ML18152A177
| ML18152A177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1994 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A178 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-93-28, 50-281-93-28, NUDOCS 9401240013 | |
| Download: ML18152A177 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1993028
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
,a 01 tlM.
Report Nos. : 50-280/93-28 and 50-281/93-28
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280, 50-281
Facility Name:
Surry Power Statio.n
1993
License Nos.:
Inspect'J':
,j
(r W. M.
Accompanying Personnel:
E. Fox
W. Gloersen
F. McManus
. -~*
Salyers
Approved by: l,, ~
/i:: ~y'
K. P. Barr, Chief *afe/~gned
Emergency Preparedness Section
Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch *
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the full participation emergency preparedness exercise.
Emergency
organization activation and response were selectively observed in the
licensee's Emergency Response Facilities including: the Simulator Control
Room; Technical Supp*ort Center; Operations Support Center; and the Local
Emergency Operations Facility. The inspection also included a review of the
exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's post-exercise critique.
This exercise was a full participation exercise for Stat~ and local response
agencies and offsite activities were evaluated by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. The
licensee's performance during the exercise was very good in all the emergency
response facilities throughout the exercise with one exception.
The exception
was the development of an appropriate offsite Protective Action Recommendation
9401240013 940107
ADOCK 05000280
G
in the Local Emergency Operations Facility. This issue was identified as an
exercise weakness (Paragraph 11).
Exercise strengths included exercise
control, the. licensee's critique process, and the scenario data which provided
unexpected offsite dose consequences to the emergency organization in the
Local Emergency Operations Facility .
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- R. Anderson, Supervisor, Business Services
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
- E. Collins, Manager, Corporate Emergency Planning
- J. Costello, Station Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- D. Erickson, Superintendent, Radiological Protection
- A. Friedman, Superintendent, Nuclear Training
- L. Girvin, Vice President, Nuclear Services
- D. Hayes, Supervisor, Administration Services
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- R. Kulp, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- W. Madison, Staff Emergency Planner
- B. McBride, North Anna Station Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- W. Neidermeyer,- Staff Emergency Planner
- J. O'Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- J. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- W. Renz, Staff Emergency Planner
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,
technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commiss_ion
- J. York, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
An index of the abbreviations used throughout this report will be found
in the last paragraph.
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine
whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and
a major portion of the basic elements existing .within the licensee,
State, and local emergency plans and organization as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise_and was discussed
with licensee representatives. The scenario developed for this exercise
was challenging and fully exercised the onsite and offsite emergency
organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the
State and local government agencies for their full participation in the
exercise .
No violations or deviations were identified.
2
3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for
- . emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established
and whether adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made
for the licensee's ERO and there were adequate personnel available to
respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization
was augmented by designated licensee representatives and the planning
capability for 1 ong-term staffing of the ERO was demonstrated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine
whether responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously
defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility
accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the
interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.4/{b)(2),
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in
The inspector detJrmined that the licensee's onsite emergency
organization was effective in dealing with the simulated emergency.
Adequate staffing of the ERFs was provided for the initial accident
response and the interfaces between the onsite organization and offsite
support agencies appeared to be adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting
and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that
arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's
onsite EOF have been made, and that other organizations capable of
augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by
10 CFR 50.47{b)(3), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
Commonwealth of Virginia representatives from the DES and the Department
of Heal th were accommodate.d at the LEOF.
The Surry Vo 1 unteer Rescue
Squad and .the Medical Coll~ge of Virgini~ Hospital participated in the
tr~nsport and treatment respectively of the simulated contaminated
3
injured individual. Other organizations capable of augmenting the
p 1 anned response were *i dent i fi ed in the Surry Power Station Emergency
. Plan and implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
7.
This area was observed to determine whether a standard emergency
classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I.D.
EPIP-1.01 established the EAL scheme to identify and classify the
simulated emergency conditions. The Shift Supervisor in the CRS
properly classified the Alert condition based on the identified
increased letdown activity. The SAE and General Emergency
classifications were properly made by the SEM in the TSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been
.established for notification by the licensee of State and local response
organizations and emergehcy p~rsonnel; that the content of initial and
follow-up messages to response organizations had been established;
and that means to provide early notification to tbe populace within the
plume exposure pathway EPZ had been established as-required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragr~ph IV.D, and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section 11.E.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been
established and were used to provide information concerning the
simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response
organizations. The notifications were properly made and were
informative regarding plant conditions and the prognosis of the
situation.
