ML18152A396
| ML18152A396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1994 |
| From: | Belisle G, Branch M, Tingen S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A397 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-94-21, 50-281-94-21, NUDOCS 9409130067 | |
| Download: ML18152A396 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1994021
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
Report Nos.:
50-280/94-21 and 50-281/94-21
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
July 3 through August 6, 1994
Inspectors:
W. Branch,
Inspector
M~-1tekspector
Accompanying Personnel: ~
W. Garner, Project Engineer
M. Tamai, Intern .
Approved by:
~~-~--~
Scope:
~G.
lisle, Chief
Rea to Projects Section 2A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
~6~
Date S,ged
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant
status, operational safety verification, maintenance and surveillance
inspections, safety assessment and quality verification, Licensee Event Report
followup, and engineering technical specification review project.
Inspections
of backshift and weekend activities were conducted on July 13, 14, 15, and 28 .
9409130067 940826
ADOCK 05000280
G
PD8_
L
2
Results: *
Plant Operation fun~tional area
Housekeeping in the Unit 2 containment spray pump safeguards area was not up
to the normal station standards. Housekeeping and equipment condition was
good in the emergency service water pump house (paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2).
Maintenance functional area
The weekly service water flow method of determining component cooling heat
exchanger heat transfer capacity was conservative and provided useful
information to operations and system engineering as to when a component
cooling heat exchanger needed to be .cleaned.
In addition the heat transfer
capability was in excess of that required by Technical Specifications (TSs),
(paragraph 4.1).
The maintenance and surveillance associated with replacing the train A
charcoal filter media were satisfactorily accomplished.
However, an
unresolved item was identified in the area of required charcoal
testing/sampling following a chemical release in the Unit~ containment during
steam generator chemical cleaning activities (paragraph 4.2).
Engineering functional area
The licensee's review of the TS surveillance program was thorough.
The
identification and correction of deficiencies significantly improved the TS
surveillance program.
However, three concerns identified by engineering
involving monthly surveillance functional testing may not have been properly
evaluated.
Resolution of these three concerns was identified as an unresolved
item (paragraph 7) .
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
2 .
I.I
Licensee Employees
- B. Allen, Acting Superintendent Operations
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
H. Blake, Jr., Superintendent of Nuclear Site Services
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Maintenance
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
J. Costello, Station Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness
- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
- D. Erickson, Superintendent of Radiation Protection
A. Friedman, Superintendent of Nuclear Training
- B. Garber, Licensing
- L. Hartz, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance
B. Hayes, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- D. Hayes, Superintendent of Administrative Services
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- C.;Luffman, Superintendent, Security
J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- R. Saunders, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- V. Shifflett, Licensing
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- B. Stanley, Procedures
- J. Swientoniewski, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Safety
- G. Woodzell, Nuclear Training
Other licensee employees contacted included plant managers and
supervisors, operators, engineers, technicians, mechanics,
security force members, and office personnel.
1.2
NRC Personnel
M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- D. Tamai, Intern
L. Garner, Project Engineer
- Attended Exit Interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Plant Status
Units I and 2 operated at power for the entire inspection period.
2
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent tours of the control room to verify
proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to approved
procedures.
The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed
operator logs on a daily basis to verify operational safety and
compliance with TSs and to maintain overall facility operational
awareness.
Instrumentation and ECCS lineups were periodically reviewed
from control room indications to assess operability. Frequent plant
tours were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection
programs, radiological work practices, plant security programs and
housekeeping. "Deviation reports were reviewed to assure that potential
safety concerns were properly addressed and reported.
3.1
Biweekly ESF Inspections
3.1.1 Unit 2 CS System
The inspectors walked down the Unit 2 CS components located
in the safeguards building, the CS valves adjacent to the
~WST and chemical addition tank and control board
indications for CS pumps and valves.
The inspectors noted
that housekeeping in the safeguards area was not up to the
normal station standards. The area was in the process of
being painted. The area was not being painted on the day of
the walkdown.
There were rags, sand paper, and rubber
gloves on the floor and CS components.
The licensee was
informed and took corrective action by cleaning the area.
3.1.2 ESW System
The inspectors walked down the three diesel driven ESW pumps
located at the low level intake structure.
Items checked
were positions of diesel trip and fuel oil valves,
housekeeping and general condition of equipment.
