliable operating condition.
The only motors of the safety injection system that must operate inside the containment are valve motors.
Although these motors, which are provided only to drive engineered safety features equipment, are normally run only for test, the design loading and temperature rise limits are based on the accident conditions.
Normal design margins are specified for these motors to make sure the expected lifetime includes allowance for the occurrence of accident conditions.
6
- 4.
Electrical Supply The electrical power distribution system for the Surry Power Station provides duplicate systems for emergency components.
Each system is contin-uously energized from the external system grid or from onsite diesel generators.
Each unit has two 4160-V emergency buses to supply safety-related auxiliary loads.
These buses are normally supplied from the reserve station service transformers.
The reserve station service transformers have automatic tap changers, which ensure nearly constant load voltages during long-term grid voltage transients.
Tap changing is activated by a change in output voltage of +/-1.25% for greater than 30 sec, at which time the tap changes in increments of 0.625%/sec for 16 steps.
Emergency bus loads are designed to operate within +/-10% of rated voltage, and the automatic tap changer configuration maintains emergency bus voltage within this range.
The circuit that supplies power to the emergency buses through either switchyard autotransformer is called a "primary source."
In the event that any one or both autotransformer(s) become inoperable, an automatic transfer to an alternate switchyard transformer wi 11 occur. Thus, a primary source is available to both units even if both of the two autotransformers are out of service.
In the event that the alternate switchyard transformer and one auto-transformer are inoperable, the remaining autotransformer may be crosstied by a 34.5-kV bus to the three reserve station transformers.
In addition to the "primary sources," each unit has an additional offsite power source, which is called the "dependable alternate source." This source can be made available in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> by removing a unit from service, disconnecting its main generator from the isolated phase bus, and feeding offsite power through the main step-up transformer and normal station service transformers to the emergency buses.
The main generator can be disconnected from the isolated phase bus within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
As a backup power source for the emergency buses, an onsite, indepen-dent, automatically starting emergency power system is provided.
It supplies power to vital auxiliaries if a normal power source is not available and con-
7 sists of three diesel generators for the two units.
One generator is used exclusively for Unit 1, the second for Unit 2, and the third unit functions as a backup for either Unit 1 or 2.
Each diesel generator has 100% capacity and is connected to independent 4160-V emergency buses.
Each emergency bus provides power to the following operating engineered safeguards equipment:
- 1.
One containment spray pump.
- 2.
One charging pump (high-head safety injection pump).
- 3.
One low-head safety injection pump.
- 4.
One recirculation spray pump inside containment.
- 5.
One recirculation spray pump outside containment.
- 6.
One motor control center for valves, instruments, control air com-presser, fuel-oil pumps, etc.
- 7.
Control area air-conditioning equipment - four air recirculating units, one water chilling unit, one service water pump, and one chilled water circulating pump.
- 8.
One charging pump service water pump for charging pump intermediate seal coolers and lube-oil coolers.
- 9.
One charging pump cooling water pump for charging pump seal coolers.
The safeguards equipment items are duplicated and connected to separate emergency buses.
In the event of an equipment failure on one emergency bus coincident with a diesel-generator failure on the other bus, it is possible to connect both electrical buses to one generator so that the equipment normally powered from one diesel generator could be powered from another diesel generator if required.
The emergency connection would be made under strict administrative control by manual operation of the bus tie breaker.
If the
8 loss of normal power is not accompanied by a loss-of-coolant accident, the safeguards equipment is.not required.
Under this condition, other plant auxiliary equipment, such as a component cooling pump, residual heat removal pump, etc., may be operated manually up to the capacity of the emergency generators.
Instrumentation is provided to indicate diesel-generator loading.
If the safeguards equipment fails to operate automatically, manual opera-tion is possible from the control room or at the switchgear.
The switchgear for each diesel generator is physically and electrically isolated from the switchgear for the other diesel generators.
It should be noted that one charging pump motor can be connected to either emergency bus.
If an operator selects emergency bus H to energize the swing motor, he locks out the alternate circuit breaker connection to emer-gency bus J by means of a contra l switch on the main contra 1 board.
In addition, a breaker mechanism interlock is provided to block closing of the alternate feeder breaker, when the selected breaker is closed.
- 5.
Piping The safety injection system piping in contact with borated water is austenitic stainless steel. Piping joints are welded, except for the flanged connections at the safety injection pumps.
The safety injection charging pump suction piping from the refueling water storage tank is designed for low-pressure losses to meet NPSH requirements of the pumps.