When minor inaccuracies in any notification were observed,
. they were corrected in the next emergency message.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for
prompt communications among principal response organizations and
emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6); 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section IL F.
4
Communications between the licensee's ERO and offsite authorities were
good throughout the exercise. Likewise, the communications among the
licensee's ERFs were good.
No communications r~lated problems of any
significance were identified during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the
simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public
as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654, Section 11.G.
- The licensee established its JPIC in ihe company's Innsbrook Technical
Center located in Glen Allen, VA.
The company also had a LMC
established in the Nuclear Information Center approaching the entrance
to Surry. A total of four News Releases were provided from the JPIC
during the exercise. The NRC did not evaluate the facilities and their
operations during the exercise; however, the licensee evaluators in the
JPIC and LMC observed that the facilities and equipment operated as
designed with minor exceptions.
No violations or deviations were identified .
10.
Emergency Facilities and E~uipmeni (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency
facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided
and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section 11.H.
The inspector observed the activati~n, staffing, and-operation of
selected ERFs and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during
the exercise.
a.
CRS - An inspector observed that CRS personnel acted promptly to
initjate emergency response to the simulated emergency.
Emergency
procedures were readily available and used effectively.
b~
by the SEM of the simulated emergen~y condition leading to an
Alert emergency classification. The TSC appeared to have adequate
equipment for the support of the assigned staf~.
c.
OSC - The OSC was staffed expeditiously following the order to
activate. Necessary emergency equipment was available to support
OSC damage control team activities. A new HP and Operations
communication bridge had been established among the OSC, TSC, and
HP areas.
The bridge aided in expeditiously forming and
dispatching the damage control teams.
5
d.
LEOF - The LEOF was located onsite in the Simulator/Training
Building.
The facility appeared to be adequately designed,
equipped and staffed to support an emergency response ..
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Accident Assessment (82301}
This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems,
and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b}(9}, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.B, and specifi~ criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I ..
. The accident as~essment program included an engineering assess~ent of
plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite
and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
The radiological
dose assessment projections for offsite personnel were done in the LEOF
under the direction of the Radiological Assessment Director.
Following
the release, the initial offsite dose projections by MIDAS indicated
that PARs would be required beyond the 10 mile plume pathway planning
zone.* This information was immediately used to inform the Recovery
Manager as well as an informal recommendation to the Commonwealth of*
Virginia DES personnel to evacuate the downwind sectors to 15 miles.
The licensee's decision making process prior to making this
recommendation did not use available g4idance for correlating field team
measurements to the dose projection nor did it consider any assumptions
on which MIDAS was based that could account for the apparently excessive
dose projection.
The unofficial PAR to include distances to 15 miles
was hastily made without due consideration of the available data nor
consideration of the perturbation such a PAR would have upon evacuating
the personnel in the 10 mile EPZ.
The inspector identified the failure
of the LEOF decision makers to adequately evaluate the dose assessment
data in formulating PARs as an EW ..
EW 50-286, 281/93-28-01:
Failure to perform offsite dose assessment
activities in~ manner to develop appropriate PARs.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Protective Responses (82301}
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective
actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are
developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers,
includjng evacuation of nonessential personnel, are implemented promptly
as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b}(l0}, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section 11.J~
6
An inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for
for~ulati~g PARs for the offsite populace within the 10-~ile EPZ.
However, as discussed in Paragraph 11, the offsite dose assessment
projections wera not analyzed in a manner that led to an appropriate
PAR.
Earlier in the exercise, the SEM in the TSC was planning to
release nonessential personnel from the site because of the degrading
prognosis. Just prior to the initiation of the evacuation, the
simulated earthquake occurred.
The SEM was very timely in delaying the
evacuation until a damage assessment from the earthquake was completed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether means for controlling
radiological exposures during an emergency were established and
implemented for emergency workers, and that these means included
exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(ll), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.K.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled
throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency
workers and by periodic surveys in the ERFs.
Exposure guidelines were
in place for various categories of emergency actions, and adequate
protective clothing and respiratory prot~ction were available and used
as appropriate.
No violations or deviatiuns were identified.
