ML18152A102
| ML18152A102 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1989 |
| From: | Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A103 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-89-33, 50-281-89-33, NUDOCS 9001100179 | |
| Download: ML18152A102 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1989033
Text
'v' **
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
. -
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
- Report Nos.:
50-280/89-33 and 50-281/89-33
Licen.see:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
Lice~se Nos.: DPR-32 ~nd DPR-37
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
November 13-17, 1989
Inspector:
f_ c,C,*, ~Q;;)--k.-,
W. M. Sartor, Jr.
~
Accompanying Personnel:
D. Collins, NRC
B. Haagensen, Sonalysts, Inc.
F. Kantor, NRR
L. Nicholson, NRC
R. Schi-n ,- NRC
R. Serbu, NRR
Approved by:
L
1
- I) . ~~ ~
W. H. Rankin, Chie¥
Scope:
Emergency Preparedness Section
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological
Protection Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Date Signed
Date Signed
This routine, unannounced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the
annual emergency exercise.
State and local governments participated fully in
this exercise.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
Based upon the scenario used and .the response observed thereto, the licensee
fully demonstrated the capability to perform in accordance with the Emergency
Plans and Procedures to adequately provide for the health and safety of the
public.
'E'OO 1100 :L 7*7
~*DR
ADOCK
1,.,
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- W. Cartwright~ Vice President, Nuclear Operation~
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager, Operations and Maintenenace
- J. Costello, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- D. Erickson, Radiation Protection Superintendent
- A., Friedman, Superintendent, Nuclear Training
- E. Greckeck, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
- J. Higgins, Director, Nuclear Security
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent, Operations
- J. Ogren, Superintendent, Maintenance .
- J. 0 1Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Services
- R. Saunders, Manager, Licensing and Programs
- W. Stewart, Senior Vice President
Other 1 icensee employees contacted during this inspection included
engineers, operators, mec~anics, security force members, technicians, and
administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- W. Holland
- L.-Nicholson
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determfoe that
provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, State, and
local Emergency Plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l4),
10 tFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and
was discussed with 1 i censee representatives on severa 1 occasions.
The
scenario developed for the exercise fully exercised the onsite and offsite
emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency
information to the State and 1 oca 1 government agencies for their ful 1
participation in the exercise.
The scenario was both challenging and
innovative with message inputs that exercised damage control teams with
repair activities that were not directly related to accident mitigation.
The better than average scenario package was also reflected in exercise
- -
2
control as the complete and accurate data provided for a consistent player
response to the simulated accident.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and
that adequate staff was available to response to an emergency as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made
for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate
staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.
As the Techni ca 1 Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Faci 1 ity
(EOF) were established, responsibility and authority were transferred
effectively. Priorities for equipment repair and other corrective actions
were well-formulated and communicated effectively to repair teams or
appropriate plant staff.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and
effectively using assistance resources had been made, that arrangements ta
accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site EOF had been
made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned
response had been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section
I I. C.
State and licensee staff were accommodated at the Local Emergency
Operations Facil i'ty (LEOF).
The licensee included in the exercise,
monitoring of the Safety Perimeter Display System (SPDS) status (which was
showing actual plant status) in addition to status sheets which contained
exercise information.
This effort to consult SPDS was to provide a level
of reality to licensee response not available using only scenario data
sheets.
When the SPDS experienced a failure during the exercise, the
Controller group took effective action to minimize the disruption to
players in the exercise.
Licensee contact with offsite organizations was
prompt and assistance*resources from various agencies were prepared to
assist in the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3
5.
Emergency Classification Syste~ (82301)
6.
. This area was observed to determine that q standard emergency
classification and action level scheme was in use by thenuclear facility
licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.C, and specific* criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in
effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and in the
Implementing Procedures.
The system appeared to be adequate for the
cl assifi cation of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures
provided for . initial and continuing mitigating actions* during the
simulated emergency.
A flow chart for classification of events was posted
in the EOF and effectively used by EOF support staff. The classifications
of each event up to and including the General Emergency were timely.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established
for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations
and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup
messages to* response organizations had been established; and means to
provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure
pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,
Sec ti on I I.E.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been
established and were used to provide information concernfog the simulated
emergency conditions to Federal, -State, and local response *organizations
and to inform the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
The licensee used a phone system consisting of direct "ring down" phones
to notify offsite authorities of plant status.
After the EOF was
established, and the State staff was in place in the EOF (approximately
12:30 p.m.), the State representatives in the EOF requested that verbal
notifications to the State of licensee recommendations be made to him
rather than over the direct phone system.
The licensee accomodated this
request, but also transmitted copies of the notification forms to the
State EOF.* The State representative in the EOF assumed the responsibility
of communicating verbally the licensee's recommendations to the State.
The State representative noted an error on the licensee's notification
form Number 9, which showed the 1 i censee had made a protective action
recommendation (PAR) of evacuation 360° out to two miles, when in fact the
recommendation had been to shelter this area.
Notification fonn 8 also
contained this error *
4
Periodic meetings were -held between the 1 i censee and the State
representatives in the EOF to discuss in detail the plant status,
projected plant status, and the status of State protective response.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
8.
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt
communications among principal response organizations and emergency
. personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6)~ 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and specified criteria in NUREG~0654,Section II.F.
Communi cati ans qmong the licensee's emergency. response faci 1 iti es and
emergency organization an9 between the licensee I s emergency response
organization and offsite authorities appeared adequate.
No communications
related problems were identified during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Public Educatiori a.nd Information (82301)
This area -was observed to determine that information concerning the
simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV;D, and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the
exercise.
