ML18152A238
| ML18152A238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1991 |
| From: | Gooden A, Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A239 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-90-31, 50-281-90-31, NUDOCS 9102060164 | |
| Download: ML18152A238 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1990031
Text
(
Report Nos.:
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
"""--*
50-280/90-31 and 50-281/90-31
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
December 11-14, 1990
Inspectors ~-!l!?Jff.~---
_{JL
~ -----------
A. Gooden
Accompanying Personnel: ~uilfoi} (Battelle)
Approved by~~----
W. H. Rankin, Chief
Scope:
Emergency Preparedness Section
Radiological Protection and Emergency
Preparedness Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
I/;; /9/
--Tit""~ 'Signed
1/ii/t/J
T'
ate Signed
This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the
annua 1 emergency exercise.
Team observers eva 1 uated the 1 i censee
I s response
and performance in the Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operational Support Center (OSC), Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF),
and Local Media Center .(LMC).
This was a full participation exercise which
progressed to a General Emergency.
The exercise began at 8:00 a.m. and ended
at 2:15 p.m.
- Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The licensee was successful in meeting the exercise objectives.
Exercise
strengths included exercise control, use of the Simulator Control Room,
activation of the emergency response facilities (ERFs), recovery/reentry
planning, and the licensee
I s critique process.
One exercise weakness was
i.dentified for failure to direct damage control teams in accordance with
procedures resulting in delayed entry into the radiation controlled area (RCA)
and the TSC staff not being aware of the damage control team status.
91020601
Aoot4 9lOll4
G
K osooo280
1.
Persons Contacted
. Licensee Employees
REPORT DETJl..ILS
- R. Bilyeu, Engineer, Licensing
- M. Bowling, Manager, Licensing and Programs
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- E. Collins, Manager, Emergency Planning
- W. Cook, Operations Superintendent
- J. Costello, Station Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- D. Erickson, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
- W. Harrell, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- R. Kulp, Assistant Station Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- J. Lusher, North Anna Station Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- J. Maciejewski, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. 0
1Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Services
- J. Price, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
- E. Smi-th, Jr., Manager, Surry Quality Assurance
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
technicians, security, and office personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- W. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
Th~ scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that
provisions had been made to test an integrated emergency response
capability as well as the basic elements existing within the licensee,
State and local Emergency Plans and organization* as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario developed for this exercise was reviewed in advance of the
scheduled exercise date and was determined to be adequate for the scope
and objectives of this exercise.
The exercise was originally scheduled
for November 14, 1990, but was rescheduled for December 12, 1990, as a
result of plant events occurring on November 13,1990.
One exception to
the rescheduling was the licensee's participation in a first aid emergency
drill which included transport of a simulated contaminated injured
individual to an offsite medical facility.
This drill was conducted on
November 14, 1990, and was evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ( FEMA).
t
l
2
The simulated emergency progressed from a Notification of Unusual Event
(NOUE) declaration for unit shutdown due to reactor coolant system (RCS)
leakage, to an Alert declaration for high reactor coolant activity, to a
Site Area Emergency based on the high RCS leak rate and high activity with
degrading containment conditions, to a General Emergency based on the loss
of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with the potenti a 1 1 oss of the
3rd barrier.
The exercise controllers used the simulator and message
inputs and data to maintain the timeline which permitted demonstration of
exercise objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that
the
following
requirements
were
implemented
pursuant
to
10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response;
(2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident
response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of
onsite and offsite support organization interactions.
The inspector observed that the licensee's on-shift organization for the
exercise responded to the simulated abnormal conditions that initiated the
exercise.
The Shift Supervisor promptly classified the NOUE and promptly
assumed the responsibilities as the Station Emergency Manager (SEM).
Responsibilities were clearly defined and sufficient staff was available
for the initial emergency response.
The TSC was activated 36 minutes after the Alert declaration.
The
functional responsibilities shifted from the Simulator Control Room
to the SEM and his staff in the TSC after its activation.
An inspector
observed that some tasks assigned to the damage control teams were not
accomplished in accordance with Procedure EPIP-5.08, Damage Control
Guideline.
