ML18142A355
| ML18142A355 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1985 |
| From: | VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18142A354 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8504230287 | |
| Download: ML18142A355 (8) | |
Text
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e ATTACHMENT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES 8504230287 850412 PDR ADOCK 05000280 P
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
FUNCTIONAL UNIT COLUMN 1 MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS TABLE 3.7-1 REACTOR TRIP INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS COLUMN 2 DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY COLUMN 3 PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS COLUMN 4 OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 1 OR 2, EXCEPT AS CONDITIONED BY COLUMN 3, CANNOT BE MET I
I/non-isolated loop I/non-isolated loop e
Maintain hot shutdown Low Steam Generator Water Level With Steam/Feedwater Mismatch Flow A. Reactor Trip Breakers B. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Auto Trip Logic A. Undervoltage Trip Logic B. Shunt Trip Logic 2
1 2
2 1
0 1
1 Maintain hot shutdown Maintain hot shutdown Maintain hot shutdown
- If both misalignment monitors (a and b) inoperable for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or more, the nuclear overpower trip shall be reset to 93 percent of rated power in addition to the increased surveillance noted.
- Terminate testing of Reactor Trip Breakers and open the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers.
I t-3 r:n
(,J
Channel Description
- 26.
Environmental Radiation Monitors
- 27.
Logic Channel Testing
- 28.
Turbine Overspeed Protection Trip Channel (Electrical)
- 29.
Turbine Trip Setpoint
- 30.
Seismic Instrumentation
- 31.
Reactor Trip Breaker
- a.
Undervoltage Trip Logic
- b.
Shunt Trip Logic
- 32.
Reactor Coolant Pressure
- 33.
- a.
Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low
- b.
- c. s.r.
- d.
Station Blackout
- e.
Main Feedwater Pump Trip Check
- M N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
M N.A N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
s TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)
Calibrate N.A.
N.A.
R R
R N.A N.A.
N.A.
R R
Test N.A.
M R
R M
M M
M N.A.
M S
R M
Remarks TLD Dosimeters Stop valve closure or low EH fluid pressure (All Safety Injection surveillance requirements)
N.A.
R N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
R I
e H
en I
00
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e e
Page 4.1-Sa is deleted.
Item 34, Loss of Power, also appears on page 4.1-9.
The legend at the bottom of page 4.1-Sa has also been moved to page 4.1-9.
Channel Description
- 34.
Loss of Power
- a. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under-voltage (Loss of Voltage)
- b. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under-voltage (Degraded Voltage)
- 35.
Control Room Chlorine Detectors
- 36.
- 37.
Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker
- a.
Undervoltage attachment
- b.
Shunt trip attachment S - Each shift D - Daily W - Weekly N.A. - Not applicable M -
p -
R -
Check N.A.
- N.A.
s N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Monthly Calibrate R
R R
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Test M
M M
R M
R TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)
Remarks Test prior to placing in service Prior to each startup if not done previous week Each Refueling Shutdown BW - Every two weeks SA - Semiannually AP - After each startup if not done previous week Q - Every 90 effective full power days
- See Specification 4.lD I
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e ATTACHMENT 2 DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES I~
e e
Letter No.85-229 DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE Revisions to the Surry 1 and 2 Technical Specifications are required as a result of the NRC Staff's issuances of their Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the Auto Shunt Trip Modification.
The Staff's review approved the Auto Shunt Trip Modification and indicated a need for additional test-ing of the Reactor Trip Breakers and its associated equipment.
To meet these requirements, revised specifications are submitted for the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers, Undervol tage Trip logic and Shunt Trip Logic.
Revised Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Require-ments (SR) require Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker testing prior to the routine testing of the Reactor Trip Breakers to further assure the oper-ability of the Bypass Breaker during the testing of the Main Breaker.
Secondly, LCO's and SR's are submitted which require operability and sur-veillance of both the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Logic features. Testing of the newly installed Auto Shunt Trip feature will be accomplished in accordance with the Westinghouse Owners Group technique.
Thirdly, the existing specifications for the Manual Trip feature are adequate to assure operability.
A new Surveillance Requirement is submitted to assure sur-veillance is performed at the Refueling interval. Testing of the Manual feature will be accomplished in accordance with approved station proce-dures and by the method described in the SER.
Pursuant to 10CFR50.59, an evaluation to determine whether an unreviewed safety question exist has been made. It has been concluded that:
- 1)
The proposed change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Surry Final Safety Analysis Report (SAR).
The increased operability and testing requirements proposed with this change will help ensure that the reactor trip system will function properly and that the consequences of a transient are within the bounds of the existing safety analyses.
- 2)
The proposed change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.
The increased operability and testing requirements proposed with this change will help ensure that any transient which may occur will not be compounded by the failure of the reactor to trip on demand.
- 3)
The proposed change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
- Rather, the margin of safety is considered to be increased since the increased operability and testing requirements should ensure a more reliable reactor trip system.
e We have also determined that the proposed change does not involve a sig-nificant hazards consideration.
The NRG has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (48FR14870).
The examples of actions involving no significant hazards consideration include:
11 **** (ii) A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the Technical Specifi-
- cations, for example, a more stringent surveillance requirement.
11 The proposed change is encompassed by this example in that the proposed change adds additional operability and surveillance requirements on the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers and the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip logic as well as additional surveillance requirement on the Manual Trip circuitry.
It has been concluded from our review that this proposed Technical Spec-ification change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFRSO. 59 nor a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10CFRS0.92.