ML18152A414
| ML18152A414 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1989 |
| From: | Blake J, Chou R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A415 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-89-05, 50-280-89-5, 50-281-89-05, 50-281-89-5, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, IEB-88-008, IEB-88-011, IEB-88-11, IEB-88-8, IEIN-86-094, IEIN-86-94, IEIN-88-025, IEIN-88-25, NUDOCS 8904040002 | |
| Download: ML18152A414 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1989005
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-280/89-05 and 50-281/89-05
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Scope:
Date Signed
3/5fe'i
Date Signed
Section
Safety
SUMMARY
This routine, announced inspection was in the areas of previous open_
items related to pipe support base plate designs using concrete
expansion anchor bolts (IEB 79-02) and seismic analyses for as-built
safety-related piping systems (IEB 79-14), fastener testing to
determine conformance with
applicable
material
specifications
(Bulletin No. 87-02), thermal stresses in piping connected to reactor
coolant systems (Bulletin No. 88-08), and pressurizer surge line
thermal stratification (Bulletin No. 88-11).
Results:
In
the areas
inspection, violations or deviations were
not
identified.
Three
Unresolved
Items (UNR)
were identified, two concerning
thermocouple orientation problems (paragraph 3.b) and sampling of
non-safety related fasteners for testing (paragraph 3.a).
The
licensee* has a weakness involving
inspection, design and
installation methods for thermocouples.
890404000
~DR
Anoe~ &90316
05000280
PNIJ
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
J. Artigas, Staff Speciality - Quality
- R. M. Cramer, NSS
- J. P. Curry, Station Stores Superintendent
T. Cybert, Quality Control (QC) Inspector
- W. D. Grady, NOE Supervisor
- E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager - Nuclear Safety & Licensing
- D. S. Hart, Quality Supervisor
- R. K. MacManus, Surveillance and Test Supervisor
B. Macmeccan, Project Engineer - Innsbrook
S. MacMillan, System Engineer
- G. D. Miller, Licensing Coordinator
P. Skopic, System Engineer
J. Smith, Quality Supervisor
- T. B. Sowers, Engineering
- C. Whipp, System Engineer - Innsbrook
- M. S. Whitt, Systew Engineer
D. Wang, Senior Eng:ieer
Other licensee employees contacted during this
craftsmen,
engineers,
mechanics,
technicians,
personnel.
Other Organizations
The Virginia Corporation of Richmond
S. R. Erickson, NOE Supervisor
NRC Resident Inspectors
W. E. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector
- L. Nicholson, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
inspection included
and
administrative
2.
Action on -Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (92702)
a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (UNR) 50-280,281/88-20-0l, As-Built Drawing
Discrepancies
in
Pipe
Supports.
This matter concerned the
discrepancies found in as-built drawings such as anchor bolt edge
distance,
holes on wide flange beams,
number and plate size
differences, bolt diameter difference, etc.
The inspector he 1 d
discussions with the responsible licensee engineers and reviewed the
response to NRC Inspection Findings 50-280,281/88-20 addressed in
b.
2
Surry Project ID NP-1575, Power Engineer Services Project NP-1651 and
Engineering Mechanics Technical
Report EMTR-88-MSW-04.
In the
response, the licensee claimed that the Surry re-analysis of piping
systems for IEB 79-14 was performed conservatively by using 1%
damping for the Design Basis Earthquake instead of 2% for the ASME
Code Case N-411 used.
Therefore the licensee considered the minor
differences between the as-installed conditions and as-built drawings
could be justified without revising most calculations and only adding
the calculation addendum to explain the as-installed conditions per
the new revised drawings and justifications.
The licensee revised
the as-built drawings to reflect the as-installed conditions.
The
inspector sampled the revised drawings and calculations for review to
v~rify the - licensee commitments in the response.
They were
acceptable to the inspector and the item is considered closed.
(Closed)
UNR 50-280,281/88-20-02, Maintenance in Piping Systems.
This matter concerned defects which required maintenance, such as
spring can rusty and i 11 egi b 1 e, snubber name p 1 ate missing, water
retention, pipe and check valve rusty, etc.
The inspector held
discussions with the licensee engineers and review EMTR-88-MSW-04.
Corrective actions were included in Engineering Work Request (EWR)
No.88-458.
The inspector conducted a walk down with the licensee's
engineers to check the corrective actions.
Support No. 11448-PSSK-
122A2.36 (Rev. 1) had been cleaned and repainted.