14.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency was observed to determine
whether deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and
weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were
formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b}(l4}, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted player critiques following the exercise
termination. A formal licensee critique of the emergency exercise was
held on December 10, 1993, with exercise controllers, licensee
management, and NRC personnel attending. The licensee reviewed the
exercise objectives and objectively evaluated the performance of the
emergency organization in meeting the objectives. The critique was
thorough and the licensee's evaluation team had been proactive in its
analysis of the EW identified in Paragraph 11.
Licensee management also
acknowledged their concern and support to prompt corrective actions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7
15.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarizeq on December 10, 1993,
with those persons indicated in Paragraph I..
The inspector described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the exercise weakness listed
below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number
50-280, 281/93-28-01
Status
Open
16.
Federal Evaluation Team Report
Description and Reference
EW - Dose assessment activities did
not support PAR process
(Paragraph 11).
The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee
and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region III staff) concerning
the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded
by separate correspondence.
17.
Index*of Abbreviations Used in Thts Report
-CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Control Room Simulator
Emergency Action Level
Environmental Protection Agency
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure
Emergency Planning Zone
Emergency Response Facility
Emergency Response Organization
EW
Exercise Weakness
DES
Department of Emergency Services
Health Physics
JPIC Jotnt Public Information Center
Local Emergency Operations Facility
LMC
Local Media Center
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Support Center
Protective Action Recommendation
Site Area Emergency
SEM
Station Emergency Manager
Site Area Emergency
Attachment:
Scope, Objectives, Narrative
Summary, and Scenario Timeline
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
DECEMBER 8, 1993 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
EXERCISE SCOPE
Virginia Power will demonstrate its ability to implement both the
Corporate and Surry Power station Emergency Plans on December 8,
1993.
The purpose of this exercise is to activate and evaluate
major portions of the Surry Emergency Plan, associated implementing
procedures,
and selected portions of the Corporate Emergency
Response Plan in accordance with 10CFR50.47(b) (14), and to support
the implementation of state and local governments
emergency
response plans as required by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency.
This plume exposure pathway exercise will be held in conjunction
with emergency response demonstrations by the Commonweal th of
Virginia and several local governments.
The exercise will
demonstrate
that
those
individuals
and
agencies
assigned
responsibilities in a
radiological emergency are capable of
providing the necessary protective measures to ensure the_ health
and safety of the public in the event of an accident at Surry Power
Station.
The exercise will demonstrate responses to the emergency classes,
commensurate with the stated exercise objectives, established by
NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
Power Plants.
Free play is encouraged and controllers will be
allowed to interface with the participants to provide information.
The controllers will only alter the participants' responses if the
exercise lags behind schedule, if emergency response personnel take
inappropriate actions to carry them to the next event, or if action
is taken that would correct the expected simulated response earlier
than scheduled by the scenario.
The exercise will fulfill the following drill requirements:
Annual medical emergency drill
Semi-annual radiological monitoring drill
Communications drill
At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the
safe operation of the stationo
Station management may, at their
discretion, suspend the exercise for any period of time necessary
to ensure this goal.
Exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the
simulated incident, except the exercise date .
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
DECEMBER 8 1 1993 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES SUMMARY
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the adequacy of the
Surry Power Station Emergency Plan, the Corporate Emergency
Response Plan, and associated implementing procedures.
The objectives of this emergency exercise are to demonstrate by
ac_tual performance a number of key emergency preparedness functions
as they relate to the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan.
The
simulated
accident
will
involve:
emergency
classification,
_notifications of company and off-site organizations, simulated
actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of
accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope
with the event.
The event will include, a simulated off-site
radiological release to support a plume exposure pathway exercise.
As applicable to the events developed by the exercise scenario, the
Surry Power station and corporate emergency response facilities
{ERFs)
will be activated.
Each ERF staff will demonstrate
functions described in the implementing procedures.
Emergency
response functions which are impractical to demonstrate will be
simulated.
The attached objectives, as numbered in the Virginia Power Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Six Year Plan, will be demonstrated as
applicable to the schedule provisions of this- six year plan.
A
matrix, identifying the objectives and the Virginia-Power emergency
response facilities/groups where they will be demonstrated, is*
provided.
The Control Room Simulator will be used in lieu of the
actual Station control Room.
The following is a list of corporate and station emergency response
facilities and groups with their associated acronyms:
(1)
Control Room Simulator {CRS)
(2)
Technical Support Center {TSC)
(3)
Operational Support Center {OSC)
(4)
Local Emergency Operations Facility {LEOF)
(5)
Corporate Emergency Response Center {CERC)
(6)
Joint Public Information center {JPIC)
(7)
Local Media Center {LMC).