The information included details on how the public would be
notified and what initia1 actions they should take in an emergency.
A
rumor control program was in place. A Local Media Center was established
and appeared adequately equipped and coordinated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment ('82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and
equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed the activation, staffina, and operation of selected
emergency response facilities.
No equipment deficiencies were observed
during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified *
10.
5
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods. systems, and
equipment for asses~ing and monitoring actual or potential offsit.e
consequences of a radioloqical emergency condition were in use as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.B, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment proqram included both an enqineerinq assessment of
plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and
offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Both programs* appeared
effective during this exercise in analyzing the plarit status so as to make
recommendations to the Station Emergency Manager concerning mitigating
actions to reduce damage to plant equipment. to prevent release of
radioactive materials and to terminate the emergency condition.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions
during the emergency. consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and
in place. and protective actions for emergency workers. including
evacuation of nonessential personnel. were implemented promptly as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (10). and specific criteric1. in NUREG-0654,
Section I I. J.
An inspector verified the licensee had emergency procedures for
formulating PARs for offsite populations within the 10-mile emergency
planning zone (EPZ).
Following the General Emergency declaration. the
Sta ti on Emergency Manager and the Recovery Manager had difficulty
determining the applicable PARs within the time requirements to make the
recom~endation to the offsite authorities.
Despite this difficulty. the
PAR was made appropriat~ly within 15 minutes of identification of condi-
tions warranting a General Emergency declaration.
The major reason for
the difficulty appeared to be the licensee's PAR procedure, EPIP-1.05,
which differs from the simple flow chart of I&E Notice 83-26 and was
confusing to follow.
During the critique, the licensee identified the
cumbersomeness of EPIP-1.05 for determination of PARS as needinQ correc-
tive action as well as identifying a need for enhanced training on the use
of EPIP-1.05 in determinina PARs.
The licensee's corrective action to
enhance PAR decision making will be tracked via inspector followup item
(IFI) 50-280, 281/89-33-01~
The protective actions instituted for onsite emergency workers included
periodic radiation surveys. exposure control, and contamination control as
required.
The licensee also demonstrated the ability to conduct assembly
and accountability of personnel within the protected area *
No violations or deviations were identified.
V **
12.
6
Exercise Criti~ue (82301)
The licensee's cr_it i que of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and
weaknesses noted in the 1 i censee' s emergency response organization were
formally preserited to licensee management for corrective actions as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix _E, Paragraph IV.E.
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
A licensee critique of the emergency exercise was held on November 17,
1989, with exercise controllers, key exercise participants, licensee
management, and NRC personnel attending.
The critique was the best one
observed to date by the team leader. It was well organized and addressed
each of the exercise objectives.
Those areas that required either
corrective action or further evaluation had been crouped into funttional
'areas for followup.
The critique was presented *from a viewpoint of
securing emergency preparedness program enhancements rather than taking
credit for those areas that went well.
No violations or deviations were identified.
-13.
Federal Evaluation Team Reoort
The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee
and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I I staff) concerning the
activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by
separate correspondence.
14. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a.
(Closed) IFI 50-280, 281/87-29-04: * Provide security at the LENC
during exercises and/or events.
The relocated LENC on licensee
property provides for security with the road blotks e~tablished to
control access to the site during an emergency.
b.
(Closed) IFI 50-280, 281/87-29-10:
Assure that offsite monitoring
teams conduct environmental monitoring in accordance with EPIP-4.16.
Licensee e~jluation of offsite monitorina teams indicated procedural
adherence.
c.-
(Closed) IFI 50-280, 281/89-07-01:
Failure to demonstrate the
ability to au~ment the onsite emergency organization in a timely and
effective manner.
The licensee had revised personnel assignments to
its emergency organization to make timely and effective staffing of
its emergency organization as observed during this exercise.
d.
(Closed) IF! 50-280, 281/89-07-02:
Failure to establish radiological
access control to Control Room, TSC, and LEOF following an onsite
radiological release.
The licensee documented radiological access
control to these facilities during the exercise.
15.
7
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were surrunarized-on November 17, 1989,
with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed -in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting
- comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number
50-280. 281/89-33-01
Description and Reference
IFI:
Review and revise as necessary
PAR procedure EPIP 1.05 to enhance
decisionmaking (Paraqraph 11).
Attachment:
Scope. Objectives, and Scenario
Timeline
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 1989 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
EXERCISE SCOPE
On
November 15, 1989, Virginia Electric and Power Company will demonstrate its
ability to implement the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan.
The purpose of
this exercise is to activate and evaluate major portions of the Emergency Plan,
associated implementing procedures, and selected portions* of the Corporate
Emergency Response
Plan in accordance with 10CFR50.47(b) (14), and to support
the implementation of state and local government emergency response plans as
required by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
This
exercise
will
be
held
in conjunction with emergency response
demonstrations by the Commonwealth of Virginia, the counties of James City,
Isle _of Wight, Surry,
and
York,
as well as the cities of Newport News and
Wil,iamsburg.
The exercise will demonstrate that those individuals and
agencies assigned responsibilities in a radiological emergency are capable of
providing the necessary protective measures to ensure the health and safety of
the public in the event of an accident at the Surry Power Station.