The safety injection high-pressure branch lines are designed for high-pressure losses to limit the flow rate out of the branch line, which may have ruptured at the connection to the reactor cool ant 1 oop.
The system design incorporates the ability to isolate the safety injection charging pumps on separate headers so that full flow from at least one pump is ensured should a branch line break.
9 The p1p1ng is designed to meet the minimum requirements set forth in the USAS 831.1-1955 Code for Pressure Piping, USAS B36.10 and B36.19, ASTM Standards, supplementary standards, and additional quality control measures.
Minimum wall thicknesses are determined by the USASI Code formula found in Section 1 of the USASI Code for Pressure Piping. This minimum thickness is increased to account for the manufacturer's permissible tolerance of -12.5% on the nominal wall and an 8% allowance for bending.
Purchased pipes and fittings have a specified nominal wall thickness that is no less than the sum of that required for pressure containment, pipe bending, mechanical strength, and manufacturing tolerance.
Special attention is directed to the piping configuration at the pumps, with the objective of minimizing pipe-imposed loads at the suction and discharge nozzles.
Piping is supported to accommodate expansion due to temperature changes and hydraulic forces during an accident.
Welds for pipes sized 2.5 in. and larger are butt welded.
Reducing tees are used where the branch size exceeds one-ha 1 f of the header size.
Branch connections of sizes that are equal to or less than one-half of the header size are of a design that conforms to the USASI rules for reinforcement set forth in the USAS B3I. l Code for Pressure Piping.
Bosses for branch connections are attached to the header by means of full-penetration welds.
The length of pipe between the valve pit and the pump suction for the safety injection system is 3 ft. This run of pipe is embedded in concrete.
The pipe employed is 12-in., Schedule 40S, fabricated of ASTM A358, Type 304 material, in accordance with Code for Pressure Piping USAS-B31.l.O, 1955 edition, plus Code Cases N-1 and N-7.
- 6.
Protection Against Dvnamic and Environmental Effects The high-head safety injection lines penetrate the containment adjacent to the auxiliary building.
10 For most of the routing, these lines are outside each reactor coolant loop cubicle and hence are protected from missiles originating within these areas.
Each line penetrates the cubicle wall near the injection point to the reactor cool ant pipe.
In this manner, maxi mum separation, and hence protection, is provided in the coolant loop area.
Coolant loop supports are designed to restrict the motion in one loop due to rupture in another to about 0.1 in., whereas the attached safety injection piping can sustain a 3-in. displacement without exceeding the working stress range.
The analysis assumes that the injection flow to the ruptured loop is spilled on the containment floor.
The hangers, stops, and anchors are designed in accordance with USAS 831.1 Code for Pressure Piping, and ACI 318 Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete.
- 7.
Reliance on Interconnected Systems Though the safety injection system relies on support systems, such as service water, component cooling water and electrical interfaces, the flow of the water via the safety injection pumps during the injection phase is not dependent on any portion of other interconnected systems with the exception of the suction line from the refueling water storage tank.
During the recirculation phase of the accident for small breaks, suction to the safety injection charging pump is provided by the low-head safety injection pumps.
_,I PUMP PARAMETERS Safety Injection Charging Pumps Number of pumps (per unit)
Design pressure, discharge, psig Design pressure, suction, psig Design temperature, °F Design flow rate, gpm Maximum flow rate, gpm Design head, ft Type Low-Head Safety Injection Pumps Number of pumps (per unit)
Type Design pressure, discharge, psig Design temperature, °F Design flow, gpm Design head, ft Maximum flow rate, gpm Table 1 3
2750 250 250 150 600 5800 11 Horizontal centrifugal 2
Vertical centrifugal 300 (150 lb ASA discharge flange) 300 3250 (injection) 225 4200
Table 2
- MAXIM.UM rorENTIAL EXI'ERNAL RECIRCUI.ATION I.OOP IBAKAGE (SAFEI'Y IMJECI'ION SYSTEM ONLY)
Number Leakage to Leakage to of Type of Leakage Control and Unit Atmosphere Waste Disposal Items Units Leakage Rate Used in the Analysis (cc/hr)
Tank ( cc/hr) low-head safety injection 2
Mechanical seal with leakoff -
0 24 pt.mips one drop per min Safety injection charging 3
Mechanical seal with leakoff -
0 36 pumps one drop per min Flanges Gasket - adjusted to zero leakage following any test - 10 drops per min, per flange used in analysis Pump 10 1200 0
Valves, bonnet to body 54 2240 0
(larger than 2 in.)