As a result, the status of damage control teams was not known
to the TSC staff and some teams were delayed because task requirements for
Health Physics support had not been coordinated.
Additionally, the
damage control task guide sheets were frequently missing information or
unavailable as they were for teams 4 and 5.
The failure to dispatch and
control teams in accordance with procedures was identified as an exercise
weakness (EW) (50-280, 281/90-31-01).
The licensee also identified this
as a problem area in their critique.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and
effectively using assistance resources had been made, that arrangements to
accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site EOF had been
f
3
made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned
response had been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.A,
and specific. criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.C.
Section 5.0, "Organizational Control of Emergency," of the Surry Power
Station Emergency Plan discussed the augmentation of the onsite emergency
organization and the coordination with participating government agencies.
An inspector observed that the licensee's LEOF accommodated the State
On-Scene Coordinator and members of the Commonwealth of Virginia
1s
Department of Emergency Service and Bureau of Rad Health. Space was also
available iri the LEOF for members of the Federal government.
The
effective use of offsite assistance resources was also demonstrated with
the medical drill on November 14, 1990.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification
and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance
recommended in NRC Information Notice (IN) 83-28.
The licensee's emergency classification system was desctibed in Section 4
of the Emergency Plan.
Initiating Conditions are listed for emergency
classifications.
The tables were used effectively by the emergency
response organization in classifying the simulated events.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established
for notification by the.licensee of State and local response organizations
and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and follow-up
messages .to response organizations had .been established and means to
provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure
pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.E.
The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPIP-2.01, Notification of State
and Local governments, contained the required forms and instructions for
both initial and followup messages to State and local governments.
During
this exercise, the licensee effectively used the procedure in making
12 notifications to the State and 1 oca 1 governments from the Simula tor
Control Room, TSC, or LEOF as appropriate.
The licensee also made timely
notifications to the NRC.
4
Early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway was
provided by the Surry Early Warning Siren System (EWSS).
The system was
activated by a dispatcher from either James. City County or Surry County in
conjunction with the EOC of Virginia Department of Emergency Services in
Richmond.
A quarterly test of the EWSS was conducted on December 12,
1990; however, the test was not part of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area, was observed to verify that prov1s1ons existed* for .prompt
communications among principal response organizations and emergency
personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's
emergency facilities, and the offsite environmental monitoring teams, and
the LEOF.
The inspector also observed information flow among the various
groups within the licensee's emergency organization.
Communications of
information appeared to be adequate throughout the exercise with the
exception of the information flow for damage control teams discussed in
Paragraph 3.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine that information concerning the
simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
A news release provided information to the media and public in advance of
the exercise.*
The information included details on the extent of
participation as well *as referencing the quarterly siren test not
associated with the exercise.
A separate news release for the siten test
was issued which contained details on how the public would be notified to
include a listing of the radio and television stations that would be
Emergency Broadcast Stations (EBS) in the event of a real emergency.
The licensee established a LMC at the Surry Nuclear Information Center and
a Joint Public Information Center in the company's Innsbrook Technical
Center.
The licensee issued four news releases during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and
equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as
5
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed the activation and staffing of key emergency
response facilities and evaluated equipment used by the emergency
- responders during the exercise.
No equipment problems were identified.
a.
Simulator Control Room -
An
Control Room personnel acted
to the s i mu 1 a ted emergency.
available.
inspector observed that the Simulator
promptly to initiate emergency response
Emergency procedures were readily
b.
Techni ca 1 Support Center -
The TSC was 1 ocated adj a cent to the
Control Room.
Drawings and supporting information were readily
available to the TSC emergency responders.
c.
Operational Support Center~ The OSC was located in the
Maintenance Building.
The Damage Control Teams were based in this.
area and were under the direction of the OSC Director.
ct.
Local Emergency Operations Facility - The LEOF was located adjacent
to the Training Complex Simulator Building.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective
actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were
developed and in place, and whether protective actions for emergency
workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented
promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in
Section II.J of NUREG-0654.