(8)
Health Physics {HP)
(9)
Security {SEC)
(10)
Chemistry {CHEM)
{11)
Central Emergency Operations Facility {CEOF)
VIRGINIA POWER
'SURRY POWER STATION
DECEMBER 8, . 19 9 3 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
The following objectives establish the extent of play for the
December 8,
1993 Emergency Exercise.
The objectives ensure that
required events are included in the exercise scenario and establish
appropriate exercise evaluation criteria.
1.
Demonstrate the ability_ to analyze station conditions, assess
Emergency Action Level
(EAL)
parameters,
and
correctly
classify the emergency.
The CRS and TSC Emergency Response Organization (ERO) will
demonstrate this objective by initiation and use of EPIP-1.01
and appropriate operational procedures.
Status forms detailing radiological monitor and operational
data may be issu.ed at periodic intervals to facilitate conduct
of the scenario.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify, mobilize, and sustain the
Surry
Power
Station
and
corporate
Emergency
Response
Organizations.
The CRS staff, Station Security, and Corporate Security will
notify and mobiiize the ERO.
station ERO notification will be
conducted in accordance with the appropriate Station EPIPs.
Corporate Security will initiate their emergency notification
procedure to call out the corporate ERO.
CERC, and JPIC will demonstrate sustaining
continuous response capability by formulating shift relief
rosters.
If required, the process for obtaining logistical
and technical support for emergency response personnel may be
simulated.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the state and. local
governments and the NRC within established time constraints.
The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO will demonstrate this objective by
providing up-to-date information to federal, state, and local
governments within required time limits.
a.
State and Local Government Notification
An
Emergency
Communicator
(EC)
is responsible for
obtaining
the
information
required
by
EPIP-2. 01,
Attachment 1 (Report of Emergency to state and Local
Governments), and Attachment 2 (Report of Radiological
conditions to the state).
Upon approval by the Station
Emergency Manager ( SEM) or the Recovery Manager (RM) , as
appropriate, the EC will transmit the information to the
state and local governments.
Initial and follow-up notifications will be conducted in
accordance EPIP-2.01.
As conditions warrant, the ability to transmit Protective
Action Recommendations
(PARs)
to the State will be
demonstrated in accordance with appropriate notification
procedures.
As required, in accordance with EPIP-2.01, the EC will
transmit the initial and follow up Report of Radiological
Conditions to the State
(EPIP-2.01,
Attachment
2)
following data assimilation, recording, and approval.
The
SEM retains responsibility for state and local
government notifications until the LEOF is activated.
Following
activation,
responsibility
for
notification is transferred to the Recovery Manager (RM) .
b.
NRC Notification
Information for these notifications will be identified
- and record~d by the EC on EPIP-2. 02, Attachment f"' (NRC
Event
Notification
Worksheet) ,
Attachment
2,
(NRC
Emergency Communicator Log), and EPIP-4.33, Attachment 1
(HPN Protective Measures Status) and Attachment 2 (HPN-
~
Communications Log) .
EPIP-2. 02 Attachment 3,
(EROS
Operation) may be simulated to a controller. Upon proper
approval, the ECs will transmit the information to the
NRC (phone cell if the NRC does*not participate).
The initial notification will be performed from the CRS
or TSC.
Following initial notification and unless
otherwise directed by * the NRC, . the EC will maintain
continuous communications with the NRC Operations Center
(phone cell if the NRC does not participate) to transmit
plant
condition
changes.
Communication
dialogue
highlights will be documented.
Responsibility for NRC Notifications in accordance with
EPIP-2.02 will remain with the TSC ERO.
Responsibility
for Health Physics Network (HPN) communications will be
transferred to the LEOF following activation of that
facility.
A
demonstration
of
back-up
communications
may
be
conducted with the NRC from the CRS.
The Emergency Response Data System (EROS) will not be
used during this exercis~.
..
4.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct assembly and accountability
of personnel within the Protected Area.
The station Security staff will d.emonstrate this objective in
accordance with EPIP-5. 09 and EPIP-5. 03. Also, to support the
overall accountability process, the Assembly Area Leaders will
perform area accountability.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch, and control on-
site emergency teams to perform response activities.