But the new load
indication plate will be installed during the next refueling outage.
For the concern of rust due to check va 1 ve 1 eakage near support
No. 11448-PSSK-122A2.36 (Rev.'1), the licensee considered it to be a
continuing generic concern which must be addressed in a long-range
programmatic manner.
The EWR will be prepared to direct corrective
maintenance of the va 1 ve.
The attachment of a 1 oad rating tag
required by
EWR 88-458 for the snubber of Support No. 11548-PSSK-
122Ll. 3 is not completed in the field.
For the concern of water
retention in the cubicle formed by wing plates and stiffener plates,
the licensee reviewed the other support drawings for similar concerns
and identified one support in Unit 1 and ~leven supports in Unit 2
which have this type of construction.
Seven of the eleven Unit 2
supports had been found to have standing water and snubber oil. within
the supports. These supports had been cleaned of the standing water
and/or debris, inspected for any corrosion, and base plates painted.
Support No. 11448-PSSK-122Dl.7 had been found to have the corrosion
less than 1/16
11 and was evaluated to be acceptable by the engineer.
The standing water in Unit 1 for Support No. 11548-PSSK-122DA5 has
not been cleaned up because it is in a locked high radiation area
(approximately 15 Rem) enclosed by a special fence.
Pending licensee
completion of the above actions, this item remains open.
c.
(Closed)
UNR 50-280, 281/88-20-03, Adequacy of l/8
11
Gap To 1 erance
Allowed for Anchor Bolt Diameters Greater than 1/2
11
in Inspection
Procedure No. STF-16.
This matter concerned that the l/8
11
gap
d.
3
tolerance may be too loose.
The licensee stated that l/8
11 gap was
based on the recommendation of Exanpan Anchor Manufactures Institute.
This gap tolerance was used for the inspection of existing anchor
bolts and new installation for modification of pipe supports per
The l/8
11 gap allowed under one side of the
washer/nut for bolts over 1/2
11 diameter in accordance with the Hilti
report recommendations and STF-16, represents an angularity of
approximately 6 degrees.
The
11State-of-the-Art Report of Stee 1
Embedments
11 of the ASCE Nuclear Structures and Materials Committee in
June 1984 (printed in Structural Engineering in Nuclear Facilities,
Volume 2, 1984) provides supporting information in Section 4.2.2.1,
Anchor Angularity.
It stated that the allowable anchor tensile and
shear loads should be reduced if the angularity exceeds 6 degrees and
provided Figure 4.18 to illustrate a recommended procedure for
accounting for anchor angularity when the installed anchor is greater
than 6 degrees by increasing the applied tensile and shear loads.
However, the licensee revised the procedures for new installations to
specify the use of tapered washers over a certain angularity. Civil
Engineering Standard CEN-010 specifies this tolerance as follows:
A gap of 1/32
11 for 5/8
11 bolts or smaller and 1/16
11 for bolts greater
than 5/8
11 is acceptable without tapered plate-washers. Tapered plate
washers may be used to correct bolts with up to twice this gap.
Gaps
greater than"~l/16 11 for 5/8 11
bo 1 ts or sma 11 er and 1/8
11 for bo 1 ts
greater than 5/8
11 are unacceptable and shall be reinstalled.
11
The
requirements i~ CEN-010 are similar to the AISC Code requirements for
high-strength-bolt
connections
(Section 1.23.5):
Surfaces
of
high-strength-bolted parts in contact with the bolt head and nut
sha 11 not have a s 1 ope of more than 1: 20 with respect to a p 1 ane
normal to the bolts axis.
Where the surfaces of a high-strength-
bolted part have a slope of more than 1:20, a beveled washer shall be
used to compensate for the lack of parallelism.
11
The 1/16
11 gap for
bo 1 ts greater than 5/8
11 with out tapered p 1 ate washers a 11 owed by
CEN-010 is consistent with the 1:20 slope permitted by the AISC Code.
In conclusion, the licensee claims that use of 1/8
11 gap tolerance,
the angularity criteria of STF-16, is considered appropriate for past
use in inspection of existing anchor bolts.
The incorporation of
1/16
11 gap to 1 erance and the use of tapered p 1 ate washers * i ri the
procedures for new anchor bolt i nsta 11 at ions pro vi des the new
methods to meet the more restricted requirements per the AISC Code.
Therefore, this item is considered closed based on the licensee
explanations as showed above.