The
exercise* will demonstrate responses to the four emergency classes
establis.hed
by
. Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of
Radiological Emergency Response Plans Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power
Stations. A scenario will be prepared to accomplish a successive escalation
through these emergency classes. Free play is encouraged and controllers will
only interfere with participant's response if the exercise lags behind
schedule, if emergency response personnel take inappropriate actions to carry
them to the next event, or if action is taken that would correct the expected
simulated response earlier than scheduled by the scenario. At no time will the
exercise be permitted to interfere with the routine safe operation of the
station. Station management may, at their discretion, suspend the exertise for
a_ny period of time necessary to ensure this goal~
Exercise participants will
not have prior knowledge of the simulated incident or any parts thereof.
- -
YIRGINI_A POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 1989 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES S~RY
The objectives of this exercise are to demonstrate by actual performance a
number of key emergency preparedness functions as they relate to the Surry
Power Station . Emergency Plan.
The simulated accident will involve: emergency
classification, notifications of company and off-site organizations, simulated
actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of accident
assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with the event, which
will
include a simulated off-site radiological release.
The intent of this
effort is to demonstrate the adequacy of the Surry Power Station Emergency
Plan,
the Emergency Plan
Implementing Procedures (EPIPs), the Corporate
Emergency Response Plan, and the Corporate Pl~n
Implementing Procedures
(CPIPs).
Simulations of some aspects of emergency preparedness, without actual
demonstrations by the Station or Corporate entities, may occur where it is
impractical to call for personnel involvement.
The following objectives have been developed in order to establish the scope of
the 1989 Surry Emergency Exercise.
The objectives ensure that required events
are included in the exercise scenario, and establish criteria to be evaluated
by controllers and observers during the conduct of the exercise *
VIRGINIA P<MER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 1989 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
1.
Demonstrate the ability of the emergency response organization to activate
the Surry Power Station and Corporate Emergency Plans and use the
appropriate associated implementing procedures.
The Surry Pow.er Station and Corporate emergency response organizations wi 1.1
demonstrate this objective.
The initial activation will start in the
Control Room.
A 11 Surry Power Sta ti on and Corporate response facilities wi 11
be manned
and perform prescribed functions in accordance with implementing procedures
as appropriate to the development of the exercise scenario.
The
following Surry Power Station and Corporate emergency response
organizations located within the following facilities will participate in
this exercise:
(1)
Control Room (CR)
(2) Technical Support Center (TSC)
(3) Operational Support Center (OSC)
(4)
Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)
(5)
Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)
(6) Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
(7)
Local Media Center (LMC)
-
Other emergency response
personnel, not located within
the
listed
facilities, will also participate in this exercise including Security,
Chemistry, and Health Physics.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze station conditions, assess Emergency
Action Level (EAL) parameters and correctly classify the emergency.
The Control Room and the TSC will demonstrate this objective by initiation
and use of appropriate operational procedures and EPIP-1.01.
The use of the Emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS) will
be
simulated during the exercise.
Status sheets detailing radiological
monitor and operational trend data will
be issued on a periodic time
interval.
The ability to access the
ERFCS or to acquire the data by
back-up methods will be demonstrated in each facility.
During the conduct of this exercise, the Station Emergency Manager might
choose to escalate the emergency classification to a higher level than
prescribed by the
EALs.
If this situation occurs, the controller will
block this escalation to conform to state timeline requirements *
3.
Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch and control on-site emergency
teams to perform response activities.
-.
As
appropriate, the Control
Room,
and
OSC will demonstrate this
objective by dispatching and controlling teams
necessary to respond
to
events within the Surry Power Station protected area.
The ability to brief
emergency teams
and establish appropriate protective
measures,
and
appropriate communications will be demonstrated.
Prior to activation of the emergency response facilities, this objective
wi 11
be demonstrated
by
the Control Room through the use of appropriate
procedures.
After activation of the TSC and OSC,
the
TSC and
OSC will
demonstrate this objective by implementing the requirements of EPIP-3.03
and 5.08.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to notify and mobilize the Surry Power Station and
Corporate emergency response organizations.-
The Control Room and Security will demonstrate this objective by making
appropriate notifications per EPIP-1.03
and the Surry Power Station
Emergency Telephone Directory. Corporate Security will demonstrate this
objective by making the appropriate notifications to corporate personnel.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the state, local governments and the NRC
within the required time limits.
As appropriate, the Control
Room,* TSC
and
LEOF will demonstrate this
objective .
The Control
Room,
and
LEOF will demonstrate the ability to provide
accurate up-to-date information to the
federal,
state
and
local
governments.
a.
State and Local Government Notification
Information for these notifications will be identified and recorded by
the Emergency Communicator (EC) on EPIP-2.01, Attachment 1 (Report of
Emergency to State and Local Governments) and Attachment 2 (Report of
Radiological
Conditions to the State).
Upon approval by the Station
Emergency Manager (SEM), the EC will
transmit the information, as
appropriate, to the state and/or local governments. _
The 15-minute clock for completing the initial notification will begin
when the
SEM declares the emergency classification. After initial
notification,
the
_EC
will
perform
follow-up
conmunications
approximately
every
30 minutes or as conditions change using
EPIP-2.01, Attachment 1.
As conditions warrant, the ability to transmit protective action
recommendations (PARs) to the state will be demonstrated in accordance
with appropriate procedures.
The initial Report of Radiological Conditions to the State (EPIP-2.01,
attachment 2) will
be transmitted when
the data is gathered and
recorded.
Follow-up notifications regarding radiological conditions
will
be performed
by the
EC approximately every 30 minutes or as
radiological conditions change.
The State may waive or alt~r any follow-up reporting requirements.
b.
The responsibility for making State and local government notifications
will remain with the SEM, either in the Control Room or TSC, until the
is activated.
This notification responsibility will then
. transfer to the Recovery Manager ( RM) located in the LEOF.
