ML18152A068

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Submits Written Summary Rept of Actions Taken,Conclusions, Basis for Continued Operability & Corrective Actions to Be Implemented in Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis....
ML18152A068
Person / Time
Site: Surry, North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 01/28/1997
From: Ohanlon J
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
96-516A, GL-96-06, GL-96-6, NUDOCS 9702040176
Download: ML18152A068 (56)
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e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 2 3 2 61 January 28, 1997 United States Nu~lear Regulatory Commission Serial No. 96-516A Attention: Document Control Desk NL&OS/MWH: R7a Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Docket Nos. 50-280, 50-281 50-338, 50-339 License Nos. DPR-32, DPR-37 NPF-4, NPF-7 Gentlemen:

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC GENERIC LETTER 96-06 ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITIONS On September 30, 1996, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued NRG Generic Letter 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions." The generic letter requested that licensees determine: (1) if containment air cooler cooling water systems are susceptible to either waterhammer or two-phase flow conditions during postulated accident conditions, and (2) if piping systems that penetrate the containment are susceptible to thermal expansion of fluid such that overpressurization of piping could occur.

The generic letter requires two written responses. First, within 30 days of the issuance of the generic letter, a written response is required to confirm whether the requested actions, information and schedule identified in the generic letter will be completed.

Second, within 120 days of the generic letter, a written summary report is to be submitted describing the actions taken and conclusions reached relative to susceptibility for waterhammer and two-phase flow in the containment air cooler cooling water system, as well as for overpressurization of piping that penetrates containment.

The summary report is also to include the basis for continued operability of affected systems and components as applicable and the corrective actions that are planned to be implemented.

On October 30, 1996, Virginia Power provided a written response (Serial No.96-516) to confirm that the requested actions, information and schedule identified in the generic letter would be completed. The purpose of this letter is to provide a written summary report of the actions taken, conclusions, basis for continued operability and corrective actions which are planned to be implemented.

( 9702040176 970128 ,-

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-The generic-letter question regarding the- susceptibility of waterhammer and two phase flow in the containment air cooler cooling system is not applicable to either North Anna or Surry since this system is not used to mitigate the effects of a design basis accident (OBA) and is isolated in response to a containment isolation signal. An evaluation of susceptibility of overpressurization of piping that penetrates containment has been completed and the- summary -report is provided as an enclosure to this letter. The piping design code for Surry is B31.1 and for North Anna is B31.7. This issue is not specifically addressed in the pipe code. No specific criteria exist in the piping code and design bases- for evaluating isolated pipe segments under faulted conditions. Using a conservative analytical approach and taking guidance from ASME Section Ill for_ faulted pressure stress limits, a small population of containment pipe penetrations were identified as requiring further: analysis/evaluation. -In addition, several penetrations for -

systems that are not used at power or to mitigate a OBA have been partially drained to preclude the potential for overpressurization. The summary report concludes that the loss of containment integrity will not occur due to overpressurization of containment piping penetrations.

The commitments being made by this letter are as follows: 1) procedures at both .

stations will be revised to assure that those penetrations which are potentially susceptible and are associated with systems that are only used during shutdown will be partially drained prior to unit startup following an outage in which the specific system(s) was placed into service, 2) Surry Unit 2 penetrations #22, #96, and #114 will be partially drained during the next outage of sufficient duration, and 3) additional evaluations will be performed on these containment pipe penetrations which exceed our conservatively applied criteria and which are not presently identified for being drained. The results of the evaluations will be provided to the NRC by October 30, 1997.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact us Very truly yours, James P. O'Hanlon Senior Vice President - Nuclear

I I Enclosure cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N. W.

Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. R. A. Musser NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station Mr. R. D. McWhorter NRC Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station

e COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA )

)

COUNTY OF HENRICO )

The foregoing document was acknowledged before me, in and for the County and Commonwealth aforesaid, today by J. P. O'Hanlon, who is Senior Vice President - Nuclear, of Virginia Electric and Power Company. He is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing document in behalf of that Company, and the statements in the document are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Acknowledged before me this d8'1hday of ' 19 f:/'7 .

My Commission Expires: March 31, 2000.

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NRC GENERIC LTR 96-06 ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND

  • coNTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

- NOTICE -

THE ATTACHED FILES ARE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE INFORMATION &

RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH.

THEY HAVE BEEN CHARGED TO YOU FOR A LIMITED TIME PERIOD AND

  • MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RECORDS & ARCHIVES SERVICES SECTION, T5 C3. PLEASE DO NOT SEND DOCUMENTS CHARGED OUT THROUGH THE MAIL. REMOVAL OF ANY PAGE(S) FROM DOCUMENT FOR REPRODUCTION MUST BE REFERRED TO FILE PERSONNEL.

- NOTICE -

Serial No. 96-51 SA ENCLOSURE

SUMMARY

REPORT NRC Generic Letter 96-06 Assurance Of Equipment Operability And Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions North Anna & Surry Power Stations Prepared By Virginia Electric and Power Company

  • ENCLOSURE GENERIC LETTER 96-06 120 DAY REQUESTED ACTIONS ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITIONS The purpose of this Summary Report is to provide the conclusions of analysis, basis for continued operation, actions taken, and corrective actions that are planned as requested in NRC Generic Letter 96-06. The Generic Letter requested addressees to determine the following:
1) if containment air cooler cooling water systems are
  • susceptible to either waterhammer or two-phase flow conditions during postulated accident conditions;
2) if piping systems that penetrate the containment are susceptible to thermal expansion of-fluid such that overpressurization could occur.

1.0 Containment Air Cooler Cooling Water Systems Susceptibility to Waterhammer or Two-Phase Flow 1.1 Discussion North Anna At North Anna Power Station, the closed Component Cooling Water system provides the cooling water to the Containment Air Recirculation Fans (1/2-HV-F-1 A, 1B & 1C). The Containment Air Recirculation Fans are tripped and the Component Cooling Water subsystem that supplies the coolers is automatically isolated in response to a Design Basis Accident (OBA). Therefore, the system is not required to provide an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) function during a OBA event. In addition, the cooling water piping inside containment between each of the inside containment penetration isolation valves is protected from overpressurization by a relief valve on the discharge side of the Recirculation Air Cooling Coils. Therefore, two-phase flow and waterhammer in the containment air cooling system are not of concern because *the system is isolated and deenergized during a OBA.

Containment_ cooling and depressurization following a OBA is accomplished by the Containment Depressurization System (CDS) which is comprised of the Quench Spray (QS) system and the Recirculation Spray (RS) system. The QS piping inside containment that would be exposed to the OBA containment environment is not filled until after the system receives a CDA signal. The RS system is comprised of two subsystems, the Inside Recirculation Spray (IRS) system and the Outside Recirculation Spray (ORS) system. Each of the two IRS and two ORS pumps deliver containment sump water through one of four Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers (RSHXs) which cool the

containment sump water, using Service Water (SW), prior to the containment sump water exiting the-spray nozzles in the containment *dome area. The SW flow through the RSHXs is initiated upon receipt of.a CDA signal with the isolation valves located outside the containment. Therefore, the RS piping and the SW piping are not water filled until after initiation of a CDA signal.

At Surry Power Station, the closed Component Cooling Water system provides the cooling water to the Containment Air Recirculation Fans (1/2-VS-F-1 A, 1B & 1C). The Containment Air Recirculation Fans are tripped and the Component Cooling Water subsystem that**supplies the coolers is automatically isolated in* response to a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Therefore, the system is not required to provide an Engineered Safeguards Function (ESF) during a DBA event. In addition, the cooling water piping inside containment between each of the inside containment penetration isolation valves is protected from overpressurization by a relief valve on the discharge side of the Recirculation Air Cooling Coils. Therefore, two-phase flow and waterhammer in the containment air .cooling system are not of concern because the system is .isolated and deenergized during a DBA.

Containment cooling and depressurization following a DBA is accomplished by the Spray system that consists of the Containment Spray (CS) subsystem and the Recirculation Spray (RS) subsystem. The CS system is initiated after a Hi-Hi CLS (Consequence Limiting Safeguard) signal. The CS piping inside containment that would be exposed to the DBA containment environment is not filled until after the system received a CLS signal. The RS subsystem is comprised of the Inside Recirculation Spray (IRS) system and the Outside Recirculation Spray (ORS) system. Each of the two IRS and two ORS pumps deliver containment sump water through one of four Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers (RSHXs) which cool the containment sump water, using Service Water (SW),

prior to the containment sump water exiting the spray nozzles in the containment dome area. The SW flow through the RSHXs is initiated upon receipt of a CLS signal with the isolation valves located outside the containment. Therefore, the RS piping and the SW piping are not water filled until after initiation of a CLS signal.