Valves - steam leakoffs 27 Backseated, double packing 0
108 with leakoff - 1 ccjhr/in.
stem diameter Miscellaneous valves 33 Flanged body packed stem -
396 0
one drop per min used Total 3836 168
13 II.
RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM The recirculation spray system, is designed to provide cooling and depressurization of the containment after any LOCA.
The components, piping, valves, and supports in the spray system are Seismic Category I.
The recirculation spray and containment spray subsystems, operating together, cool and depressurize the containment to subatmospheric pressure in less than 60 min following the design-basis accident.
The spray system is designed to depressurize the containment to subatmospheric pressure with any one of the two containment spray pumps operating and only two of the four recirculation spray pumps operating.
A.
Recirculation Spray System Component Design The spray system is designed, fabricated, inspected, and installed to meet the requirements of the General Design Criteria.
- 1.
Pumps and Valves The spray system pumps and valves are fabricated, welded, and inspected according to the requirements of the applicable portions of the ASME Code, Sections III, VIII and IX.
Materials of construction are stainless steel or equivalent corrosion-resistant materials.
Valve packing and pump seals are selected to minimize or eliminate leakage where necessary. Motor-operated valve operators are selected because their proven superior reliability in past applications ensures reliable valve operation under incident conditions.
The Teflon sleeve and packing of the outside recirculation spray system suction valves have been changed to XOMOX 7.
This change reflects the review performed in accordance with NUREG-0578.
In this review it was found that the valves would be located in a high-radiation area as a result of a LOCA.
The Teflon material is satisfactory to only 1 x 104 rads, whereas the XOMOX 7
- -t 14 material is satisfactory to 8 x 106 rads.
The expected 40-year normal plus postaccident integrated radiation dose in this area is conservatively estimated to be 7 x 106 rads.
The recirculation spray system p1p1ng and equipment are also fabricated of ASTM A358, Type 304 stainless steel, or equivalent.
System operating conditions are 200° to 130°F temperature and 7.6 to 8.2 pH during the long-term postaccident period.
- 2.
Pump and Valve Motors Electrical insulation for motors located outside containment is in accordance with ANSI, IEEE, and NEMA standards, and is tested as required by these standards.
Temperature rise design is such that normal long life is achieved even under accident loading conditions.
Winding insulation has been developed that operates at temperatures well in excess of those calculated to occur under design-basis accident conditions.
This type of insulation is used in motors located inside containment.
The containment motors have been selected to ensure operation during LOCA conditions.
Motor electrical insulation is in accordance with ANSI, IEEE, and NEMA standards.
The motors are tested as required by these standards.
Bearings are antifriction type, silicone grease lubricated.
Bearing loading and high-temperature tests have been performed, and the expected bearing life equals, or exceeds, that specified by the American Federation of Bearing Manufacturers (AFBM).
- 3.
Electrical Supply The electrical power distribution system for the Surry Power Station provides duplicate systems for emergency components.
Each system is contin-uously energized from the external system grid or from onsite diesel generators.
1,,-
15 Each unit has two 4160-V emergency buses to supply safety-related auxiliary loads.
These buses are normally supplied from the reserve station service transformers.
The reserve station service transformers have automatic tap changers, which ensure nearly constant load voltages during long-term grid voltage transients.
Tap changing is activated by a change in output voltage of
+/-1.25% for greater than 30 sec, at which time the tap changes in increments of 0.625%/sec for 16 steps.
Emergency bus loads are designed to operate within
+/-10% of rated voltage, and the automatic tap changer configuration maintains emergency bus voltage within this range.
The circuit that supplies power to the emergency buses through either switchyard autotransformer is called a 11primary source.
11 In the event that any one or both autotransformer(s) become inoperable, an automatic transfer to an alternate switchyard transformer will occur.
Thus, a primary source is available to both units even if both of the two autotransformers are out of service.
In the event that the alternate switchyard transformer and one auto-transformer are inoperable, the remaining autotransformer may be crosstied by a 34.5-kV bus to the three reserve station transformers.
In addition to the 11 primary sources, 11 each unit has an additional offsite power source, which is called the 11dependable alternate source.
11 This source can be made available in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> by removing a unit from service, disconnecting its main generator from the isolated phase bus, and feeding offsite power through the main step-up transformer and normal station service transformers to the emergency buses.
