ML18152A427
| ML18152A427 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1990 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Holland W, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A428 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-90-19, 50-281-90-19, NUDOCS 9006150180 | |
| Download: ML18152A427 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1990019
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-280/90-19 and 50-281/90-19
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
April 1 through May 5, 1990
Inspectors:
0/"2_ /~
P-e:17e
W. ~~ident Inspector
>4f~
~
J. W". York, Resfdent Inspector
MJZ/~~
SUMMARY
Scope:
Region
s-:t~-,e,
Date Signed
s--.is-?.::?
Date Signed
s-is-Jo
Date Signed
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant.
operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, and licensee* event report
review.
Certain tours*.,were conducted on backshifts or weekends.
Backshift or weekend
tours were conducted on April 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 22.
Results:
In the area of plant operations, weaknesses were noted regarding operations
department personnel being less attentive in the performance of their duties
{paragraph 3.a).
Examples were an improper fuel building ventilation
alignment, inadequate monitoring of outside recirculation spray pump 2-RS-P-2A
motor oil level, an emergency diesel generator operating procedure change not
thoroughly reviewed, and an inadequate isolation of charging pump 2-CH-P-lC
lube oil cooler. Station management sensitivity to these concerns was evident.
9006150180 9005?~
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Although several weaknesses were identified, overall operator performance was
acceptable.
Weaknesses were also identifted in the licensee's methods and procedures for
operating ventilation systems in the auxiliary building, fuel building, turbine
building, and decontamination building (paragraph 3.d).
In the area of maintenance, several equipment problems were identified by the
licensee during the repair of two safety-related charging pumps (paragraph
4.a). The.extent to which the licensee evaluated the pump problems in order to
implement proper corrective actions was considered a strength.
An NCV was identified for failure to provide adequate isolation of equipmeht
for performance of maintenance activities (paragraph 3.a) .
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
- H. Collar, Supervisor, Quality, Quality Assurance
J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
- D. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
- W. Gross, Supervisor, Shift Operations
- R. Gwaltney, Superintendent of Maintenance
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
T. Kendzia, Supervisor, Safety Engineering
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
- A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance_Manager
- Attended exit interview.
- Effective May 1, 1990, A. Price replaced E. Grecheck as Assistant
Station Manager.
E. Grecheck was transferred to the corporate offices and
became the Nuclear Engineering Manager.
Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
On May 1, 1990, Region II management visited the Surry Power Station and
met with the resident inspectors.
The managers were:
L. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
E. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II
.M. Sinkule, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
Region management discussed current plant status with the residents, an*d
toured the station with the residents and the Surry Station Manager.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
Unit 1 and -unit *2 began the reporting period at power.
Both units
-operated at power for the duration of the inspection period.
2
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707 & 42700)
a.
Daily Inspections
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator
adherence to approved procedures, TS, and LCOs; examination of panels
containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system
elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review
of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation
reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify
compliance with approved procedures.
The inspectors also routinely
accompany station management on p 1 ant tours and observe the
effectiveness of their influence on activities being performed by
plant personnel.
During this inspection period, the inspectors observed examples where
operations department personnel demonstrated lack of attention to
detail in performance of their duties.
The following are examples of
these ~bservations:
-
On March 26, a control room operator established an improper
fuel building ventilation fan lineup which created a positive
pressure in the fuel building.
A negative pressure is desired
in the fuel building in order to assure that potential
contamination of other areas is minimized.
Procedure OP-21.2.5,
Placing Fuel Building Ventilation System in Service, contains
precautions with regards to inward leakage of air into the fuel
building.
A subsequent NRC Inspection Report will discuss the
radiological consequences and enforcement associated with this
occurrence.
On April 21, during a tour of the Unit 2 safeguards building,
the inspectors discovered that the lower motor bearing oil
sightglass on outside recirculation spray pump 2-RS-P-2A was not
visible.
Eighteen ounces of oil was added to the 64 ounce
capacity reservoir to bring level within specification.
The
motor lower bearing drain plug was known to be leaking oil;
however, operations surveillance intervals did not ensure that
the sightglass oil level remained in the visible range.
It
should be noted that the pump was detennined by the licensee to
be operable with the observed low oil level.
The inspector
will review. the 1 icensee' s corrective action for the leaking
drain plug.