1.2 .Results Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the containment air cooling *systems at both North Anna and Surry Power Stations are not susceptible to two-phase flow or a waterhammer event during a DBA because the system is isolated and de-energized.

2.0 Overpressurization of Piping Systems that Penetrate the Containment 2.1 Discussion North Anna UFSAR, Section 6.2.4.1 states that all containment pipe penetrations are designed and built, inspected and tested to the requirements of "Nuclear Power Piping,"

ANSI B31.7-1969 Class 1 or Class 2. Surry UFSAR, Section 15.5.1.8 -states that the pipes anchored to the containment penetrations between the containment isolation valves are designed in accordance with USA Standard Code for Pressure Piping - Power Piping, USAS B31.1-1967.

ANSI B31.7 states the following with respect to Class 1 piping:

"1-701.4.2 Effects of Fluid Expansion Provisions shall be made in the design to either withstand, relieve, or internally dissipate increased pressure -caused by the heating of the static fluid in a piping component. Particular consideration shall be given to fluids that are normally solid or semisolid at room temperature."

ANSI B31.7 refers to USAS B31.1 for the design of Class 2 and Class 3 piping systems.

The equivalent design requirement from USAS B31.1 is as follows:

"101.4.2 Fluid Expansion Effects Where expansion of fluid may increase the pressure, the piping system shall be designed to withstand the increased pressure or provisions shall be made to relieve the excess pressure."

Other than these original design guidelines, no specific criteria existed in the piping Code and the design bases (UFSAR & design specifications) for evaluating pressurization of isolated piping systems under faulted conditions. In addition, there are no load combinations set forth in the UFSAR or piping specifications that require consideration of this condition.

Virginia Power addressed the overpressurization issue of Generic Letter 96-06 in three steps: 1) identify and categorize all containment piping penetrations, 2) for those penetrations, which by their categorization require further review, perform a heating analysis of the piping to conservatively calculate the rise in pressure within the piping penetration as a result of a OBA and compare those results to acceptance criteria (based on later ASME Section Ill pipe design requirements for pressure stress limits during level D events), and 3) determine which penetrations require additional action based on the results of the evaluations performed in step 2.

  • The first step in reviewing the containment penetrations was to identify and categorize the

-penetrations to facilitate the grouping of-- similar penetrations to permit consistent disposition of like penetrations. The pipe penetrations were grouped into nine categories.

It should be noted that a penetration may be placed in more than one category, however, if this was the case, the most conservative category was selected. The following categories were used:

1) Penetrations.required to be in operation with flow through the piping during a OBA.

Penetrations in this category are used for OBA mitigation and are required to be open with process fluid flowing. Therefore, no further evaluation is required. - ..

- 2) -- Gas* filled penetrations normally *in service that are automatically isolated or manually isolated during a OBA.

This category is for penetrations that contain compressible fluids (including steam).

The increased -pressure caused by the increase in temperature -will not cause overpressurization. Therefore, no further evaluation is required.

3) Penetrations associated with the Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS)
  • 4)

In the event of a OBA, the inside containment capillary tubing overpressurization is prevented by the expansion allowance provided by the high volume sensor bellows assembly. Therefore, no further evaluation is required.

Hot liquid penetrations normally in service that are automatically isolated or manually isolated during a OBA.

Piping penetrations in this category are for lines that are normally in service, but

-are isolated during a OBA. Since these lines handle hot fluids, there is no temperature rise following isolation and, therefore, no increase in pressure.

Therefore, no further action is required.

5) Cold liquid penetrations normally isolated and drained which are not in use during

. a OBA.

The penetration lines are used during shutdowns or refueling operations and are procedurally drained when these lines are prepared for power operations.

Therefore, no further evaluation is required.

6) Cold liquid penetrations normally isolated during power operations but not specifically drained which are not operated during a OBA.

These piping penetrations are required to be isolated during a OBA, but may be maintained in a filled condition. These lines require further evaluation.

7) Cold -liquid -penetrations -normally , in service with an isolation valve outside containment that is automatically or manually isolated during a OBA and a check valve and a relief valve inside containment.

Penetrations in this category are protected from overpressurization by a relief valve located downstream of the check valve in the line. Therefore, no further action is required.

8) Cold liquid penetrations normally in service with an isolation valve outside containment that is automatically or manually isolated during a OBA and a check_

valve, but no relief valve inside containment.

Penetrations in this category are not protected from overpressurization due to temperature effects and require further evaluation.

9) Cold liquid penetrations normally in service that-are automatically isolated during a OBA.

Penetrations in this category are not protected from overpressurization due to temperature effects and require further evaluation .

  • The results of the categorization of the containment penetrations are contained in Attachments 1 & 2 for North Anna Power Station and 3 & 4 for Surry Power Station.

Containment isolation valves for penetrations in categories other than 6, 8, and 9 are not subject to significant pressure increases. Therefore, these valves are not subject to pressure locking and would function when needed.

The next step in the containment penetration review process was to analyze those penetrations that were determined to require further evaluation. The penetrations that required further evaluation were those penetrations associated with categories 6, 8, and 9.

The penetrations which fall into the three categories noted above are not required to

. provide a Jlowpath in response to a OBA. Therefore, the function of the .containment isolation valves is to provide containment integrity only. Further evaluation of the effect of pressurization on the valves' ability to stroke is not required.

Since there are neither load combinations defined, nor criteria established in the licensing basis for North Anna and Surry Power Stations for faulted pressure transients, the criterion for maximum allowable stress due to thermal expansion of fluid in the closed section of the piping penetration was set at 2Sm. This criterion was based on taking guidance from the ASME Section Ill Code as discussed below:

ASME Section Ill Code issued after 1971 provides guidance as follows:

  • ASME Section Ill, Subsection-NB; Consideration of Faulted *Conditions,-paragraph 3656 states for Class 1 piping:

"Under any faulted condition specified, the permissible pressure shall not exceed the design pressure (P) calculated in accordance with equation (2) of NB 3641.1 by more than 100 percent."

ASME Section Ill, Subsection NC/ND, Stress limits, paragraph 3611.2, states that for Class 2/3 piping:

"When level D limits apply, the peak pressure P max alone shall not exceed 2.0 times the pressure calculated in accordance with eq. (5), ND-3641.1" The above statement translates into limiting the primary stress due to faulted pressure loading calculated on the basis of the Code equation to 2 Sm. Using 2 Sm as the limiting stress value allows acceptable margin for other longitudinal stresses. It should be noted that this assumes that the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) is not concurrent with the overpressure event.

The maximum internal pressure developed inside the isolated containment piping penetrations during a DBA was conservatively calculated. The results, for category 6, 8 &

9 penetrations, are tabulated in Attachment 5 for North Anna Power Station and Attachment 6 for Surry Power Station.

2.2 North Anna Results As indicated on Attachment 5, the results of the analysis show that penetrations #12 (Unit 2 only), #13, #14, #25, and #26 (Unit #2 only) are potentially susceptible to overpressurization of the piping based on the conservative analysis acceptance criteria used.

Penetrations #25 and #26 (Unit #2 only) are normally open, permitting returning component cooling water flow from the "A" and "C" Reactor Coolant Pumps, respectively.

During .normal operation, the returning .component..cooling water flow from the Reactor -

Coolant Pumps is warmer than the supply fluid flow. Due to the warmer temperature of the fluid, a small percentage of the entrained gases in the cooler supply fluid flow will come out of solution and facilitate reducing the potential pressure rise of the isolated containment penetration piping during a OBA. -Additionally, analysis shows that in the worst case, the ductile piping would yield slightly and mitigate the pressure increase prior to failure of the piping. Therefore, in the near term, Virginia Power believes that penetrations #25 and #26 (Unit #2 only) are acceptable for continued operation. Virginia Power will evaluate further analysis or potential modifications for these penetrations for long term corrective action.

Penetrations #12 (Unit 2 only), #13, and #14 are normally open permitting returning component cooling water flow from the Containment Air *Recirculation Fans (CARFs).

