ML18152A460
| ML18152A460 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1994 |
| From: | Barr K, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A461 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-94-22, 50-281-94-22, NUDOCS 9409270092 | |
| Download: ML18152A460 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1994022
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
. SEP O ,B 1994_
Report Nos.:
50-280/94-22 and 50-281/94-22
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA 23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry Power Station
Inspection Conducted:
August 8-12, 1994
Inspector:
a. #~
Approved b:: G~~
K. Barr,
Emergency Preparedness Section
Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
oC,-07-~4
Date Signe
~~-
K s1g'ne
Branch
This routine, announced inspection was conducted to assess the operational
readiness of the site emergency preparedness program in the following areas:
training, key program changes (organizational, facility, equipment, etc.),
independent audits, maintenance of emergency response equipment and
facilities, Emergency Plan activations, and management control system for
drills and exercises.
Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. However,
two areas were discussed with the licensee for follow-up actions:
0
Develop and implement strategies to improve the proficiency of dose
assessment personnel (on-shift Rad Assessment Directors and Dose
Assessment Team members) with the use of the Meteorological Information
and Dose Assessment System known as "MIDAS" (Paragraph 5).
~
Corrective actions to prevent a loss of the State/local ring-down phone
system (lnsta-phone) and/or capability to notify authorities within
15 minutes of an event (Paragraph 2) .
9409270092 940908
ADOCK 05000280
Positive aspects (strengths) of the licensee's program included:
Independent audits, event assessments, and critiques were generally
effective in the identification of issues and items requiring corrective
actions and resolutions.
0
Effective management control of the emergency planning program.
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
G. Belongia, Instructor, Radiation Protection
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
P. Blount, Health Physicist
- A. Brown, Supervisor, Operations Training
- J. Collins, Director, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Corporate)
- J. Costello, Station Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- R. Kulp, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- H. McCallum, Supervisor, Operations Training
- H. Moore, Shift Supervisor
T. Ragland, Health Physics Shift Supervisor
M. Small, Assistant Shift Supervisor
- S. Wood, Senior Instructor, Nuclear Training
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
engineers, security force members, technicians, and administrative
personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- D. Tamai, NRC Intern
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Abbreviations used throughout this report are listed in the last
paragraph.
2.
Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (82701)
This area was inspected to determine whether significant changes were
made to the licensee's emergency preparedness program since the last
inspection of this area (June 1993), to assess the impact of any such
changes on the overall state of emergency preparedness at the facility,
and verify that such changes were approved and distributed in accordance
with licensee procedures and NRC requirements.
Requirements applicable
to this area are found in 10 CFR 50.4?(b)(l6), 10 CFR 50.54(q),
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and the licensee's Emergency Plan.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's system for making changes to the
Through selective review of applicable documents,
the inspector confirmed that licensee management approved revisions to
the SEP and EPIPs, as required.
Copies of the SEP and selective EPIPs
were examined at the TSC and LEOF, and were found to be current
revisions. The inspector reviewed licensee letters transmitting EPIP
2 .
revisions to the NRC for the period June 1993 through July 1994.
The
records disclosed that each of the EPIP revisions during that period had
been transmitted to the NRC within 30 days of the implementation date,
as required.
The version of the SEP in effect at the time of the current inspection
was Revision 36. Since the aforementioned June 1993 inspection, the NRC
had completed formal licensing reviews of Revisions 35 and 36.
By
letter dated August 16, 1993, the NRC approved changes incorporated as
Revision 35.
Regarding Revision 36 to the SEP, minor discrepancies were
noted and discussed in a NRC letter to the licensee dated May 27, 1994.
During this inspection, the inspector did not review the licensee's
actions in resolving the discrepancies in that the resolution of these
items would be addressed during the next Plan revision review process.
Changes to the EPIPs and Revision 36 of the SEP were primarily
associated with the implementation of the revised federal guidance
promulgated in EPA 400-R-92-001 (Manual of Protective Action Guides and
Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents) and 10 CFR Part 20.
