ML18152A384
| ML18152A384 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1990 |
| From: | Gloerson W, Potter J, Shortridge R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A385 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-90-25, 50-281-90-25, NUDOCS 9008270121 | |
| Download: ML18152A384 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1990025
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
AUG 14 1990
Report Nos.:
50-280/90-25 and 50-281/90-25
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspectinn Conducted:
July 16-20, 1990
Inspectors:
l(;.,.15. ~~~=-~.;....+-'f<~-~~~~~-
R. B.
or,
idge
(I
Approved
n P. Potter, Chief
Facilities Radiation Protection Section
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological
Protection Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of occupational
exposure, shipping, transportation, and followup on_ previous inspector
identified items.
Results:
No violations, program weaknesses, or deviations were identified.*_>**The~.-"
inspectors determined based on observation of work, records review, a*nd *
interviews with licensee management, and other licensee personnel, that the
radiation protection program at Surry continues to improve.
_The licensee'-s
program for self-indentification and resolution of problems was a program
strength.
- *
9008270121 900814
ADOCK 05000280
G!
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- D. Anderson, Shift Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- V. Batiste, Senior Decontamination Technician
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilgeu, Engineer, Licensing
- W. Cook, Operations Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- D. Erickson, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
- B. Garber, Technical Supervisor, Radi~tion Protection
- D. Hart, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- M. Kansler, Station Manager.
- J. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- W. Thornton, Corporate Director, Health Physics and Chemistry
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, and administrative personn~l *
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- W. Holland, Senior Resid~nt Inspector
- J. Potter, Chief~ Facilities Radiation Protection Section
- Attended exit interview
2.
Occupational Exposure (83750)
a.
Audits and Appraisals
Technical Specification (TS) 6.1.C.3. a requires audits of facilities
to be performed under the cognizance of the Quality Assurance (QA)
Department encompassing conformance of facility operation to
provisions within TSi.and applicable license conditions; at least
once per 12 *mon.ths for the *Radiological Environmental Monitoring
Program, and once every 24 months for the Process Control Program,
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, and implementing procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the following audits and discussed the
findings with licensee representatives:
0
0
0
S89-19, Radiation Protection Program, April 21, 1989
S90-03, Radiological Environmental Monitoring/Offsite
Dose Calculation Manual, February 12, 1990
2
The inspectors found the audits *to be well planned, comprehensive,
and adequately documented.
Responsible departments were required to
respond to each finding identified and complete appropriate actions
to resolve the finding.
The inspectors noted that QA not only
performed followup on all corrected findings, but, in a majority of
cases, reverification at a later date found that the finding had not
recurred.
Findings that were not easily resolved were placed on the
station Commitment Tracking List for resolution.
The inspectors
found the licensee program for self-identification and resolution of.
problems to be a program strength.
b.
Training and Qualification
The licensee is required by 10 CFR 19.12 to provide radiation
protection training to workers.
TS 6.1.B requires that each member
of the facility staff meet or exceed the minimum qualification of
ANSI NI8.1-1971 and Regulatory Guides 8.13, 8.27, and 8.29 outlines
topics that should be included in such training.
The inspectors discussed training of licensee and contractor
personnel in radiological controls with licensee representatives.
In
1989, the licensee initiated Advanced Radiation Worker (ARW) training
.for workers as one element of becoming a qualified maintenance team
- -:* member.
Quality maintenance teams were comprised of personnel that
were qualified to. perform certain inspection and radiological
functions independently.
Classroom and on-t_he-job traini-ng require
one week after which time the ARW candidate was requireq to pass a
written examination on the material presented.
In addition, the
licensee started a pilot training program to include contractors
in ARW training.
A licensee representative stated that since the
inception of the program, 85. percent of maintenance personnel have
been qualified as ARWs.
The inspector attended a portion of the
classroom ARW training and noted that the material presented was
practical and covered subjects such as how to perform all types of
radiological surveys, respiratorY-:Pr<>tection, changes in radiological
conditions and radiation instrument-qtialification~
The inspectors also attended portions of two classroom training
- sessions for health physics (Hp.)?te~~n*:ician. ba~ic -training/ahµ_ for
entries into containment when sub-atmospheric.