An inspector verified that the 1 i censee used emergency procedures
to formulate protectiv~ action recommendations (PARs) for offsite
populations within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ).
The
1
1 i censee recommended PARs and the State . imp 1 emented PARs were posted in
the LEOF.
'
The pr.otective response for onsite personnel was initiated at the Alert
with the accountability of all personnel in the protected areas.
The
onsite personnel were not evacuated during this drill.
No violations or deviations were identified.
f
6
11.
Recovery and Reentry Planning (82301)
12.
This area was observed to determine that general pl ans were made for
recovery and reentry as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13); 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.H;
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.M.
The licensee developed general p 1 ans and procedures for reentry and
recovery which addressed both existing and potential conditions.
The plan
contained the position/title, authority and responsibilities of each key
individual in the recovery organization.
The plan was coordinated with
all appropriate agencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The 1 i censee
I s critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and
weaknesses noted in the licensee
1s emergency response organization were
formally presented to 1 i censee management for corrective actions as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N .
The 1 i censee
I s exercise controllers/observers , conducted ERF critiques*
with the players following the exercise termination.
A formal critique
was provided to licensee management on December 14, 1990.
The critique
reviewed performance against the objectives and identified areas requiring
corrective action.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (!FI) 50-280, 281/90-02-01:
Review
documentation of differences between MIDAS dose assessment model and the
current State model.
The inspector reviewed the evaluation conducted by Corporate Health
Physics. in which the MIDAS and the RASCAL were compared and test cases
documented; thereby closing this previous open item.
14.
7
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 14, 1990,
with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed
below.*
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number
50-280, 281/90-31-01
Description/Reference
EW - Failure to direct damage control
teams in accordance with procedures
(Paragraph 3).
Attachment:
Objectives, Scenario Narrative
and Timeline
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 14, 1990 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES SUMMARY
The objectives of this Emergency Exercise are to demonstrate by
actual performance a number* of key emergency preparedness functions
as they relate to the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan.
The
simulated
accident
will
involve:
emergency
classification,
notifications of company and off-site organizations, simulated
actio"ns to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of
accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope
with the event.
The event will include a simulated off-site
- radiological release to support a plume pathway exercise.
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the ability to
activate the Surry Power station and Corporate Emergency Response
Plans and appropriate implementing procedures.
All Surry Power Station and Corporate Emergency Response Facilities
(ERF) will be activated.
As applicable to the events developed by
the exercise scenario, each ERF staff will demonstrate functions
described in the implementing procedures.
Emergency response
functions which are impractical to demonstrate will be simulated.
The following Surry Power Station and Corporate facilities will be
staffed by the Emergency Response Organization (ERO)
for this
exercise:
(1)
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
(2)
Technical Support Center (TSC)
(3)
Operational Support Center (OSC)
(4)
Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)
(5)
Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)
(6)
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
(7)
Local Media Center (LMC)
Other ERO Groups participating in this exercise, but not responding
to the above facil*i ties,
include Chemistry,
Heal th Physics,
Operations, and Security .
r
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 14, 1990 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
The following objectives were developed to establish the scope of
the November 14, 1990 Surry Emergency Exercise.
The objectives
ensure that required events are included in the exercise scenario
and establish evaluation criteria used by the controllers and
observers.
1.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze station conditions, assess
Emergency
Action
Level
(EAL)
parameters,
and
correctly
classify the emergency.
ERO will demonstrate this objective by
initiation and use of EPIP-1.0l*and appropriate operational
procedures.
status forms detailing radiological monitor and operational
data may be issued at periodic intervals.
The ability to
acquire data using the Emergency Response Facility Computer
System (ERFCS) or by back-up methods will be demonstrated in
appropriate facilities.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch, and control on-
site emergency teams to perform response activities.
As appropriate, the CRS, TSC, and osc staffs will demonstrate
this objective by dispatching and controlling teams in
response to scenario events within the.Station Protected.Area.
Also, the ability to brief emergency teams and *establish
appropriate protective measures and communications will be
demonstrated.
Prior to Emergency Response Facility activation, the CRS staff
will demonstrate this objective by initiating applicable
procedures.