On April 25, procedure OP-6.1.3, #1 Emergency Diesel Generator,
Exercise Start From EOG Room, was changed by operations in order
to obtain additi.onal test data which was not obtained when
requirea during the performance of the procedure.
The procedure
change resulted in an EOG start and acceleration to 900 rpm
instead of 450 rpm.
3
On April 28, operations established an incorrect SW isolation on
Unit 2 charging pump 2-CH-P-lC lube oil cooler.
This was
discovered when SW issued from the lube oil cooler during
maintenance.
Jhe lube oil cooler maintenance involved removal
of a zinc plug which created a small opening allowing a limited
amount of SW to be lost; therefore, SW flow to the charging pump
in operation was not adversely affected.
The inspectors noted
that the licensee prepared a deviation report for this equipment
isolation problem and implemented ~orrective action to prevent
recurrence.
This item is identified as an NCV (281/90-19-01)
for failure to provide adequate isolation of equipment during
performance of maintenance activities.
The inspectors were concerned that these examples were an indication
that operations personnel were becoming less* attentive in the
performance of their duties. These concerns were discussed with the
Operations Superintendent and he acknowledged that additional
supervisory and management attention was warranted.
In addition,
station management sensitivity to these concerns was evident.
Although several weaknesses were identified, the inspectors
considered that overa 11 operator performance was acceptable.
b.
Weekly Inspections
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
operability verification of selected ESF systems by valve alignment,
breaker positions, condition of equipment or component, and
operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system
actuation or performance.
Plant tours were conducted which included
observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire protection
and preventative measures, control of activities in progress,
radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant
housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazards.
The
inspectors routinely noted the temperature of the AFW pump discharge
piping to ensure increases in temperature were being properly
monitored and evaluated by the licensee.
c.
Biweekly Inspections
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagouts in effect;
review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant
samples, boric ac~d tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples);
observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation
of the plant problem identification system; .verification of selected
portions of containment isolation lineups; and verification that
notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
d.
Other Inspection Activities
Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital
battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms,
diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, cable
penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level
4
intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit and pump pit areas.
RCS leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected
leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated;
and that appropriate actions were taken, if required.
The inspectors
routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC
Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular
basis RWPs were reviewed, and specific work activities were monitored
to assure they were being conducted per the RWPs.
Selected radiation
protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment
operability and calibration frequency were verified.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methods and procedures for
maintaining ventilation in the auxiliary building, fuel building,
decontamination building, and turbine building.
The auxiliary
building and turbine building lower levels are cross connected via a
piping tunnel. By original design, the auxiliary building, fuel
building, and decontamination building were cross connected via
tunnels in the lower levels; however, the licensee has modified the
original design by constructing barriers in the tunnels to separate*
these buildings.
The barriers have doors that allow personnel
passage between the buildjngs.
The following procedures were
reviewed:
OP-21.1.1, dated October 27, 1983, Alignment of Auxiliary
Ventilation System for Normal Operation.
OP-21.2.2, dated July 27, 1989, Putting Auxiliary Building.
General Area Vent System in Service.
OP-21.2.3, dated December 14, 1989~ Putting Auxiliary Building
Central Area Vent System in Service.
OP-21.2.4, dated October 27, 1983, Placing "Decon Bldg" Vent
System in Service.
OP-21.2.5, dated October 27, 1983, Placing "Fuel Bldg" Vent
System in Service.
The inspectors also reviewed section 9.13.4 of the FSAR and conclud~d
that the ventilation systems in potentially contaminated areas were
designed to provide contamination control as follows:
Ensure air ts not recirculated.
Supply 10 or more air changes per hour.
Supply air to least likely areas of contamination and exhaust
air from area_s of greatest contamination potential.
Monitor exhaust air for gaseous and particulate activity *.
5
The inspectors' review identified the following weaknesses with the
licensee's methods and procedures for operating the ventilation
systems in the auxiliary, fuel, turbine, and decontamination
buildings in regards to contamination control:
Procedures did not specify what supply and/or exhaust fans were
required to operate.
Procedures provided very general
instructions and left it up to the operators to determine what
supply and exhaust, fans were needed to obtain adequate
ventilation to control contamination.
Procedures did not specify that different ventilation lineups
are required for different evolutions*.
For example, when
opening the barrier doors that separate the auxiliary, fuel and
- decontamination buildings lower levels, the spaces become cross
connected and ventilation air flow is altered.