(Closed) IFI 50-280,281/88-20-04, Allowable Loads and Justifications
for .Hilti Anchor Bolts for IEB 79-02,
NRC
Information Notice
Nos. 86-94 and 88-25.
IEB 79-02 requires the licensee to determine
the anchor bolt allowables based on the testing capacity in field or
catalog capacity published by the manufacturer if Quality Assurance
(QA) document is available.
NRC Information Notice Nos. 86-94 and
88-25 recommends that licensees who use Hilti anchor bolts review the
4
allowables used in design calculations since the NRC found that the
test capacity in field was 30% - 40% below the catalog capacity due
to the various concrete mixtures.
The inspector held discussions
with the licensee's engineers and reviewed the response contained in
EMTR-88-MSW-004.
The allowable loads for Hilti Kwik-Bolt anchor
bolts used during the IE Bull et in 79-02 effort at Surry were
calculated from the average Ultimate Loads listed on attachment A of
the Abbott A. Hanks, Inc.
Testing Laboratory Report No. 8783 and
8783R.
An additional on-site testing at Surry was performed by Hilti
Systems,
Inc.
and documented i.n the test report, "Torque vs.
Pretension Test and Load vs. Displacement Test for Hilti Kwik-Bolt
Concrete Expansion Anchors Performed at Surry Power . Station on
January 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1980.
11
The average ultimate strengths
from field tests were about 20% -
50% higher than the corresponding
values in the Abbott A. Hanks Report.
Therefore,
the licensee
concluded that the allowable used for IEB 79-02 were adequate.
NRC
Information Notice No. 86-94 provided information that Hilti was
revising the allowable loads for their 1/2
11 diameter Kwik-Bolts
provided in their catalogs, based on additional testing.
For the
average tensile ultimate load on a 1/2
11 diameter Hilti bolt, Surry
fie 1 d testing was 12,380 pounds which was higher than the 10,338
pounds in the A. A. Hanks Test Report used as a design basis and the
- 9,500 pounds reported in NRC Information Notice No. 86-94 which
reported that Hilti was revising the new allowable loads.
The
licensee claimed the new ultimate load was only 9% lower than the
design load and the field test results provided the enough margin.
Therefore, the licensee concluded that the 1/2
11
Hilti Kwik-Bolt
previously installed are acceptable.
However, the procedure for
installation of new Hilti Kwik-Bolts at Surry (Civil Engineering
Standard CEN-010) was revised to use the design allowables based on
Attachment 1 of NRC Information Notice No. 86-94.
NRC Information
Notice No. 88-25 provided the information that Hilti had filed a
notification stating that recent testing had demonstrated that their
previously published allowable edge distance for Hilti Kwik-Bolts
were non-conservative.
Licensee were required to evaluate the effect
of the increased required edge di stances.
The 1 i censee made a
preliminary study based on
the field test results
and
the
conservative seismic loadings and concluded that no safety concern
exists due to the revised requirements.
The procedures for New Hilti
installation have been revised to incorporate the latest Hil_ti
installation guidelines, and these will be used for any new Hilti
bolt
installation
in
the
future.
Power
engineers
participated a meeting between the NRC,
and other utility
representatives in Bethesda, Maryland on July 15, 1988 to discuss NRC
Information Notice No. 88-25 and other issues related to anchor bolt
problems in the industry.
NRC is studying this issue with other
anchor bolt problems.
Virginia Power will initiate a program to
review the impact of this issue (NRC Information Notice No. 88-25)
after the full scope of concerns regarding the expansion bolts have
been identified in the industry, and after the NRC issues additional
5
clarification; if any, in a generic letter or a bulletin.
The
inspector considers the explanation of allowable loads for Hilti
Anchor Bolts for IEB 79-02 and justific,:a,tion for NRC Information
Notice No. 86-94 ar& acceptable.
The resolution of NRC Information
Notice No. 88-25 will be handled as a separate issue.
3.
Review of NRC Bulletins
a .. (Open)
IFI 50-280,281/87-BU-02, fastener testing to determine
conformance
with
applicable
material
specifications (Bulletin
No. 87-02). This bulletin and its supplements 1 and 2 request that
licensees 1) review their receipt inspection requirements and
i nterna 1 contro 1 for fasteners; 2) independently determine, through
testing, whether fasteners (studs, bo 1 ts, cap screws, and nuts) in
stores at their facilities meet required mechanical and chemical
specification
requirement;
and
3) submit
information to
NRC
concerning the source of fasteners purchased for use in nuclear power
plants.