As appropriate, the CRS, TSC, and osc staffs will demonstrate
this objective by dispatching and, controlling teams in
response to scenario events within the Station Protected Area.
Also, the ability to brief emergency teams and establish
appropriate protective measures and communications will be
demonstrated.
The CRS staff will demonstrate this objective by initiating
applicable ~rocedures. Following facility activation, the TSC
and osc staffs
will
demonstrate
this * objective
by
implementing EPIP-3.02, EPIP-3.03, and EPIP-5.08.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and implement
appropriate
protective
measures
for
emergency
response
personnel,
including site access
control,
contamination
control, exposure control, use of protective devices and, as
appropriate, the process for authorization of potassium iodide
(KI) administration.
This objective will be demonstrated through an interface among
the CRS, TSC, LEOF, and osc ERO in which the TSC staff will
monitor and authorize protective measures for site access,
contamination 'control, and exposure control.
The TSC organization, via the Radiation Protection Supervisor
(RPS) located in the Health Physics area, will dispatch and
direct monitoring teams within the bounds of the site property
per EPIP-4. 01 and EPIP-4. 02 and associated proced:ures to
assess_ radiological
conditions.
Protective
measures,
appropriate
for
conditions,
will
be
developed
and/or
implemented for emergency response_personnel.
Security will implement access control measures in accordance
with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.04.
The osc staff and other site personnel* will implement any
necessary
actions
associated
with
protective
equipment
requirements and in-plant access control.
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the CRS and/or
TSC and OSC staffs may demonstrate the process for requesting
and authorizing exposure extensions, to include emergency
exposure authorization in accordance with EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-
4. 04.
Also, -if necessary, the TSC staff will demonstrate the
KI authorization process per EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-5.07.
If necessary, in iesponse to scenario events, the TSC will
demonstrate the planning and notification processes for
protective measures and evacuating non-essential personnel in
accordance with EPIP-4.01 and EPIP~5.0S.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate Off-site
Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) based on assessment
of plant conditions and off-site dose projections and/or
measurements.
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the SEM
from the TSC or by the RM in the LEOF by implementation of
EPIP-1.06.
Additional information for PAR determination may
be obtained from EPIP-4.07.
The TSC and LEOF organizations
may monitor plant conditions and perform off-site dose
projections to support formulation of PARs. Responsibility for
PAR development is transferred from the TSC to the LEOF
following activation of the LEOF.
Radiological parameter data generated during the development
- of this scenario* may be artificially elevated and may not
represent the degree of fuel failure and radiological release
commensurate with the plant dynamic events.
This* may be
necessary to demonstrate* this exercise objective. *
8.
Demonstrate the ability to perform off-site dose assessment.
9.
As appropriate, th_is objective will be demonstrated by the TSC
and LEOF
staffs.
The ability to perform initial dose
assessment will be demonstrated through the implementation of
EPIP-4. 01 and associa.ted dose assessment procedures.
As
required, the CERC will act in a back-up capacity to perform
off-site dose assessment.
Field monitoring teams will be dispatched per EPIP-4 ~ 01, EPIP-
4. 02, and associated procedures to support the dose assessment
effort.
As appropriate, these teams will be directed by the
RPS and/or the TSC and LEOF staffs.
As appropriate, demonstrate.the ability of Health Physics and
Chemistry to conduct radiological monitoring activities,
including exposure rate surveys, sample collection, and sample
analysis.
As required, radiological monitoring, sampling, and analysis
for in-plant and/or on-site activities will be initiated:in
accordance with EPIP-4.02. Post Accident Sampling activities
may be performed in accordance with EPIP-4.22 and EPIP-4.23 .
The
field
monitoring
teams
will
perform
radiological
monitoring activities in accordance with EPIP-4.15 and EPIP-
4.16.
Reactor coolant and/or containment samples will not be
obtained utilizing the High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS).
Radiological data necessary to test response and monitoring
capabilities will be provided by the controller during
simulated sample collection.
Isotopic analysis data will be
provided following demonstra.tion of proper sample preparation
and upon expiration of spectrum collection and analysis times.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively activate the emergency
response
facilities
and
associated
emergency
response
processes.
Activation of facilities and emergency processes by the TSC,
osc, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and the LMC, will be demonstrated in
accordance with the appropriate procedures.
As appropriate,
demonstrated by
security.
-
activation of emergency processes will be
the
CRS,
Health Physics,
Chemistry and
11.