,
NRC Notification
Unless otherwise directed, the NRC will be contacted for the. initial
classification, within one hour,
and once again when the exercise
terminates.
The initial notification will be made by the EC from the
Control
Room using EPIP-2.02, attachment 1 (NRC Event.Notification
Worksheet).
The termination notification will be made by the EC .from
the
TSC using EPIP-2.02, attachment 2 (NRC Emergency Corrmunicator
Log).
After initial notification, the
EC will maintain the
NRC
Emergency
Co1T1T1unicator
Log as plant conditions change to simulate
maintaining continuous phone contact.
Unless required to be maintained through contact with the NRC during
the initial notifications, the Health Physics Network
(HPN)
phone
contact will be simulated from the TSC and LEOF.
The responsibility for making NRC notifications will remain with the
SEM, either in the Control Room or TSC.
Once the LEOF is activated,
the RM will assume the responsibility for notifications via the HPN.
Maintaining contact with the NRC via the Emergency Notification System
(ENS) and the HPN will be simulated by controllers.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct assembly and accountability of personnel
within the* protected area.
The Control Room and Security will demonstrate this objective in accordance
with EPIP-1.03 and 5.03.
Additionally, the Assembly Area Leaders will
.perform area accountability to support the overall accountability process.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to perform assessments of on-site and off-site
conditions to support the fonnulation of Protective Action Recorrmendations
(PARs).
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the Control Room,
The Control Room and TSC will monitor plant conditions
to support the formulation of PARs, and will transfer the responsibility to
the LEOF upon activation.
Radiological data generated during the development of this exercise ensures
the level of response corrmensurate with the exercise objectives.
However,
certain radiological parameters may be artificially elevated.and do not
necessarily reflect actual plant dynamic data.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate protective actions for emergency
- response personnel, including area access control, contamination control,
exposure control, use of protective devices and, if appropriate, the
process for administration of potassium iodide (KI).
This objective will be demonstrated through an interface among the Control
Room,
and
OSC where
the
TSC wi 11 monitor and authorize protective *
actions for site access, contamination control and expos~re control.
The
TSC,
via the Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) located in the Health
Physics area, will dispatch and direct teams within the bounds of the site
property per EPIP-4.01
and 4.02 and associated procedures to monitor.
radiological conditions and provide protective measures for site emergency
response personnel.
When
directed by the SEM, Security will implement
access control measures in accordance with EPIP-5.04.
The
OSC staff. and
other site personnel will implement any necessary actions associated with
protective equipment requirements, .. in-plant access control
and,
if
appropriate, simulate KI administration.
As necessary, -on-site Surry
Power Station emergency response personnel
shall
don appropriate protective clothing within the plants' radiological
control area (RCA)~
When outside a plant RCA, the wearing* of protective
clothing will
be simulated.
The ability to don and verify proper fit of
respiratory protection equipment will
be *initially demonstrated
and
simulated thereafter.
If necessary, the_Control Room and/or TSC and the OSC will demonstrate the
P.rocess for authorizing exposure extensions, to include emergency exposure
authorization in accordance with EPIP-5.06 and 4.04.
If required, the
TSC will direct evacuation of designated non-essential
personnel from the site per EPIP-5.05, and Health Physics will demonstrate
the ability to monitor the evacuees in accordance with EPIP-4.21.
9.
Demonstrate t~e ability to perform off-site dose assessment.
As
appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the Control Room,
The ability to perform i-nitial dose assessment will
be
demonstrated
through
the
implementation of EPIP-4.08 and followup
assessments through the use of other associated implementing and station
procedures.
Field monitoring teams will be dispatched per EPIP-4.01 and 4.02 to support
the dose assessment effort. These teams will perform their functions in
accordance with EPIP-4.15 and 4.16. These teams will be dispatched by the
RPS and, as appropriate, directed by the RPS, TSC or LEOF.
With the exception of hand protection, the use of protective clothing and
respiratory protection equipment will be simulated.
10. As appropriate, demonstrate the ability of Health Physics and Chemistry to
conduct radiological monitoring activities, including dose rates, sample
collection and sample analysis.
As required, radiological monitoring, sampHng and analysis for in-plant
and/or on-site activities will be initiated in accordance with EPIP-4.02.
If necessary, post accident sampling activities will
be performed in
accordance with EPIP-4.22 and 4.23.
The field monitoring teams will
perform radiological monitoring acthities in accordance with EPIP-4.15 and
4.16.
Simulated radiological, sample collection and analyses data will be
provided by controllers upon completion of appropriate actions.
Simulated reactor coolant and/or containment sump/air samples
may
be
obtained utilizing the High Radiation Sampling .System (HRSS}.
Radiological
data necessary to adequately test response and monitoring capabilities will
be provided by the controller during sample acquisition. Isotopic analysis
data will be p*rovided upon demonstration of proper sample preparation and
counting delay times.
11. Demonstrate the ability to effectively activate the emergency response
facilities.*
The
Control Room, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC and LMC will demonstrate this
objective in accordance with appropriate procedures.
12. Demonstrate that facility layout and equipment adequately support emergency
response activities in each facility.
objective.
13. Demonstrate
the
ability to communicate with appropriate locations,
organizations, and field personnel.,
Co1T1T1unications will be demonstrated among the Control Room, TSC, OSC, LEOF,
CERC, JPIC,
LMC
and field teams.
The field monitoring teams shall
implement the requirements of EPIP-4.19 .
14.
Backup corrmunication systems will
be demonstrated only
if
primary
corrrnunications systems fail.
Demonstrate the ability of the Station Emergency Manager (SEM) to maintain
control of the emergency response effort on-site and the Recovery Manager
(RM)
to maintain overall control of the emergency response effort once the
LEOF is activated.
