ML18150A180
| ML18150A180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1987 |
| From: | Conlon T, Fillion P, Hunt M, Mcelhinney T, Vanderniet C, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18150A179 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-87-07, 50-280-87-7, 50-281-87-07, 50-281-87-7, NUDOCS 8706260062 | |
| Download: ML18150A180 (30) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1987007
Text
1-
.l
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-280/87-07 and 50-281/87-07
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
Richmond, VA
23261
.Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Con~-~:~;d:
_May 4-8,_ 1987 /
Inspectors: CY g ~&7t___,
M. D. Hunt (leam~der)
14 f, /u44M:t44',
P. J. Fill~
.
L
~R. ~)~
.girv* I. ~ McE firnney
~e ~£V-?4-/
C. L. Vanderniet
Accompanying Personnel:
M. S. Lewis/NRC RI!
A.' * s*i ngh/NRR/I LRB
_ . .__/f ~
C. P. Patel/NR_~LPD22
- Approvedi£i?<! C:::-~~
I. E. Conlon,ecion Chief
Plant Systems Section
Eng-1.neeri ng.-. Brarich . . .
.
Divisfon*of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
fa~n~
. a~U~k
~~*/,;~
of<<csf§n~d
~~~f~Za
Scope:
Th.is special, announced inspection was in the -areas of fire protection
and the licensee's actions regarding the implementation of the requirements of
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G., III~J., III.L., and 1II.O.
Results:
One violation was identified ~. Improper Ro~ting. of Appendix R
Related Cables, paragraph 5.a.(1).
No deviations were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- R. H. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services
- S. R. Burgold, Operations Coordinator (Projects)
- D. J. Burke, Superintendent of Maintenance
- H. E. Carroll, Senior Staff Engineer
- R. *R. Champagne, Project Engineer
- C. R. Core, Fire Protection Specialist
- W. D. Craft, Licensing Coordinator*
- R. W. Cross, Nuclear Specialist
- L. Farinhot, Loss Prevention Coordinator
- A. H. Friedman, Superintendent Nuclear Training
- E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager (Nuclear Safety & Licensing)
M. Hadduck, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
- J. D. Hegner, Licensing Engineer
- R. Johnson, Operations Coordinator
- H. F. McCallum, Supervisor of Training
- H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager (Operations and Maintenance)
- M. C. Phillips, Senior Engineer
- J. A. Price, Manager Quality Assurance
- J. Simpson, Operations Shift Supervisbr (Procedures)
- L. T. Warnick, Fire Protection Engineer
Other 1 i censee emp 1 oyees contacted included construction craftsmen,
engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members,~ and
office personnel.
Other Organiz,tions
- C. R. Sinopoli, Fire Protection Engineer, TENERA
NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. Ho 11 and
- L. E. Ni cho 1 son
- Attended exit interview
- '
2
2.
Exit Interview
4.
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 8, 1987, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described.
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The following new
items were identified during this inspection.
a.
Violation Item (50-280, 281/87-01), .Improper Routing of Appendix R
Related Cables - paragraph 5.a.(1).
b.
Unresolved
Item
(50-280~ 281/87-07-02),
Correct Deficiencies
Identified and Conduct a Detailed Review of All Fire Contingency
Actions (FCA) Procedures - paragraph 6.a.
c.
Unresolved Item (50-280, 281/87-07-03), Provide Practical Shift Crew
Training on Fire Contingency Actions
(FCA)
Procedures -
paragraph 6.c.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided
to or review~d by the inspector during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations. * Two (2) unresolved items identif1ed during this inspection are
discussed in paragraphs 6.a and 6.c.
5.
Compliance to 10 CFR, Appendix R, Sections III.G. and III.L
By letter dated October 31, 1980, Virginia Power provided their original
response regarding the safe shutdown capability of the Surry Power
Station. Additional information was provided in letters, dated May 19,
July 2, and October 12, 1981; and February 12 and June 18, 1982, and
on this basis, the NRC issued Safety Evaluation Reports, (SERs) dated
December 4, 1981 and November 18, 1982, for Surry Power Station.
Subsequent to the SERs, the NRC issued Generic Letter 83-33.
In October
1983, Vi rgi ni a Power recognized that its 1 eve 1 of understanding of the
' fire protection issues embodied in Appendix R to -10 CFR 50 had not been
adequate and a 11 issues had not been fully addressed.
In response,
Virginia Power commenced Jn Appendix R re-analysis.
Information
concerning this re-analysis consists of seven chapters contained in two
3
volumes.
Volume II was submitted by letters, dated July 6, 1984 (Serial
No. 381), and November 30, 1984 (Serial No. 692).
Volume I was submitted
to NRC/NRR by letter, dated April 10, 1986 (Serial No. 781).
At the time
of this inspection, the licensee's revised fire hazards and safe shutdown
re-analysis (Revision 2/2/86) had not been reviewed or approved by NRR.
These documents were used as the basis of this inspection.
Therefore, an inspection of the licensee's re-analysis and revised
alternative shutdown methodology was conducted to determine if the
protect ion features provided for structures, systems, and components
important to safe shutdown at Surry Units 1 and 2 were in compliance with
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G. and III.L.
The scope of this
inspect ion determined if the fire protection features provided for
identified essential safe shutdown systems were capable of limiting
potential fire damage so that one train of these systems essential to
achieving and maintaining hot standby from either the control room or
emergency control stations are free from fire damage.
Safe Shutdown Capabilities
In order to ensure safe shutdown capabilities, where cables or equipment
of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot
standby conditions are located within the same fire area outside the
primary containment, 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 requires that
one train of hot standby systems be maintained free of fire damage by one
of the following means:
Separation of cables and equipment and associatednonsafety circuits
of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a three hour rating;
Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits
of *redundant trains by a horizontal di stance of more than 20 feet
with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards.
In addition, fire
detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed
in the fire area;
Enclosure of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits
of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a one hour rating.
In addition, fire detection and an automatic fire suppression system
shall be installed in the fire areas; or,
'
Where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot
standby does not satisfy the above requirements or Section III.G.2,
alternative or dedicated shutdown capabilities independent of cables,
systems, or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration
shall be provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,
Secti.on III. G. 3. and III..L.
In addition,Section III. G. 3 requires
that fire detection and fixed suppression be installed in the area,
room, or zone under consideration.
y
4
On the basis of the above Appendix R criteria, the inspectors made an
inspection of cabling and components associated with the Chemical
Volume and Control System, Emergency Electrical Power Supply System,
Emergency Diese.l Fuel Oil Transfer System, Circulating and Service
Water Systems, Main Steam System, Support Ventilation Systems~ and
Emergency Lighting/Communication Systems.
- a.
Separation/Fire Protection for Safe Shutdown Systems and Components
Based on the licensee's Appendix R Reevaluation (Revision 2/2/86),
Virginia Power has identified 35 fire areas at Surry Power Station.
These fire areas are listed in Chapter 2, Table 2-.1, of the Fire
Protection Reevaluation Report (Volume I) and illustrated on drawings
11448-FAR-200 through 212.