Demonstrate that facility
layout and
equipment
support
emergency response activities in each facility.
This objective will be demonstrated-in the CRS, TSC, osc,
LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Health Physics and Chemistry.
12.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain effective
communications.
The CRS, TSC, osc, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Health
Physics, Chemistry, and Field Teams will demonstrate this
objective.
Use of backup communications systems will be demonstrated only
if primary communications systems fail.
13.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain command and control of the
- emergency response effort*~
The SEM will demonstrate on-site emergency response command
and control from the CRS and TSC.
The RM will demonstrate
command
and
control
of
the
emergency
response
effort
associated with the LEOF upon activation of that facility.
The corporate-Response-Manager will demonstrate command and
control of the emergency response effort associated with the
CERC upon activation of that facility.*
The SEM will ensure personnel within the Protected Area are
informed of emergency event status by the use of emergency
alarms and the plant paging system (Gai-tronics) and selected
personnel pagers.
Remaining site personnel will be notified
by other verbal communication methods.
Announcements should
be preceded and terminated with the phrase:
"This is a
drill."
The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO will demonstrate the ability to
transfer appropriate command and contro*1 functions.
a.
The CRS functions that will transfer to the TSC include:
(1)
Notifications to the state, local governments, and
NRC.
(2)
Determining the emergency classification.
(3)
Authorizing emergency exposures.
(4)
Developing and transmitting PARs to the state.
b.
The TSC functions that will transfer to the LEOF are:
(1)
Notifications to the state and local governments
and to the NRC via the HPN.
(2)
Developing and transmitting PARs to the state.
14.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate preparation, review and
release of timely and accurate information to the public.
The CERC, JPIC, LEOF, and LMC sta'ffs will demonstrate this
objective.
Press releases will be prepared and edited at the CERC and
transmitted to the LEOF for technical review.
Following
approval by the RM and/or the Corporate Response Manager, the
process for issuing press releases will be demonstrated.
The JPIC Director will be cognizant of all press releases and
make them available to the media in the JPIC and LMC.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control
functions.
Public Affairs will demonstrate this objective by establishing
an
emergency
hotline
in
accordance
with
CPIP-2.1.
Questions will be called into the Public Information Room
requiring response as part of the scenario.
16.
Demonstrate the ability to provide basic life support and to
package and transport a contaminated injured person to an off-
site medical facility.
This objective will be demonstrated by the First Aid Team
implementing treatment appropriate for the victim's level of
injury
and
by
Health
Physics
employing
the
necessary
radiological controls in accordance with EPIP-4.20 to remove
the victim from the accident scene.
As required, the CERC will implement CPIP-7.1.
An off-site rescue unit will demonstrate. the ability to
respond to the station.
The contaminated injured person will be transported to an
off-site facility~
17.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to, control and mitigate
the consequences of a fire.
This objective will not be demonstrated.
18.
Demonstrate the ability to establish a Recovery organization .
. and to develop a Recovery Plan.
This objective will not be demonstrated.
19.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct a self-critique and to
identify areas for improvement.
The CRS, TSC, osc, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Chemistry,
and Health Physics will conduct a self-critique to identify
weaknesses and improvement items.
1
2
3
4
5
X
X
X
X
X
osc
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
LBOI'
X
X
CBRC
X
JPIC
X
LIIC
SECURITY
X
X
BP
X
X
CHEMISTRY
X
DECEMBER 8, 1993 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES DEMONSTRATION MATRIX
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
13
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
- x
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
'
X
X
X
X
- =Denotes objective not to be .demonstrated
14
15
16
17
18
19
-
X
X
X
X
X
X
x,
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
DECEMBER 8, 1993 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
SCENARIO NARRATIVE
A full scale plume pathway exercise is scheduled to be conducted at
the Surry Power station on Decembers, 1993.
For the purpose of
the exercise, Unit 1 is designated as the affected unit.
Unit 1 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions near
end of life.
Unit 2 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions with
no equipment out of service.
The exercise begins at 0900.
A dropped rod occurs at 0915.
This
event drives a turbine runback to 70%.
At this time reactor
coolant system activity begins to increase. The activity increases
and warrants the declaration of an Alert.
It is noted that the
requirements for a Notification Of Unusual Event (NOOE) are quickly
exceeded and that there is a slight possibility that a NOOE may be
declared prior to ~n ALERT.