If ventilation
is not properly aligned when the barriers are opened,
contamination will spread from one space to another.
Another
example occurs during refueling outages ~hen ventilation lineu~s
are significantly different than durtng reactor operation, yet
procedures do not spec-ify any ventilation lineup changes.
Procedures did not specify how to maintain auxiliary building
ventilation in relation to turbine building ventilation. These
spaces are continuously cross connected, and if *not properly
maintained, air could potentially flow from the auxiliary
building contaminated areas to the turbine building.
This is
not desired because turbine building exhaust is not monitored
for activity.
Many of the initial conditions, precautions, and limitations
contained in the *procedures did not apply. For example,
instructions were given that referenced containment and control
room ventilation systems which did not apply to operating the
auxiliary, fuel, or decontamination buildings ventilation
systems.
These weaknesses were discussed with the Superintendent of Operations
and the venti 1 ati on system engineer who agreed that procedure
improvements were needed.
The inspectors were informed that several
actions to aid operators in maintaining ventilation for the
auxiliary, fuel, and decontamination buildings have been initiated.
On Apr~.l 6, 1990,-the ventilation system engineer issued a memorandum
that:provided a matrix tabulation of which ventilation system should
be in service during a given event or situation.
E'.WR 89-701 was
issued on April 19, 1990, and reconmended changes to the barriers
separating the auxiliary, fuel, and decontamination buildings.
These change~ would redirect the air flow direction as originally
designed.
The inspectors considered these proposed corrective
actions to be beneficial.
The ventilation procedures have not been
reviewed as part of the licensee's procedure upgrade . program;
however, the 1 i censee needs to eva 1 ua te the importance of these
..
6
procedures and prioritize when these procedures will be reviewed for
upgrade.
During the exit, the station manager stated that the
ventilation system has been added to the plant "Level 1
11 list. This
will ensure that additional attention will be provided in this area.
e.
Physical Security Program Inspections
In the course of monthly activities, the insp~ctors included a review
of the 1 i censee
I s phys i ca 1 security program.
The performance of
various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of
daily activities to inclu*de: protected and vital areas access
controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge
issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and
compensatory posts.
No discrepancies were noted.
Within the areas inspected, one NCV was identified.
4.
Maintenance Inspections (62703 & 42700)
During the* reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance
activities to assure compliance. with the appropriate procedures.
Inspection areas included the following:
a.
Maintenance on Charging Pumps 1-CH-P-lA and 2-CH-P-lA
During routine inservice testing of the Unit 1.
11A
11 charging pump, a
lube oil spray mist issued from the pump outboard radial bearing.
As
a result of* this lube oil leak, the pump was declared inoperable and
removed fonn service.
For troubleshooting purposes, the gearbox
metal access cover was removed and a plexiglass cover installed. The
pump was started and lube oil spray to the speed increaser box gear
teeth was monitored.
Results of this testing indicated inadequate
lube oil spray to the gearbox teeth. The Unit 1
11A
11 charging pump
gearbox and pump inboard and outboard bearings were disassembled and
inspected.
Results of these inspections revealed deficiencies with
the charging pump lube oil system, and excessive bearing clearances.
Lube oil system deficiencies involved lube oil contaminated with a
black: residue. substance, a relief valve stuck in an intermediate
posttion, an incorrectly positioned lube oil gear box manual flow
control valve, and a partially clogged gearbox spray nozzle.
The
pump outboard radial bearing and the gearbox high speed bearings*
clea*rances wero excessive and were replaced.
Based, in part, on
these, * findings.~* the 1 i censee commenced a fonna 1 component fa i 1 ure
evaluation for this pump.
On April 20, repair of Unit 1
11A
11 charging pump was completed.
The
pump was satjsfactorily tested per procedure 1-PT-18.7, Charging Pump
Operability and Performance Test.
The inspectors witnessed this
testing and noted that during the performance of the test, lube oil
,.
7
pump pressure and gearbox lube oil pressure were monitored.
Several - -
relief valve and gearbox spray valve adjustments were required to
bring these lube oil pressures within the desired range.
During a
review of the test procedure, the inspector noted that the procedure,
l-PT-18. 7, did not specify lube oil pump and gearbox lube oil
pressure limits. Since this procedure is utilized to test Unit 1
11A
11
charging pump quarterly and following maintenance, the inspectors
were concerned that lube oil pressure tolerances were not listed.