The
SEM will demonstrate on-site emergency response control from the
Control Room and TSC.
The RM will demonstrate overall control of the
emergency
response effort from the
LEOF and the Protective Acti~n
Reco11111endation process.
The
SEM keeps the personnel within the protected area informed through the
use of emergency alarms and the site Gai-Tronics (plant paging) system.
Remaining site personnel will
be notified by other verbal cDn1T1unication
methods.
A 11 announcements must be proceeded with "This is a drill."
Also the Control
Room,
TSC and
LEOF will demonstrate the ability to
transfer appropriate corrmand functions.
The Control Room functions that will transfer to the TSC include:
(1)
Notifications to the State and local governments and the NRC
(2)
Providing PARs to the State
(3)
Determining the emergency classification
(4) Authorizing emergency exposures
The TSC functions that will transfer to_ the LEOF are:
(1) Notifications to the State and local governments and
communication to the NRC via the HPN.
- (2)
Providirig PARs to the State.
15. Demonstrate the ability to
provide
continuous
emergency
response
capability.
The emergency response organizations within the
emergency
response
facilities will demonstrate this objective by formulating a shift relief
roster; however, an actual shift turnover wi 11 not be performed.
As
appropriate, the ability to provide logistical support for emergency
response personnel will also be demonstrated/simulated.
16. Demonstrate the ability to provide basic life support, package and
transport a contaminated injured person to an off-site medical facility.
Thi.s objective will be demonstrated by the First _ Aid Team implementing
procedures appropriate for the level of injury incurred by the victim and
Health Physics employing the necessary radiological controls to remove the
contaminated victim from the accident scene.
An off-site rescue unit will
demonstrate the ability to respond to Surry Power Station.
The injured
victim will
be transported to an off-site medical facility. The off-site
medical facility will demonstrate the ability to treat a contaminated
injured person.
When the contaminated injured person is transported, the station emergency
response organization will perform the requirements of EPIP-4.20 and 5.01.
17. Demonstrate the ability to coo~dinate preparation, review and release
accurate information to the public in a timely manner.
The
CERC,
JPIC
and
LEOF will demonstrate this. objective by the
implementation of CPIP-1.0 and the CPIP-2 series procedures. *
Press releases shall be prepared at the CERC until the LEOF is prepared to
assume the responsibility. Once the LEOF is activated, the
LEOF shall
prepare the press releases and transmit them to the CERC for editing.
Press releases shall be issued after approval
by the Recovery Manager
and/or the Corporate Response Manager.
The initial press release will be transmitted to the Associated _press and
United Press International.
All press releases shall be brought to the attention of the Chief Technical
Spokesman.
The Chief Technical
Spokesman shall then make the press
releases available to the media in the JPIC and LMC.
For the purposes of
this
exercise, personnel
impersonating media c*orrespondents will
be
available to ask questions.
18. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control functions.
This objective will
be demonstrated by the establishment of a special
emergency hotline by Public Affairs personnel in accordance with CPIP-2.1
and 2.3.
The personnel staffing the emergency hotline will be periodically
contacted by a controller to determine their response to various questions
related to the accident
19. Demonstrate the establishment of a recovery organization and the initiation
of recovery actions.
The Station Emergency Manager and Recovery Manager will demonstrate this
objective by implementing EPIP-6.01 and/or CPIP-6.5.
The
recovery aspects of the exercise will be to establish a recovery plan
and organization to return the station to a normal status.
20. Demonstrate the ability of the emergency response organization to conduct a
self-critique and identify improvement areas.
The Control Room, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC,
JPIC,
LMC
and
field monitoring
teams will
conduct a self-critique to identify weaknesses and improvement
i terns .
OBJECTIVES DEf<<JNSTRATION MATRIX
FACIL ITV ORGANIZATION/
fB
OBJECTIVE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
19
20
CONTROL ROOM
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
CENTER
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
TECHNICAL SUPPORT
CENTER
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
LOCAL EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS FACILITY
X
X,
X
X .
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
CORPORATE EMERGENCY
RESPONSE CENTER
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
JOINT PUBLIC
INFORMATION CENTER
x-
X
X
X
X
X
X'
X
LOCAL MEDIA CENTER
X
X
X
X
X
X
SECURITY
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
HEALTH PHYSICS AND
CHEMISTRY
X
X
X
X
- X
X
- x
X
X
EVENT SUMMARY
FORWARD
Any emergency exercise must have a significant effort put forth in research and
development to ensure that the.events depicted are as realistically possible as
can be simulated through the use of cue cards, signs, etc.
For discussion
purposes, these events can generally be broken down into two categories:.
1.
Human *Error, and
2.
Equipment Malfunction.
The first, human error, is the easiest and more flexible of the two categories
to identify in a scenario; however, no one likes to assume that they will
make
mistakes, especially of the magnitude to cause significant plant damage or
off-site consequences. This does not, however, preclude using this means to
provide inpu~ into the scenario, since the possibility f.or human error does
exist based on the amount of human judgement involved in implementing emergency
response actions for off-nonnal plant events.
The second .category, equipment malfunction, is much harder to incorporate into
a scenario, especially where it is needed to cause plant damage that creates a
serious problem to the off-site environment.
This is true because of the
tremendous effort placed on equipment reliability and redundancy during design,
fabrication and installation of systems at nuclear power facilities. The
Safety Analysis Report, written for all nuclear facilities, including the Surry
Power Station, analyzes the capabilities of plant systems to maintain control
over radioactive material .within the plant during all types.of off-normal plant
incidents.