During normal operation the returning component cooling water flow from the CARFs is warmer than the supply fluid flow. As stated above, due to the warmer temperature of the fluid, a small percentage of the entrained gases in the cooler supply fluid flow will come out of solution and facilitate reducing the potential pressure rise of the isolated containment penetration *piping during a OBA. The return piping is also insulated which would slow down the heating effect over the period of the OBA, resulting in a pressure increase less than was predicted by analysis. Furthermore, the analysis results indicate that the ductile piping would, in the worst case, yield and relieve the potential pressure transient prior to any failure of the piping component. Therefore, in the near term Virginia Power believes that penetrations #12 (Unit 2 only), #13, and #14 are acceptable for operation. Virginia-Power will evaluate further analysis or potential modifications for these penetrations for long term corrective action.

Penetrations #33, #38, #45, #103 and #104 contain weir type diaphragm valves with rubber diaphragms. These valves have a reduced pressure rating due to the diaphragm material and therefore required further evaluation.

Penetration #33 is used intermittently at power and is used to drain the Primary Drain Transfer Tank (POTT). Penetration #38 is used intermittently at power and is used to transfer fluid from the containment sump out of containment. Due to the intermittent

  • service of both of these penetrations and the expectation that gases are entrained in the fluid that is being transferred out of containment, it is expected that when the penetrations are isolated, the penetrations will contain at least a small percentage of gas. In addition, it should be noted that if any appreciable pressure is developed in the closed penetration, the diaphragm of the closed valves will deform to relieve pressure. In the worst case, a diaphragm would partially fail and pressure would be relieved by the expansion volume afforded by the valve bonnets.

Penetration #45 is used intermittently at power to provide primary grade water to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT). It has been determined through discussions with the valve vendor that if the pressure is increased in the isolated penetration, the pressure would overcome the valve spring force and the outside containment air-operated isolation valve would open. Once the pressure was released, the valve would reseat thereby eliminating the potential for overpressurization.

Penetrations #103 and #104 are only used during refueling operations. Virginia Power has drained penetrations #103 and #104 for Unit #1 and Unit #2 at North Anna Power Station, thereby removing the potential susceptibility for overpressurization for these penetrations. Virginia Power will revise procedures to assure that the subject penetrations are drained prior to unit startup following an outage in which these specific systems were placed into service .

2.3 Surry Results As shown on Attachment 6, penetrations #22, #24, #96, #103, #104, and #114 are not used at power operations and are candidates for draining to preclude overpressurization.

Actions have been taken for penetrations #24, #103, and #104 for both Units and penetrations #22, #96, and #114 for Unit 1 to ensure that sufficient air has been

  • introduced to the penetration piping to eliminate the potential for overpressurization.

Unit 2 penetrations #22, #96, and #114- are associated with the Steam Generator Recirculation and Transfer system. Due to the configuration-of the piping and the location of vents and drains in the system, it is not possible to drain these penetrations from outside the containment Access to the vents and drains inside the containment would require the erection of scaffolding and entry into high radiation areas. Based on concerns for personnel safety and radiation exposure, these penetrations will be drained during the next outage of sufficient duration. Until that time, integrity of the penetrations in these piping systems is assured based on the following: 1.) When in operation, the system pressure is low. It is expected that gasses would be entrained in the system which would leave air pockets in the piping when the system is-taken out of service. These air pockets would mitigate a pressure rise. 2.) Although the calculated pressure stress levels exceed the acceptance criteria, yielding of the ductile stainless steel piping (< 2% strain) would mitigate the pressure increase sufficiently to prevent failure of the piping, even if the system were completely water solid.

As a long term action to preclude the potential for overpressurization of penetrations #22,

  1. 24, #96, #103, #104, and #114, Virginia Power will revise procedures to assure that the subject penetrations are drained partially prior to unit startup following an outage in which these specific systems were placed into service.

Penetration #46 is associated with the Chemical Volume and Control system and used during a Unit shutdown to fill the Reactor Coolant system loop piping. This penetration did not meet the analysis acceptance criteria, however, the stress levels in the associated piping do not exceed yield. Virginia Power will evaluate further analysis or potential modifications for penetration #46 long term corrective action. Penetration #20 is also used intermittently at power operations to pressurize a Safety Injection Accumulator.

.. Penetration .#20 did not meet the analysis acceptance criteria. However; yielding of the ductile stainless steel piping (< 2% strain) would mitigate the pressure increase sufficiently to prevent failure of the piping. Virginia Power will evaluate further analysis or potential modifications for penetration #20 long term corrective action.

Penetrations #33, #38, #45, #103, and #104 contain weir type diaphragm valves with rubber diaphragms. These valves have a reduced pressure rating due to the diaphragm material and therefore required further evaluation.

Penetration #45 is used intermittently at power to provide primary grade water to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT). It has been determined through discussions with the

  • valve vendor that if the pressure is increased in the isolated penetration, the pressure would overcome-the valve spring force and the outside containment air-operated isolation valve would open. Once the pressure was released, the valve would reseat thereby eliminating the potential for overpressurization.

Penetrations # 33 and #38 are used intermittently at power. Penetration #33 is used to drain the Primary Drain Transfer Tank (POTT). Penetration #38 is used to transfer fluid from the containment sump out of containment. Due to the intermittent service of both of these penetrations and the expectation that gases are entrained in the fluid that is being transferred out of containment, it is expected that when the penetrations are isolated, they will contain at least a small percentage of gas . .In addition, it should be noted that if any appreciable pressure is developed in the closed penetration, the diaphragm of the closed valves will deformto*relieve pressure. In the worst case, a*diaphragm would partially fail and pressure would be relieved by the expansion volume afforded by the valve bonnets.

Any appreciable leakage due to a failed diaphragm would be mitigated by the stem a-ring seal of the valves.

As noted above, penetrations #103 and #104 have been drained.

2.4 Conclusions

  • Attachment 5 for North Anna Power Station and Attachment 6 for Surry Power Station provide a summary of the penetrations which were determined to require further analysis (penetration categories 6, 8, & 9). The tables show action that has already been taken to eliminate the potential susceptibility to overpressurization of the containment penetrations, the basis for near term operability and, as required, the need for further analysis or modification evaluation for long term acceptability.

It should be noted that the post-OBA containment bulk atmospheric and containment liner temperatures used as inputs to the analysis are conservatively calculated. This conservatism was appropriate for sizing the safeguards systems and the design of the containment structure and pressure boundary components. Use of the maximum calculated temperature value in a steady-state analysis of containment penetration piping heating / pressurization is highly conservative. The location of the containment piping

.penetrations of concern, relatively low in the structure and outside the crane wall, results in their being exposed to significantly lower peak temperatures. In addition, the penetrations of concern are shielded from direct impingement during a OBA. Therefore, as stated previously, the analyses performed are very conservative .

2.5 Action Items 2.5.1 North Anna Action Items Virginia Power will complete evaluations and determine long term corrective action, if applicable, for penetrations #12 (Unit 2 only), #13, #14, #25, and #26 (Unit #2 only), by October 30, 1997.

In addition, penetrations #103 and #104, which were drained for long term acceptability, will have procedures in place to assure the penetrations are drained prior to unit startup following an outage in which these specific systems were placed into service.

2.5.2 Surry Action Items Virginia Power will complete evaluations and determine long term corrective action, if applicable, for penetrations #20 and #46 by October 30, 1997.

Surry Unit 2 penetrations #22, #96, and #114 will be partially drained during the next outage of sufficient duration.

In addition, procedures will be revised to assure that the affected penetrations are partially drained to preclude overpressurization prior to unit startup following an outage in

  • which these specific systems were placed into service.