The main generator can be disconnected from the isolated phase bus within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
As a backup power source for the emergency buses, an onsite, indepen-dent, automatically starting emergency power system is provided.
It supplies power to vital auxiliaries if a normal power source is not available and con-sists of three diesel generators for the two units.
One generator is used exclusively for Unit 1, the second for Unit 2, and the third unit functions as a backup for either Unit 1 or 2.
Each diesel generator has 100% capacity and is connected to independent 4160-V emergency buses.
16 Each emergency bus provides power to the following operating engineered safeguards equipment:
- 1.
One containment spray pump.
- 2.
One charging pump (high-head safety injection pump).
- 3.
One low-head safety injection pump.
- 4.
One recirculation spray pump inside containment.
- 5.
One recirculation spray pump outside containment.
- 6.
One motor control center for valves, instruments, control air com-pressor, fuel-oil pumps, etc.
- 7.
Control area air-conditioning equipment - four air recirculating units, one water chilling unit, one service water pump, and one chilled water circulating pump.
- 8.
One charging pump service water pump for charging pump intermediate seal coolers and lube-oil coolers.
- 9.
One charging pump cooling water pump for charging pump seal coolers.
The safeguards equipment items are duplicated and connected to separate emergency buses.
In the event of an equipment failure on one emergency bus coincident with a diesel-generator failure on the other bus, it is possible to connect both electri-cal buses to one generator so that the equipment normally powered from one diesel generator could be powered from another diesel generator if required.
The emergency connection would be made under strict administrative control by manual operation of the bus tie breaker.
If the loss of normal power is not accompanied by a loss-of-coolant accident, the safeguards equipment is not required.
Under -this condition, other plant auxiliary equipment, such as a component cooling pump, residual heat removal pump, etc., may be operated manually up to the capacity of the emergency generators.
Instrumentation is provided to indicate diesel-generator loading.
17 If any safeguard equipment fails to operate automatically, manual opera-tion is possible from the control room or at the switchgear.
The switchgear for each diesel generator is physically and electrically isolated from the switchgear for the other diesel generators.
- 4.
Piping Piping fabrication, installation, and testing are in accordance with the Specification for Power Plant Piping, ANSI B31.l, with supplemental requirements and inspections as necessary for use in nuclear applications.
Pipe routing and supports are such that missiles generated from postulated events or the effects of LOCAs do not impair the operation of spray systems.
The spray system consists of two separate but parallel containment spray headers, each of 100% capacity, and four separate but parallel recirculation spray headers, each of 50% capacity.
Each of the containment spray headers draws water independently from the refueling water storage tank.
The refueling water storage tank is a vertical cylinder
- with a fl at bottom and a dome top, and is secured to a reinforced-concrete foundation.
The refueling water storage tank is fabricated of ASTM A240, Type 304 stainless steel, in accordance with API STD-650.
This standard has been upgraded to provide requirements for welding, welding procedures, welding qualification, weld joint efficiency, and weld inspection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Code.
The length of pipe between the valve pit and the pump suction for the recirculation spray system is 10 ft 6 in.
The pipe employed is 12-in.,
Schedule 40S, fabricated of ASTM A358, Type 304 material, in accordance with Code for Pressure Piping USAS-B31.l.O, 1955 edition, plus Code Cases N-1 and N-7.
'\\.. t References I. Surry UFSAR Revision 7, Section 6.2, Safety Injection System Section 6.3, Consequence - Limiting Safeguards Section 8.5, Emergency Power System 18
/
' III. Penetration Configuration A.
Penetration No. 7:
Function:
High Head SI to Cold Leg Location: Auxiliary Building Elev. 6'9 11 Isolation Valves:
1(2)-SI-150 Ol-SI-MOV-1867C & D 02-SI-MOV-2867C & D Outside Piping:
5'10 11 loop between outside isolation valves and penetration Inside Piping: Approximately 34' loop between penetration and reactor coolant cold legs.
Reference Drawing:
11448-MKS-1106B6 11448-WMKS-1106A4 B.
Penetration No. 15:
Function:
Normal Charging Location:
Auxiliary Building Elev. 11'3 11 Isolation Valves:
1(2)-CH-309 Ol-SI-MOV-1289A 02-SI-MOV-2289A Outside Piping: Approximately 9' loop between outside valve and penetration Inside Piping: Approximately 14'9 11 loop between penetration and regenerative heat exchanger.
Reference Drawings:
11448-MKS-1105Bl0 11448-MKS-1105C2 11448-MKS-1105Cl 19
C.