Equipment
appeared to be in good overall condition and housekeeping
was acceptable. Trip and fuel-oil-valves were in the*
correct positions.
3.2
10 CFR 50.72 Report on Early Warning System Siren Failure
On July 26, the licensee made a non-emergency one-hour
10 CFR 50.72 report due to the Early Warning System being
While performing the Early Warning System polling
functional test, the Early Warning System sirens did not respond
to the polling signal. A failed transistor in the Early Warning
System power supply caused the system failure.
The power supply
was repaired and the system was returned to service at 2:51 p.m.
of the same day.
.*
3
3.3
Unit 2 SG Cleaning Activities
Unit 2 was shutdown between June 4 and 24, 1994, in order to clean
the secondary.sides of the SGs.
The final estimates, in pounds,
of materials removed during the SG cleaning process were:
SG A
SG B
SG C
350
470
500
2600
3050
3900
Sludge
1258
984
610
The inspectors discussed the sources of corrosion/erosion products
with the licensee and concluded that the most likely source of
copper was from the copper/nickel tubes in the main feedwater
heaters.
The SGs at Surry were replaced in the 1981 time frame.
At that time, the main feedwater heat exchangers had copper/nickel
tubes.
In the 1991 timeframe, all the feedwater heaters in Unit 1
were replaced with new feedwater heaters having titanium tubes.
In 1990 stages 6, 5, 4 and 3 of Unit's 2 feedwater heaters were
replaced with the new design.
The two remaining Unit 2
copper/nickel tube feedwater heaters are scheduled to be replaced
with titanium tube heaters during the 1995 refueling outage which
is currently scheduled to start in February 1995.
Flow assisted
corrosion/erosion of the main feedwater piping is the source of
The licensee's Flow Assisted Corrosion
Program has replaced iron piping with chrome molly piping in many
instances where wall thinning was identified.
Other than restricting power operations due to oscillating SG
level and causing the operators to be distracted, the SG tube
scaling did not appear to have an adverse effect on plant safety.
The inspectors based this conclusion on the following:
The number of tubes plugged in*the Surry SGs is very low.
Eddy current testing performed during refueling outages have
not identified significant SG tube problems such as denting
or degradation.
Regional inspectors routinely review eddy
current test results and have not identified any significant
problems during these reviews.
The shell sides of SGs are routinely inspected during
refueling outages and no significant problems have been
identified. The resident inspectors accompanied
Westinghouse personnel on one of these inspections and did
not identify any problems.
The licensee utilized cameras to inspect the support plate
regions of the SGs prior to, during and after cleaning.
The
4
results of these inspections were recorded.
With the
exception of plugged tube support quatrefoil assembly
openings identified before cleaning the SGs, no problems
were identified. These films were reviewed by the resident
inspectors and problems were not identified.
In the past the licensee has utilized ammonia and hydrazine for
feedwater pH control. Very recently secondary chemistry controls
was changed for Unit 2 and ETA is being injected into the
feedwater/condensate systems to enhance pH control.
Improved pH
control should reduce the corrosion rate of the feedwater piping.
If this is successful in Unit 2, the same method of feedwater pH
control will be implemented in Unit 1.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance And Surveillance Inspections (62703, 61726)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed the following
maintenance/surveillance activities to assure compliance with the
appropriate procedures.
4.1
Measuring Macrofouling Blockage in the CCHX
On July 14, the inspectors reviewed completed procedure
l-OSP-SW-005, Measurement of Macrofouling Blockage of
CCHX 1-CC-E-lD, revision 4.
The procedure had just been completed
by the evening shift when the inspectors performed their review.
The procedure's purpose was to provide instructions to monitor
flow through the SW side of CCHX 1-CC-E-lD, and to use the flow
readings obtained to determine the CCHX operability with respect
to the amount of tubesheet macrofouling. All four of the CCHXs
were tested each week to ensure operability.
Procedure l-OSP-SW-005 contained instructions to measure and
record DP across the SW side of the CCHX, as read on the Barton
and Annubar gages .. The SW discharge valve*was throttled-and
several sets of DP measurements were recorded.
The highest set of
DP measurements recorded were plotted on one of six graphs in
attachment 2 of the procedure.
SW temperature was recorded in
attachment 1 and this SW temperature determined which graph to
use~
The six graphs were for different SW temperatures starting
at 70 degrees F and going up to 95 degrees Fin 5 degree
increments.