- - ___ _J

ATTACHMENT 1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 1 DESCRIPTION: Penetrations required to be in operation with flow through the piping during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION .. FLOW DIAGRAM(1"1715) 7 SI HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FM-968, SH 4 22 SI . HHSI BIT BYPASS TO RCS COLD LEGS FM-968, SH 4 31 *HC HYDROGEN ANALYZER DISCHARGE FM-1 06A, SH 1 35 CH SEAL INJECTION WATER TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP "C" FM-95C, SH 2 36 ,CH 51:AL iNJt:CTiON WATER TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP "B" FM-95C, SH 2 37 CH SEAL INJECTION WATER TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP "A" FM-95C, SH 2 60 SI LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION DISCHARGE FM-968, SH 4 51

  • 63 as QUENCH SPRAY PUMP "B" DISCHARGE FM-91A, SH 4 64 as QUENCH SPRAY PUMP "A" DISCHARGE FM-91A, SH 4 66 RS OUTSIDE RS PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP FM-91A, SH 4 67 RS OUTSIDE RS PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP FM-91A, SH 4 68 SI LHSI PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP FM-96A, SH 1 SI LHSI PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP FM-96A, SH 1 RS OUTSIDE AECIRC SPRAY PUMP "B" DISCHARGE FM-91A, SH 4 T.:,IDE RECIRC SPRAY PUMP "A" DISCHARGE FM-91A, SH 4

~

- .., ERVICE WATER IN FM-788, SH 1

, 11 ERVICE WATER IN FM-788, SH 1 11 M ,Ei I.., " ,
1 II FM-788, SH 1

- 11 RSHX "A" SERVICE WATER IN FM-788, SH 1 RSHX "D" SERVICE WA I ER OUT fM-188, SH 1 84 11 I

... E I - J Fr - uB ..

85 .... R:, .>< El I 11 ,:R I :r B I 86 11 R , S...:F1 *1 ... 1:, i'ER l l Fl B, ., i 113 .. I Hli..:,li 1-A[ ::, y 'N TION TO HOT LEGS FM-968, SH 4 114 _I HI Ii ,_ I .F T Ir J TION TO HOT LEGS FM-968, SH 4

./16/97 07:07:13 PAGE 1 OF 9

ATIACHMENT 1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 2 DESCRIPTION: Gas-filled penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(l1715) 42 SA SERVICE AIR FM-82F, SH 1 43 IA RADIATION MONITOR AIR SAMPLE FM-82N, SH 3 44 IA RADIATION MONITOR AIR SAMPLE FM-82N, SH 3 47 IA INSTRUM_ENT AIR LINE TO CONTAINMENT FM-S2A, SH 1; 82N, SH 48 VG PRIMARY VENT HEADER FM-90C, SH 1 50 SI SI ACCUMULATORS VENT FM-968, SH 1 53 SI NITROGEN TO SI ACCUMULATORS AND PRT FM-968, SH 1 54 DA PRIMARY VENT POT VENT FM-90C, SH 3 550 LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-92A, SH 1 57A LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-92A, SH 1 578 ss PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK GAS SPACE SAMPLE FM-890, SH 1 73 MS MAIN STEAM "A" FM-708, SH 1 74 MS MAIN STEAM "8" FM-708, SH 2 75 MS MAIN STEAM "C" FM-708, SH 2 89 VP AIR EJECTOR DIVERT TO CONTAINMENT FM-72A, SH 2

~

HV PURGE EXHAUST F8-6A, SH 2 HV PURGE SUPPLY F8-6A, SH 2 CV CONTAINMENT VACUUM PUMP "B" SUCTION FM-92A, SH 2 93 CV CONTAINMENT VACUUM PUMP "A" SUCTION FM-92A, SH 2 94 CV CONTAINMENT AIR EJECTOR SUCTION FM-92A, SH 2 978 LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM*92A, S!-! 1 988 HC CONTAINMENT .GRAB SAMPLE TO HASS PANEL FM-106A, SH 3 98A HC HYDROGEN ANALYZER SUCTION FM-106A, SH 1 105A LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-92A, SH 1 105C LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING SEALED SYSTEM FM-92A, SH 1 105D LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING SEALED SYSTEM FM-92A, SH 1 1058 HC HYDROGEN ANALYZER SUCTION FM-106A, SH 2 109 HC HYDROGEN ANALYZER AND RECOMBINER RETURN TO CONT FM-106A, SH 2

.16/97 07:07:17 PAGE 2 OF 9

  • ATTACHMENT 1 r NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 3 DESCRIPTION: Penetrations associated with the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS).

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(l17_15) 55A RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM 13075-FM-93C, SH 1 .

558 RC .. REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM 13075-FM-93C, SH 1 '

55C RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM 13075-FM-93C, SH 1 117C RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM 13075-FM-93C, SH 2 117D RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM 13075-FM-93C, SH 2 117A RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL SYSTEM 13075-FM-93C, SH 2

  • /16/97 07:07:22 PAGE 3 OF 9

ATTACHMENT 1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 4 DESCRIPTION: Hot liquid penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(r17151 28 CH REACTOR COOLANT LETDOWN FM-95C, SH 1 39 BD . STEAM GENERATOR "A" SLOWDOWN FM-98A, SH 2 40 BD STEAM GENERATOR "C" SLOWDOWN FM-98A, SH 4 41 BO STEAM GcNERATOR "B" SLOWDOWN FM-SSA, SH 3 56A ss PRESSURIZER LIQUID SPACE SAMPLE FM-890, SH 1 56C ss PRIMARY COOLANT COLD LEG SAMPLE FM-89D, SH 1 568 ss PRIMARY COOLANT HOT LEG SAMPLE FM-89D, SH 1 560 ss STEAM GENERATOR SLOWDOWN SAMPLE FM-898, SH 3 57C ss PRESSURIZER VAPOR *sPACE SAMPLE FM-89D, SH 1 76 FW MAIN FEEDWATER TO S/G "A" FM-74A, SH 1 77 FW MAIN FEEDWATER TO S/G "C" FM-74A, SH 1 78 FW MAIN FEEDWATER TO S/G "8" FM-74A, SH 1 97C RC PRESSURIZER DEAD WT CALBRATOR FM-938, SH 1 97A ss RHR SAMPLE FM-89D, SH 1

/16/97 07:07:24 PAGE 4 OF 9

ATTACHMENT 1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 5 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally isolated and drained which are not used during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(11715) 34 FP CONTAINMENT FIRE PROTECTION FB- 1028, SH 1 65 FH FUEL TRANSFER TUBE FV-5A

  • 1/16/97 07:07:27 PAGE 5 OF 9

ATIACHMENT 1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 6 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally isolated but not drained which are not used during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(r1715).

. 24 RH RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL TO RWST FM-94A, SH 2

. 32 WT . STEAM GENERATOR "A" WET LAYUP 13075-FM-102C, SH 1

. 46 CH RCS LOOP FILL FM-95C, SH 1 100 WT STEAM GENERATOR "B" WET LAYUP 13075-FM-102C, SH 1 103 RP REFUELING PURIFICATION DISCHARGE-TO REACTOR CAVITY FM-88A, SH 2 104 RP REFUELING PURIFICATION OUTLET FROM CAVITY TO FILTERS FM-88A, SH 2 108 WT STEAM GENERATOR "C" WET LAYUP 13075-FM-102C, SH 1

./16/97 07:11:00 PAGE 6 OF 9

. ' ATTACHMENT 1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 7 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service with an isolation valve outside containment that is automatically or manually isolated during a OBA and a check valve and relief value inside containment.

PEN#, SYS .. . FLOW D1AGRAM(1"1715)

PENETRATION DESIGNATION 1 cc COMPONENT COOLING FROM RHR HX 1A FM-798, SH 1 2 . cc COMPONENT COOLING TO RHR HX 1A FM-798, SH 1 4 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO RHR HX 1B FM-798, SH 1 5 cc COMPONENT COOLING FROM RHA HX 1 B FM-'/9B, SH 1 9 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR. "C" COOLING WATER SUPPLY FM-79D, SH 4 10 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR. "B" COOLING WATER SUPPLY FM-79D, SH 4 11 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR. "A" COOLING WATER SUPPLY FM-79D, SH 4 15 CH CHARGING FM-95C, SH 1 16 cc CC TO RCP "C" & SHROUD COOLING COILS FM-798, SH 4 17 cc CC TO RCP "B" & SHROUD COOLING COILS FM-798, SH 3 18 cc CC TO RCP "A" & SHROUD COOLING COILS FM-798, SH 2 19 CH SEAL WATER RETURN FROM RCP'S FM-95C, SH 2 111A WT CHEMICAL ADDITION TO "A" S/G FM-102A, SH 2 111 B WT CHEMICAL ADDITION TO "B" SIG FM-1 02A, SH 2 111 C WT CHEMICAL ADDITION TO "C" S/G FM-1 02A, SH 2