Thus,
in order to incorporate equipment~related problems into the
scenario, some unrealistic assumptions must be made.
Additionally, the public's perception of the exercise scenario often times
leads them to bel.ieve that these events may very well be probable.
However, it
should be known that if the events in the exerci~e scenario presented within
were at all possible, an unanswered safety question*would exist and actions
would be taken to rectify the situation.
Thus, in order to achieve a sequence of events that will lead to a significant
plant
problem, the exercise scenario must contain an incredible plant
situation, and unlikely series of equipment failures, or an*improbable opera~or
error combined with equipment failures.
VIRGINlA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 1989 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
SCENARIO NARRATIVE
A full scale emergency exercise is scheduled to be conducted at the Surry Power
Station on November 15, 1989. For the purposes of the exercise, Unit 1 has been
designated as the affected unit.
Unit 1 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions with some known
fuel leakage present.
1-SI-P-lA, "A" Low Head Safety Injection Pump, is in the
. "Alert" range. due to high pump vibrations.
Plans are to bring the unit to Cold
Shutdown conditions to replace the failed fuel during the upcoming Thanksgiving
holiday.
Unit 2 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions with one Charging
Pump out of service.
A small Steam Generator tube leak of 0.06 gallons per day
exists in the "A" Steam Generator.
The exercise will be initiated by a Unit 1 turbine blade failure that does not
penetrate the turbine casing but results in turbine vibrations increasing above
the setpoint requiring unit trip.
A "NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT" will be
declared.
Sho-rtly after the turbine trip/reactor trip, increased fission product release
from the leaking fuel assemblies will cause primary coolant system activity to
rise. Conditions requiring the declaration of an*"ALERT" will then be achieved.
Following unit stabilization* and evaluation of conditions, a normal plant
cooldown will commence.
Approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after the unit trip, Unit 1 will
experience a Reactor Coolant System leak from the pressurizer surge line. This
leak will rapidly propagate into a complete surge line failure and a large Loss
of Coolant Accident (LOCA) which is confined to the Containment Building. Plant
conditions will require declaration of a "~ITE AREA EMERGENCY."
Approximately 45 minutes following the LOCA,
automatic Recirculation Mode
Transfer will realign the Safety Injection System to cold leg recirculation.
Foliowing alignment to the Recirculation Mode, one of the Low Head Safety
Injection (LHSI) pumps will experience a seal failure which results in a loss
of reactor coolant to the LHSI pump cubicle.
This reactor coolant system leak
outside of the Containment Building will result in an offsite release through
the Ventilation Vent System.
A "GENERAL EMERGENCY* will be declared based on
a breach of the three fission product barriers.
The escalation through the emergency classifications will provide activities
designed to exercise both onsite and offsite response organizations. Sufficient
time will be permitted to allow the response organizations to perform the
required assessment and appropriate response actions .
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 1989 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
SCENARIO CHRONOLOGY
NOTE:
TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE
0700
- Initial conditions distributed.
0800
- Controllers/observers posit1ion:ed.
Controllers perform any necessary
participant briefings (i.e., exemptions).
0845
- Operations Department participants positioned in the Main ~ontrol Room.
0900
- Unit 1 Main Turbine experiences a thrown blade.
- Annunciator J-E-5 (ROTOR ECCENTRICITY VIBRATION).
- Main turbine vibration recorder indicates 14. 6 mils on #4 turbine
bearing.
-
- 4 Bearing red alarm light lit on Turbine Supervisory Panel Vibration
Alarm Module.
0903
- Manual reactor and turbine trips performed in accordance with AP-8.00.
- Annunciator E-B-8 (MANUAL RX TRIP).
- Annunciator F-B-1 (MANUAL TURBINE TRIP).
- Annunciator F-A-1 (TURBINE TRIPPED BY REACTOR TRIP).
- Annunciator E~A-9 (RX TRIP BREAKERS OPENED).
- EP-1.00, Reactor Trip / Safety Injection, implemented.
- All other expected annunciators for a normal reactor trip received.
- All plant parameters trending as expected for a normal reactor trip.
0906
-
Procedure transition made to EP-1.01, Reactor Trip Recovery.*
- Operators dispatched to inspect in the Turbine Building for equipment
damage.
- EPIP-1.01, Station Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure,_ implemented.
0915
- Initiate l-OP-3.1, Unit Shutdown from 21 to HSD.
- Letdown radiation monitor (RM-CH-118 & RM-CH-119) indications begin to
increase.
0918. -
Source Range NIS detectors automatically re-energize.
0920
-
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT declared (Tab K-13) based on Turbine
rotating component failure without casing penetration resulting in unit
trip.
a
.
.. *
i
0920
-* Annunciator RM-E-7 Upper Window
(RX COOI.ANT LETDOWN LOW ALERT)
(RM-CH-118 reading 1 x 10' cpm).
-
AP- 5 .12, Reactor Coolant Letdown Monitors, initiated.
0923
-
Annunciator RM-E- 7 Lower Window (RX COOLANT LETDOWN LOW HIGH).
-
Annunciator RM-E-8 Upper Window (RX COOLANT LETDOWN HIGH ALERT)
-
(RM-CH-118 & RM-CH-119 reading 1 x 10' cpm).
0927
-
Annunciator RM-E-8 Lower Window (RX COOLANT LETDOWN HIGH HIGH).
RM-CH-118 & RM-CH-119 indicate 6 x 105 cpm.
0930
-
Commence establishing conditions to perform unit cooldown.
-
RM-CH-118 & RM-CH-119 stabilize at 7 x 105 cpm.