Within the above areas, the licensee has performed a cable separation
analysis for identified essential safe shutdown systems and components
required to achieve hot standby and cold shutdown.
The licensee has
identified 19 fire areas which contain safe shutdown equipment and/or
cables.
The results of the licensee's cable separation analysis
indicate that a fire in 12 plant areas could potentially cause damage
to both trains of safe shutdown functions thus requiring alternative
shutdown capability.
Alternative shutdown is required in the
following 12 fire areas:
(1) Fire Area 1, Unit 1, Cable Vault and Tunnel
(2) Fire Area 2, Unit 2, Cable Vault and'Tunnel
(3) Fire Area 3, Unit 1, Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room
(4) Fire Area 4, Unit 2, Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room
(5) Fire Area 5, Main Control Room
(6) Fire Area 15, Unit 1, *Reactor Containment
.(7) Fire Area 16, Unit 2, Reactor Containment
(8) Fire Area 17, Auxiliary, Fuel, and Decontamination Buildings
(9) Fire Area 19, Unit 1 Safeguards Area
(10) Fire Area 20, Unit 2 Safeguards Area
(11) Fire Area 45, Mechanical Equipment Room No. 3
(12) Fire Area 54, Charging Pump Service Water Pump Room
5
An inspection was made to determine if redundant cabling for the safe
shutdown systems, required to achieve and maintain hot standby and
cold shutdown conditions have been provided with adequate separation
or protected in accordance with Appendix R,Section III.G.2 and
III. G. 3.
Included in the review was an evaluation of the acceptability of the
barrier or enclosure construction configuration as a fire rated
barrier as used in the pl ant to separate fire areas.
Al so, the
review verified the adequacy of the i nsta 11 ed penetration sealing
systems and fire dampers/fire doors with respect to i nsta 11 at ion
completeness, physical condition; fire test documentation, and
periodic surveillance and tests.
Within the fo 11 owing fire areas, the cab 1 e rout fogs for redundant
. safe
shutdown
components/functions,
alternative
shutdown
capabilities, and the fire protection features afforded these areas
were inspected:
(1) Fire Areas 1 (CVT-1) and 2(CVT-2), .Units 1 and 2 Cable Vault and
Tunnel
System/Function
Chemical Volume
and Control/Makeup
Charging
Charging Pumps
1-CH-P-lA
1-CH-P-lB
1-CH-P-lC
2-CH-P-lA
2-CH-P-lB
2-CH-P-lC
Charging Pump*
Suction Valves
From RWST
LCV-1115D
LCV-2115D
Circulating and
Service Water/
Charging Pump
Cooling Water
Pumps
Fire
Area/Zone
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
Train A (H Bus)
Raceway/Conduit
lHSPHl
1H6PH1
2HSPH1
2H6PH1
Train B (J Bus)
.Raceway/Conduit
lJSPHl
2J5PH1
1J10PL185
2J10PL185
2J10PL186
'
"
l-CC-P-2A
l-CC-P-28
2-CC-P-2A
Emergency Power/
Emergency Diesel
Generators
Diesel Generator
No. 1 (Power)
Diesel Generator
No. 2 (Control)
Diesel Generator
No. 3 (Control)
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
6
1H6PL10
2H6PL10
2H6PL12
1H3DH2A
1H3DH1A
2H8PH6
1J6PL117
2J6PL117
2J3PH6
2J3PH10
2J3PH11
1J3PH6
2J3PH7
2J8PH6
A fire in either of the Units* Cable Vault and Tunnel areas
could result in the loss of power and control cables for both
trains of the Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) Charging
Pumps, and the charging pump suction valves from the Refueling
Water Storage Tank (RWST) for that respective affected unit.
The 1 i censee stated that the eves has been designed with a
manually operated cross connection between the Unit 1 and
Uhit 2 charging pumps discharge manifolds.
This manual crosstie
enables either set *of pumps to feed both units in case of a fire
which may affect both trains of one unit in the affected fire
area.
This alternative shutdown scheme for fire utilizing system
crossties is included in Virginia Power 1s revised Appendix R
re-analysis provided in Volume I .of the April 10, 1986, submittal
to NRC/NRR.
Operator actions to *accomplish the eves crosstie
are provided in Attachment 7 to Procedure FCA-1. 00.
The
inspectors expressed a concern that control and power cabling
for all onsite emergency diesel generators were located in Fire
Area 2.
It appeared that a fire in the. Unit 2 Cable Vault and
Tunnel could potentially disable Diesel Generator No. 2 and
Nos. 1 and 3.
Since the Unit 1 charging pumps are powered
by Diesel Generators No. 1 and No. 3, a fire in this area would
result in loss of the charging pumps for either unit.
The
licensee stated that this cable interaction discrepancy was
discovered during the annual update of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R
(2)
7
report.
Surry Power Station Deviation Report SI-87-278 was
prepared on March 13, 1985, for this issue and a 10 CFR 50.73
Special Report, No. 87-010-00, was submitted to the NRC on
April 10, 1987.
The licensee indicated that compensatory
measures for the area included a fire watch to inspect the area
at least once each shift.
Corrective actions for the cable
interaction discrepancy will relocate the Diesel Generator No. 3
control cables out of Fire Area 2.
This design change for the
cable rerouting is to be imp 1 emented through Design Change
CD-87-14-3.
This issue is identified as Violation Item (280,
281/87-07-01}, Improper Routing of Appendix R Related Cables.
The inspectors performed a walkdown of Fire Areas 1 and 2 and
verified that they are separated from adjacent fire areas by
equivalent three hour construction. It was noted that the fire
door frame assemblies for the doors that lead to the respective
Emergency Switchgear Rooms (Fire Areas 3 and 4) were not labeled
for fire door use.
This item is the subject of an Exemption
Request under review by NRC/NRR.
The inspectors verified that early warning ionization type fire
detectors were provided in the area of Fi re Areas 1 and 2.
Also, heat detectors are provided which actuate a total flooding
low pressure COi system for the areas.
In addition, the
inspectors verified that the sprinkler systems protecting these
fire areas provided full area coverage.
The sprinkler systems
protecting these areas are a manual open-head sprinkler system
for protection of cable trays in the high ceiling upper levels
of the rooms and a manual closed-head sprinkler system in the
lower area to provide floor coverage.
These systems are provided
as manual backup systems to the primary automatic carbon dioxide
suppression system.
In addition~ manual fire hose stations are
provided within each fire area for fire brigade use.