Following facility activation, the TSC and OSC
staffs will demonstrate this objective by implementing EPIP-
3.02, EPIP-3.03, and EPIP-5.08. _
.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to notify and mobilize the Surry Power
Station and Corporate Emergency Response Organization.
The CRS staff, Station Security, and Corporate Security will
demonstrate this objective. Station ERO notification will be
conducted
in
accordance
with
EPIP-3.01
and
EPIP-5.09.
corporate Security will initiate ECP-5 for corporate ERO
notification.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the state and local
governments and the NRC within established time constraints.
The CRS, TSC,. and LEOF ERO will demonstrate this objective by
providing up-to-date information to federal, state, and local
governments within required time limits.
a.
state and Locai Government Notification
Information for these notifications will be identified
and recorded by an Emergency Communicator (EC) on EPIP-
2. 01, Attachment 1 (Report of Emergency to State and
Local
Governments),
and
Attachment
2
(Report
of
Radiological Conditions to the State).
Upon approval by
the station Emergency Manager
(SEM)
or the Recovery
Manager (RM), the EC will transmit the information to the.
state and/or local governments.
The start time for comple.ting the 15-minute initial
notification will commence when the SEM declares the
emergency classification. Follow-up communications will
be maintained using EPIP-2.01, Attachment 1, and will.
occur at about 30 minute intervals or as conditions
change.
As conditions warrant, the ability to transmit Protective
Action Recommendations
(PARs) . to the State will . be
demonstrated in accordance with EPIP-1. 05 and appropriate
notification procedures.
The EC will transmit the initial Report of Radiological
Conditions to the State
(EPIP-2.01,
Attachment
2)
following data assimilation, recording, and approval.
Follow-up notifications on radiological conditions will
occur at about 3 o minute intervals or as conditions
change.
The
SEM retains responsibility for state and local
government notifications until the LEOF is act1vated.
Following
activation,
responsibility
for
notification is transferred to the Recovery Manager (RM).
b*.
NRC Notification
Information for these notifications will be identified
and recorded by the EC on EPIP-2.02, Attachment 1 (NRC
Event
Notification
Worksheet),
Attachment
2
(NRC
Emergency Communicator Log), and EPIP-4.03, Attachment
3 (HPN Communications).
Upon approval by the SEM, the
ECs will transmit the information to the NRC.
The start time
for completing the 1-hour initial
notification
commences
when
the
SEM
declares
the
emergency classification. The initial notification will
be
performed
from
the
CRS.
Following
initial
notification and unless directed otherwise, the EC will
maintain continuous communications with NRC Operations
f
to transmit plant condition changes.
dialogue highlights will be documented.
Communication* *
Responsibility for NRC Notifications in accordance with
EPIP-2.02 will remain with the TSC ERO.
Responsibility
for Health Physics Network (HPN) communications will be
transferred to the LEOF following activation of that
facility.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct assembly and accountability
of personnel within the Protected Area.
The CRS staff and Security will demonstrate this objective in
accordance with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.03.
Also, to support*
the overall accountability process, the Assembly Area Leaders
will perform area accountability.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate off-site
Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) based on assessment
of plant conditions and off-site dose projections and/or
measurements.
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the SEM
from the CRS or TSC or by the RM in the LEOF.
organizations will monitor plant conditions and perform off-
site dose projections to support formulation of PARs.
The
PARs wi11* be determined in accordance with EPIP-1. 05 and EPIP-
4. 07.
Responsibility for PAR development is transferred to
the LEOF *following activation of that facility.
Radiological parameter data generated during the development
of this scenario may be artificially elevate_d and may not
represent the degree of fuel failure and radiological release
commensurate with the plant dynamic events.
This may be
necessary to demonstrate this exercise objective.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and implement
appropriate
protective
measures
for
emergency
response
personnel,
including site access control,
contamination
control, exposure control, use of protective devices and, as
appropriate, the process for authorization of potassium iodide
(KI) administration.
This objective will be demonstrated through an interface among
the CRS, TSC, and osc ERO in which the TSC staff will monitor
and
authorize
protective
measures
for
site
access,
contamination control, and exposure control.