0956
-
Annunciator D-A-1 (BORIC ACID TANK lA HI-LO LEVEL CH-1).
-
Annunciator D-B-1 (BORIC ACID TANK 1A HI-LO LEVEL CH-2).
0957
-
ALERT declared (Tab C-2) based on primary system activity RM-CH-118
increase within 30 minutes and remains greater than S x 105 cpm for 15
minutes).
0958
-
Annunciator D-A-2 (BORIC ACID TANK lA LO-LO LEVEL CH-1).
-
Annunciator D-B-2 (BORIC ACID TANK 1A LO-LO LEVEL CH-2).
1000 * -
Boric Acid Transfer Pump (l-CH-P-2B) fails.
-
Operator dispatched to investigate pump failure and lineup l-CH-P-2C
to recirculate the "B" Boric Acid Storage Tanlt.
1020
-
First Aid Drill commences.
1030
-
Cold Shutdown boration completed.
-
Chemistry requested to verify Cold Shutdown Boron concentration.
1055
-
Chemistry confirms CSD boron concentration.
1059
Secure 1-RC-P-lB.
-
Annunciator E-A-3 (RX COOL LOOP lB LOW FLOW CH-1).
-
Annunciator E-C-3 (RX COOL LOOP lB LOW FLOW CH-3).
-
Annunciator E-D-3 (RX COOL LOOP lB LOW FLO\\J CH-2).
Annunciator H-B-2 (dT DEVIATION LOOP lB >/< LOOP lC).
-
RVLIS dynamic head indication goes from 107% to 611.
1101
-
Secure 1-RC-P-lA.
-
Annunciator E-A-2 (RX COOL LOOP lA LOW FLOW CH-1).
Annunciator*E-B-2 (RX COOL LOOP 1A LOW FLOW CH-2).
-
Annunciator E-C-2 .(RX COOL LOOP 1A LOW FLOW CH-3).
-
Annunciator H-A-2 (dT DEVIATION LOOP 1A >/< LOOP lB).
-
Annunciator H-C-2 (dT DEVIATION LOOP 1A >/< LOOP lC).
-
RVLIS dynamic head indication goes from 61% to 41%.
2
1103
-
Begin primary plant cooldown and depressurization.
1105
- Annunciator E-B-4 (AMERTAP PIT HIGH LEVEL).
- Operator dispatched to investigate Amertap Pit alarm.
1145
-
Small RCS leak develops in the Pressuriz,er Surge Line.
1147
- Annunciator RM-C- 7 Upper Window (CONTAINMENT GAS ALERT).
- Annunciator RM-C-7 Lower Window (CONTAINMENT GAS HIGH).
1150 - Annunciator RM-C-8 Upper Window (CONTAINMENT PART ALERT.).
- Annunciator RM-C-8 Lower Window (CONTAINMENT PART HIGH).
1154
- Annunciator C-D-8 (PRZ LO LEVEL).
1156
- Manual Safety Injection due to decreasing pressurizer level.
- EP-1.00, Reactor Trip/ Safety Injection initiat~d.
- RI-RM-161, Cont Hi Rng Gamma, reading 2 x E2 mR/Hr.
- RI-RM-162, Manipulator Crane, reading 1 x E3 mRjHr.
- RI-RM-159, Containment Particulate, reading > 1 x E6 cpm.
- RI-RM-160, Containment Gaseous, reading> 1 x E6 cpm.
- Victoreen Vent-Vent RM indicates a *Flow Fault* condition.
1200 - Pres,surizer Surge Line ruptures causing a large-break LOCA.
- High-High Consequence Limiting Safeguards actuation occurs
increasing containment pressure.
- Annunciator A-A-4 (ACCUM TK lA HI-LO LV).
- Annunciator A-A-5 (ACCUM TK lB HI-LO LV).
- Annunciator A-A-6 (ACCUM TK lC HI-LO LV).
- Annunciator A-B-4 (ACCUM TANK lA HI-LO PRESS).
- Annunciator A-B-5 (ACCUM TANK lB HI-LO PRESS).
- Annunciator A-B-6 (ACCUM TANK lC HI-LO PRESS).
- Annunciator A-A-8 (RWST CHEM ADD TK LO LEVEL).
Annunciator A-F-4 (SIS INITIATED).
- Annunciator B-B-4 (CLS HI TRAIN A).
- Annunciator B-B-5 (CLS HI,TRAIN B).
- Annunciator B-B-7 (CONT PARTIAL PRESS +o.l PSI CH-2).
- Annunciator B-A-7 (CONT PARTIAL PRESS +o.l PSI CH-1).
- Annunciator B-C-2 (RCP FRAME ALERT).
- Annunciator B-C-4 (CLS HI-HI TRAIN A).
- Annunciator B-C-5 (CLS HI-HI TRAIN B).
- Annunciator B-C-6 (CONT PARTIAL PRESS +0.25 PSI CH-1).
- Annunciator B-D-6 (CONT PARTIAL PRESS +0.25 PSI CH-2).
- Annunciator B-E-4 (RCP FRAME DANGER).
- Annunciator B-F-6 (CTMT INST AIR HDR LO PRESS).
- Annunciator B-H-1 (RTD BYPASS LINE lC LOW FLOW).
- Annunciator C*A-1 (RCP lA CC RETURN LO FLOW).
Annunciator C-A-5 (RCP lA SEAL WATER RETURN LO d-PRESS).
- Annunciator C-B-1 (RCP lB CC RETURN LO FLOW).
due to
3
, .
1200
Annunciator C-B-5 (RCP lB SEAL WATER RETURN LO d-PRESS).