EPIP-3.03
entitl.ed "Activation of Operational Support Center," was revised to
reflect an organizational change involving the relocation of emergency
maintenance personnel previously located in the TSC to the OSC.
The
inspector's review of these and other selected EPIP changes disclosed
none that decreased the effectiveness of the licensee's emergency
preparedness program or response capability.
The licensee's implementation of EPA-400 resulted in changes to the
dose assessment default values for both the automated (MIDAS) and manual
methods of dose projection. Consequently, the inspector requested for
review documentation to show that the licensee had performed a
validation and verification of MIDAS following the EPA-400 upgrade.
In
response, the licensee provided the following documentation for review:
MIDAS EPA-400 upgrade "Site Acceptance Test;" MIDAS site testing
summary; summary document detailing the results of a comparison between
the manual and MIDAS default values; and a document comparing MIDAS/EPA-
400 to NRC RASCAL Program (Version 2.0) and detailing the differences.
The inspector determined that based on the beforementioned
documentation, the licensee's performance in this area was effective in
the implementation of the revised codes.
The inspector requested from the licensee contact documentation for
declared emergencies and Plan implementations during_the period
June 1993 - August 1994.
According to documentation, three event
declarations occurred: August 17, 1993, August 21, 1993, and August 31,
1993.
All three events were declared as NOUEs.
8/17 /93
Event Time
0635
Event Summary
Meteorological instrumentation lost due to
an electrical service disruption
(Condition 9, Tab A, EPIP-1.01) .
8/21/93
0443
8/31/93
0610
3
Unit 1 shutdown required by TSs as a
result of a RCS leak on the "B" Steam
Generator (Condition 4, Tab B, EPIP-1.01).
Hurricane warning was issued for Surry
County (Condition 8, Tab L, EPIP-1.01).
The licensee was both timely and correct in the event recognition and
classification. With one exception, licensee actions in the area of
offsite notifications was timely and in accordance with EPIP 2.01
"Notification Of State and- Local Governments."
The one exception
involved notifications to State and local governments following the NOUE
declaration on August 17, 1993, due to the loss of meteorological
instrumentation. Notifications were delayed due to failure of the
dedicated ringdown phone known as the "Insta-phone." According to
licensee documentation (Shift Supervisor log, completed notification
message form, and li_censee Event Summary Report), the event was declared
at 0635 hours0.00735 days <br />0.176 hours <br />0.00105 weeks <br />2.416175e-4 months <br />.
At 0640 hours0.00741 days <br />0.178 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.4352e-4 months <br />, the Insta-phone was determined to be
inoperable and EPIP-2.01 (Section 17a, steps 1-4) actions were
implemented to contact State and each local EOC via regular telephone.
Although Control Room personnel were prompt in initiating the backup
means of notification (started at 0649 hours0.00751 days <br />0.18 hours <br />0.00107 weeks <br />2.469445e-4 months <br />), approximately 32 minutes
were required to complete the State and local notifications. The
inspector discussed with licensee representatives from site and
corporate emergency planning the root cause of the Insta-phone failure,
and the status of back-up power to the emergency communications system.
The inspector was informed that the Insta-phone failure was due to the
loss of electrical service and failure of the back-up power system to
operate. According to the licensee, the local cbmmunications company
provides back-up power via a generator which is maintained and
periodically tested by the local communications company.
On August 23,
1994, the inspector discussed telephonically with licensee
representatives actions to prevent future Insta-phone failures, or
actions implemented to ensure timely notifications via back-up
methodology.
The licensee indicated the following:
1) The local
communications company (GTE) maintains and periodically tests the
generator; according to discussions with GTE, normally inoperable
equipment is returned to service within three hours; and 2) Strategies
for improving the timeliness of notifications via back-up means are
being evaluated." The licensee further stated that a CT No. 2735 was
assigned to document the cause of the Insta-phone failure and evaluate
. strategies for improving timeliness of notifications in the event of a
loss of the Insta-phone system.
No other concerns were noted in the
areas of Plan implementation, activation, classification, and
notification.
No violations or deviations were identified .
3.