Fire Areas 3 (ESGR-1) and 4 (ESGR-2) Unit 1 and 2 Emergency
Switchgear and Relay Rooms (ESGR)
Train A (H Bus)
Train B (J Bus)
Slstem/Function
Fire Area/Zone
Racewa)!'. Conduit
Racewai'. Conduit
Chemical Volume
and Control
System/Charging
Pumps
1-CH-P-lA
3
lHSPHl
1-CH-P-lB
3
1J5PH1
1-CH-P-lC
3
1H6PH1
2-CH-P-lA
4
2H5PH1
2-CH-P-lB
4
2J5PH1
2-CH-P-:-lC
4
2H6PH1
.*
Circulating and
System/Charging
Pump Service
Water Pumps
1-SW-P-lOA
1-SW-P-lOB
3
3
8
1H6PL11
1H6PL47
MCC-lHl-1
1
,
-*
8
Circulating and
System/Charging
Pump Service
Water Pumps
1-SW-P-lOA
3
1H6PL11
1H6PL47
MCC-lHl-1
l-SW-P-108
3
1J6PL70
1J6PL118
MCC-lJl-1
2-SW-P-lOA
4
2H6PL11
2H6PL47
MCC-2Hl-1
2-SW-P-108
4
2J6PL70
2J6PL118
MCC-2Jl-l
Charijing Pump
Cooling Water
Pumps
l-Ce-P-2A
3
1H6PL10
1-Ce-P-28
3
1J6PL117
2-CC-P-2A
4
2H6PL10
2-Ce-P-28
4
2J6P117
A fire in either Fire Area 3 or 4 can result in the loss of
cabling and functions affecting the eves charging pumps, motor
driven auxi 1 i ary f eedwater pumps, emergency di ese 1 generator
power system, and ESGR ventilation systems for the affected
unit.
The licensee has provided alternative shutdown methodology
as described in paragraph 5.a.(1) for the eves charging system.
The licensee stated that for a fire in Fire Area 3 (causing loss
of No. 1 and No. 3 emergency diesel generators), the emergency
d1 ese 1 generator No. 2 would be avai 1 ab 1 e through Unit 2
emergency buses to supply necessary power to the Unit 2 Emergency
Switchgear Room; thus, providing power to the alternative
shutdown systems manually crosstied to shutdown Unit 1.
Likewise, the Auxi 1 i ary Feedwater Systems (AFW) for each unit
can be manually crosstied to the unit unaffected by the fire.
The inspectors verified that this operator action is accomplished
in Step 17 of Procedures FeA-1. 02 and 1. 03.
Al so, a 100%
capacity turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is available on
loss of the two motor driven pumps.
Visual inspection of the
turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps located in Fire Areas 19
and 20 (Unit 1 and 2 Safeguards Areas) was not accomplished due
to high level airborne contaminants associated with sandblasting
and painting activities in these areas.
i
I
9
The inspectors reviewed the fire area boundaries provided to
separate Fire Areas 3 and 4 from each other and other adjacent
plant areas such as Fire Area 31 (Turbine Building), Fire Areas 1
and 2 (Cable Vault and Tunnel) and the Fire Area 45 (Mechanical
Equipment Room No. 3).
The i.nspectors verified the installation
of RTV Silicone Foam Fire Stop seals in the pipe trenches as the
fire barrier boundaries between the Emergency Switchgear Rooms
and Mechanical Equipment Room.
Also, the Circulating Water and
Service Water Fiberglass piping in the Emergency Switchgear Room
trenches was protected by a TSI design three hour fire barrier
to preclude fire damage to the system fl ow path to prov.i de
cooling water to the safe shutdown charging pumps.
The inspectors visually inspected fire door No. 18 which is a
normally open sliding fire door located between the Unit 1 and
Unit 2 ESGRs.
The door. is actuated to close upon activation of
either of two ionization smoke detectors at the doorway or a
Halon system discharge in the rooms.
The inspectors reviewed
Periodic Test PT-24.llA, Fire Doors, which assures the door
to be operational on a monthly basis.
It was noted that the
smoke detectors are not currently tested by a periodic test,
however, the licensee committed to include these detectors in an
existing periodic test.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed
the license's design basis preoperational tests results report,
dated December 4, 1984, for the ESGR fixed manual Hal on 1301
J
fire suppression system.
Based on the review of the licensee's
testing, and * our wal kdown of the fire areas, the fire area
barriers and the fire detection and suppression systems provided
for these areas appear adequate.
(3) Fire Areas 6 (EDG-1), 7 (EDG-2), 8 (EDG-3), Emergency Diesel
Generator Rooms
System/Function
Fire Area/Zone
Emergency Electrical
Distribution System/
Emergency Diesel
Generators (EOG)
EOG No. 1
EOG No. 2
EOG No. * 3
6
7
8
Train A (H Bus)
Raceway Conduit
1H3PH1
1H3PH2
1EG98
2H3PH1
2H3PH2
2EG47
Train B (J Bus)
Raceway Conduit
2J3PH1
2J3PH2
2J3PH15
1J3PH15
1EG47
10
The inspectors performed a wa l kdown and verified that Fi re
Areas 6, 7, and 8 were separated by equivalent three hour rated
construction from each other and from adjacent Fi re Area 31
(Turbine Building) except that the fire door frames from the
four emergency diesel generator rooms to the turbine building
are not of labeled construction. These doors are the subject of
an exemption request No. 6 submitted in Volume II of the Surry
Appendix R Reevaluation.
(4) Fire Area 17, Auxiliary Fuel, and Decontamination Buildings
(Elevations 2
1-0
1i, 13 1-0 1', and 45 1-10
11 )
System/Function
Chemical Volume
and Control
System/Charging
Pumps
1-CH-P-lA
1-CH-P-lB
1-CH-P-lC
2-CH-P-lA
2-CH.-P-lB
2-CH-P-lC
CharQing Pump
Suction Valves
From RWST
LCV-11150
LCV-21150
Circulating and
System/Charging
Pump Cooling
Water Pumps
l-CC-P-2A
l-CC-P-2B
2-CC-P-2A
2-CC-P-2B
Train A (H Bus)
Fire Area/Zone
Raceway Conduit
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
lHSPHl
1H6PH1
2H5PH1
2H6PH1
1H6PL10
2H6PL10
Train B (J Bus)
Raceway Conduit
1J5PH1
2J5PH1
1J10PL185
1JlOPL186
2JlOPL185
2JlOPL186
1J6PL117
2J6PL117
Ventilation Support
Systems/Normal
Auxiliary Building
Exhaust Fans
1-VS-P-58A
1-VS-P-58B
1-VS-F-9A
1,-VS-F-9B
17
17
17
17
11
2H17PL3
2H17PL2GN
- 1Hl1PL3
1H11PL2GN
1H10PL20
1J10PL225
Fire Area 17 consists of the Auxiliary, Fuel, and Decontamination
Buildings which are common for both Units 1 and 2.
The Auxiliary Building is a four-story structure consisting of
the 2 ft.-0 in., 13 ft.-0 in., 27 ft.-6 in.~ and 45 ft.-10 in.
elevations.
The CCW, charging pumps, and the charging
pump-component cooling water pumps are located on .the
2 ft.-0 in. elevation, with the CCW pumps in the main open floor
area of this elevation, and each charging pump in a separate
cubicle .accessed from the 13 ft.-0 in elevation.
The charging
pump-component cooling water pumps, two for Unit 1 and two for
Unit 2, are located outside their respective unit's charging pump
cubicles on the 2 ft.-0 in elevation.