The inspector held discussions with the licensee warehouse
superintendent and QC receiving inspection supervisor and reviewed
information provided.
The responses submitted to NRC for this
bulletin were
reviewed.
They
are
Serial
No.87-705,
dated
January 12, 1988; Serial No. 87-705B, dated February 29, 1988; and
Serial No.88-232, dated July 21, 1988.
Enclosure 1
of
Submittal
No.87-705
described the
following
chiracteristics currently being examined during receipt inspection of
the fasteners:
1) visual inspections for damage; 2) random check of
thread size, diameter, 1 ength, and markings on heads or ends;
3) chemical and physical data on certified material test report
(CMTR) or material test report (MTR); 4) verification of heat number
or lot number identification to CMTR or MTR; 5) verification of
manufacturer 1 s certificate of conformance when applicable, etc.
For internal control of fasteners, the licensee uses the following
three methods stated in their response:
(1)
Fasteners are tagged individually or bagged and tagged as a lot
with number of fasteners, stock number, storage 1 eve 1, * heat
number,
purchase order (P.O.)
number,
and
safety-related
designation.
(2)
If safety-related threaded bar is cut, a qualified inspector
witnesses the subdivision and provides additional acceptance
tags or stickers.
(3)
For safety-related items, a QA accepted tag is affixed. Stores
personne 1 do not issue safety-re 1 ated i terns un 1 ess a tag is
affixed.
These tags are inspected as part of maintenance
monitoring activities in the field.
6
In response to Bulletin 87-02 action items 2 through 5, the
licensee submitted a technical report as Enclosure 2 to letter
serial
No.87-705.
51 fastener samples were selected on
December 4, 1987, in the presence of the NRC Resident Inspector.
The 51 samples included capscrews, bolts, threaded bars, and
nuts.
The technical report included completed fastener testing
data sheets for each sample, completed data summary sheets for
each sample, and the technical evaluations for the out-of-speci-
. fications fasteners.
The licensee concluded that no fastener
discrepancies identified during this testing adversely affect
safety-related components.
The test results indicated five
fasteners slightly out of specification and two fasteners with a
significant deviation from specification.
The two fasteners
with a significant deviation had measured hardness higher than
the specified maximum and their metallurgical structures are
more susceptible to stress corrosion cracking.
To eliminate
this problem in future, the licensee plans to remove the
remaining supply of these fasteners from stock to prevent future
use of these materials in safety-related systems.
The inspector
toured the warehouse and did not see any of these two fasteners
in stock. The store superintendent has committed to conducting
a documentation search to prove that these fasteners have been
removed and discarded.
After discussion with the
store
personnel, the inspector learned that there were two warehouses
in Surry site during the fastener sampling which were combined
into one warehouse, called the main warehouse, about three
months ago.
The main warehouse previously stocked safety-
related fasteners only and was the only warehouse sampled.
The
other warehouse which was eliminated was called the Construction
Warehouse and stocked safety-related fasteners and non-safety
related
fasteners.
Both
fasteners
were
used
for
new
construction and pl ant modification.
There were non-safety
related fasteners in the Construction Warehouse during the
fastener sampling which were not submitted for testing per the
requirements of Bulletin No. 87-02.
The licensing engineers and
material engineers indicated that only safety-related fasteners
are used in pressure boundary systems, therefore non-safety
related fasteners from the Construction Warehouse were not
submitted for testing.
Since none of these safety-related and
non-safety related fasteners were submitted for testing, the
inspector requested that the licensee Quality Assurance (QA)
Department investigate a) the types and quantity of each group
of non-safety related fasteners b) location/equipment where
non-safety related fasteners are used.
Pending the licensee
investigation, this item will be identified as UNR 50-280,
281/89-05-03, Sampling of Non-Safety Re 1 ated Fasteners for
Testing from Construction Warehouse for Bulletin No. 87-02.
In
response to Item 6 of Bulletin No. 87-02, the licensee
submitted Letter Serial No. 87-705B for their evaluation of
current procedures and practices to assure continued compliance
b.
7
with fastener specifications and requirements.
Two actions were
taken after reviewing current procedures and practices:
the
feas i bi 1 i ty of reducing the number and types of fastener
materials stocked; development of purchasing specifications for
purchase order for each pressure boundary fastener type against
the appropriate ASTM/ASME specification.