The. inspectors noted
that the instructor~ presented material effectively, training aids
were good, as were the lesson _plans and instructor guides __ used for
the 1 ecture.
- .-. '. :,.: '. -- *' **.
- * *
- . i
- *:??\\ :
.
.
.
In discussions with the Operations Supervisor and Superintend~nt of
Radiation Protection, the inspectors learned that the six .HP
supervisors had each visited a different facility to gain a broader
knowledge of licensee radiation protection programs.
The inspectors
were* informed that this had benefited the program and that HP, which
3
is organized into six shifts, with one shift in training all the
time, had committed to send entire training shifts to other utilities
to observe their radiation protection program for a week.
Each
training shift consisted of a shift *supervisor. and five HP
technicians.
To .date two of the six shifts have completed their
visits to different utilities.
The inspectors determined that the
licensee training program conti"nued to improve performance at the
station and received good managefuent support.
c.
Outage Planning and Preparation
The inspecto*rs reviewed the planning and preparation by _the Radiation
Protection Department for the nine week refueling/maintenance outage
scheduled to start in October 1990.
Licensee representatives stated
that in parallel with refueling, *major \\l!Ork to be .performed included:
inservice inspection, valve repair, steam generator primary and
secondary maintenance, fuel transfer cart overhaul, and cavity seal
replacement.
HP was preparing radiation work permlts (RWPs) and
planned to have over_ 1,000 ready for the outage start date.
H.P
personnel preparing RWPs were required to use a new*standard set of
codes for RWP instructions to ensure a consistency among personnel
preparing RWPs and consisting of job site requirements.
- To con.trol
the outage work scope, the licensee placed a freeze on accepting any
design change packages after July 19, 1990 ~
Licensee personne 1
further stated that to reduce .collective dose . during the Unit 1
outage, plans called for. increased.borationduring hydrogen peroxide
injection,* increased use of temporary shielding and nioldable
shielding, hot spot and system flushes, and better coritrol of worker
dose using digital alarming dosimeters.
d.
External Exposure Contra l
10 CFR 20~202 requires each licensee to supply appropriate personnei
.monitorin[ equipment to specific individuals.and requires the use of
such equipment.
During tours of the Auxiliary Building*, the inspectors _observed the
use of digital alarming dosimeters _(DADs)~
Individuals, wore. the
DADs on the outside of the prote*c:tive .:clothing whichJillowed:' for.
frequent monitoring of their dose.
licensee representatives stated
that workers had become more conscious of dose rates due to alarm set
points used, and that for some repetitive jobs the collective dose
for workers had been lower than when the DADs were tiot used.
The inspectors surveyed radiation levels and contamination -levels in
the auxiliary buildi.ng over a three day period.
When compared, the
inspectors' measurements- were in agreement with licensee surveys and
postings.
The inspectors al so reviewed RWPs for appropriate
radiological job protection requirements and monitored the Auxiliary
Building for unlocked very high radiation doors.
No discrepancies
were identified.
- ,
4
e;
Internal Exposure Control (83750)
(1)
Respiratory Protection
10 CFR 20.103(b) requires the licensee to use process or other
engineering controls to the extent practical, to limit
concentration of radioactive material in air to levels below
that specified in 10 CFR Part *20, Appendix B, Table 1, Column 1.
10 CFR 20.103(b) also requires that when it is impracticable to
apply process or other engineering controls to limit
concentrations of radioactive material, other precautionary .
procedures shall be used.
The precautionary procedures include
respiratory protective equipment.
The inspectors verified that the licensee issued respirators for
use after determining the user's training and qualifications for
the type of respirator issued; the date of.last medical review;
the user's respirator fit testing date; in-vivo bioassay
results,
and
the
user's total
maximum
permissible
concentration-hours. (MPC-hrs) in the last seven days.
The
inspector toured the respirator fit testing facility and
observed two individuals being tested~ The licensee utilized an
automated fit testin*g* apparatus (Dynatech System 2000) which
automatically determined an average fit factor after cycling the
respirator user through six different exercises (normal
breathing, deep breathing, move head side to side, move head up
and down, talking, and frown or laugh).