Cable for these pumps
are routed up to the 13 ft.-0 in elevation, and then to the
respective unit's Cable Vault and Tunnel.
An inspection was made of the charging pumps and CCW pump areas
at elevation 13 ft. to determine what separation and protection
was provided the systems and components as described in the Fire
Hazards and Safe Shutdown* Re-analysis.
The Unit 1 charging pumps are 1 ocated back-to-back against
the Unit 2 charging pumps on the 2 ft.-0 in elevation .. * Each
pump is enclosed in a cubicle that reaches up to the
elevation 13 ft. floor.
The cubicle walls rise up to the
13 ft. ceiling on three sides and are open on the side facing
the respective unit.
The power feeds for the A and C charging pumps rise up f ram the
2 ft. elevation within the pump cubicles to the 13 ft. elevation
and exit southerly toward their respective Cable Vault and
Tunnel.
The B charging pump power feeds for Units 1 and 2 are
routed in a northerly direction away from the A and C charging
pump power feeds.
This routing provides a minimum of 40 ft.
separation for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 charging pump cables.
The
power feeds for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 charging pump-component
cooling water pumps are run in conduit up to the 13 ft.
12
elevation, then turn into trays toward the respective Cable
Vault and Tunnels in the same general area as the A and C
charging pump power feeds.
The licensee has provided a fire
stop in the cable tray that runs perpendicular between the A and
C charging pump cable routes.
Also, a cable tray barrier
penetration firestop was provided where this tray penetrates a
partial wall that extends nearly six feet down from the ceiling
at the 13 ft. elevation.
The inspectors reviewed the firestop
design details.
The completed firestop appeared to be installed
in accordance with the design drawing configuration.
The inspectors noted that these firestops were not included in
the issued periodic test procedures for surveillance of the fire
barriers.
The licensee stated that the lack of this procedure
was i dent i fi ed during a routine wa l kdown by the station fire
protection personnel and that a draft procedure had been
developed to initiate periodic surveillance of these fire
protection items.
Based on our review, this procedure appears
adequate.
A fire in this area could result in the lass of the CVCS
charging pumps and the suction valves to the Refueling
Water Storage Tan ks ( RWST) , LCV-1115D and LCV-2115D.
. The
1 i censee proposes to use the manual cross-connect of the
.
unaffected unit charging pumps.
In the event of a fire that
disables all charging pumps of one unit, the two normally closed
cross-connect valves and alternate RWST suction valves are
manually opened by an operator who re-enters the fire area
within less than a one hour timeframe.
Thi's alternative
shutdown capability is not fully physically or electrically
independent of the fi r.e area of concern.
The licensee has
provided an engineering evaluation to NRC/NRR for justification
of these operator actions.
.
To preclude loss of the eves charging pump cooling water in a
fire event, the licensee has replaced the tharging pump service
water fiberglass piping within the Auxiliary Bujlding with heavy
wall socket welded copper~nickel piping.
The new piping was
designed and i nsta 11 ed to QA Category I, in accordance with
Surry Specification NVS-20.
This installation appeared
acceptable.
A fire in this area could also result- in the loss of the
auxiliary building ventilation.
This system is required to
maintain a tenable environment for personnel and equipment
during plant shutdown.
Redundant fan systems are located on
elevation 45 ft. -10 in. of the Auxiliary Building.
The inspectors
verified that this equipment and associated cab 1 i ng were
separated by at 1 east 20 feet hori zonta 1 di stance.
Three
"
,,
13
ventilation charcoal filter units are located in the center of
the fl oar between the redundant auxi 1 i ary bui 1 ding fans.
This
intervening combustible situation is the subject of an exemption
request submitted to NRC/NRR.
A fixed fire suppression system is not provided in Fire Area 17
in the vicinity of the charging pumps (Elevation 13 ft. -0 in.) or
- the auxiliary building fans (Elevation 45 ft. -10 in) or their
associated cabling; however, the inspectors verified that automatic
smoke detection is provided in these areas.
Manual fire fighting
equipment is provided by portab 1 e extinguishers and hose
stations located in these plant areas.
These systems appear to
provide adequate manual fire fighting capability for the area.
(5) Fire Areas 18A and 188, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Pump
Rooms
System/Function
Emergency Power
System/Emergency
Diesel Generator
Fuel Oil Transfer
Pumps
1-EE-P-lA
(DG No. 1)
1-EE-P-lB
(DG No. 2)
1-EE.;.P-lC
(DG No. 3)
1-EE-P-lD
1-EE-P-lE
1-EE-P-lF
Fire Area/Zone
18A
18A
18A
188
l8B
188
Train A (H Bus)
Raceway Conduit
1H6PL32
2H6PL200
1HlOPL186
1HlOPL186
Train B (J Bus)
Raceway Conduit
1J6PL37
2J6DL37
A fire in either Fire Area 18A or 188 can result in loss of
cab.ling or equipment for both trains of a single set of
emergency di ese 1 generator fuel oil transfer pumps.
However, a
redundant alternate set of pumps and power cabling are provided
in the other unaffected* fire area, thus, providing the required
emergency diesel generator power function for operation or
shutdown of the *affected unit.
~
)
..
14
The inspectors performed a walkdown of Fire Areas 18A and 188
and verified that they were separated from each other by
equivalent three hour rated construction.
The inspectors
verified that early warning heat detection and a full area
automatic high pressure CO2 fire suppression system were
provided in each of the fire areas.
In addition, the inspectors
reviewed Periodic Test PT 24.2C which indicated that tests are
performed which verify that the exhaust fans for the fue 1 oi 1
pump rooms A and 8, respectively, ~hutdown on the discharge of
CO2 into either fire area.
(61 Fire Area 45, Mechanical Equipment Room No. 3 (MER-3)
System/Function
Train A (H Bus)
Fire Area/Zone Raceway Conduit
Train B (J Bus)
Raceway Conduit
Circulating and
System/Charging
Pumps
1-SW-P-108
2-SW-P-lOA
2-SW-P-108
45
45
45
2H6PL2
1J6P446
2J6PL69
A fire in this area may cause 1 oss of 3 of 4 charging pump
service water pumps.
Charging service water pump 1-SW-P-lOA is
available to supply service water to the Unit 1 charging pump
seals and lube oil coolers such that the Unit 1 charging system
would be used to achieve shutdown for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The inspectors verified that pump 1-SW-P-lOA and its associated
cabling are located in a separate fire area (Fire Areas 54 and
31).
The licensee stated that one charging pump service water
pump has sufficient capacity to supply cooling water to .the two
charging pumps required to bring both units to a safe shutdown
condition.
The inspectors performed a walkdown of Fire Area 45 and verified
that the area
was separated from adjacent fire areas by
equivalent three hour construction.
The inspectors verified
that early warning ionization type fire detectors were provided
in the area of Fire Area 45.
In addition, the inspectors
performed a wa 1 kdown of the three hour rated TS! Thermo 1 ag
fire. barrier installation around the fiberglass reinforced
plastic piping routed through the area from the charging pump
service water pump l-SW-P-10A to the Emergency Switchgear and
Relay Rooms.