The licensee did not
have specifications for purchasing fasteners and based on the
manufacturer specifications before March 1987.
Speci fi cation
No. NUS-2081,
11Speci fi cation for Threaded Fasteners for Surry
Power Station, Units 1 and 2
11 , dated March 12, 1987, was issued
for use for fasteners and was discontinued after specification
No. NUS-2206
was
issued.
Specification
No. NUS-2206,
11Specification for Pressure Boundary Threaded Fasteners for
North Anna and Surry Power Station
11 , dated August 11, 1988 was
revised from specification No. NUS-2081 and included the above
two actions taken.
Appendix 1 of specification No. NUS-2206,
11 Fastener Cross Reference and Usage Gui de
11 , reduces the number
of fastener types to be purchased.
Technical Data Sheets of
Specification No. NUS-2206 1 i st the purchase requirements for
each type of fastener.
Letter Serial No.88-232 provided a list
of safety-related fastener vendors within past ten years and
non-safety re 1 ated fastener vendors within past five years.
Pending further inspection and verification of the responses,
this item remains open .
(Open) IFI 50-280,281/88-BU-08, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected
to Reactor Coolant Systems '(Bulletin No. 88-08).
This bulletin
requests that licensees 1) review their reactor coolant systems
(RCSs)
for
unacceptable thermal
stresses due
to temperature
distributions and 2) take actions to ensure the pipe remain within
acceptable thermal stresses. Supplement 1 to the bulletin emphasizes
the need for sufficient examinations due to more cracks found in a
foreign nuclear plant.
Supplement 2 to the Bulletin emphasizes the
need for enhanced ultrasonic testing (UT) and for experienced
examinatiun personnel to detect cracks in stainless steel piping.
The inspector held discussions with the licensee's engineers and
reviewed the information provided.
The
response to. bulletin
No. 88-08 in Letter Serial No*.88-433, dated October 3, 1988, was
reviewed.
The licensee has reviewed piping that connect to the
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) in accordance with Bulletin No. 88-08.
This review has identified lines from the Safety Injection Systems
(SI) that connect to the RCS and could be subjected to stresses from
temperature stratification or oscillations.
The
licensee has
initiated efforts to evaluate the concern with thermal gradients in
pressurizer surge lines for Surry during the review of Bulletin
No. 88-08 since the Bulletin concerned thermal stresses. The concern
of pressurizer surge lines became a separate bulletin on December 20,
1988
as
Bulletin
No. 88-11,
Pressurizer Surge
Line
Thermal
Stratification, as stated in Paragraph 3.c.
Therefore, the licensee
went ahead and all activity for Bulletin No. 88-08 included the
concerns of Bulletin No. 88-11.
8
As a result of review, the licensee identified the following lines as
potentially susceptible to this thermal stress concern:
Surry Unit 1
(1)
Safety Injection System (Cold Leg)
6
11 -RC-17-1502, 6
11 -RC-19-1502, and 611 -RC-20-1502
(2)
Low Head Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
6
11 -RC-16-1502
'
' 611 -RC-18-1502, and 611 -RC-21-1502
Surry Unit 2
(1)
Safety Injection System (Cold Leg)
6
11 -RC-317-1502, 611-RC-319-1502, and 611 -RC-320-1502
(2)
Low Head Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
6
11 -RC-316-1502, 611 -RC-318-1502, and 611 -RL-321-1502
The licensee completed Ultrasonic Testing (UT) on Unit 1 using
Standard UT Examination Techniques with 45° and 60° transducers
during the Spring of 1988, per NRC Information Notice No. 88-01. The
UT was performed on the welds' and approximately 2
11 beyond the welds
which would include heat affected zones and about 1
11 of base metal.
The licensee now intends to use Intergranular Stress Corrosion
Cracking Procedure (IGSCC)
recommended by the Supplement 2 to
Bulletin No. 88-08 to do the new UT Examination including welds, HAZ,
and the base metal at center of elbow, which will be in full
compliance with the bulletin requirements for Unit 1.
The licensee
had completed UT on Unit 2 based on IGSCC procedures using 45° and
60° transducers and the high sensitivity adjustment at welds, HAZ,
and base metal (about 2
11 ) next to the HAZ at the elbow, in compliance
with the bul 1 et in requirements, during the Fa 11
of 1988. . The
licensee did not examine the base metal at center of .elbow as
requirements by Supplement 1 to Bulletin No. 88-08.