-/16/97 07:11:02 PAGE 7 OF 9

ATIACHMENT 1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 8 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service with an isolation valve outside containment that is automatically or manually isolated during a DBA and a check valve, but no relief valve inside containment.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(1"1715) 120 ISI ISAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP l FM-96A, SH 1 ; 968, SH , ,

/16/97 07: 11 :05 PAGE 8 OF 9

  • ATTACHMENT 1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 9 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(.1"1715) 8 cc CC FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIER FM-798, SH 1 12 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR. "B" COOLING WATER RETURN FM-79D, SH 4 '

13 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR. "C" COOLING WATER RETURN FM-790, SH 4

- 14 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR. "A" COOLING WATER RETURN FM-79D, SH 4 25 cc CC FROM "A" RCP & SHROUD COOLING COILS FM-798, SH 2 26 cc CC FROM "C" RCP & SHROUD COOLING COILS FM-798, SH 4 27 cc CC FROM "B" RCP & SHROUD COOLING COILS FM-798, SH 3 33 DG PRIMARY DRAIN TRANSFER PUMP DISCHARGE FM-90C, SH 1 38 DA CONTAINMENT SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE FM-90A, SH 1 45 RC PRIMARY GRADE WATER TO PAT & RCP STANDPIPES FM-938, SH 2 106 SI SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR TEST LINE FM-968, SH 1

/16/97 07:44:29 PAGE 9 OF 9

ATTACHMENT 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 1 DESCRIPTION: Penetrations required to be in operation with flow through the piping during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(12050) 7 SI HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION -FM-968 SHT4, FM-96A S 22 SI HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FM-96A SHT3, 968 SHT4 31 HC H2 ANALYZER 11715-FM-106A 35 CH INJ SEAL WATER TO REACTOR COOL.ANT PUMP FM~95C, SH 2 36 CH INJ SEAL WATER TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FM-95C, SH 2 37 CH INJ SEAL WATER TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FM-95C, SH 2 60 .... - - - AFETY INJECTION DISCHARGE FM-968 SHT4 FM-968 SHT4 61 SI LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION DISCHARGE 62 SI LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION DISCHARGE FM-968 SHT4 63 OS QUENCH SPRAY PUMP DISCHARGE FM-91A SHT2 64 OS QUENCH SPRAY PUMP DISCHARGE FM-91A SHT2 668 RS ***CASING COOLING PMP DISCH FM-91 A ST4, 918 ST1 66A RS RECIRC SPRAY PUMP SUCTION FROM REAC CONT SUMP FM-91A SHT4 RS ***CASING COOLING PUMP DISCHARGE FM-91A ST4, 91 B ST1 e

70 71 RS SI SI RS RS RECIRC SPRAY PUMP SUCTION FROM REAC CONT SUMP LOW HEAD SAFETY INJ PUMP SUCTION FROM REAC CONT SU LOW HEAD SAFETY INJ PUMP LOW HEAD REAC CONT SUMP RECIRC SPRAY PUMP DISCHARGE RECIRC SPRAY PUMP DISCHARGE FM-91A SHT4 FM-96A, SH 1 FM-96A, SH 1 FM-91A SHT4 FM-91A SHT4 79 SW SPRAY RECIRC SERVICE WATER IN 11715-FM-788, SH 3 80 SW SPRAY R~CiRC SEflVICE WAI i::H IN 1 '1'!15-fM-/81:3, SH 3 81 SW SPRAY RECIRC SERVICE WATER IN 11715-FM-788, SH 3 82 SW SPRAY RECIRC SERVICE WATER IN 11715-FM-788, SH 3 83 SW SPRAY RECIRC SERVICE WATER OUT 11715-FM-786, SH 3 84 - SW SPRAY RECIRC SERVICE WATER OUT 11715-FM-786, SH 3 85 SW SPRAY RECIRC SERVICE WATER OUT 11715-FM-788, SH 3 86 SW SPRAY RECIRC SERVICE WATER OUT 11715-FM-788, SH 3 113 SI HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FM-96A ST3, 968 ST4 114 SI HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FM-96A ST3, 966 ST4 1/22/97 14:57:03 PAGE 1 OF 9

ATTACHMENT 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 2 DESCRIPTION: Gas-filled penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(12050) 42 SA SERVICE AIR FM-82F SHT2 43 IA AIR MONITOR SAMPLE FM-828 ST2

=47 iA INS I HUM EN I AIR DISCHARGE LINE FM-82B SHT1 I 48 VG PRIMARY VENT HEADER FM-90A 50 SI NITROGEN TO WASTE GAS CHARCOAL FILTERS FM-968 SHT1 53 SI NITROGEN TO PRESSURE RELIEF TANK FM-968 SHT1 54 VA PRIMARY VENT POT VENT FM-90A SHT3 55A LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-92A 57A LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-92A ST1 578 ss PRESS RELIEF TK GAS SPACE SAMPLE FM-898 73 MS MAIN STEAM FM-708 SHT3 74 MS MAIN STEAM FM-708 SHT1 75 MS MAIN STEAM FM-708 SHT2 e92 93 VP HV HV CV CV AIR EJECTOR VENT PURGE DUCT PURGE DUCT REAC CONTAINMENT VACUUM PUMP SUCT REAC CONTAINMENT VACUUM PUMP SUCT FM-72A, sh 2.

11 71 5-FB-6A, SH 2 1171 5-FB-6A, SH 2 FM-92A SHT2 FM-92A SHT2 94 CV EJECTOR SUCTION FM-92A 978 LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-S2A ST1 98A HC CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CLEAN UP 11715-FM-106A 988 HC CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CLEAN UP 11715-FM-106A 105A LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-92A ST1 105C LM CONTMT LEAKAGE MONITORING SEALED SYSTEM FM-92A ST1 1050 LM CONTMT LEAKAGE MONITORING SEALED SYSTEM FM-92A ST1 1058 HC H2 ANALYZER 11715-FM-106A 109 HC H2 ANALYZER 11715-FM-106A 112 IA INSTRUMENT AIR FM-82C SHT2 1 /22/97 14:54:09 PAGE 2 OF 9

ATIACHMENT 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 3 DESCRIPTION: Penetrations associated with the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS).

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(12050).

. RC 55D REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL SYSTEM 13075-FM-37D

'558 RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL SYSTEM 13075-FM-93D 55C RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL SYSTEM 13075-FM-93D 117A RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL SYSTEM

  • 13075-FM-37D 117C RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL SYSTEM 13075-FM-37D 117D RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL SYSTEM 13075-FM-37D
  • 1 /22 /97 14:54: 13 PAGE 3 . OF 9

ATTACHMENT 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 4 DESCRIPTION: Hot liquid penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION . FLOW DIAGRAM(12050) 28 CH REACTOR COOLANT LETDOWN FM-95C SHT1 39 BD STEAM GENERATOR SLOWDOWN FM-98A, sh 2 40 BD STEAM GENERATOR SLOWDOWN FM-98A, SH 4 41 BD STEAM GENERATOR SLOWDOWN FM-98A, sh 3 56A ss PRESSURIZER LIQUID SPACE SAMPLE FM-898 56C ss PRIMARY COOLANT COLD LEG SAMPLE FM-898 68 ss PRIMARY COOLANT HOT LEG SAMPLE FM-898 s STEAM GENERATOR SLOWDOWN SAMPLE FM-89A, sh 3 57C ss PRESSURIZER VAPOR SPACE SAMPLE FM-898 76 FW FEED WATER FM-74A SHT1

... I 1:1 D WATER FM-74A SHT1 J F FEED WATER FM-74A SHT1 97A ss LIQ SAMPLE RES HT REMOVAL INLET, OUTLET FM-898 97C RC PRESSURIZER DEAD WT CALBRATOR FM-938 SHT1

  • 1 /22/97 14:55:50 PAGE 4 OF 9

ATTACHMENT 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 5 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally isolated and drained which are not used during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(12050) 34 FP CONTAINMENT FIRE PROTECTION FB-104A 65 FH FUEL TRANFER TUBE 11715-FV-SA 1 /22/97 14:55:59 PAGE 5 OF 9.

ATTACHMENT 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 6 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally isolated but not drained which are not used during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(l 2050).