4
Emergency Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies (82701)
This area was inspected to determine whether the licensee's ERFs and
associated equipment, instrumentation, and supplies were maintained
in a state of operational readiness, and to assess the impact of any
changes in this area upon the emergency preparedness program.
Requirements applicable to this area are found in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8)
and (9), 10 CFR 50.54(q),Section IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50,
and the SEP.
The inspector toured the TSC, the DSC (both primary and alternate
locations), and the LEOF.
The inspector verified as operable the
following equipment: Insta-phone, MIDAS computer, and SPDS terminal from
the TSC; and the ERFCS terminal, MIDAS computer, and ENS phone in the
LEOF. As part of the operational readiness review, the inspector
requested an operability test of the emergency ventilation system for
the LEOF.
A permanently installed instrument (manometer) in the LEOF
provided a differential pressure measurement in inches of water gauge.
The acceptance criterion specified in the licensee's surveillance test
for tht emergency ventilation system was 0.05 inches; shortly after
switching the ventilation system from the normal mode to the emergency
mode the manometer reading rose to 0.15 inches indicating a positive
pressure test that met the test acceptance criterion.
Two additional
tests that were observed by the inspector included the quarterly test of
the EROS capability to communicate plant data to NRC, and the bi-monthly
silent test of the EWS siren system.
No problems were noted. Selective
examination of equipment and communications systems identified no
inoperable or absent components, and indicated that*an adequate state of
operational readiness was being maintained for the ERFs.
The inspector reviewed the completed documentation for the following
required surveillances that were performed during the period
August 1993 - July 1994:
0
Emergency Plan Radiation Instruments and Emergency Kits Inspection
and Checks (performed monthly)
0
Monthly Emergency Communications Test
0
Quarterly Emergency Communications Test
0 -
Early Warning System Polling Function Test (semi-monthly)
0
Early Warning System Siren Activation Monitoring (quarterly)
TSC and LEOF Ventilation System HEPA and Filter Test Documentation
(annual)
TSC Pressure Test (18 months or refueling)
0
LEOF Pressurization Test (18 months or refueling)
5
0
Emergency Warning System Alarm Test {weekly)
0
Emergency Warning System Light Test {monthly)
The documentation indicated that the surveillances were performed at the
required frequencies and identified problems were corrected
expeditiously.
As a program improvement in the area of communications, since the last
inspection, the licensee had procured a radio trunking system which
provided additional communication channels for various emergency teams
(fire brigade, damage control, rad protection, etc.) in an effort to
alleviate communications cross-talk and/or competing communications
during events or exercises.
The inspector reviewed the operational readiness of the EWS used for
prompt alerting and notification of the IO-mile EPZ population.
The
system was comprised of 61 sirens. Licensee data provided to FEMA
showed an overall siren availability of 99.6 percent in 1993. This
availability factor included results of all siren testing for the year
(viz., bimonthly silent tests, quarterly growl tests, and quarterly
full-cycle tests). During the inspection, the inspector observed a
silent test of the capability of the siren control system to transmit a
polling signal to installed RTUs.
The results from the test indicated
that siren availability was 100 percent. No failures were reported.
Based upon ERF walk-downs, review of changes to the EPIPs, inspection of
selected emergency equipment and supplies, and discussions with licensee
representatives, the inspector concluded that no degradation of ERF
capabilities had occurred since June 1993.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Organization and Management Control (82701)
This area was inspected to determine the effects of any changes since
the June 1993 inspection in the licensee's emergency organization and/or
management control systems on the emergency preparedness program, and to
verify that any such changes were properly factored into the SEP and
Requirements applicable to this area are found in
10 CFR 50.47(b)(l) and (16),Section IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR
Part 50, and the SEP.
The organization and management of the emergency preparedness program
were reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives.
No changes
in the site or corporate organization management or reporting chain had
occurred. Site emergency planning reported directly to the Assistant
Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing.
Regarding the ERO, the
most significant change involved the relocation of emergency maintenance
personnel from the TSC to the OSC, and there were minor changes in the
emergency organization involving personnel filling key positions as
primaries in the TSC.