This fire barrier application appeared continuous
and applied to the entire length of the piping as they were
routed through Fire Area 45.
.,,
.. )
15
(7) Fire Area 54 Charging Pump Service Water Pump Room (CPSWPR)
System/Function
Train A (H Bus)
Train
Fire Area/Zone Raceway Conduit
B
(J
Bus)
Raceway Conduit
Circulating and
System/Charging
Pumps
i
1-SW-P~lOA
1-sw-pL10B
2-SW-P-lOA
54
54
54
1H6PL50
2H6PL2
1J6PL46
A fire in this area may cause loss of both Unit 1 Charging pump
service water pumps and one Unit 2 pump.
Charging service water
pump 2-SW-P-lOB is ~vailable to supply service water to the
Unit 1 charging pump seals and lube oil coolers such that the
Unit 2 charging system would be used to achieve shutdown for
both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The inspectors verified that pump
2-SW-P-lOB and its associated cabling are located in a separate
fire area (Fire Area 45).
The licensee stated that one charging
pump service water pump has sufficient capacity to supply
c1;>0 ling water to the two charging pumps required to bring both
units to a safe shutdown condition.
The inspectors performed
a walkdown of Fire Area 54 and verified that the area was
. separated from adjacent fire areas by equivalent three ho.ur *
construction.
In addition, the inspectors verified that early
warning ionization type fire detectors were provided in the area
and that this system was operable.
Within the areas inspected above, one violation was identified
during the review of LER Special Report No. 87-010-00.
No
deviations were identified.
b.
Associated Circuits
An inspection was conducted of associated circuits as defined in GL 81-12, dated February 20, 1981, and Supplement to GL 81-12.
The three areas of concern affiliated with associated circuits as
defined in: the above referenced GL are:
A common power source (common bus) where the shutdown-equipment
and the power source is not el ectri cal ly protected from the
circuit of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar
devices; or
...
.) .
16
A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation
(spurious signal) would adversely affect the shutdown
capability; or
A common enclosure with the shutdown cables, and
Type (1) are not electrically protected by circuit breakers,
fuses or similar devices, or
Type (2) will allow propagation of the fire into the enclosure.
(1) Associate,.d Circuits by Common Power Supply (Common Bus)
Circuits and cables associated by common power supply are
non-safe shutdown cables whose fire-induced failure will cause
the loss of a power source (buss, distribution panel; or MCC)
that is necessary to support safe shutdown.
This problem could
exist for power, control or instrumentation circuits.
The
problem of associated circuits of concern by common power supply
is resolved by ensuring adequate electrical coordination between
the safe shutdown power source supply breaker and the component
feeder breakers or fuses.
Coordination of overcurrent devices on plant buses was reviewed
by the .inspectors.
The overcurrent protective devices were
,_
applied according to good engineering practice and NRC concerns
about the possibility of fire *induced faults causing loss of
shutdown capability were resolved.
Specifically, the NRC inspectors reviewed Chapter 9, "Electrical
Distribution System Coordination Study - Appendix R Reanalysis
11 ,
of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis. Chapter 9, together
with the referenced drawings, define the power di stri but ion
system for the safe shutdown equipment, including control power.
Coordination of overcurrent protective devices is achieved* in a
particular distribution system when overloads or faults are
cleared by the protective device that is upstream of and nearest
to the overloaded equipment or fault point.
The licensee
presented a standard coordination study for the NRC 1s review.
The time-current characteristic curves for critical groups of
protective devices were plotted on one sheet of log-log paper.
Sufficient sheets had been prepared to cover the whole safe
shutdown system.
Coordination was shown to exists on the
following buses:
1.
4160 Volt buses lH, lJ, 2H and 2J.
- 2.
480 Volt buses, lH, lH-1, lJ, lJ-1, 2H, 2H-l, 2J and 2J-l.
3.
480 Volt motor control center lHl-1, lHl-2, lJl-1, lJl-2,
2Hl-l, 2Hl-2, 2Jl-l and 2Jl-2.
\\ ..
J
...
17
4.
120/240 Volt vital AC buses 1-III, 1-IIIA, 1-I, 1-IA, 1-II,
1-IIA, 1-IV, 1-IVA and corresponding Unit 2 buses.
5.
125 Volt DC 1-A, 1-B, 2-A, 28 and DC control buses in 4160
Volt and 480 Volt switchgear.
The feeder cables for the 125 VDC control buses in 4160 Volt and
480 Volt switchgear are protected by 50 Ampere circuit breakers.
In the original design, individual trip and close circuits in
the switchgears were protected by 30 Ampere fuses manufactured
by Shawnut Co. (Type OT, Cl ass K-5).
To meet 10 CFR 50,
Appendix.R require~ents, the 30 Ampere fuses should coordinate
with the:~Q Ampere ~ircuit breaker.
The licensee decided, based
on co!ncT~s;fons drawn from fuse melt time calculations and
. convetsatfons with the circuit breaker manufacturer, to change
the 30 amwere fuses to 15 ampere fuses of the same type in order
to achiev~' better coordination.
Results of the fuse clearing
time calcqlations are tabulated below:
Fuse Clearing Times (seconds)
Max fault
.600 A Fault*
30 A fuse
0.0047
0.0106
- Start of breaker instantaneous region.
i
!
15 A fuse
0.0030
0.0048
One can see! from* 1 these results that there is a si gni fi cant
advantage in terms! of speed at the 600 Ampere point by switching
to a ~5 Ampere fus~.
'
.
.
.
I
The NRC inspectors questioned whether or not changing to a lower
rated fuse could adversely affect circuit breaker operation.
The licensee stated that the switchgear manufacturers (ITE Co.
for both 480 and 4160 Volt switchgear) was consulted before the
change was approved.
The analysis for breaker control power was
accepted by the NRC as being reasonable.
Coordination of overcurrent protective devices for ground faults
on three-phase power circuits was addressed during the
inspection.
The 4160 Volt system is a low-resistance grounded
system limiting fault current to about 1500 Amperes.
Since
individual feeder breakers are equipped with sensitive
instantaneous ground fault :relays and upstream ground fault
relays. are inverse .time type, it was determined that
coordination exists .for any possible ground faults.
The 480
Volt system is an ungrounded delta system and, therefore, ground
faults are not a concern .
(2)
' .
18
Associated Circuits Causing Spurious Operation
Circuits associated because of spurious operation are those that
can, by fire-induced failures, cause safe shutdown equipment or
nonsafe shutdown equipment to maloperate in away that defeats
the function of safe shutdown systems or equipment.* Examples
include the uncontrolled opening or closing of valves, or of
circuit breakers, due to fire-induced damage to nonsafe shutdown
instrument and control circuits that affect the control circuit
interlocks of the safe shutdown components.
The reactor
inspectors reviewed the licensee's analysis of possible
fire~induced spurious signals ~nd open circuits that could
defeat the safe shutdown systems.