The TSC organization, via the Radiation Protection Supervisor
(RPS) located in the Health Physics area, will dispatch and
direct moni taring teams within the bounds of the site property
per EPIP-4. 01 and EPIP-4. 02 and associated procedures to
assess
radiological
conditions.
Protective
measures,
appropriate
for
conditions,
will
be
developed
and/or
8.
9.
implemented for site emergency response personnel.
Security will implement access control measures in accordance
with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.04.
The osc staff and other site personnel will implement any
necessary
actions
associated
with
protective
equipment.
requirements and in-plant access control.
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the CRS and/or
TSC and osc staffs will demonstrate the process for requesting
and authorizing exposure extensions, to include emergency
exposure authorization in accordance with EPIP-4.01, EPIP-
4.04, EPIP-5.06 and EPIP-5.08.
Also, if necessary, the TSC
staff will demonstrate the KI authorization process per EPIP-
4.01 and EPIP-5.07.
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the TSC will
demonstrate
the
planning
and
notification
process
for
evacuating non-essential personnel in accordance with EPIP-
4.07 and EPIP-5.05.
Demonstrate the ability to perform off-site dose assessment.
As approprfate, this objective will be demonstrated by CRS,
The ability to perform initial dose
assessment will be demonstrated through the implementation of
EPIP-4.01 and associated dose assessment procedures.
Field monitoring teams will be dispatched per EPIP-4. 01, EPIP-
4. 02, and associated procedures to support the dose assessment
effort.
As appropriate, these teams will be directed by the
RPS and/or the TSC and LEOF staffs.
As appropriate, demonstrate the ability of Health Physics and
Chemistry to conduct radiological monitoring activities,
including exposure rate surveys, sample collection, and sample
analysis.
As required, radiological monitoring, sampling, and analysis
for in-plant and/or on-site activities will be initiated in
accordance with EPIP-4. 02.
If required,
post accident
sampling activities will be simulated in accordance with EPIP-
4. 22 and EPIP-4.23. The field monitoring teams will perform
radiological monitoring activities in accordance with EPIP-
4.15 and EPIP~4.16.
Obtaining reactor coolant and/or containment samples utilizing
the High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS) will be simulated.
Radiological data necessary to test response and monitoring
capabilities will be provided by the controller during the
simulated sample collection.
Isotopic analysis data will be
provided following simulation of proper sample preparation
and upon expiration of spectrum collection and analysis times *
10.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively activate the emergency
response
facilities
and
associated
emergency
response
processes.
Activation of facilities and emergency processes- by the TSC,
osc,
LEOF,
CERC,
JPIC,
and
LMC will be demonstrated in
accordance with the appropriate procedures.
As appropriate, activation of emergency processes will be
demonstrated by Health Physics, Chemistry and Security.
11.
Demonstrate that facility layout and equipment adequately
support emergency response activities in each facility.
This objective wili. be demonstrated in the CRS, TSC, OSC,
LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and LMC.
In addition, Security, Health Physics and Chemistry facilities
will demonstrate this objective.
12.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain effective
communications.
The CRS, TSC, osc, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC staffs, and Field
Teams will demonstrate this objective.
In addition, Security, Health Physics and Chemistry facilities
will demonstrate this objective.
Use of backup communications systems will be demonstrated only
if primary systems fail.
-
13.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain command and control of
the emergency response effort.
The SEM will demonstrate on-site emergency response command
and control from the CRS and TSC.
The RM will demonstrate
command
and
control
of
the
emergency
response
effort
associated with the LEOF upon activation of that facility.
The SEM will ensure personnel within the Protected Area are
informed of emergency event status by the use of emergency
alarms and the plant paging system (Gai-tronics). Remaining
site personnel will be notified by other verbal communication
methods. All announcements should be preceded and terminated
with the phrase:
"This is a drill."
The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO will demonstrate the ability to
transfer appropriate command and control functions.
a.
The CRS functions that will transfer to the TSC include:
(1)
Notifications to the state, local governments, and
NRC.
(2)
Providing PARs to the state.