This concern was discussed with the system engineer.
After review,
the licensee stated that specific lube oil pressure tolerances along
with other procedura 1 improvements are planned to be implemented
based on the charging pump deficiencies recently discovered.
On* March 25, during routine inservice testing of the Unit 2
11A
11
.
charging pump, unacceptable vibration levels were observed and the
pump was immediately secured. A subsequent lube oil sample indicated
that there was excessive amounts of iron and chromium in the lube
oil.
The Unit 2
11A
11 charging pump gearbox and pump bearings were
disassembled and inspected.
Results of the inspection revealed that
, the pump thrust bearing was damaged, the gearbox high and slow speed
bearings clearances weri excessive, and lube oil system deficiencies
existed.
More detailed inspections identified that the pump thrust
bearing key and keyway slot were worn.
Also, the thrust bearing
gasket was too thick.
The cause of the charging pump thrust bearing
failure is unknown, but the licensee suspects that either the thrust
bearing key that secures the bearing to the shaft failed, or that the*
thick thrust bearing gasket created excessive loading on the bearing.
Lube oil -system deficiencies included incorrect positioning of the
gearbox flow control valve and a stuck open relief valve. Corrective
actions was ongoing at the end of the inspector period.
Due to the lube oil system deficiencies discovered during the
maintenance of Units 1 and 2 charging pumps, the licensee is planning
to test the lube oil systems on the remaining four charging pumps.
This testing will involve operating the charging pumps' lube oil
systems and closely monitoring lube oil pump and gearbox pressures.
The inspectors reviewed the work package associated with the
inspection of Unit 1
11A" charging pump, frequently visited the job
site to observe work in progress, held discussions with the
maintenance superintendent, craft supervisors and system engineer,
reviewed the associate~ tagouts, and verified compliance with TS
requirements.
The ins pee tors cone 1 uded that a more deta i 1 ed and
~~liberate cause eval~ation process has been implemented d~ring these
maintenance activities.
More management attention has been focused
at determination of root cause of the problems *
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b.
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger
On May 2, 1990, the inspectors witnessed the cleaning of component
cooling water heat ~xchanger 1-CC-E-18 under work order 3800095043.
Visual examination of the tube sheet showed sea weed or hydroids (a
biological growth), shells, and fish, all of which combined to
prevent adequate SW fl ow through the heat exchanger.
Mechanical
Maintenance Procedure, MMP-C-HX-277, Tube Sheet and Channel Cleaning
For Bearing and Component Cooling Heat Exchangers, dated October 18,
1989, was reviewed and the initialling of various steps was
witnessed.
The inspectors reviewed tagging, torquing, radiation work
permit, materials accountability, and the final cleanliness
inspection.
No discrepancies were noted.
The inspectors discussed STP-418, 1-CC-E-18 OperabiJity Check, and
the frequency for cleaning the four component cooling water heat
exchangers with the systems engineer.
This special test was first
initiated in August 1989, after the installation of instrumentation
for measuring differential pressure across the heat exchanger, an
indication of the degree of fouling.
The degree of fouling by
seaweed, etc. depends upon-the time of year.
There is less fouling
during the winter season, e.g., the
11A
11 heat exchanger went eight
weeks, the B six weeks, the C ten weeks, a~d the D (the. new heat
exchanger) went twelve weeks before having to be cleaned. At the ~nd
of this inspection peri ad, a 11 four heat exchangers were being
cleaned on approximately a weekly basis.
Within the areas *inspected, no violations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Inspections (61726 & 42700}
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as
follows:
Test prerequisites were met.
Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
Test procedures appeared to perform their intended function.
Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.
.
'
.
Test data :was properly: co-llecteq and recorded.
Inspection areas included,the following:
a.
Rod Position.Indication - Unit 2
On Apri 1 16, 1990, the inspectors witnessed the performance of
periodic test 2-PT-5.1, Analog Rod Position Instrumentation, dated
9
October 17,1989.
This monthly test is performed to prove operability
of the rod bottom bistable for compliance of TS Table 4.1-1, Item 9.
The inspectors observed some of the testing in cabinets R~I-1 and
RPI-3 located in the ESGR.
Annunciators associated with this testing
were noted in the control room.
During the test, the procedure had
to be deviated because the rod bottom bistable for rod L-11 (shutdown
bank B) was jumpered due to a drift problem.