Special attention was focused
on the following piping and valves:
Piping
Pressurizer PORV and
block valve
RHR Suction
eves letdown
eves excess letdown
Reactor vessel head vent
Pressurizer vents
eves charging
eves ReP seal injection
Steam Generator PORVS
Valves
PeV-1456, MOV-1535
PeV-1455C, MOV-1536
MOV-1700, MOV-1701
LeV-1460 A and 8
HCV-1200 A, B and C.
HeV-1557 A, Band e
HeV-1201, HCV-1137
SOV-RelOOA-1, -2;
SOV-RelOOB-1, -2
SOV-RelOlA-1, -2;
SOV-RelOlB-1, -2
MOV-1286 A, Band e
MOV-1267A, MOV-1269A
MOV-1270A, MOV-1289A and B
MOV-1370
MOV-2370
MOV-SW-101A and B
MOV-SW;,.102A and B *
RV-MS201A, Band e
The licensee's analysis for protection against spurious
ope rat i ans was adequate and, NRe concerns in this area were
resolved.
For example, the arrangement of the valves shown in
the above tabulation for the eves system are shown on SWEe
C.
19
Drawing No. 11448-DAR-888 (and 88C),
11Valve Operating Numbers -
Chemical and Volume Control System Sheet 2 (and Sheet 3)
Appendix R Flowpath
11 *
The isolation valves in th~ letdown lines
are air operated valves.
Switches in the control room and
emergency switchgear room (different fire areas) can block power
from coming to the solenoid operated valves in the air lines
resulting in the valve remaining in or reverting to the closed
position.
Thus, this potent ia 1 1 eak path from the RCS can be
blocked for any postulated fire.
Auxiliary (Alternate) Shutdown Panels
. .
!
For motors and valves that may ~e tontrolled :from both the main
control
room and the auxiliar~ shutdown* panel, there is
interconnecting wiring between the ni~i.n contra l room, the auxi 1 i ary
shutdown pane 1 , switchgear and oth'er' panels.
Therefore, these
control circuits must be designed with switches and/or relays that
can operate to isolate any wires that terminate in the main control
room from other wires in the same circuit.
In addition, these control
circuits must be designed with daub 1 e fuses, pne for contra 1 room
operation and one for auxiliary shutdown panel operation.
The
inspectors reviewed elementary diagrams for motors that may be
controlled from both the main control room and the auxiliary shutdown
- panel and determined that isolation switches and relays, as well as
daub le fuses, were properly i ncorpor~ted:.
The inspectors reviewed Stone and Webster Erigi neeri ng Corporation
drawing 11448-ESK-SP, Revision 18,
11Elementary Diagram 4160V
Charging Pumps Sheet l.
11
This drawing showsl the 125 VDC control
circuit for charging pump l-CH-P-1A.
'
The transfer circuit utilizes a hand operable latching relay (43X)
and an override switch mounted on the switchgear door. . A feature of
this circuit is that the transfer of control from the main control
room to the auxiliary shutdown panel may be made in two ways:
(1) With
a transfer switch mounted on the auxiliary shutdown panel or (2) by
manually operating the 43X relay.
Both methods are covered by the
appropriate operating procedures.
The same methodology is employed
for all 4KV safe shutdown motors .
. The inspectors also reviewed Drawing No. 11448-ESK-GcRl, Revision 1,
.
11 Elementary Diagram - Miscellaneous Pump Circuits.
11
Tnis drawing
shows the 120 VAC control circuit for the charging puqips service
water pumps SW-P-lOA and 108. Transfer of control is accomplished by
operating a multistage two-position switch at the Appendix R panel.
The design of this circuit was acceptable.
d.
20
Other drawings associated with transferring control of safe shutdown
equipment reviewed by the NRC inspectors were:
1.
11448-ESK-3A, Revision 4,
Sheet 1.
11
11Control Switch Contact Diagrams
2.
11448-ESK-3J, Revision 3, "Control Switch Contact Diagrams
Sheet 9.
11
Damage Control Measures
Appendix R, Sections III.G.1.b and III.LS require fire prptection
features to be provided for structures, systems and components
important to safe shutdown and to be capable of limiting fire damage
so that systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown are
free of fire damage or can be repaired such that the equipment can be
made operable and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Materials
for such repairs are required to be readily available on site and
procedures are to be in effect to implement such repairs.
The 1 i cense*e has deve 1 oped the fo l1 owing corrective e 1 ectri ca 1
maintenance procedures:
EEMP-C-RH-135
EEMP-C-CC-153
EEMP-C-CC-159.
Emergency Installation of Temporary Power to RHR
Motors (Safety-Related).
Emergency Ins ta 11 at ion of Temporary Component
Cooling Water Pump Motors.
Corrective Maintenance Procedure for Emergency
Ope rat ion of Charging Pump Component Coo 1 i ng
Water Pump.
The NRC inspectors reviewed these procedures to determine that
suffitient information is contaihed in each procedure to adequately
perform the intended emergency repairs. These procedures designated
and dedicated the required hand tools, rigging equipment, test gear,
lightihg equipment and materials to support the intended activities.
In addition, the routes for movement of equipment and installing
replacement electrical cables are defined.
Material dedicated for
Appendix R repairs have been identified by tagging and segregated in
the warehouse storage areas.
Theie procedures provid~ for Q/C inspection hold points and certain
documentation.
The procedures provide adequate information for the
performance-of the require emergency repairs and if followed should
prove adequate, if required.
"
... ~
,J.
21
6.
Alternative Shutdown Capability
In a letter dated April 10, 1986, the licensee submitted to NRR, Revision 2
to the Surry Station, 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Report.
Volume I contains
an introduction description of plant fire areas, safe shutdown analysis,
compliance summary and the alternative shutdown analysis.
a.
Review of Plant Procedures
Those systems and* components to achieve hot shutdown and* subsequent
cold shutdown along with operator actions are identified :in Fire
Contingency Action (FCA) procedures.
The system and com~onents to be
used in the FCAs are based on the safe shutdown analysis fciri:a given
fire area and the potential loss of equipment in the fir¢:~rea.
Volume I, Chapter 4 of Surry Station Appendix R Report iaent~fies the
fire areas requiring alternative shutdown.
The licensee ha~* issued
and approved nine FCAs.
The inspectors se 1 ected four FCAs: for a
detailed review as follows:
FCA-1.00, Safe Shutdown Area Fire, Revision 05
FCA-1.01, Limiting Main Control .Room Fire, Revision 03
FCA-1.02, Limiting Emergency Switchgear Room Fire, Revision 02
FCA-1.03, Limiting Cable Vault/Tunnel Fire,.Revision 02
I
Based on the review of the above procedures, the 1 i censee has
!
incorporated systems, components and operator actions tq accomplish (
the* performance goals identified in_ 10 CFR 50, Appendix *R,
Section III.L. for taking a Unit or Units to hot shutdown conditions.
The inspectors did identify several procedure deficien*cies for which
corrective act ion is needed.