- Annunciator C-B-8 (PRZ LO PRESS).
- Annunciator C-C-1 (RCP lC CC RETURN LO FLOW).
- Annunciator C-C-5 (RCP lC SEAL WATER RETURN LO d-PRESS).
- Annunciator C-D-4 (RCP lA SEAL LEAKOFF LO FLOW).
- Annunciator C-E-4 (RCP lB SEAL LEAKOFF LO FLOW).
- Annunciator C-E-8 (PRZ LO LEVEL HTRS OFF & LETDOWN ISOIATION).
- Annunciator C-F-4 (RCP lC SEAL LEAKOFF LO FLOW).
- Annunciator C-G-1 (PRZ NOT OVERPRESS SYSTEM REQ'D).
- Annunciator C-G-8 (PRZ SURGE LINE LO TEMP).
- Annunciator E-A-1 (HI-HI CONT PRESS CLS CH-1).
- Annunciator E-A-4 (RX COOL LOOP lC LOW FLOW CH-1).
- Annunciator E-B-1 (HI-HI CONT PRESS CLS CH-2).
- Annunciator E-B-9 (CONT HI PRESS).
- Annunciator E-C-1 (HI-HI CONT PRESS CLS CH-3).
- Annunciator E-C-4 (RX COOL LOOP lC LOW FLOW CH-3).
- Annunciator E-D-1 (HI-HI CONT PRESS CLS CH-4).
- Annunciator E-D-4 (RX COOL LOOP lC LOW FLOW CH-2).
- Annunciator E-E~2 (HI CONT PRESS CLS CH-1).
- Annunciator E-F-1 (HI CONT PRESS CLS CH-2).
Annunciator E-F-7 (PRZ LO PRESS SI CH-1).
- Annunciator E-G-l(HI CONT PRESS CLS CH-3).
- Annunciator E-G-7 (PRZ LO PRESS SI CH-2).
- Annunciator E-H-1 (HI CONT PRESS CLS CH-4).
- Annunciator E-H- 7 (PRZ LO PRESS SI CH-3).
- Annunciator G-B-1 (APPROACH TO SATURATION TEMP ALARM).
- Annunciator H-A-8 (STM LINE ISO TRIP VLVS CLOSED).
- Annunciator VSP-C-2 (AUX VENT SYSTEM SAFETY MODE INITIATED).
- Annunciator VSP-J-2 (UNIT 1 AUTO START BLOCK).
1201
-
Secure 1-RC-P-lC.
-
RVLIS Dynamic Head indication goes off-scale low.
-
RVLIS Full Range indication on-scale bouncing between 96 and 105%.
-
RVLIS Upper Range indication on-scale bouncing between 79 and 113%.
1205
- Transition made to EP-2.00, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
1210
-
Containment pressure restored to subatmospheric.
- Annunciator B-D-4 (CLS TRAIN A RESET PERMISSIBLE).
- Annunciator B-D-5 (CLS TRAIN B RESET PERMISSIBLE).
1214
-
Containment Total pressure 10.0 psia.
-
Containment Partial Pressure 9. 00 psia.
- Reset Consequence Limiting.Safeguards signals.
-
Secure 1-RS-P-2B.
- Annunciator A-H-8 (RECIRC SPRAY PP 2B-LOCKOUT OR OL TRIP).
1215
High _Head Safety Injection realigned to redundant flowpaths
in
accordance-with EP-2.00, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
4
,* .
- ' * . .
1216
Annunciator J*F-6 (TURB GEAR ZERO SPEED).
1220
SITE AR.EA EMERGENCY declared (Tab B-2) based on RCS leak rate exceeding
makeup capability or (Tab D-2) based on high Containment radiation,
pressure and temperature.
1235
- Annunciator VSP-B-5 (#3 EMER DIESEL GEN TROUBLE).
- Operator dispatched to check #3 EDG local panel *indications .
. 1236
-
Annunciator A-A- 7 (RWST TANK LOW LEVEL).
1237
-
RWST level at 19% causes SI system realignment to Recirc Mode.
Annunciator A-D-4 (SI VLVS OUT OF POSITION).
Transition to EP-2.03, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.
1300
1-SI-P-lA develops a seal leak of approximately 50 gpm.
1310
-
Low Head SI pump, 1-SI-P-lA, trips.
- Annunciator A-G-4 (LO HD SI PP 1A LOCKOUT OR OL TRIP).
- High-Head Safety Injection Pump amp indications begin fluctuating:
1311
-
1-CH-P-lB secured in order to stop HHS! pump cavitation.
1-CH-P-lA amp indication steady at normal amperage reading.
1315
-
MOV-1864A breaker thermals when closure attempt made.
- Operator dispatched to reset MOV-1864A breaker (lHl-2101).
1320
-
MOV-1864A breaker fails when operator resets thermal overload.
1330
-
GENERAL EMERGENCY declared (Tab B-10) based on breeching all three
fission product barriers or (Tab E-1) based on actual or projected Site
Boundary Doses of 2 R W.B. or 12 R Thyroid.
'
1345
-
l-RS-P-2A, "A" Outside Recirculation Spray Pump, loses indicating lights
due to a blown control power fuse.
1400
-
FI-1496, "B" UiSI discharge flow, power supply module fails.
-
FI-1496 indication goes to O gpm.
1430
MOV-1864A breaker repaired.
-
MOV-1864 closed, release terminated.
1700
-
Terminate emergency on-site, commence area critiques.
1730
-
Commence recovery planning phase.
1800
-
Terminate exercise on-site.
1900
-
Terminate exercise off-site.
5