No discrepancies were
identified.
b.
Boric Acid Pump And Discharge Check Valve Testing - Unit 1
On April 17, the inspectors witnessed testing of boric acid pumps
1-CH-P-2A and 1-CH-P-2B and their respective discharge check valves
1-CH-76 and 1-CH-92.
This testing was accomplished in accordance
with periodic test 1-PT-18.9, Boric Acid Operability and Perfonnance
Test, dated April 17, 1990.
The purpose of the test was to verify
that the pumps
I differenti a 1 pressures and vi bra ti on measurements
were within acceptable limits, the pump discharge check valves shut
on flow reversal, and the pump discharge check valves partially
stroked opened.
The overa 11 performance of the pumps and check
valves was observed to be- satisfactory.
No discrepancies were
identified.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Report Review (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LER
1s listed below to ascertain whether NRC
reporting requirements were being met and to evaluate initial adequacy of
the corrective actions. The inspector's review also included followup on
implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation
that all required corrective actions were complete.
LERs that iden-tify violations of regulations and that meet the criteria of
10 CFR, Part-2, Appendix C,Section V.G.1 are identified as an NCV in the
following closeout paragraphs.
These items are identified to allow for
proper evaluations of corrective actions in the event that similar events
occur in the future.
(Closed) LER 280,281/90-01, The Three Emergency Service Water Pumps
Declared Inoperable Due to Their Emergency Shutdown Devices Being in a
Tripped Condition.
This issue involved an operator not being able to
start a diesel driverr emergency SW pump because the diesel engine air
intake trip device was ,:,ut of positfon (shut). ***The operator was not
familiar enough with the operation of the trip device to detennine that
the device needed to be properly set prior to starting the pump nor did
the pump operating procedure provide enough detail to ensure that the
trip device was .in the proper position prior to starting the pump .
Corrective action for thi S* event involved modifying procedures to provide
more detail to ensure that trip devices were in the proper position prior
to starting the pump and enhancement of operator training in the area of
i,
10
purpose and operation of the trip device.
The inspectors reviewed -the
procedure changes and verified that adequate detail was provided to ensure
the trip device was in the proper position prior to starting the pump.
Non-1 icensed operators were in the process of being trained on the trip
device and licensed operators were scheduled to obtain training on this
topic during an upcoming requalification session.
The licensee was not
able to determine why the trip devices on all three emergency SW pumps
were out of position. This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/90-02, Both Containment Vacuum Pumps Inoperable Due to
Mechanical Binding as a Result of Corrosion Buildup.
The issue involved a
failure of both of the Unit 1 Containment Vacuum Pumps when a start signal
was present.
This condition was contrary to TS and the unit entered a
6-hour LCO to hot shutdown.
The licensee's review of plant conditions
concluded that required containment vacuum was being maintained within TS
limits;. therefore, no immediate compensatory actions were required. A TS
waiver of compliance was granted by the NRG.to allow reasonable time to
make repairs to the pump.
One pump was replaced and returned to operation
within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
At that time the TS LCO was exited.
Additional
-
corrective actions included replacement of the second pump.
The pumps
were placed on a more frequent operational schedule to minimize corrosion
build up.
Finally, the licensee will review the TS requirement and the
suitability of these pumps for this application.
The inspectors monitored
the licensee actions from identification of the problem ~hrough review of
more frequent operation of the pumps and consider that adequate corrective
actions have been taken to date.
However, the pump application review
will be followed to assure that this process provides for a more suitable
resolution. This LER is closed.
7.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 8, 1990, with
those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph 1.
The following
summary of inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during this
exit:
Weaknesses and a strength identified in this Inspection. Report were
discussed {paragraphs 3.a, 3.d, and 4.a). *
NCV 281/90-19-01 was identified for a failure to provide adequate
isolation of equipment for performance of maintenance activities
(paragraph 3.a).
The licensee
was informed that the LERs discussed in paragraph 6
were closed.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection conclusions with no dissenting
corrments.
The l.icensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provided to **or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
,
11
8.
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms
CFR
EOG
EMP
LER
LCO
NRC
OP
RS
TS
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM
ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION
NON-CITED VIOLATION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
OPERATING PROCEDURE
PERIODIC TEST
REVOLUTION PER MINUTE
RECIRCULATION SPRAY
RADIATION WORK PERMIT
SPECIAL TEST PROCEDURE
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
..