After a selected
records review of individuals who had been exposed to
concentrations of radioactive material during 1990 and
discussions with licensee representatives, it was determined
that no individual had been exposed to concentrations of
radioactive material greater than 40 mpc-hours.
(2)
Internal Assessment
10 CFR 20.103(a) requires the licensee to perform appropriate
bioassays and assess intakes of radioactivity.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for frt-vitro
bioassays, * including procedure HP-5.2B.30, "Collection and
Analysis of Urine and Fecal Sa~ples,
11 dated December 12, 1985.
The licensee had a routine sample collection program for urine.
Twice a year approximately 30 individuals are randomly selected
from six different departments and are requested to supply a
urine sample [operations (8), mechanical (8), instrumentation
(4), electrical (4), chemistry (2), and health physics (6)].
Non-routine samples are* collected on a case-by-case basis
depending on whole body counting (WBC) results. and/or the
nature of the event.
5
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the WBC equipment and
operation, and discussed counting, calibration, and quality
control (QC) checks with equipment users.
Approximately eight
months ago, the litensee purchase a Nuclear Data (ND) stand-up
counter [People Mover (trademark)].
A major equipment
acquisition of this nature was considered a significant program
improvement.
The licensee still maintained a ND chair system as
back-up .. The license's stand-up unit provided rapid screening
capabilities and the capability to quantify the body burden of
radioactive materiar, however it only provided crude activity
localization capabilities.
The inspectors reviewed calibration
data and associated records for the stand-up WBC which was
performed on December 22, 1989.
The calibration was performed
in accordance with HP-5.2B.62,
11Whole Body Counter Calibration
Standup and Chair/ND9900,
11 dated December 21, 1989.
The
inspectors reviewed the efficiency plots for the upper and lower
detectors and observed no anomalies.
The license used National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) certified
calibration sources (Mn-54, Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-60, Ba-133,
I-131).
The licensee indicated that the standup unit would not.
be calibrated annually, however it would be recalibrated only
after the unit failed its QC test.
This practice was a.
departure from the normal practice of performing an*. annual
calibration.
It was noted that the licensee**had a rather
comprehensive QC Program.
The licensee performed QC data checks
one per shift via HP-5.2B.42,
11Whole Body Counter Startup and
Performance Checks,
11 dated December 21, 1989.
The inspector
reviewed QC data accumulated during 1990 including energy
calibration, centroid determination, efficiency check, and
resolution (full-width-half-maximum) check.
The licensee used
an Eu-152 source to perform the quality control checks. If any
of the QC parameters failed the control limits of+/- two sigma of
the parameter mean value several times then a recalibration of
the system would be performed.
In addition to tracking the QC
parameters noted above, the licensee also performed a background
check one per shift.
There ~~re no obvious.problems_as~ociated
with the QC data.
The QC: and calibration records were*:well
organized and maintained.
During the review, it was noted that
the licensee did not participate in a formal cross-check
program.
The last cross-check was performed in the third
quarter 1987.
The licensee's bioassay action levels were described in
HP-5.2B.11,
11 Bioassay Data Evaluation and Followup," dated
December 12, 1985.
Based on discussions with the licensee and
selected records review there were no WBC results which*exceeded
the* action levels prescribed in HP-5.2B.11 within the last
12 months.
The licensee's 1owest action level is a maximum
permissible organ burden (MPOB) greater than or equal to
5 percent.
It was noted, however, that during an airborne
f.
6
radioactivity event in the Auxiliary Building on March 26, *1990,
several individuals had uptakes with measurable MPOB's tanging
from 1.1 - 2.1 percent MPOB.
This event was dcicumented in. IR
50-280, 50-281/90-18.
The inspectors reviewed HP-5.2B.11 to
determine what actions the licensee would take at the various
action levels of 5 percent, 10 percent, 25 percent, and
50 percent MPOB.
The procedure was cumbersome, and it appeared
difficult to use if an analyst was required to take appropriate
action for a particular action level.
The i.nspectors and
licensee representatives discussed the use of a matrix or flow
chart in order*to better define the action levels and streamline
the appropriate actions.