Penetration No. 21:
Function:
High Head SI to Cold Leg Location: Auxiliary Building Elev. 10'9" Isolation Valves:
Ol-SI-MOV-1842 02-SI-MOV-2842 Outside Piping: Approximately 8' loop between outside valve and penetration 20 Inside Piping: Approximately 35' loop between penetration and reactor coolant cold legs Reference Drawings:
11448-MKS-1106Bl 11448-MKS-1106Al 11448-WMKS-1106A4 D.
Penetration No. 23:
Function:
High Head SI to Hot Legs Location: Auxiliary Bldg. Elev. 6'9" Isolation Valves:
Ol-SI-MOV-1869B 02-SI-MOV-2869B Outside Piping: Approximately 4' loop between isolation valve and penetration Inside Piping: Approximately 34' loop between penetration and reactor coolant hot legs Reference Drawings:
11448-MKS-1106B2 11448-MKS-1106A2 11448-WMKS-1106A3
..)
~
E.
Penetration No. 46:
Function:
Loop Fill to Cold Legs Location: Auxiliary Building Elev. 8'9" Isolation Valves:
Ol-CH-FCV-1160 02-CH-FCV-2160 21 Outside Piping:
5'2" loop between isolation valve and penetration Inside Piping: Approximately 12' loop between penetration and reactor coolant cold legs Reference Drawings:
11548-MKS-CH-18 11548-MKS-CH-60 11448-WMKS-1105B9 11448-WMKS-100A6Z 11448-WMKS-lOOA?Z F.
Penetration No. 60:
Function:
Low Head SI to Hot Legs Location:
Safeguards Valve Pit Elev. 13'9" Isolation Valves:
Ol-SI-MOV-1890A 02-SI-MOV-2890A Outside Piping: Approximately 2' pipe drop between pump discharge and isolation valve.
No pipe drop between isolation valve and penetration.
Inside Piping: Approximately 23' loop between penetration and reactor coolant hot legs.
Reference Drawings:
11448-WMKS-127Cl 11448-WMKS-122Kl 11448-WMKS-122Hl 11448-WMKS-122Jl
I
'I
- G.
Penetration No. 61:
Function:
Low Head SI Pump Discharge to Cold Legs Location:
Safeguards Valve Pit Elev. 15'9" Isolation Valves:
Ol-SI-MOV-1890C 02-SI-MOV-2890C Outside Piping: Approximately 2' loop between isolation valve and penetration Inside Piping: Approximately 12' loop between penetration and reactor coolant cold legs.
Reference Drawings:
11448-WMKS-127C2 11448-WMKS-127J5 11448-WMKS-127Jl 11448-WMKS-127J2 11448-WMKS-127J3 H.
Penetration No. 62:
Function:
LHSI Pump Discharge to Hot Leg Location:
Safeguards Valve Pit Elev. 13'9" Isolation Valves:
Ol-SI-MOV-18908 02-SI-MOV-28908 Outside Piping: Approximately 1'6" loop between isolation valve and penetration.
Inside Piping: Approximately 12' loop between penetration and reactor coolant hot legs.
Reference Drawings:
11448-WMKS-127C2 11448-WMKS-122Kl 11448-WMKS-122Hl 11448-WMKS-122Jl
I. Penetration No. 68, 69:
Function:
LHSI Suction from Containment Sump Location:
Safeguards Valve Pit Elev. -33' Isolation Valves:
Ol-SI-MOV-1860A&B 02-SI-MOV-2860A&B Outside Piping: Approximately 49' loop from penetration to flooded top of pump casing Inside Piping:
Containment Sump top at Elev. -27'7".
Sump is approximately 4' deep Reference Drawings:
11448-WMKS-1106A7 11548-MKS-SI-l-l J.
Penetration No. 113:
Function:
HHSI to Hot Leg Location: Auxiliary Basement Elev. 10'9" Isolation Valves:
1(2)-SI-174 Ol-SI-MOV-1869A 02-SI-MOV-2869A Outside Piping: Approximately 9' loop between penetration to isolation valve 23 Inside Piping: Approximately 34' loop between penetration and reactor coolant hot legs Reference Drawings:
11448-MKS-110685-l 11448-WMKS-ll06A3 11448-WMKS-1106A2
K. Penetration No. 66, 67:
Function: Outside Recirculation Spray Suction Location:
Safeguards Valve Pit Elev. -33' Isolation Valves:
01-RS-MOV-155A&B 02-RS-MOV-255A&B Outside Piping: Approximately 3 ft. loop from isolation valve to penetration 24 Inside Piping: Containment Sump top at approximately -27'7'.