24 RH HESID. HEAT REMOVAL TO REFUELING WTR TANK FM-94A SHT2 '

32 SBD STEAM GENERATOR WET LAYUP FM-1028 46 CH LOOP FILL FM-95C SHT 1 100 SGD STEAM GENERATOR WET LAYUP FM-1028 103 RP REFUELING PURIFIER INLET 11 71 5-FM-88A SHT2 104 RP REFUELING PURIFIER OUTLET 11 71 5-FM-88A SHT2 108 SGD STEAM GENERATOR WET LAYUP FM-1028

.,/22/97 14:56:00 PAGE 6 OF 9

ATTACHMENT 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 7 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service with an isolation valve outside containment that is automatically or manually isolated during a OBA and a check valve and relief value inside containment.

PEN#. SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(12050) 1 cc COMPONENT COOLING FROM RES. HX FM-79A SHT1 2 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO RES. HX FM-79A SHT1 4 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO RES. HX FM-79A SHT1 5 cc COMPONENT COOLING FROM RES. HX FM-79A SHT1 9 cc AIR RECIR. COOLING WATER FM-74B SHT3 10 cc AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-74B SHT3 11 cc AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-74B SHT3 15 CH CHARGING FM-95C SHT1 16 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO REAC. COOLING PUMP CUBE 3 FM-79A SHT4 17 cc COMPONENT COOLIONG TO REAC. COOLING CUBE 2 FM-79A SHT3 18 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO REAC. COOLING CUBE 1 FM-79A SHT2 19 CH SEAL WATER FROM REACTOR SEAL PUMPS FM-95C SHT2 111A WT CHEMICAL ADDITION FM-102A ST2 111 B WT CHEMICAL ADDITION FM-102A ST2 1C WT CHEMICAL ADDITION FM-102A ST2

  • 1 /22/97 14:56: 15 PAGE 7 OF 9

ATTACHMENT 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 8 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service with an isolation valve outside containment that is automatically or manually isolated during a DBA and a check valve, but no relief valve inside containment.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(12050) 120  !SI ISAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP .1 FM-96A, B I

  • 1/22/97 14:56:50 PAGE 8 OF 9

. ATTACHMENT 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 9 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(12050)

. 8 cc CC FROM RX COOLANT PUMP THERMAL BARRIER FM-79A SHT1 12 cc AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-79B SHT3 13 cc AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-79B SHT3 14 cc AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-79B SHT3 25 cc CC FROM REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TO CUBE 1 FM-79A SHT2 26 cc CC FROM REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS TO CUBE 3 FM-79A SHT4 27 cc CC FROM REA TOR COOLANT PUMP TO CUBE 2 FM-79A SHT3 33 DG PRIMARY DRAIN TRANSFER PUMP DISCHARGE FM-90A 38 DA SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE FM-90A, 908 45 RC PRIMARY GRADE WATER FM-938 SHT2 106 SI ACCUMULATOR TEST LINE FM-96A,B e,/22/97 14:56:51 PAGE 9 OF 9

ATTACHMENT 3 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 1 DESCRIPTION: Penetrations required to be in operation with flow through the piping during a DBA .

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION . FLOW DIAGRAM(11448) 7 SI HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION TO RCS COLD LEGS FM-89A, SH 3; 898, SH4 21

ATTACHMENT 3 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 2 DESCRIPTION: Gas-filled penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11448) 32 GW HYDROGEN ANALYZER RETURN FM-90C, SH 1 42 SA

  • SERVICE AIR FM-75G, SH 1 43 RM AIR MONITOR SAMPLE FM-1308, SH 1 44 RM AIR MONITOR SAMPLE FM-1308, SH 1 47 IA . iNSTRUMENT AIR FM-75C, SH 1 48 DG PRIMARY VENT HEADER FM-83A, SH 1; 838, SH 1 50 SI ACCUMULATOR VENT HEADER TO GASEOUS WASTE FM-898, SH 1 53 SI NITROGEN TO PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK FM-898, SH 1 54 VA PRIMARY VENT POT VENT FM-83A, SH 1; 838, SH 3 55A LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-85A, SH 1 57A LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-85A, SH 1 578 ss PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK GAS SPACE SAMPLE FM-828, SH 2 57C ss PRESSURIZER VAPOR SPACE SAMPLE FM-828, SH 2 58 IA INSTRUMENT AIR FM-75C, SH 1 89 VP AIR EJECTOR VENT TO CONTAINMENT FM-66A, SH 2 vs PURGE DUCT FB-6A, SH 1 vs PURGE DUCT F8-6A, SH 1 CV CONTAINMENT VACUUM PUMP SUCTION FM-85A, SH 2 93 CV CONTAINMENT VACUUM PUMP SUCTION FM-85A, SH 2 94 CV EJECTOR SUCTION FM-85A, SH 1 97C LM LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-85A, SH 1 100 GW HYDROGEN ANALYZER RETURN FM-90C, SH 1 105C GW CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE SAMPLE FM-90C, SH 1 105 LM CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-85A, SH 1 112 IA INSTRUMENT AIR FM-75J, SH 1
  • 1 /22/97 07:52:04 PAGE 2 OF 9
  • ATTACHMENT 3 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 3 DESCRIPTION: Penetrations associated with the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS).

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(114.48) 558 RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C, SH 1 55C RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C, SH 1 55D RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C, SH 1 1178 RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C, SH 2 117C RC REACTOR VESSECU~VEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C, SH 2 117D RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C, SH 2 1/22/97 07:52:08 PAGE 3 OF 9

' ATTACHMENT .3 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 4 DESCRIPTION: Hot liquid penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11448) 28 CH REACTOR COOLANT LETDOWN FM-SSC, SH 1; 88A, SH 4 39 BD . STEAM GENERATOR nAn SLOWDOWN - FM-124A, SH 1 40 BD STEAM GENERATOR "C" SLOWDOWN FM-1 24A, SH 3 41 BD STEAM GENERATOR "B" SLOWDOWN FM-1 24A, SH 2

.56A ss PRESSURIZER LIQUID SPACE SAMPLE FM-828, SH 2 568 ss PRIMARY COOLANT COLD LEG SAMPLE FM-82B, SH 2 56D ss PRIMARY COOLANT HOT LEG SAMPLE FM-82B, SH 2 .

73 MS nAn MAIN STEAM LINE FM-64A, SH 1 74 MS "B" MAIN STEAM LINE FM-64A, SH 2 75 MS "C" MAIN STEAM LINE FM-64A, SH 3 76 FW FEEDWATER TO "A" S/G FM-68A, SH 1 77 FW FEEDWATER TO "B" S/G FM-68A, SH 1 78 FW FEEDWATER TO "C" S/G FM-68A, SH 1 978 ss RHR SAMPLE, INLET/OUTLET FM-828, SH 2 1 /22/97 07:52: 10 PAGE 4 OF 9

. AITACHMENT 3 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 5 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally isolated and drained which are not used during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11448) 51 SW RECIRC SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER SW DRAIN HEADER FM-71A, SH 3 65 FH FUEL TRANSFER TUBE N/A 101 FP CONTAINMENT DRY STANDPIPE (FIRE PROTECTION) FB-478, SH 1

  • 1/22/97 07:53:32 PAGE 5 OF 9

. ATIACHMENT 3 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 6 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally isolated but not drained which are not used during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(11448) 20 SI SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP FM-898, SH 1

' 22 RT '8' S/G RECIRC & TRANSFER FM-124A, SH 2

. 24 RH RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL TO RWST FM-87A, SH 2 46 CH RCS LOOP FILL FM-88C, SH 1 96 RT I A S/G RECIRC & TRANSFER I FM-124A, SH 1 103 RL REFUELING CAVITY PURIFICATION INLET FM-118A, SH 2 104 RL REFUELING CAVITY PURIFICATION OUTLET FM-118A, SH 2 114 RT 'C' S/G RECIRC & TRANSFER FM-1 24A, SH 3

. 1 /22/97 09:00:05 PAGE 6 OF 9

' ATIACHMENT 3 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 ..