The inspectors had no further
questions.
Maintaining Dose ALARA
10 CFR 20.l{c) states that persons engaged in activi'ties under
licensees issued by the NRC should make every reasonable effort to
maintain radiation exposures ALARA.
The recommended elements of an
ALARA program were contained in Regulatory Guides 8.8, "Information
Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposure at Nuclear
Power Stations will be ALARA," and Regulatory Guide 8.10, "Operating
Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational Exposure ALARA.11
The inspectors reviewed the 1 i censee' s program for ma i nta i n*i ng .
occupational radiation dose to workers a.s low as reasonably .
achievable.
The licensee established a goal of 607 person-rem, or
less, for 1990. Through July 18, 1990, the licensee's projection for
collective dose was 111.241 person-rem and actual collective dose was
95.611 person-rem; .14.1 percent below projection.
Licensee
representatives stated that they were confident that they would
remain under the dose projected through the Unit 1 outage.
Also,
that a number of initiatives taken this year, in response to NRC
identified ALARA issues and self-identified changes. to the* station's
ALARA program, were responsible for being under the projected
collective dose.
Examples of self-identified changes incl~ded
eliminating the buddy system for locked high radiation gate'entries,
individual exposure tracking sheets that are filed out for :workers
exceeding 5 mrem for the day, revision of RWPs to reduce unijecessary
radiation surveys, use of remote .television cameras, reduction of*
hot spots, high radiation, and contaminated areas.
The licensee had increased the ALARA staff with the additior(-0f two
experienced HP technicians and were working closely with newly
appointed department ALARA coordlnators.
The ins~ectors noted that
the ALARA coordinator was actively involved with ALARA meetings among
Region II utilities as well as on the national level.
The
inspectors determined that station collective dose was being managed
by plant management and supervision and the station's overall program
. was effective; however, source term reduction was still the *major
challenge for Surry 1 and 2.
Licensee representatives discussed a *
7
draft five year source term reduction plan with the inspectors and
stated that a meeting was scheduled at the corporate level on Aug,,ust
15, 1990, to establish priorities and make task assignments.
g.
Solid Waste (84722)
10 CFR 20.311 (d)(l) requires that any generating license who
transfers radioactive waste to a land disposal facility prepare all
waste so that the waste is classified according to 10 CFR 61.55 and
meets the waste characteristic requirements of 10 CFR 61.56.
.
.
The
inspectors
reviewed
radioactive waste
classification
documentation for selected radioactive waste shipments made in 1990
and determined that the waste had been properly classified and met
the waste characteristic requirements.
The licensee used a.
vendor-supplied computer program (RADMAN)* which processed input
information obtained from a package of waste to determine package's
waste classification and transportation type.
The program identified
the non-gamma emitters based on the site-specific scaling factors for
the particular waste steam from which the waste was generated.
The
program correlated radiation levels and activity contents as .a
function of time and generated a form for use in preparing shipping
papers .
During tours of the. licen~ee's waste processing areas and thro~gh*
interviews with radwaste personnel, the inspectors observed that:the
licensee had adequate provisions for the onsite storage of radwaste.
The licensee had established a temporary low level radwaste storage
facility which was used to store low specific activity (LSA) material
in boxes and 55 gallon drums.
At the time of this inspection, the
licensee had stored a collective total of approximately 1.25 curies
of LSA material in the facility.
In addition, the licensee has.
stored onsite four 55 gallon drums of mixed waste containi~g oil,
kerosene and water with measurable quantities of lead, chromium,.
cadmium, and cesium-134, -137 and coba1t-60.
The licensee was
awaiting guidance from the Commonweath of Virginia with regard to
obtaining a storage permit for the mixed waste until final
disposition was determined.
.. ~--"-
- *. ~* ,~ ..
-* " ~~>? .. /
~ . : :
The inspectors observed that the)icensee's current *waste.processing
activities were limited to dewatering resins and filters in
preparation for shipment directly to Barnwell and sorting _and
segregating dry active waste (PAW) for shipment to an offsite
supercompaction facility.
The inspector and licensee representatives toured the New Radwaste
Facility (NRF) still under construction at the Surry Site.