When accountability begins an individual is conta~inated and
injured~
The victim will require transport to an off-site medical
facility.
At 1112 a Design Bases Earthquake occurs.
The earthquake.drives
the declaration of a Site Area Emergency (SAE).
In addition, this
event will drive both units to be ramped off the line.
One minute
later leaks start in the condensate and feedwater systems. At 114 7
one RWST level indicator fails low.
At 1202 charging pump 1-CH-P-
lB fails~
At 1216 component cooling pump 1-CC-P-2A fails.
At 1245 a tube rupture occurs in the "A" steam generator.
same time a safety valve for the "A" steam generator fails
open position allowing a release to the environs to begin.
conditions require the declaration of a General Emergency.
At the
in the
These
Escalation through the applicable emergency classifications will
provide activities designed to exercise both on-site and off-site
response organizations. Sufficient time will be permitted to allow.
the response organizations to perform the required assessment and
appropriate response actions.
At 1415 the exercise will be terminated.
Facility critiques are scheduled to begin approximately fifteen
minutes after termination of the exercise.
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
DECEMBER 8, 1993 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
TIME LINE
NOTE:
TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE
0730
Lead Controllers and Lead Observers briefing.
0815
Operations Department participants briefing in the Control
Room Simulator (CRS).
0855
Operations Department participants positioned in the Control
Room Annex Annex.
0900
Simulator run started.
0915
Dropped rod F-10 causes Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
activity to increase (mini-scenario #1 Dropped Rod F-10).
The rod may be recovered.
Note:
ensure limit ramp rate, due to high reactor coolant activity
conditions.
The crew will want to ramp the unit oiif the
0940
1000
. 1112
line at a rapid rate.
-
Turbine runback to 70%.
RCS activity starts to increase at a rapid rate.
Notification Of unusual Event (NOOE) may be declared per
Tab C-3.
Emergency Action Level (EAL) conditions (15 minutes) met
or exceeded for ALERT Tab c-2.
ALERT Tab C-2 is declared due to severe clad damage (between
0940 and 1000, contingency time).
An individual is contaminated and injured in the Auxiliary
Building when trying to report for accountability.
This
initiates the First Aid Emergency (mini-scenario #2 First
Aid Emergency).
F.arthquake greater than Design Bases Earthquake (DBE) levels
(mini-scenario #3 Design Bases Earthquake).
DBE will drive both units to be ramped off the line and
brought to cold shutdown.
Note:
limit ramp rate.
1113
Condensate system leak (245 gpm initially, steady state
65 gpm) begins between 1-CN-114 and l-CN-FCV-107 (mini-
scenario #4 condensate system Leak).
1142
1147
1202
1216
1245
1247
1248
1305
1415
1430
1530
Feedwater system leak (gpm 44) begins at 1-FW-96 (mini-
scenario #5 Feedwater system Leak).
Site Area Emergency (SAE) per Tab L-1 is declared due to
earthquake greater than DBE levels _(between 1112 and 1142,
contingency time).
Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level fails low on 1-CS-
LI-lOOA (mini-scenario #6 RWST Level Indicator Fails Low).
Charging pump 1-CH-P-lB trips (mini-scenario #7 Charging
Pump 1-cH-P-lB Failure).
Component cooling pump l-CC-P-2A trips (mini-scenario #B
component cooling Pump 1-cc-P-2A Failure).
Tube rupture occurs in Steam Generator (SG) "A".
Safety valve for SG "A" fails in the open position (mini-
scenarlo #9 Safety Valve Failure).
Release begins.
Reactor and turbine trip.
Steam driven Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) pump overspeeds
(mini-scenario #10 Terry Turbine overspeeds).
Electric driven AFW*pump 1-FW-P-3B fails upon receipt of
start signal (mini-scenario #11 AFW Pump 1-FW-P-3B Failure).
Safety Injection (SI) and Phase "1" isolation occur.
Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump 1-SI-P-lA trips upon
receipt of SI signal (mini-scenario #12
Loss Of 1-SI-P-lA).
l-SI-MOV-1867D does not open upon receipt of SI signal
(mini-scenario #13
1-SI-MOV-1867D Failure).
GENERAL EMERGENCY declared due to Tab B-11 fuel failure
with SG tube rupture (between 1245 and 1305 contingency
time).
Terminate emergency on-site and restore emergency response
facilities.
Begin facility critiques.
Complete facility critiques.