Each graph had three regions titled "Inoperable",
"Alert" and "Operable".
The results of the July 14 performance of procedure l-OSP-SW-005
were that CCHX 1-CC-E-lD was in the "Alert" region but still
The operator used the 85 degree F graph in the
procedure since the recorded SW temperature was 84.3 degrees F.
Step 6.2.17 of the procedure instructed using a graph
corresponding to a temperature equal to or higher than the actual
4.2
5
recorded temperature.
The inspectors were in the control room at
10:00 p.m., and noted the following temperatures based on
condenser water box inlet temperatures, which is what the operator
used to measure SW temperature.
The temperatures were taken from
the P-250 monitor and were all in degrees F.
The A CWB inlet
temperature was 85.9, B was 85.4, C was 89.6 and D was 86.1.
Based on the temperatures noted by the inspectors at 10:00 p.m.,
CCHX 1-CC-E-lD would have been inoperable based on the 90 degree F
graph.
The inspectors questioned both the STA and the unit SRO as
to the apparent data discrepancy.
The SRO indicated that CWB
inlet temperature changed with the time of day as well as the
tide. At the time of the test, the data that was recorded was
correct.
The SRO also indicated that the data would be verified.
It was not apparent from the procedure what, if any, margin was
included in the graphs.
As noted above, a CCHX could be operable
or in alert at the time of testing but would be inoperable with an
increase in SW temperature. After questioning by the inspectors
the licensee reperformed the test of 1-CC-E-lD with the elevated
temperature and declared the CCHX inoperable.
DR S-94-1471 was
written to document the unsatisfactory condition.
The inspectors discussed this issue with the system engineer.
Additional information as to the margin contained in the
acceptance criteria used in procedure l-OSP-SW-005 was provided.
Technical Reports ME-0047, revision 0, and ME-0076, revision 0,
CCHX Performance Testing, contained an accurate comparison of
between.the SW flow measurement heat transfer determination and
the CC heat transfer determination.
Periodically more accurate
test equipment including RTDs and ultrasonic flow meters were
temporarily connected to the CCHX's CC side and measurements were
taken.
This CC side heat transfer information was compared to
that obtained from the weekly SW Annubar flow instrument
measurement to determine margin in the weekly measurement.
The
comparative measurements indicated that the Annubar flow
determination was conservative by approximately 30%.
The actual
heat transfer would* be approximately 50 mi 11 ion* Btu/hr verses *
38.5 million Btu/hr.
The inspectors determined that the weekly SW flow method for
determining CCHX heat transfer capacity was conservative and
provided useful information to operations and system engineering
as to when a CCHX should be cleaned.
In addition, the heat
transfer capability was in excess of that required by TSs.
After
reviewing the additional information provided by the licensee the
inspectors had no concerns with the test observed on July 14.
Train A Charcoal Filter Replacement/Testing
On June 16, 1994, a hydrazine concentration of 6 ppm and an
ammonia concentration of 30 ppm were detected in the Unit 2
containment. These fumes were identified after the manways were
6
removed from SGs that had just completed chemical cleaning.
In
order to decrease the concentrations of hydrazine and ammonia *in
containment, ventilation flow rate was increased.
The train A and
train B" AVEF systems were operated to increase the containment
flow rate. The emergency ventilation system charcoal supplier was
contacted and informed the licensee that exposing charcoal to
these fumes was not detrimental to the charcoal.
On June 28, 1994, charcoal samples were obtained for the train A
AVER system and sent to a contractor for analysis. This sample
was obtained to meet the requirement of TS 4.12.A.8.d.
TS 4.12.A.8.d requires that laboratory analysis on charcoal samples
be performed following painting, fire, or chemical release in a
ventilation zone communicating with the system during system
operation.
On July 15 the licensee was notified that analysis
results for the methyl iodide removal rate was 93.43%.
The
minimum methyl iodine removal rate specified in TS 4.12.B.4 was
96%.
The AVEF system train A was declared inoperable.
On July 19 through 22, the inspectors witnessed the licensee
replacing and testing the AVEF system train A charcoal filter
media.
The maintenance was accomplished in accordance with WO 292920 01 and procedure O-MCM-0620-02, Ventilation System Pre-
Filter, HEPA and Carbon Cell Removal, Inspection and Installation,
revision 0.