The
licensee indicated that the construction was approximately 90 percent
complete.
System testing was scheduled to begin in April 1991.
The
following processing systems were located at the NRF:
(1) liquid
- waste system; (2) laundry drain system; (3) DAW System; (4) Spent
.. )
I
I
8
ion-exchange resin handling system; and (5) asphalt solidification
system.
In addition, the NRF will have storage capability for
containers of primary resins and filters.
h.
Shipping of Low-Level Wastes for Disposal and Transportation
10 CFR 71.5 requires that licensees who transport licensed material
outside the confines of its plant or other places of use, or who
deliver licensed material to a carrier for transport to comply with
the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate to the
mode of transport of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in *
49 CFR Parts 170 through 189 ..
The inspectors reviewed the records of selected shipments of
radioactive material and radioactive waste performed in 1990.
The
shipping manifests examined were prepared in accordance with
49 CFR 170-189 and 10 CFR 20.311 requirements.
The radiation and
contamination survey results were within the limits specified for the
mode of transport and shipment classification.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the shipping records associated
with radioactive materials shipment SH-1989-064. * In that shipment,
three pressurizer safety valves were shippe.d in a DOT Specification
7A package.
The *inspectors reviewed records of the licensee's
determinations that the package had been fabricated in accordance
with an approved design as specified in DOT specifications and that
the licensee had on file the documentation of an engineering
evaluation and testjng demonstrating that the package met those
specifications as required by 49 CFR 173.415(a).
The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures which incorporated
quality control checks
to ensure the appropriate waste
classification, stability characteristics and manifest reporting were
reviewed prior to each shipment.
The following procedures were
reviewed:
0
0
0
0
0
HP-7.1.40,
11 Packaging and Shipment of Radioactive Material,"
dated December 6, 1989 .
~ ;, ' ..
- :' *-~~ : :~'
HP-7.2.11, "Solid Radioactiv{Waste Controf Program Evaiuation,
11
dated July 13, 1989
HP-7 .2.21, "Sampling, Analyi:ing, and Classifying Solicl *
Radioactive Waste," dated December 8~ 1988 *
HP-7.2.40, "Disposing of Radioactive Waste using the Barnwell
Disposal Facility," dated September 11, 1989
- HP-7 .2.50, "Transfer of Radioactive Waste to Licensed Waste*
Processor,", dated September 19, 1989
I
0
9
HP-7.2.70, "Packaging *Radioactive Waste,
11 dated September 18,
1989
In genera 1 , the procedures were adequately deta i 1 ed to ensure
compliance the applicable requirements.
The inspector discussed with
licensee representatives the new Hazardous Materials Regulations
(HMR) for emergency response information on shipping papers, and
placement of emergency response* information on vehicles and at
transportation facilities.
Although the licensee was aware of the
new requirements, the licensee had not incorporated the new
requirements in the procedures since the new HMRs have not become
effective.
The* inspectors also reviewed the quality assurance audits and
assessments that focused on radioactive waste control shipments
(S90-03, 3/30/90:
Radiological Environmental Monitoring, ODCM and
PCP).
Discussions were held with the station QA audit supervisor and
the lead auditor for conducting the audits of waste processing and
transportation.
The audit was found to be well planned and well
documented, containing items of substance relating to the
radwaste/transporation program.
The reports of audits findings to
management were also reviewed and found to contain responsive
- commftments by management to effectively *corrective actions for the
few* deficiencies which had been noted.
The inspectors reviewed records.and interviewed radwaste_personnel to
determine if any transportation incidents had occurred within the
last year.
The licensee indicated that there had been no violations
cited by the State of South Carolina for radwaste shipments made to
Barnwell during the past 12 months.
The inspectors a 1 so reviewed the training program for personne 1
involved in radwaste and shipping.
The inspectors- reviewed selected
.portions o_f the training records of three radwaste specialists and
the supervisor.
It was noted that the individuals received .. ,
specialized training in radioactive waste packaging, transportat_,ion,
disposal, and classification from a vendor (Chem;...Nuclear ",Sy'sJeins,
Inc.).
Based on the records review individuals recefved' 'this
training approximately once per year.