PENETRATION CATEGORY 7 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service with an isolation valve outside containment that is automatically or manually isolated during a OBA and a check valve and relief value inside containment.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11448) 1 cc COMPONENT COOLING FROM "B" RHR HX . FM-72A, SH 1 2 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO "A" RHR HX FM-72A, SH1 4 . cc COMPONENT COOLING TO "B" RHR HX FM-72A, SH1; 728, SH 1 5 cc COMPONENT COOLING FROM "A" RHR HX FM-72A, SH1 9 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR. COOLING WATER FM-728, SH 2 10 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-728, SH 2 11 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-728, SH 2 12 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-728, SH 2 13 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-728, SH 2 14 cc CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-728, SH 2 15 CH RCS CHARGING FM-88C, SH 1 16 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO RCP CUBE "C" FM-72A, SH 4; 728, SH 1 17 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO RCP CUBE "B" FM-72A, SH 3; 728, SH 1 18 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO RCP CUBE "A" FM-72A, SH 2; 728, SH 1 19 CH SEAL WATER RETURN FROM REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS FM-88C, SH 2 25 cc COMPONENT COOLING FROM RCP CUBE "A" FM-72A, SH 2

.6D cc cc SI COMPONENT COOLING FROM RCP CUBE "C" COMPONENT COOLING FROM RCP CUBE "B" SAFETY INJECTION TEST LINE FM-72A, FM-72A, FM-898, SH 4 SH 3 SH 1; 89A, SH 2 1 /22/97 07:53:44 PAGE 7 OF 9

ATIACHMENT 3 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 8 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service with an isolation valve outside containment that is automatically or manually isolated during a DBA and a check valve, but no relief valve inside containment.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(11448)

[ j jThere are no penetrations which meet this category. I I

. 2 2 / 9 7 07:53:47 PAGE 8 OF 9

- _I

ATTACHMENT 3 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #1 PENETRATION CATEGORY 9 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11448) 33 DG PRIMARY DRAIN TRANSFER PUMP DISCHARGE FM-83A, SH 1; 838, SH 1 38 DA - CONTAINMENT SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE FM-83A, SH 2; 838, SH 3 45 RC PRIMARY GRADE WATER 'FM-868, SH 2 110 cc CC RETURN HEAD_sl3_f_ROM RCP THER~ARRIERS FM-72A, SH 1 1/22/97 07:53:49 PAGE 9 OF 9

' ATTACHMENT 4 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 1 DESCRIPTION: Penetrations required to be in operation with flow through the piping during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11548) 7 SI HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FM-898-4, FM-89A-3 21 SI HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FM-89A-3, FM-898-4

- I SPRAY PUMP "B" DISCH FM-84B SHT 2 1 I SPRAY PUMP "A" DISCH FM-84B SHT 2 79 Cl C SPRAY HX SUPPLY D FM-71A SHT 3 80 ~ I - I C SPRAY HX SUPPLY C FM-71A SHT 3 81 CIRC SPRAY HX SUPPLY B FM-71A SHT 3 8?.

83

~

SW SW

--~ RECIRC SPRAY

~__::::::,,,:_--my* .. HX SUPPLY A RECIRC SPRAY HX RETURN D FM-71A SHT 3 FM-71A SHT 3 84 SW RECIRC SPRAY HX RETURN C FM-71A SHT 3 85 SW RECIRC SPRAY HX RETURN B FM-71A SHT 3 86 SW RECIRC SPRAY HX SUPPLY A FM-71A SHT 3 87 - AFW AUX FEEDWATER FM-68A SHT 1 88 AFW AUX FEEDWATER FM-68A SHT 1 102 AFW AUX FEEDWATER X-CONNECT FM-68A SHT 1 113 SI HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FM-89B SHT 4

  • 1 /22/97 08:28:03 PAGE 1 OF 9

' ATTACHMENT 4 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 2 DESCRIPTION: Gas-filled penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11548) 32 GW HYDROGEN ANALYZER RETURN 11448-FM-90C 42 SA SERVICE AIR FM-75E 43 RM AIR MONITOR SAMPLE . ****

44 RM AIR MONITOR SAMPLE ****

47 IA 11\JSTRUMENT AIR FM-75C SHT 1 48 VA* PRIMARY VENT HEADER FM-1008 50 SI NITROGEN RELIEF FM-898 SHT 1 53 SI NITROGEN TO PRESSURE RELIEF TANK FM-89A-3, FM-898-1 54 VA* PRIMARY VENT POT VENT FM-838 SHT 3 550 LM LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-85A SHT 1 57C LM LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-85A SHT 1 570 ss PRESSURIZER RELIEF TK GAS SAMPLE FM-82A SHT 2 57A ss PRESSURIZER VAPOR SPACE SAMPLE FM-82A SHT 2 58 IA INSTRUMENT AIR FM-75C SHT 1 89 VP AIR EJECTOR VENT FM-66A SHT 2 90 HV PURGE DUCT FB-6A SHT 1 HV PURGE DUCT FB-6A SHT 1 CV REAC CONT VACUUM PUMP SUCT FM-85A-2, FM-90C-1 93 CV REAC CONT VACUUM PUMP SUCT FM-85A-2, FM-90C-1 94 CV EJECTOR SUCTION FM-85A SHT 1 97C LM LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-85A SHT 1 100 11448-FM-90C 105C GW

~~--~-...

LM HYDROGEN ANALYZER RETURN

'"""'"- ------- - .,....,........ -""'-'~,:c"--=~...

CONTMT ATMOS SAMPLE

ru,..._.__ . _ - J ....... c-...-.-*~~~*-- *-*=--

11448-FM-90C SHT 1 1058 LM LEAKAGE MONITORING FM-85A SHT 1 112 IA INSTRUMENT AIR FM-75J SHT 1

.1/22/97 08:18:49 PAGE 2 OF 9

' ATIACHMENT4 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 3 DESCRIPTION: Penetrations associated with the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS).

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11548) 55A RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C SHT 1

. 558 RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C SHT 1

. 55C RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C SHT 1 1178 RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C SHT 1 117C RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C SHT 2 117D RC REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FM-86C SHT 2 1/22/97 08: 19:39 PAGE 3 OF 9

ATTACHMENT 4 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 4 DESCRIPTION: Hot liquid penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(11548) 28 CH REACTOR COOLANT LETDOWN

  • 1 /22/97 08:20:20 PAGE 4 OF 9

' ATIACHMENT 4 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 P'.'""NETRATION CATEGORY 5 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally isolated and drained which are not used during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(11548) 51 SW RECIRC SPRAY COOLER DRAIN FM-71A SHT 3 65 FH FUEL TRANFER TUBE 101 FP CONTMT DRY STANDPIPE (FIRE PROTECTION) F-B-47B

  • 1 /22/97 08:20:52 PAGE 5 OF 9

I ! ' ' AITACHMENT4 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 6 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally isolated but not drained which are not used during a OBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11548) 20 SI SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR MAKEUP FM-89B-1, FM-1068 22 RT 'B' S/G RECIRC & TRANSFER FM-1 24A SHT 2 '

24 RH RESID. HEAT REMOVAL TO REFUELING WTR TANK FM-87A SHT 2 46 CH LOOP FILL FM-88C SHT 1 96 RT I A S/G RECIRC & TRANSFER I FM-124A SHT 1 103 RL REFUELING PURIF. INLET FM-118A SHT 1 104 RL REFUELING PURIF OUTLET FM-118A SHT 1 114 RT 'C' S/G RECIRC & TRANSFER FM-1 24A SHT 3

  • 1/22/97 09:00:45 PAGE 6 OF 9

. ' ' ' ATTACHMENT 4 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 7 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service with an isolation valve outside containment that is automatically or manually isolated during a DBA and a check valve and relief value inside containment.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW D1AGRAM(11548) 1 cc COMPONENT COOLING FROM "B" RHR HX FM-72A SHT 1 2 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO "A" RHR HX FM-72A SHT 1 4 cc COMPONENT COOLING TO "B" RHR HX FM-72A SHT 1 5 cc COMPONENi COOLING FROM "A" RHR HX FM-72A SHT1 9 cc AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-72B SHT 1 10 cc AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-72B SHT 1 11 cc AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-72B SHT 1 12 cc AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-72B SHT 1 3 AIR RECIRC. COOLING WATER FM-728 SHT 1 cc IR RECIRC. COOLING-WATER FM-72B SHT 1 15 CH CHARGING FM-88C-1 16 cc COMP COOLING TO REAC. COOLANT PUMP CUBE C FM-72A-4, 11448-FM-72 17 cc COMP COOLING TO REAC. COOLANT PUMP CUBE B FM-72A-3, 11448-FM-72 I I

1 M COOLING TO REAC. COOLANT PUMP CUBE A FM-72A-2, 11448-FM-72

  • I I

I 1 H WATER FROM REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS FM-88B-1 , FM-88C-2

.6 C C 1 IIP COOLING FROM REACTOR COOLANT PUMP CUBE A FM-72A SHT 2 C MP COOLING FROM REACTOR COOLANT PUMP CUBE C FM-72A SHT 4 C OMP COOLING FROM REACTOR COOLANT PUMP CUBE B FM-72A SHT 3 SI SAFETY INJECTION TEST LINE FM-898 SHT 1

  • , /22/97 08:23:35 PAGE 7 OF 9

I > ' ATTACHMENT 4 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 8 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service with an isolation valve outside containment that is automatically or manually isolated during a OBA and a ctieck valve, but no relief valve inside containment.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11548)

!* !There are no pen:trations which meet this category . I 1

  • /22/97 08:23:38 PAGE 8 OF 9

t I ' ,I ATTACHMENT 4 SURRY POWER STATION/ UNIT #2 PENETRATION CATEGORY 9 DESCRIPTION: Cold liquid penetrations normally in service that are automatically or manually isolated during a DBA.