Examples of procedura 1 defi ci enci es
include:
(1) provide steps to stop reactor coolant*pumps from inside
and outside control room for all procedures reviewed; (?) include
latest information concerning natural circulation including cooldown
cur~es; (3) provide procedural steps and information identified in
Vo 1 ume I, Chapter 5 of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Surry Report
concerning use*of turbine devices auxiliary feedwater pumps on the
affected units (See FCA 1.02,*1.03, Step 17); and (4) provide operational
guidance identified in chapter 5, table 3 concerning termination of
spurious events and system fl owpaths.
A 11 comments made by the
inspectors concerning the procedures review were written up by the
licensee on audits sheets.
The licensee committed to revising the
above FCA to correct those items identified by the inspectors.
The
licensee will also initiate a review program on all FCAs with close
cooperation between design engineering (APPR) and Surry Operations
groups to ensure consistency between FCAs
such that simi 1 ar
procedure deficiencies as identified above are eliminated and the
p~ocedures that interface (e.g., AP-20, Loss of Control Room) with
the FCAs are properly sequenced.
22
This matter is identified as Unresolved Item (280, 281/87-07-02),
Correct Deficiencies Identified and Conduct a Detailed Review of All
Fire Contingency Actions (FCA) Procedures.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the FCA procedures to determine
the extent that the procedures were written in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure SUADM-98, Emergency Usage Procedure Writer
1s
Guide.
The inspectors noted several discrepancies in the format and writing
of the FCAs.
These discrepancies were conveyed to the licensee and
the licensee committed to correct these problems by performing a
detailed review of the FCA 'pr*ocedures.
b.
Training
C.
The inspectors reviewed training given to licensed operators on
Appendix R modifications and Fire Contingency Action (FCA)
procedures.
The review included an evaluation of the following
lesson plans to assess the detail of instructions provided on
fire-related procedures;
N0-95. 6-LP-1:
N0-95. 6-LP-2:
N0-95.6-LP-3:
RQ-85.4-LP-5:
10 CFR 50 Appendix R Overview
FCA-1.00, Safe Shutdown Area Fire
Limiting MCR Fire
Fire Contingency Actions
The lesson plans listed above appeared to provide adequate classroom
training, however, it was not evident that coordinated walk-throughs
of the procedures were accomplished.
The need for walk-throughs of
the FCA procedures became apparent during interviews with pl ant
ope rat i ans person.ne l and during the performance of a dri 11 utilizing
the FCAs.
Lesson plans covering Appendix R modifications appeared to
adequately address those modifications and provided a sufficient
amount of detail to meet the needs of the .operators.
A review of training attendance records indicated that a 11
appropriate licensed personnel at the facility had received the
scheduled classroom training on Appendix R related materials.
Shift Staffing
The inspectors held discussions with operation personnel and reviewed
Administrative Procedures 29.1 and 29. 2.
These procedures define
the shift staffing requirements inc 1 udi ng operating personnel
required to staff the shift fire brigade.
The shift staffing exceeds
the minimum shift crew identified in Technical Specification, Table
6.1-1, for an operating plant.
The licensee safe shutdown analysis
and fire contingency action procedures are designed to only require
the use of the minimum shift crew.
23
To further review the effectiveness of FCAs interfacing plant
procedures and shift staffing, the inspectors had the licensee conduct
a walk-through of FCA-1.01, Limiting Main Control Room Fire.
The
walk-through started in the Unit 1 and 2 showed Main Control Room
where a fire was postulated to have occurred and required manning the
Auxiliary Shutdown Panels (ASP) and remote monitoring panels located
in the switchgear rooms and Unit 1 cable spreading ro6m respectively.
The inspectors teamed up with those plant operators used to operate
systems and components to place both units in hot shutdown conditions.
It was cl ear to the inspectors, by the act ions of the personne 1
assigned to the ASPs, that training on the location and purpose of the
meters and switches on the ASPs had been conducted.
The operators
also appeared familiar with the location of components needing local
operation.
Deficiencies, however, were noted in the administration,
control and coordination of evolutions performed outside the main
control room.
For example, it was clear that the operators were
unfamiliar with the the transition of the procedures and thus had
difficulty entering the FCA procedures from APs.
It was noted that
AP-20, Main Control Room Inaccessibility, contained no kick-out to
the proper FCA in the event that. the in accessibility is due to a
fire even though the attachments to FCA-1.00 as directed by AP~20.
As a result, the operators continued using AP-20 after manning the
ASPs until prompted by the inspectors to enter and use FCA-1. 00, vi a
AP-48, Fi re Protect ion -
Ope rat ions Response, which was used
concurrently with AP-20 from the start of the drill.
The walk-through also identified a weakness in the managing of the
event with respect to Appendix R materials and supplies not being
we 11 organized and coordinated such that operators had what they
needed when they went to their stations in the plant. Thus, it became
necessary for the SRO in charge to utilize additional operation
personnel to obtain Appendix R materials such as hand held radios.
The FCAs are* designed to be accomplished by a minimum shift crew
of eight individuals.
The walk-through of the procedure steps and
attachments indicated that a minimum shift of eight is adequate
to perform the procedure to achieve and maintain hot shutdown
conditions.
However, due to the confusion in communications between
the operators, as noted above, the use of extra p*ersonne 1 was
required.
Thus, it was not readily apparent that the licensee can
readily -achieve a safe shutdown with only the minimum. shift crew.
Interviews with operators indicated that they had walked through the
FCAs on an individual basis, but a coordinated effort and responding
as a shift crew had not been done.
Proper practical training of the
operators should alleviate this concern provided the training
includes a complete walk-through of the FCAs utilizing only the
minimum shift crew of eight.
7.
24
Radio communications were available during the drill and were
ut i 1 i zed by the operators.
Though some of the communication was
garb 1 ed the operators were ab 1 e to ta 1 k to one another.
The
inspectors noticed that the operators at the ASPs had difficulty
using the hand-held radios and commented that the use of headsets
would reduce the amount of background noise interference and free
operators hands allowing easier access to the ASPs and less
distraction to the operators.
Practical training should also include
use of these communication radios to provide the operators an
opportunity to become more familiar with their use.
In reviewing these issu~s with the licensee management, a commitment
was obtained to conduct practical training on the FCAs, including the
transitions from ASPs, using normal and minimum shift personnel.
These issues are identified as Unresolved Item (50-280, 281/87-07-03),
Provide Practical Shift Crew Training on Fire Contingency Actions
(FCA) Procedures.
.
.
Compliance to 10 CFR to Appendix R,Section III.a., Oil Collection System
for Reactor Coolant Pumps
The reacto.r coolant pumps are required to be equipped with an oil
co 11 ect ion system if the containment is not inserted during normal
operation.
The oil collection system is to be designed, engineered and
installed s~ch that failure will not leld to fire during normal or design basis
accident conditions and that there is reasonable assurance that the system
will withstand a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
The system is to be
capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and
unpres~urized leakage points in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems.
The leakage is to be collected and drained to a vented closed container
that is capable of holding the entire lube oil _system inventory. A flame
ar~ester is required in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the
oil present the hazard of fire flashback.
The inspectors reviewed the design of the oil collection system.
The
design drawings and the Design Change Package (DCP) No. 79-S76 were
reviewed to verify that the system is adequately designed.