In additlon,. ~iri-:h*ouse *,:
continuing training was provided in the area of vehicle loading
requirements, waste cl ass ifi cation, radioactive waste management, *
radioactive material control, packaging, and transportation~~iAll*of
the radwaste specialists were scheduled to receive addit:fonal**
specialized and continuing training before the end of calendar year
1990..
No violations or deviations were identified.
- ,
10
3.
Attion of Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
a.
(Closed) VIO 50-280/89-24-04 and 50-281/89-24-04:
In August 1989,
the licensee experienced two separate events where licensee personnel
failed to adhere to station radiation protection requirements when
entering a high radiation area.
These events were pr~ceded by four
similar events in May ~nd June.
b.
The licensee subsequently took the following corrective actions to
resolve the violations and have not experienced recurrence.
(1) All station personnel (1150) were required to attend training-
sessions by plant and upper management on management
expectations of worker compliance with radiation protection
requirements and access requirements for high radiation areas.
(2)
Personnel involved in the violations received disciplinary
actions.
(3)
A human factors analysis of the problem resulted in the purchase
of, and use of
11 talking
11 high radiation warning signs for the
applicable areas.
(4)
The event descriptions and ~oot causes, as well as, corrective
actions were added to general Employee Training material and the
events were discussed at safety meetings.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) !FI 50-280, 50-281/89-24-06:
Followup on licensee
evaluation of differences in dosimetry readouts.
On August 17, 1989, the licensee informed a resident inspector that a
maintenance worker received a radiation dose in excess of* his
assigned *adminstrative 1 imit when_.working on a check valve in: the*
Unit 2 containment.* The exposure was r~c:orded onthe'worker's .gonad_
dosimetry as being approximately 821 mrem. * Thi"s dose, *when added to
the worker's previous exposure, totaled 1802 mrem for the quarter; 52
mrem higher than the assigned administrative limit of 1750 mrem.
The
1 i censee conducted an investi gatiori **;nto the exposure and concluded
that all actions* taken by the mechailcs and HP technicians on the job
were appropriate.
The licensee further concluded that all-personnel
i nvo 1 ved were familiar with the exposure rates in the . area. and
responded proactively to staytime limits and SRO readings.
Howe~er,
the licensee was in the process of evaluating the differences between
the readings of the SRDs and the TLDs when the report period ended.
The inspector reviewed the .licensee's evaluation,
Correlations" dated September 15, 1989.
The licensee concluded that
the self-reading dosimeters (SRO) in use at the station were
apparently performing as designed.
This conclusion was supported by
the fact that the average percent difference for all 75 discrepancies
11
associated with the exposure event of August 17, 1989 was 9 percent.
This average compared favorably to the 10 percent criteria used when
SRDs were tested for accuracy and compared to TLD measurements.
The
largest observed difference was 22 percent which was still within the*
30 percent correlation criteria described in H.P.-5.1.30,
11Dosimetry
Processing and Dose Determinations.
11
This item is considered closed.
c.
(Closed) IFI 88FRP-08: HP Supervisor Visitation tfr Sites of Superior
HP Performances
The licensee sought to increase HP supervisors expertise level and
standards by visiting sites where radiation protection performance
was considered good.
The licensee has completed sending all six HP supervisors to
different sites and now is sending the HP supervisor and training
shift (5 HP technicians) to six additional sites.
This item is considered closed.
d.
(Closed) IFI 50-280/89-03 and 50-280/88-49-03:
Followup on Action
Plan Developed to Improve Station Activities, Planning, and
Management.
Based on revie\\'1s of Inspection Reports regarding Surry's Radiation
Protection Program and discussions with region based inspectors and
resident inspectors, RII Management has determined that satisfactory
progress has been made and that radiation protection activities at
Surry now warrant only routine, rather than special attention.
4.
Exit Interview
The inspectors and Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section, met
with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of
the inspection on July 20, 1990.
The inspectors summarized the.scope and
findings of the inspection with licensee management_ *. No dissenting
comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify,
as proprietary, any of the materials provided to, or reviewed by the
inspectors during the inspection.
Licensee management was informed that
the items in Paragraph 3 were considered closed.