PEN# SYS PENETRATION DESIGNATION FLOW DIAGRAM(11548)

. 33 DG PRIMARY DRAIN TRANSFER PUMP DISCHARGE FM-83A-1, FM-838-1 38 DA SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE FM-838-3, FM-83A-1

  • 1/22/97 08:23:40 PAGE 9 OF 9

' l

Line No.' Description ATTACHMENT 5 Comments Categories 6, 8 & 9 Short Term Action Long Term Action 8 4"-GG-679-1501 Return from RGP Acceptable per analysis2 None None Thermal Barrier 12 6"-GG-748-151 Return from GARF Unit 1 - Acceptable per Unit #1 None Unit #1 - None analysis 2 Unit 2 - Exceeds criteria per Unit #2 Evaluation: Air Unit #2 - Further 2

analysis / Used at Power in system / Stress analysis / possible does not exceed yield - modification pipe will remain intact 13 6"-GG-752-151 Return from GARF Exceeds criteria per Evaluation: Air in Further analysis/

2 analysis / Used at Power system I U1: Pipe possible yields slightly U2: modification Stress does not exceed yield - pipe will remain intact 14 6"-GG-744-151 Return from GARF Exceeds criteria per Evaluation: Air in Further analysis/

2 analysis / Used at Power system I Stress does possible not exceed yield - pipe modification will remain intact 2

20 1"-Sl-413-602 Hydro Pump to Acceptable per analysis None None Accumulators 24 6"-RH-418-153A Return from RHR Acceptable per analysis 2 None None to RWST 25 8"-GG-678-151 Return from "A" Used at Power I Exceeds Evaluation: Air in Further analysis/

2 RGP acceptance criteria system I U1: Stress possible does not exceed yield modification U2: Pipe yields slightly

- will remain intact 26 8" -GG-668-151 Return from "G" Unit #1 - Acceptable per Unit #1 None Unit #1 None RGP analysis 2 Unit #2 - Used at Power/ Unit #2 Evaluation: Air Unit #2 Further Exceeds acceptance i_n system / Stress analysis / possible 2

criteria does not exceed yield - modification pipe will remain intact 2

27 8"-GG-739-151 Return from "B" Acceptable per analysis None None RGP 2

32 3"-SGD-413-601 S/G Wet Layup Acceptable per analysis

  • None None 33 2"-DG-436-153A Primary Drns Xfer Intermittent Use at Power/ Evaluation: Air in Same as short Pump Disch Grinnell Diaphragm Vlvs system I Diaphragm term action used in LMGs will deform. If diaphragm fails, stem seal retains liquid 38 2"-DA-445-153A Gntmt Sump Intermittent Use at Power I Evaluation: Air in Same as short Pump Disch Grinnell Diaphragm Vlvs system I Diaphragm term action used in LMGs will deform. If diaphragm fails, stem seal retains liquid

45 Line No.' Description Comments 3"-RC-452-153A PG Water to PRT Intermittent Use at Power/

Grinnell Diaphragm Vlvs used for Cntmt lsol Viv and Categories 6, 8 & 9 Short Term Action Evaluation: AOV will open to relieve pressure Long Term Action Same as short term action in LMCs 2

46 2"-CH-408-1502 Loop Fill Acceptable per analysis None None 2

100 3"-SGD-414-601 S/G Wet Layup Acceptable per analysis None None 103 6"-RP-454-152 From Purification Not Used at Power/ Drain Drain to Rx Cavity Grinnell Diaphragm Vlvs used for Cntmt lsol Viv and in LMCs 104 6"-RP-454-152 From Rx Cavity to Exceeds criteria. Not Used Drain Drain Purification at Power/ Grinnell Diaphragm Vlvs used for Cntmt lsol Viv and in LMCs 2

106 2"-81-543-602 Accumulator Test Acceptable per analysis None None Line 2

108 3"-SGD-415-601 S/G Wet Layup

  • Acceptable per analysis None None Notes:
1. Unit 2 line numbers shown. Unit 1 penetrations are similar.
2. Based on pipe hoop stress with acceptance criteria of 2Sm for faulted pressure transients (from ASME 111)

r'

Line No.

1 Description ATTACHMENT 6 Comments Categories 6, 8 & 9 Short Term Action Long Term Action 20 1"-Sl-11-602 Hydro Pump to Exceeds criteria / Evaluation: Pipe Further analysis/

Accumulators Intermittent Use at Power stress exceeds yield possible but pipe would remain modification intact(< 2% strain) 2 22 3"-RT-111-153 "B" SIG Recirc & Exceeds criteria / Not Used Unit 1: Drain Drain Transfer at Power Unit 2: Draining at Drain power is a hardship.

Evaluation: Air in system I Stress levels exceed yield but pipe would remain intact (<

2% strain) 2 24 6"-RH-20-152 Return from RHR to Exceeds criteria / Not Used Drain Drain RWST at Power 33 2"-DG-42-152 Primary Drns Xfer Intermittent Use at Power I Evaluation: Air in Same as short Pump Disch Grinnell Diaphragm Vlvs system I Diaphragm term action used in LMCs would deform. If diaphragm fails, stem seal would retain liquid 38 2"-DA-21-152 Cntmt Sump Pump Intermittent Use at Power I Evaluation: Air in Same as short Disch Grinnell Diaphragm Vlvs system I Diaphragm term action used in LMCs would deform. If diaphragm fails, stem seal would retain liquid 45 3"-RC-32-152 PG Water to PRT Intermittent Use at Power I Evaluation: AOV will Same as short Grinnell AOV used as Cntmt open to relieve press term action lsol Viv before diaphragm fails 2

46 2"-CH-8-1503 RCS Loop Fill Exceeds criteria /Not Used Evaluation: Stress Further analysis/

at Power does not exceed yield possible

- pipe remains intact modification 2

96 3"-RT~101-153 "A" SIG Recirc &

  • Exceeds criteria / Not Used Unit 1: Drain Drain Transfer at Power Unit 2: Draining at Drain power is a hardship.

Evaluation: Air in system I Stress levels exceed yield , but pipe would remain intact(< 2% Strain) 103 3"-RL-6-152 From Purification to Not Used at Power I Grinnell Drain Drain Rx Cavity Diaphragm Vlvs used in LMCs & Cntmt lsol. Viv

~

l

104 Line No.

3"-RL-1-152 1

Description From Rx Cavity to Purification Comments Not Used at Power/ Grinnell Drain Diaphragm Vlvs used in Categories 6, 8 & 9 Short Term Action Long Term Drain Action LMCs & Cntmt lsol. Viv 2

110 3"-CC-820- Return from RCP Acceptable per analysis None None 1501 Therm Barrier 114 3"-RT-121-153 "C" SIG Recirc & Not Used at Power Unit 1: Drain Drain Transfer Unit 2: Draining at Drain power is a hardship.

Evaluation: Air in system / Stress levels exceed yield but pipe would remain intact(<

2% strain)

Notes:

1. Unit 1 line numbers shown. Unit 2 penetrations are similar.
2. Based on pipe hoop stress with acceptance criteria of 2Sm for faulted pressure transients (from ASME Ill}.
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