.
(3)
Determining the emergency classification.
(4)
Authorizing emergency exposures.
b.
The TSC functions that will transfer to the LEOF are:
(1)
Notifications to the state. and local governments and
to the NRC via the HPN.
(2)
Transmitting PARs to the state.
14.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate preparation, review, and
release of timely and accurate information to the public.
The CERC, JPIC, LEOF and LMC staffs will demonstrate this
objective.
Press releases will be prepared and edited at the CERC and
transmitted to the LEOF for technical review.
Following
approval by the RM and/or the Corporate Response Manager, the
process for issuing press releases will be demonstrated.
The JPIC Director will be cognizant of all press releases and
make them available to the media in the JPIC and LMC.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control
functions.
Public Affairs will demonstrate this objective by establishing
an emergency hotline in accordance with CPIP-2.1 and CPIP-2.3.
Questions will be called into the Public Information Room
requiring response.
16.
Demonstrate the ability to provide continuous emergency
response capability.
The TSC, LEOF, CERC and JPIC will demonstrate this objective
by formulating *shift relief rosters.
As appropriate, the ability to provide logistical support for
Emergency Response personnel may be demonstrated.
17.
Demonstrate the ability to provide basic life support and to
package and transport a contaminated injured person to an off-
site medical facility.
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the
First Aid Team implementing procedures appropriate for the
victim's level of injury and by Radiological Protection
employing the necessary radiological controls to remove the
contaminated victim from the accident scene.
As necessary, Station Security will summons off-site support.
An off-site r*escue unit will demons*trate the ability to
respond to the Station.
.
___ __J
The contaminated injured person will be transported to an off-* *
site medical.facility in accordance with EPIP-5.01 and EPIP-
4.20.
The off-site medical-facility will demonstrate the ability to
provide appropriate treatment.
18.
Demonstrate the ability to establish a Recovery Organization
and to develop a Recovery Plan.
This objective will be demonstrated by the SEM and RM by
implementing EPIP-6. 01 and CPIP-6. 5 to develop both a Recovery
Organization and Plan to return the Plant to a normal status.
- 19.
Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Organization
to conduct
a
self-critique and to identify areas
for
improvement.
The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Chemistry,
Radiological Protection, Operations, and Field Monitoring
Teams will conduct a self-critique to identify weaknesses and
improvement items.
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 14, 1990 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
5CENARIO NARRATIVE
A full scale exercise will be conducted at Surry Power Station on
November 14, 1990.
For the purposes of this exercise, Unit *1 is
designated as the affected unit.
Unit 1 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium near beginning
of life (BOL).
Containment Spray Pump 1-cs-P-lA is out of service
for motor replacement and Charging Pump 1-CH-P-lC is out of service
.for rotating element replacement.
1-RC-SV-1551A has seat leakage
of approximately 0.1 GPM.
Unit 2 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions with
no equipment out of service.
The exercise starts at 0830.
At 0857 the leak thru l-RC-SV-1551A
increases to greater than 10 GPM but less than 25 GPM. This leak
will be significant enough to require shutdown of the unit.
The Unit shutdown due to Reactor Coolant System leakage requires
declaring a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT.
At 0920 the Reactor Coolant system Loose Parts alarm occurs.
Then
at 0932 Unit 1 will experience a Reactor Coolant Letdown Monitor
Hi Alarm. High Reactor Coolant activity necessitates the declaration
of an ALERT.
Shortly after the announcement for all personnel to report for
accountability is made, a first aid emergency occurs. A mechanic
working on 1-CH-P-lC will fall, becoming contaminated and suffering
injuries. Transport of the mechanic to an off-site medical facility
will be required.
At 1030 leakage from atmosphere into the containment will cause the
internal air pressure to increase. Due to this leakage coupled with
previous events the Station Emergency Manager may declare a SITB
AREA EMERGENCY OR A GENERAL EMERGENCY based on his judgement of
existing conditions and/or the loss of two fission product barriers
with the impending loss of the third .
. The unit shutdown continues with no further indicated increase in
Reactor Coolant System leakage until 1130.