However, personnel changes and relocation did not
6
result in a decrease in the number of available responders or provide
impediments to the response capability. Further, when the assigned
personnel training records were reviewed, personnel training was current
and up to date. In view of the ERO changes, the inspectof discussed with
the licensee contact staffing and augmentation drills conducted since
the last inspection and reviewed documentation for augmentation drills
conducted March 24, 1994 and June 27, 1994.
The referenced off-hour
drills involved only notification of emergency responders and
determination of their* availability, and did not include actual
reporting to the station. The drill results concluded that the
licensee's onsite emergency organization could be augmented in
accordance with Tables 5.1 and 5.2 of the Emergency Plan.
Regarding changes to the offsite support emergency organization, the
inspector was informed that a change in management personnel included
the interim assignment of*a James City County Emergency Medica1*services
Coordinator.
As a management tool to ensure key elements of the Emergency Plan are
being tested (during exercise and drills), requirements are detailed in
an administrative procedure and implemented via an exercise matrix.
The
referenced matrix was developed for a 12 month period to include
documentation of any drill performed during the prescribed period.
According to a licensee representative, the referenced system was
implemented during calendar year 1990.
The inspector reviewed the
exercise matrix for the period 1990-1994, and details found in the six-
year Surry Exercise Plan, and determined that the licensee's
administrative program was effective in ensuring that those Plan
elements delineated in NRC Inspection Module 82302 were being satisfied.
The details of the aforementioned program are described in a Virginia
Power Corporate Department Procedure EPCP-006 entitled "Drill and
Exercise Program Manual."
As a management tool for ensuring the completion of corrective action
for identified problems in emergency preparedness, the EPMS listing was
used to track open items for the licensee's two nuclear stations as well
as for the corporate emergency preparedness program.
No violations or deviations were identified in this programmatic area.
5.
Training (82701)
This area was inspected to determine whether the licensee's key
emergency response personnel were properly trained and understood their
emergency responsibilities. Requirements applicable to this area are
contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and (15),Section IV.E of Appendix E to
10 CFR Part 50, and the SEP.
The inspector reviewed the description (in the Emergency Plan) of the
training program and the Nuclear Power Station Emergency Preparedness
Training Program Guide. Lesson plans for Station Emergency Manager,
Emergency Technical Director, Radiological Assessment Director, and
7
Chemistry (HRSS} Team were reviewed.
Lesson plans were detailed,
including lessons learned details from exercises and industry events.
The inspector also noted the lesson plans included changes reflecting
EPA-400 details and revised 10 CFR Part 20 (e.g. TEDE, CDE, DAC,
emergency worker limits, etc}.
Based on these reviews and interviews
with training personnel, the inspector determined that the licensee
maintained a formal training program.
To assess the effectiveness of the emergency response training program,
the inspector interviewed five individuals assigned to the ERO in key
roles.
Two individuals were SRO qualified (SS and Assistant SS} in
positions designated as interim SEM.
The remaining three individuals
were designated as RAD, RAC, or Dose Assessment Team.
Specific areas of
interviews included emergency classification, offsite notifications,
PARs, site evacuation, emergency worker dose limits, and dose
projection.
Interviewees designated as interim SEM were presented
accident scenarios that required event classification, and asked to
respond as appropriate, including the basis for their decision-making.
Additionally, interviewees were given an accident sequence for a General
Emergency to assess the effectiveness of training and familiarity with
procedures governing PAR formulation.
The interviews with personnel
assigned dose assessment responsibility involved a demonstration of
timeliness and capability to run MIDAS to obtain predetermined dose rate
projections for the 10 mile-EPZ following a SGTR accident. As an
additional assessment tool, all interviewees were questioned regarding
the emergency worker exposure limits and exposure limits for
administering KI.
The scenarios and dose projection data were reviewed
and validated by the licensee's Training Department personnel.
The
inspector delineated the guidelines for the interview at the outset,
including the "open book" nature of the evaluation. A representative of
the licensee's Training Department and site Emergency Preparedness staff
were present during each of the interviews to allow for confirmation and
firsthand understanding of observations.
judged to have demonstrated comprehensive understanding of the SEM
duties and responsibilities in the event of an emergency.