Sump depth is approximately 4 ft.
Reference Drawings:
11448-WMKS-llOlAS
_ _J
25
. ')"
IV.
Conclusions Surry Units I & 2 perform the Type 'A' CILRT as required by 10CFR50, Appendix J via the implementation of Periodic Test No. l/2-PT-16.3.
Types 'B'
& 'C' Tests are performed as initial conditions in each case for the Type 'A' CILRT.
Containment pipe penetrat i ans for which Type 'C' Leakage Testing is performed but for which no leakage penalty is required to be applied to the total leakage determined by the Type 'A' CILRT are identified in the individual system discussions above.
The reasons why a Type 'C' Leakage penalty is not required to be applied are:
- 1.
The system penetration has pressurized water flowing through it during the design basis accident, and/or
- 2.
The system penetration is pressurized by system status outside containment, and system pipe configuration inside containment provides a water-filled loop seal.
Type 'C' Leakge Testing is performed for each penetration by the makeup method in the accident direction.
Each penetration leakage (packing, seat) will be quantified and corr~cted prior to the "As Left" Test.
Surry Unit I and Unit 2 are each designed with accident mitigating systems which insure containment will be cooled and depressurized to subatmospheric pressure in less than 60 minutes following the design-basis accident.
After the first hour of the design basis accident, penetration leakage is only directed into containment as long as recirculation subsystems maintain a subatmospheric pressure condition.
The combination of identified water-filled pipe penetrations and the subatmospheri c containment design support maintenance of IOCFRIOO rel ease limits following a design basis accident.
Type 'A' CILRT verification should reflect containment status under accident.
The identified water-filled pipe penetrations do not contribute to containment leakage post-accident and therefore, should not require a leakage penalty to Type 'A' CILRT.
~ -
.,J' v*
ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of 2 Penetration/Piping Drawing Index Pen#
System/Valve No.
Drawing No.
7 1(2)-Sl-150 11448-MKS-110686-1 01-S1-MOV-1867C&D 11448-WMKS-1106A4 02-S1-MOV-2867C&D 15 1(2)-CH-309 11448-MKS-1105810-1 01-CH-MOV-1289A 11448-MKS-1105C2-1 02-CH-MOV-2289A 11448-MKS-1105Cl-1 21 01-SI-MOV-1842 11448-MKS-110681-1 02-SI-MOV-2842 11448-MKS-1106Al-1 11448-MKS-1106A4 23 01-SI-MOV-18698 11448-MKS-110682-1 02-SI-MOV-28698 11448-MKS-1106A2-1 11448-WMKS-1106A3 46 Ol-CH-FCV-1160 11548-MKS-CH-18-1 02-CH-FCV-2160 11548-MKS-CH-60-1 11448-WMKS-110589 11448-WMKS-100A6Z 11448-WMKS-lOOA?Z 60 Ol-S1-MOV-1890A 11448-WMKS-127Cl 02-S1-MOV-2890A 11448-WMKS-122Kl 11448-WMKS-122Hl 11448-WMKS-122Jl 61 Ol-S1-MOV-1890C 11448-WMKS-127C2 02-S1-MOV-2890C 11448-WMKS-127J5 11448-WMKS-127Jl 11448-WMKS-127J2 11448-WMKS-127J3
\\ii' ATTACHMENT 2 Page 2 of 2
.f '".,,-*
Penetration/Piping Drawing Index (cont.)
Pen#
System/Valve No.
Drawing No.
62 Ol-SI-MOV-1890B 11448-WMKS-127C2 02-SI-MOV-2890B 11448-WMKS-122Kl 11448-WMKS-122Hl 11448-WMKS-122Jl 68,69 01-SI-MOV-1860A&B 11448-WMKS-1106A7 02-SI-MOV-2860A&B 11548-MKS-Sl-l-l 113 01(2)-SI-174 11448-MKS-1106B5-l Ol-SI-MOV-1869A 11448-WMKS-1106A3 02-SI-MOV-2869A 11448-WMKS-1106A2 66,67 Ol-RS-MOV-155A&B 11448-WMKS-IIOIAS 02-RS-MOV-255A&B N/A Reactor Coolant 11548-FM-86A N/A Chemical & Volume Control 11548-FM-88B (HHSI) 11548-FM-88C N/A Safety Injection 11548-FM-89A 11548-FM-89B