The review
indicated that the system is seismically designed and supported to
function following a seismic event.
An inspection of the system was not
made since the plant was in operation and access inside the containment
was not possible. The inspectors were able to view the system through the
use of. the Virginia Power Video Information Management* System (VIMS).
This system enab 1 ed the inspector to view sti 11 photographs of the oi 1
collection system form various angles and elevations. Through the review
of the .drawings, DCP 79-S76, and the VIMS, the inspectors verified that
the following oil-bearing components are provided with oil collection
enclosures:
oil lift pump and associated lines
oil cooler and associated lines
~-'~
.) .
25
upper and lower oil level indicators
oil fill and drain lines
lower lube oil reservoir
all flanged oil-bearing connections
Each reactor coolant pump is equipped with an oil collection system .. Each
oil collection system is connected via drain lines to a collection tank
with a 265 gallon capacity.
The capacity of each lube oil system is
approximately 200 gallons.
The collection tank vents are provided with a
flame arrester to prevent flashback.
The inspectors were not able to
verify that the drain lines are sized to accommodate the largest potential
oil leak.
The calculations for the drain line sizing were not available
for review at the site. The inspectors indicated in the exit meeting that
these calculations will be reviewed during subsequent NRC inspections.
The licensee al so submitted to the NRC Standing Order No. 18, dated
November 26, 1987.
This document indicates that during the 1986 Unit 2
refueling outage, a spare reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor from North Anna was
installed due to a cracked rotor bar for the 2-RC-P-lC pump.
The spare
North Anna RCP has a different physical configuration than the Surry RCP
such that the oil collection system cannot be use~.
To compensate for the
lack of oil collection system, the licensee is taking the following
measures:
trending of upper and lower thrust and g~i de bearing
temperatures on the P-250 computer
evaluation of the trend to be made at the end of each shift had
entered into the log for Unit 2*
fire suppression equipment to be maintained outside the
containment for use by the fire brigade in case of a lube oil
fire (this includes foam equipment at the containment access
hatch).
The Standing Order also directs the operations personnel to call *out the
fire brigade if two or more separate indications are observed on reactor
coolant pump 2-RC-P-lC:
RCP motor bearing temperatures trending- upward at a rapid rate
or in exces~ of 175°F
11 RCP Bearing High Temperature" annunciator
11 RCP lC Hi Low Oil Level" annunciator
RCP vibrations excessive or in alarm
sudden loss of instrumentation originating in 1C1 cubicle
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26
The NRC inspectors reviewed operator 1 ogs to verify that the bearing
temperatures are being trended.
The inspectors also verified. that the
foam locker is located near the Unit 2 containment access for use by the
fire brigade in event of a lube oil fire.
The inspectors reviewed the documentation contained in DCP 79-S76
which verified that the oil collection systems for Units 1 and 2 were
installed and QA/QC inspected.
The DCP with the associated Field Change
Requests was completed on January 30, 1985 and transferred to station
records.
The inspectors also reviewed 1-0P-lA and 1-0P-18 Pre-Startup Checkoff
, "
List, for Units 1 and 2 respectively. This procedure directs the operator
to check the oil collection drain tank level before each time the reactor
cool ant pump is started.
The engineering review done for DCP 79-S76
recommended a visual inspection of the oil collection system piping and
connections in addition to checking the drain tank level.
The licensee
indicated to the NRC inspectors that 1-0P-lA and 1-0P-18 will be revised
to include visual examinations of the oil collection system piping and
connections.
The oil collection systems for the reactor coolant pumps appear to meet
the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.O, except for the items
discussed above.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Compliance to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J, Emergency Lighting
Emergency lighting units with at least an eight hour battery power supply
are required in all areas needed for operation of safe* shutdown equipment
and in access and egress routes thereto.
The lighting units are supplied from Exide and are rated for _eight hour
illumination capability.
Each unit is functionally tested every refueling
to verify that the unit would provide i 11 umi nation for at least eight
hours.
The NRC inspectors reviewed samples of Periodic Test (PT) 1-PT-47K
and 2-PT-47K, Emergency Lighting 8-hour Battery Discharge Test, to verify
that the eight hour discharge testing for the battery uni ts is being
performed as scheduled.
A walk-through inspection was performed by the inspectors using shutdown
procedure FCA 1.00, Safe Shutdown Area Fire, and plant drawings which show
the emergency lighting locations and the access and egress routes for the
safe shutdown equipment.
This walkdown was to verify that sufficient
emergency lighting is provided in areas where operator manual actions are
27
required to achieve and maintain Hot Shutdown conditions and the access
and egress routes thereto.
The emergency lighting met the requirements
for Appendix R,Section III.J, except for the following areas:
Fire Area 1, 480 Volt Emergency Motor Control Center (MCC) lHl-2,
located in the Unit 1 Cable Vault and Tunnel.
Lighting is marginal.
Fire Area 2, 480 Volt Emergency MCC-2Hl-2, located in the Unit 2
Cable Vault and Tunnel.
Lighting is marginal.
Fire Area 45, Mechanical Equipment Room 3 (MER) Valve 25W-269,
Charging Pump Service Water Pump cross-connect.
Lighting is inadequate for manual operation
Fire Area 5, Main Control Room -
emergency lighting requires
emergency diesel generator power in lieu of .eight hour batter packs.
Fire Areas 19 and 20, Main Steam Valve Housings for Units 1 and 2
respectively, emergency lighting for access and egress routes outside
of plant structures to these areas is provided by the security diesel
generator instead of eight hour battery packs.
Fire Areas 15 and 16, Containment Building, Units 1 and 2
respectively, use of portable lighting units instead of fixed
The l foensee has committed to provide sufficient i 11 umi nation for
MCC-lHl-2,
MCC-2Hl-2,
and 2SW-269 to comply with Appendix R,
Section III.J.
The other three i terns have been identified by the licensee and exempt ion
requests have been submitted to the NRC.
The NRC review and approval of
these exemptions will be handled by separate NRC correspondence.
The licensee has implemented periodic tests to assure that the lighting
units remain functional.
These tests verify the proper alignment o.f the
lamp heads and the operability of the battery units and lamp heads.* The
inspectors reviewed samples of completed monthly tests to verify that the
li.censee is implementing the maintenance program as scheduled.
The tests
reviewed include:
PTs 47A thru K which are the Emergency DC Lighting Self-Contained
Battery Tests for various plant areas.
The review by the inspectors indicates that the battery packs used for
Control Room emergency lighting are tested semi-annually in accordance
with PT-47A, instead of monthly.
These battery packs supply the emergency
- lighting upon a loss of offsite power until the emergency diesel
J,)>-
'
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generators start and load onto the emergency busses.
The licensee has
committed to include these Control Room emergency lighting heads and
associated battery units in PT-478 (monthly check) and l-PT-47K (refueling
eight hour test).
The review by the NRC inspectors indicated that the eight hour emergency
lighting is designed, installed, and 'maintained to meet the requirements
of Appendix R,Section III.J, except for the items noted above.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.