With one
exception, all emergency classifications and PARs were timely and
correct.
The one exception involved the Assistant SS's error in the
upgrading of accident scenario No. 1 classification from an Alert to a
SAE when additional details were provided.
Scenario No.I was properly
classified as an Alert based on Tab 8-3 (Reactor Coolant Event} of
EPIP-1.01, "Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure."
However, when
additional details were later provided regarding plant conditions (e.g.
increases in charging flow, pressurizer level rapidly decreasing,
elevated radiation monitor reading etc.}, interviewee incorrectly
upgraded the event from an Alert to a SAE based on Tab G-1 (Loss of
Secondary Coolant} of EPIP-1.01, "Emergency Manager Controlling
Procedure."
Following the interview, the Assistant SS was questioned
regarding the scenario to ascertain whether a full understanding of the
scenario event was realized. It was determined that he had not
considered the additional details as relevant to plant conditions in
Scenario No. 1, but instead considered the details as a separate set of
scenario conditions. During further discussions with members of the
8
licensee's Training Department, the interviewee agreed that his answer
was incorrect and the event upgrade from the Alert to SAE was
inappropriate. The inspector discussed this matter with members of the
Operations Training staff and the Emergency Preparedness staff to
determine what course of actions would be appropriate in light of the
walkthrough results.
In response, the licensee indicated that the
interviewee would be provided additional scenarios for classification to*
determine interviewee's capability in recognizing and properly
classifying events.
On August 11, 1994, the Assistant SS was presented
several scenarios by the licensee's Operations Training staff for review
and classification. According to Training Staff results, no problems
were noted. All events were appropriately classified. Based upon the
interviewee's prompt and appropriate response on August 10, 1994, to
initial conditions presented in Scenarios Nos. 1 and 2, including
correct PARs, and no problems were identified during the event*
classifications on August 11, 1994 (presented by Operations Training
staff), the inspector's concerns in the area of event classification was
considered resolved and no followup action was planned.
Regarding the
dose projection walkthroughs, two issues were noted by both the NRC and
licensee observers:
Two of three interviewees experienced delays in *obtaining results*.
During one interview, approximately 35 minutes were required from
the scenario start time until completion of results.
During the manual data entry of Delta T va 1 ue ( presented in * C),
personnel failed to convert *c to °F which resulted in an
erroneous stability class and projection results. All
interviewees were observed making the referenced entry without
converting.
With the exception of the two issues noted above, dose projection
personnel were knowledgeable of their role and responsibility in the
areas of exposure limits, PARs, and changes which resulted from the
implementation of EPA-400 and 10 CFR Part 20.
In response to the above
noted issues, the licensee issued CT No. 2732 to evaluate strategies and
implement measures for improving the proficiency of on-shift RADs and
Dose Assessment Team members with use of MIDAS.
Regarding the Delta T
conversion, the licensee representative indicated that the data entry
procedural steps would be changed to reflect direct entry of the
stability class (i.e. A-F) rather than converting from *c to °F to avoid
potential errors in stability class.
The capability for direct input of
the stability class into the MIDAS model was not previously implemented
by site personnel.
Emergency response training records were reviewed for randomly selected
individuals assigned to the ERO (SEM, ETD, OSC Director, RAD, RAC, Dose
Assessment Team Leader, and State/Local Communicator) to verify that
individuals received training in accordance with the Plan and Nuclear
Power Station Emergency Preparedness Training Program Guide.
No
problems were noted.
9
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Independent and Internal Reviews/Audits (82701)
This area was inspected to determine whether the licensee had performed
an independent review or audit of the emergency preparedness program,
and reviewed the effectiveness of the corr*ect i ve action system for
deficiencies and weaknesses identified during exercises and drills.
Requirements applicable to this area are found in 10 CFR 50.54(t) and
the SEP.
The inspector reviewed documentation resulting from two independent
audits conducted by the licensee's QA organization during the period
April 5-29, 1993 (documented in Report No. 93-06), and March 25 -
April 28, 1994 (documented in Report No. 94-05).