So far, all UT
performed did not show any significant indications or cracks.
The
licensee project engineer stated that UT would be performed on base
metal at the center of elbow for Unit 1 when
IGSCC would be
implemented
to
supersede
Standard
Examination
performed
previously. If there are any significant indications or cracks shown
in the base metal at the center of elbow on Unit 1, the licensee will
come back and perform IGSCC of base metal at the center of the elbow
for Unit 2.
The
inspector reviewed Procedure No. VCR-ISI-2.9,
Rev. 2,
Manual
Ultrasonic
Examination
for
the Detection of
Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking, dated September 20, 1988, to
ascertain whether they had been reviewed and approved.
The above
9
procedure were reviewed for technical adequacy and conformance with
the ASME Code,Section V in the below listed areas:
type of
apparatus
used;
extent of coverage of weldment;
calibration
requirements; search units; beam angles; DAC curves; reference level
of monitoring discontinutities; method for demonstrating penetration;
scanning
sensitivity;
limits
for
evaluating
and
recording
indications;
recording significant indications;
and
acceptance
limits.
Records of completed nondestructive examinations UT were
selected and reviewed to ascertain whether:
the methods, technique,
and extent of the examinatio~ complied with the above IGSCC
procedure; findings were properly recorded and evaluated by qualified
personnel; personnel, instruments, calibration blocks and couplants
were designated.
Records selected for this review are listed below.
No discrepancies were noted.
UT Inspection
Unit No.
1
Weld No.
8
Drawing No.
VPA-1-4500
VIR-1-4304
Line No.
Line Description
12 11 RC-10-2501R
Pressurizer Surge
Line
2
2
4
2
VIR-1-4305
6-
11 RC-321
Safety Injection
System
11 C
11 Loop Hot Leg
6
11-RC-320
Safety Injection
System
11C
11 Loop Cold Leg
The inspector reviewed Report No. 03-1250-1163, Evaluation of NRC
Bulletin 88-08 for Surry Power Station, Rev. 0, dated August 24, 1988
by Impe 11 Corporation.
This report reviewed the various systems
connected to the reactor coolant system ..
This included the
Pressurizer Surge Line and Spray Lines, the Residual Heat Removal
(RHR) System, the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), and the
Safety Injection System (SIS).
The six systems stated above were
identified as being susceptible to thermal stresses describ~d in
Bulletin No. 88-08.
The pressurizer surge line connected to the RCS
Loop 3 Hot Leg were reviewed by Impe 11
and Stone and Webster
Engineering Corporation and included in Bulletin No. 88-08 by the
licensee.
The two A/E's recommended UT inspection at welds and pipes and
installation of thermocouples attached to the top and bottom of
piping at specific locations.
The thermocouples are temporary
instrumentation and were installed at specific preselected location
to record temperature oscillations as an interim measure pending a
long term alternative. The inspector also reviewed Engineering Work
Request (EWR) No.88-425. for Unit 1 and 88-448 for Unit 2.
The
inspector walked down the systems with assistance from the licensee
10
system engineers to verify installation of thermocouples, wires,
junction boxes, Data Logger, and Mass Storage at the Safety Injection
System
11t
11 Loop and Pressurizer Surge Line for Unit 1.
The Data
Logger and Mass Storage are to record and analyze the temperatures
from the thermocouples.
A positioner was installed above the
Pressurizer Surge Line to monitor piping movement and was routed to
testing terminals in the Tunnel and Vault.
The results of walkdown
were listed below:
Thermocouple Inspection for Unit 1
Thermocouple
I. D
Pipe Section
611 -RC-20-1502
Line
Description
Required
Location
At Pipe
Descrepancies
About 45°
T /C-RC-lllA
Clockwise
T /C-RC-1118
Clockwise
T/C-RC-107A
T /C-RC-1078
T/C-RC-108
T /C-RC-109
T/C-RC-llOA
T /C-RC-100B
T /C-RC-112
to
T/C-RC-117
Notes:
611 -RC-21-1502
6
11 -RC-21-1502
611 -RC-21-1502
611 -RC-21-1502
6
11 -RC-21-1502
611-RC-21-1502
12
11-RC-10-2501R
SI to CL
SI to CL
SI to HL
SI to HL
SI to HL
SI to HL
SI to HL
SI to HL
PSL
Horizonal - Means Installation At Two Sides Of Pipe.