At this time, l-Rc-sv-
155A, B, and C fail full open, Band c reseat but A does not.
The
Pressurizer Relief Tank Rupture Disk opens to containment.
In
addition, the Containment to Fuel Building Penetration ruptures which
allows a release to the environment through the Ventilation Vent
System.
These conditions will require declaration of a GENERAL
EMERGENCY based on the breach of the three fission product barriers *
Containment spray pump 1-CS-P-lB and all Recirc Spray Pumps will- *
fail when attempts are made to start them.
These failures will require
prioritizing and conducting mitigating damage control evolutions
to terminate the radiological release.
The*escalation through the emergency classifications will provide
activities designed to exercise both on-site and off-site response
organizations.
Sufficient time will be permitted to allow the response
organizations to perform the required assessment and appropriate
response actions.
The emergency will be terminated approximat~ly 2 and 1/2 hours after
release to permit Recovery discussions.
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 14, 1990 GRADED EXERCISE
Tilm LINE
ROTE:
TIMES ARE APPROXIHATE
0800
Controllers and observers positioned. Selected controllers perform
necessary participant briefings (ie. exemptions or message formats).
0830
Operations Department participants positioned in the Control Room
Simulator and the Control Room Annex.
0857
0915
0920
0932
0935
0936
1011
NOTE
1030
1050
Simulator run started.
Reactor Coolant System leakage through l-RC-SV-1551A increases to
greater than 10 gpm but less than 25 gpm.
Start unit rampdown at 150 MWe per hour due to increased RCS
leakage.
Reactor Coolant System Loose Parts Alarm. Reactor Vessel Lower
Monitor is locked in and will not clear.
Reactor Coolant Letdown Radiation Monitor Hi Alarm at 4Xl04 cpm.
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (NOOE) (Tab B-4) declared based on
RCS leak rate requiring plant shutdown IAW T.S. 3.1.C.
Reactor Coolant Letdown Radiation Monitor is reading> 5X105 cpm.
ALERT (Tab C-2) declared based on High Range Letdown Monitor
(RM-CH-118) > 5Xl05 cpm within 30 minutes and remains for at least
15 minutes.
The following will occur immediately following the announcement
for all station personnel to report for accountability:
First Aid emergency occurs at the 1-CH-P-lC cubicle ( contaminated
individual requiring transport).
Start increased air leakage into Containment.
SEM may declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on (Tab H-2) SEM or SS
judgement or a GENERAL EMERGENCY based on (Tab B-10) Loss of 2 of
3 fission product barriers with potential loss of 3rd barrier .
1130
NOTE
1141
1145
1150
1355
1400
1415
1430
1530
1600
TIME LINE (CONTINUED)
NOVEMBER 14, 1990
1-RC-SV-1551A fails 100% open and does not close. Pressurizer
Relief Tank Rupture Disk opens to Containment.
Reactor trip and Safety Injection are initiated.
1-AFW-FI-lOOA fails low when AFW Pumps start.
When an automatic and/or manual start is attempted on the
following pumps between 1130 and 1354 it will fail as listed
below:
1.
1-RS-P-lA - Coupling breaks, no load motor amps, no
discharge pressure
2.
1-RS-P-lB - Trips on instantaneous overcurrent, motor
grounded
3.
l-RS-P-2A - Trips on instantaneous overcurrent, motor
leads shorted to ground at peckerhead
4.
l-RS-P-2B - Trips on instantaneous overcurrent, shaft
is bound, will not rotate
5.
1-CS-P-lB - Trips on motor overload, pump shaft is
bound, will not rotate
Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation energizes.
Release to atmosphere commences thru the Containment to Fuel
Building Instrumentation Penetration which has failed.
General Emergency as per (Tab B-10) based on loss of 2 of 3
fission product barriers with potential loss of 3rd barrier.
1-CS-P-lA and/or l-RS-P-2A started and containment spray is
initiated.
Containment air pressure< 14.7 psia, release terminated.
Terminate exercise on site.
Start Area Critique.
Start Recovery meeting in LEOF.
Terminate Recovery meeting and perform critique.