Both audits were
company-wide audits which*examined the emergency response capability for
both of the licensee's nuclear stations and the corporate office. The
audit team for Audit Report No. C94-05 was comprised of personnel from
the licensee's organization in addition to three technical specialists
from another southeastern utility. According to audit results, no
findings or deficiencies were identified during the April 1993 audit.
However, Audit Report No. 94-05 identified three findings. The inspector
was informed by a member of the QA staff that the referenced items
remained open at the time of the inspection.
The audits appeared to
have been detailed, comprehensive, and effective in assessing Emergency
Plan implementation.
The Audit results also indicated an effective
interface had been established with offsite officials. The independent
audits were considered a program strength.
The licensee's emergency preparedness staff utilized a computer-based
tracking system known as EPMS to track open items and issues in
emergency preparedness, such as audit findings and drill/exercise
critique findings. A review of the EPMS print~out showed that the
system was appropriately detailed, and indicated for each item the
responsible individual and a due date for completion.
The licensee was
effectively using this tracking system as a management tool for ensuring
the completion of corrective action for identified problems in emergency
preparedness.
The inspector reviewed the critique records from the
December 1993 NRC evaluated exercise and a "licensee only" training
exercise conducted April 1994.The documentation of each drill or
exercise included a list of objectives, scenario, summary of events, and
critique items.
The inspector determined that the critiques identified
substantive issues for corrective actions and that the licensee was
either monitoring the status and progress of such planned corrective
actions (via EPMS) or had completed same.
No violations or deviations were identified.
..
. .
10
7.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92904)
(Closed) EW 50-280, 281/93-28-01:
Failure to perform offsite dose
assessment activities in a manner to develop appropriate PARs.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response (dated February 18, 1994)
to the NRC Inspection Report (dated January 7, 1994), and determined
that the corrective actions were completed in accordance with the
licensee's commitments.
Although the licensee's ERO performance in this
area was not observed during the inspection, the extensive procedural
changes and interviews with personne 1 assigned res pons i bil ity for PARs
indicated that the corrective actions were adequate for closure.
8.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 12, 1994,
with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector stated no
violations or deviations were identified. The inspector also discussed
the need to assure reliable Insta-phone communications (Paragraph 2) and
accurate dose assessment projections (Paragraph 5). Licensee management
was informed that an EW from a previous inspection was ~onsidered
closed, as discussed above in Paragraph 7.
Although proprietary
information was reviewed during this inspection, none is contained in
this report.
Item Number
50-280, 281/93-28-01
Status
Closed
Description/Reference
EW - Failure to perform offsite dose
assessment activities in a manner to
develop appropriate PARs
( Paragraph 7) .
9.
Abbreviations Used in This Report
Delta T
EPCP
EPMS
ERFCS
EW
Committed Dose Equivalent
Commitment Tracking
Derived Air Concentration
Delta Temperature
Emergency Notification System
Emergency Operation Center
Environmental Protection Agency
Emergency Preparedness Corporate Procedure
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure
Emergency Preparedness Management System
Emergency Planning Zone
Emergency Response Data System
Emergency Response Facility
Emergency Response Facility Computer System
Emergency Response Organization
Emergency Technical Director
Exercise Weakness
Early Warning System
- ~
. ..
HRSS
KI
MIDAS
NRC
osc
RAC
RAD
SEM
ss
TS
- c
- F
11
Federal Emergency Management Agency
High Efficiency Particulate Air
High Radiation Sampling System
Local Emergency Operations Facility
Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System
Notification of Unusual Event
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operational Support Center
Protective Action Recommendation
Quality Assurance
Radiological Assessment Coordinator
Radiological Assessment Director
Radio Transmitter Unit
Site Area Emergency
Station Emergency Manager
Surry Emergency Plan
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Safety Parameter Display System
Senior Reactor Operator
Shift Supervisor
Technical Specification
Total Effective Dose Equivalent
Degrees Celsius
Degrees Fahrenheit