The inspectors verified that station procedures were
adequate and were adhered to, supervision and maintenance
engineering support was sufficient and appropriate radiological
controls were implemented.
The inspectors concluded that this
maintenance was efficiently accomplished.
No significant problems
were identified and the job progressed smoothly.
After replacement, the train A filter media was tested in
accordance with O-MPT-0620-01, Auxiliary And Control Room
Ventilation System HEPA And Charcoal Filter Test Criteria
Documentation And Verification, revision I.
In order to
accomplish this testing a flow rate of approximately 35,000 CFM
was established and an in-place DOP test was performed.
Results
of the DOP test indicated that the HEPA filters were 99.99%
efficient which was acceptable. After completing the DOP test, a
halogenated hydrocarbon leakage test was performed.
The test
results indicated that the filter media tray seals were 100%
efficient. The DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon leakage testing
was accomplished by a contractor.
The inspectors concluded that
the new filter media was properly tested in accordance with TSs
and licensee oversight of the contractor performing the testing
was adequate.
On July 28 the AVEF train B charcoal filter media was sampled.
On
August 4, the licensee was notified that results of the analysis
was 90.7% methyl iodide removal rate which was below minimum TS
requirements.
The AVEF system train B was declared inoperable.
The charcoal was replaced and DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon
5.
7
leakage tests were performed prior to returning the system to
service.
On August 5 Train B was successfully returned to
service.
At the end of the inspection period, the inspectors were reviewing
the time constraints associated with TSs 4.12.A.6.c, 4.12.A.7.c
and 4.12.A.8.d for sampling/testing the emergency ventilation
filters following exposure to chemical fumes.
This issue was
identified as URI 50-280, 281/94-21-01, Time Constraints For
Sampling/Testing Emergency Ventilation Filters Following Exposure
To Chemicals, pending further review by the inspectors.
Within the areas inspected, one URI was identified.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500}
The inspectors met with management level personnel at the corporate
Innsbrook office to discuss recent self assessments and ongoing
projects. The Manager of QA described the results of recent self
assessments and provided insight as to focus changes planned by QA to
provide better support to the operating units.
The Vice President of
Engineering shared information and details for several projects his
organization was involved with, including DBD efforts and changes to the
design control process to better control calculation results and ensure
timely incorporation into station design. Additionally, timeliness of
processing internal PPRs was discussed.
The licensee indicated that
their program meets the intent of GL 91-18 as to evaluating
indeterminate or questionable design concerns.
The inspectors will
continue to evaluate design issue resolution as part of the licensee's
corrective action program review.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Report Followup (92700}
The inspectors reviewed the LERs listed below to evaluate adequacy of
the corrective action. The inspectors' review also included followup of.
the licensee's corrective action implementation.
6.1
(Closed} LER 50-280/92-003-01, Incomplete Engineered Safety
Features Testing Due to Procedure Deficiency. This issue involved
calibrating the Units 1 and 2 PRZR PORV channels.
The licensee
identified that the main control room alarm that occurs when a
PORV opens was not being tested during performance of the channel
function test as required by TS 4.1.8.1.b.
Once this condition
was identified the PORV alarm was satisfactorily tested for both
units.
The inspectors reviewed procedures l/2-0PT-ZZ-005,
Verification of Local and MCB Valve Position Indication for the
PRZR PORVs, revision 1, and verified that the upgraded procedures
contained instructions to routinely test the alarm. Also as
corrective action, the licensee performed a review of the TS
8
surveillance program.
Results of this review are discussed in
paragraph 7.
6.2
(Closed) LER 50-280, 281/92-003-02, Incomplete Engineered Safety
Features Testing Due to Procedure Deficiency. This issue involved
calibration of the Units 1 and 2 RMT channels.
The licensee
identified that portions of the RMT channels were not being tested
during the performance of the monthly channel functional test as
required by TS Table 4.1-1, Item 15, in that not all test switch
contacts and interconnecting wiring were being tested.
Once this
condition was identified the test switch contacts and wiring were
satisfactory tested. The inspectors reviewed procedures l/2-PT-
2.19, Refueling Water Storage Tank Level, revision 6, and verified
that the procedures contained instructions to test the switch
contacts and wiring that were previously not tested. Also as
corrective action, the licensee performed a review of the TS
surveillance program.
Results of this review are discussed in
paragraph 7.