SI designates Safety Injection
11c
11 Loop
CL designates Cold Leg
HL designates Hot Leg
PSL designates Pressurizer Surge Line
Top
Bottom
Top
Bottom
Side
Side
Top
Bottom
Note 7
From Center
Vertical Line
About 45°
From Center
Vertical Line
Hori zonal
Hori zonal
None
None
Hori zonal
Hori zonal
Insulation covered
could not be
verified
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Drawing No. S88425-1-SK6-1, Rev. 1, SI to CL; S88425-1-SK5-l, Rev. 1, SI
to HL; S88425-1-SK-7-1, Rev. 1, PSL.
7.
Every 36° from top to bottom at one side.
The above installation for thermocouples had been signed off by a QC
Inspector on December 21, 1988, per installation records shown on
pages 17, 19 and 20 of EWR.No.88-425.
The inspector discussed the
installation discrepancies with the QC inspector who inspected
thermocouples, QC supervisor, system engineer-s, and project engineer.
The QC inspector stated that T/C-RC-lllA & 111B were slightly off
from the center vertical line and T/C-RC-107A, 107B, llOA, & 1108
were at top & bottom when he inspected and signed off.
He
contributed that the location or position changes could be due to
11
workers working around, walking around, or during pipe insulation
reinstallation.
The QC inspector also said that the thermocouples
are very easy to move after installation since it is difficult to
tighten securely to the pipe by the temporary hose clamp.
Per the
inspectors observation, a 11 thermocoup 1 es having discrepancies were
at 180° from each other, either at hori zona 1 or off from center:
vertical line.
If anyone accidentally twisted or stepped on a
thermocouple, this one would not be 180° from the opposite one since
they were separately connected to pipe and separated about 1
11 *
If
the thermocouples were so easy to twist after installation, the
design and installation methods should be reevaluated.
The exact
locations of thermocouples are very important since thermocouples
will monitor temperatures of the pipe and provide data for long term
analyses.
Pending the licensee correction of the orientation of
these thermocouples, this item is identified as
50-280,
281/89-05-01, Ori en tat ion Problems for Thermo coup 1 es Ins ta 11 ed at
Safety Injection Lines and Pressurizer Surge Line.
The licensee
QA department was requested to reinspect all thermocouples installeq
and investigate the reasons or problems for the orientation changes
of thermocouples and provided solutions to prevent the recurrence.
Pending the licensee QA
investigation on
the orientation of
thermocouples, this item is identified as UNR 50-280,281/89-05-02, QA
Investigation of Orientation changes on all Thermocouples installed
on Safety Injection Lines and Pressurizer Surge Line.
c.
(Open)
IFI 50-280,281/88-BU-11,
Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal
Stratification (Bulletin No. *88-11).
This bulletin requests that
licensees establish and implement a program to confirm pressurizer
surge
line integrity in
view of the occurrence of thermal
stratification and take actions to resolve this issue.
The
NRC
resident inspector observed the licensee action on January 16 and 18,
1989, to satisfy paragraph l.a. of the Bulletin and identified
discrepancies involving spring cans bottomed out, loose nuts, and
bent rod for the pipe supports along the line as IFI 50-281/88-51-03,
Evaluation of Whip Restraints on Pressurizer Surge Line for Unit 2.
There was no gross deformation of supports or piping noted by the NRC
resident inspector for Unit 1.
The licensee combined this BuJletin
into Bulletin No. 88-08 (see paragraph 4.b. above) for activities or
actions such as analyses, UT examination, thermocouple installation
and monitoring, and long term solution.
4.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on February 10, 1989,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed
below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
The
licensee was told that UNR 50-280,281/88-20-0l, 88-20-03, and 88-20-04
were closed.
The inspectors concerns about thermocouple orientations were
expressed during the meeting.
Dissenting comments were not received from
the licensee.
12
(Open) UNR 50-280, 281/89-05-01, Ori en tat ion Prob 1 ems for Thermocoup 1 es
Installed at Safety Injection Lines and Pressurizer Surge Line.
(Open) UNR 50-280,281/89-05-02, QA Investigation on Orientation Changes on
all Thermocouples Installed at Safety Injection Lines and Pressurizer
Surge Line.
(Open) UNR 50-280,281/89-05-03, Sampling of Non-Safety Related Fasteners
for Testing from Construction Warehouse for Bulletin No. 87-02.