6.3
(Closed) LER 50-281/92-002, Two Charging Pumps And One Charging
Pump Service Water Pump Removed From Service Simultaneously Due To
Personnel Error.
With one charging pump and one charging pump SW
pump removed from service for preventive maintenance, an SRO
authorized a surveillance test that rendered each of the remaining
charging pumps inoperable at different times.
With a 24-hour LCO
in effect for the charging pump service water pump being out of
service, a 24-hour LCO was entered each time the two charging
pumps were rendered -inoperable. However, the SRO failed to
recognize that these two simultaneous conditions were a condition
not allowed by TS 3.3 and thus should have required entry into a
six-hour LCO per TS 3.0.1.
In all cases, while not recognized,
the six-hour limitation was not exceeded.
The inspectors verified that the three actions listed in the LER
to prevent recurrence were completed as committed.
Two of the
three actions, the committed test procedure changes and the
station'directive-requiring-specific TS lCO references to be
incorporated into procedures, were no longer in effect. A
philosophy change in the procedure upgrade project resulted in a
different approach to addressing LCOs in procedures than that
reflected by the above two items.
References to specific TSs were
replaced by notifications that certain steps would involve the
potential for or actual entry into a TS LCO.
Identification of
the specific TS LCO to be entered was then based upon existing
plant conditions and the SRO's knowleqge of TS requirements.
The inspectors verified that the latest revisions to the six
upgraded procedures, 1(2)-0PT-CH-001(2 or 3), Charging Pump
Operability and Performance Test For 1(2)-CH-P-lA(B or C), that
replaced 1(2)-PT-18.7, Charging Pump Operability and Performance
Test, were written in accordance with the latest guidance.
The
inspectors also verified that training was conducted and was
9
planned for future training sessions to reinforce that
.
simultaneous TS 3.3 LCO conditions require entry into the TS 3.0.1
LCO.
Specifically, in 1992, classroom training was provided on
LER 50-281/92-002 per requalification lesson plan RQ-92.4-TS-7,
TS 3.3 Safety Injection System.
The simulator lesson plan
RQ-6.SE-l (Loss Of Operating CP, Inleakage To SI Accumulator, Loss
Of MFW, Failure Of Pressurizer Safety Valve) used this year and
next scheduled for 1996 had licensed operators demonstrate proper
entry into TS 3.0.1 LCO for simultaneous TS 3.3 equipment
failures.
In addition, the inspectors confirmed that the initial
licensed training program lesson plan ND 80.3 LP-10, Operation of
eves, provided training on the event discussed in LER 281/92-002.
The inspectors concluded that the upgraded procedures and the
training provided sufficiently complement one another to ensure a
reasonable level of confidence that a similar event will be
precluded.
6.4
(Closed) LER 50-281/92-007, Auxiliary Feedwater System
Recirculation Piping Missile Shielding Removed Due To Personnel
Error.
The licensee determined that failure to follow
administrative procedures resulted in not recognizing that removal
of soil above the full flow AFW recirculation line to the ECST
created the potential for a missile to damage the line and
partially drain the ECST.
The inspectors verified via
documentation reviews that the event was reviewed with the
involved individuals and organization as committed in the LER.
These actions were considered appropriate.
6.5
(Closed) LER 50-281/92-008, Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate
Greater Than 10 GPM Due To Failure Of A Swagelok Fitting On A Flow
Transmitter. The LER indicated that a RCE would identify actions
to prevent recurrence.
The inspectors reviewed RCE Report No.92-009.
The event was caused by a failure to correctly assemble
the flow transmitter Swagelok fitting and an improper method for
repairing leaks on Swagelok fittings.
The inspectors verified
that VPAP-2002, Work Requests And Work Order Tasks, revision 3,
was revised as recommended by the RCE to* delete*tightening
instrument tubing from Attachment 13 as an example of work that
can be performed as minor maintenance.
On February 11, 1994, the
licensee identified that the October 1993 edition of The Accident
Prevention Manual was not revised to include the warning not to
tighten pressurized fittings.
The RCE recommended warnings are
now planned to be incorporate in the manual's next revision.
In
addition, the licensee identified that Gyrolok and Swagelok
fittings are not interchangeable.
The licensee indicated that
Gyrolok fittings had been removed from the stock room.
The
inspectors reviewed documentation that 13 other similar fittings
were inspected and found to be properly assembled.
The actions
taken should be sufficient to preclude recurrence.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified .
10
7.
Engineering TS Review Project (37551)
All TS surveillance and implementing procedures were reviewed by the
licensee in order to verify that the required surveillances were being
properly performed.
The inspectors reviewed the results of the
licensee's TS review Project.
The following issues were identified as a
result of this review:
Three surveillances were identified as not being properly
performed and LERs were issued as a result.
It was identified that the charging pump low pressure auto start,.
accumulator discharge MOV auto open at 2000 psi RCS pressure, loop
stop valve interlock to reactor protection and RHR inlet MOV
interlock circuits were not being functionally tested.
The
licensee concluded that TSs did not require these circuits to be
tested.
The inspectors reviewed TSs and verified that these
circuits were not required to be tested.
- --
Three surveillance procedures were identified as not providing
adequate instructions for entry into LCOs.
It was concluded that
LCO time constraints were not exceeded but procedures were changed
to;provide guidance for entry into the applicable LCO.
Three surveillances were identified where reactor protection/ESF
circuits were not being fully tested on a monthly basis with the
unit at power because testing required the use of jumpers or
disconnecting wires. These circuits were the auto start of TDAFWP
on lo-lo SG level and RCP UV and opening the reactor trip breakers
on low RCS flow.
The licensee concluded that the circuits were
not designed to test at power and therefore not required to be
tested monthly.
This issue is further discussed below.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's review of TS surveillance
and implementing procedures was thorough and significantly improved the
quality of the TS surveillance program.
At the end of the inspection
period the inspectors were reviewing -the licensee's justification for*
not completing monthly TS tests on circuits where jumpers or
disconnected leads were required. This was identified as URI
50-280, 281/94-21~02, TS Monthly Testing That Requires Jumpers or Leads
Disconnected to Complete.
Within the areas inspected, one URI was identified .
11
8.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 10, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results addressed
in the Summary section and those listed below.
Item Number
URI 50-280, 281/94-21-01
URI 50-280, 281/94-21-02
LER 50-280/92-003-0l
LER 50-280, 281/92-003-02
LER 50-281/92-002
LER 50-281/92-007
LER 50-281/92-008
Status
Open
Open
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed*.
Closed
Description/(Paraqraph No.)
Time Constraints for Sampling/
Testing Emergency Ventilation
Filters Following Exposure to
Chemicals (Paragraph 4.2).
TS Monthly Testing That
Requires Jumpers or Leads
Disconnected to Complete
(Paragraph 7).
Incomplete Engineered Safety
Features Testing Due to
Procedure Deficiency
(Paragraph 6.1).
Incomplete Engineered Safety
Features Testing Due to
Procedure Deficiency
(Paragraph 6.2).
Two Charging Pumps and One
Charging Pump Service Water
Pump Removed from Service
Simultaneously Due to
Personnel Error (Paragraph
6.3).
Auxiliary FeedwaterSystem*
Recirculation Piping Missile
Shielding Removed Due to
Personnel Error (Paragraph
6.4).
Rate Greater Than 10 GPM Due
to Failure of a Swagelok
Fitting On a Flow Transmitter
(Paragraph 6.5).
Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting
comments were not received from the licensee.
..
9.
12
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms
AVEF
BTU/HR
cc
CCHX
CFR
cs
eves
CWB
DP
DR
ECST
ETA
F
GL
GPM
LER
LCO
NRC
RMT
TDAFWP
TS
AUXILIARY VENTILATION EXHAUST FILTER
BRITISH THERMAL UNITS/HOUR
COMPONENT COOLING
COMPONENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER
CUBIC FEET PER MINUTE
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
CHARGING PUMP
CHEMICAL VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM
CONDENSER WATER BOX
DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT
PENETRATION OF DIOCTYL PHTHALATE
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
DEVIATION REPORT
EMERGENCY CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER
ETHANOLAMINE
FAHRENHEIT
GENERIC LETTER
GALLONS PER MINUTE
HIGH EFFICIENCY PARTICULATE AIR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION
MOTOR OPERATED VALVE
MAIN FEEDWATER
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE
PARTS PER MILLION
POTENTIAL-PROBLEM REPORT
QUALITY ASSURANCE
ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP
RECIRCULATION MODE TRANSFER
RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR
REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK
SAFETY INJECTION
SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR
TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
UNRESOLVED ITEM
UNDER VOLTAGE
WORK ORDER