05000280/LER-1979-035-03, Routine Surveillance Revealed Failure of Heat Tracing Circuit 2B,Unit 1 Suction Piping to Boric Acid Transfer Pump.Caused by Water Damage to Heat Tracing Circuit

Routine Surveillance Revealed Failure of Heat Tracing Circuit 2B,Unit 1 Suction Piping to Boric Acid Transfer Pump.Caused by Water Damage to Heat Tracing Circuit

ML18136A466
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	12/21/1979
From:	Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18136A464	List: 05000280/LER-1979-031-03, While Reviewing Liquid Waste Release Forms,Discovered That Liquid Waste Monitor Did Not Alarm High & Trip Release Valve During 791117 Isotope Activity Release.Caused by Personnel Error 05000280/LER-1979-035-03, Routine Surveillance Revealed Failure of Heat Tracing Circuit 2B,Unit 1 Suction Piping to Boric Acid Transfer Pump.Caused by Water Damage to Heat Tracing Circuit 05000280/LER-1979-037-03, During Normal Operation, Routine Surveillance Revealed Failure of Heat Tracing Circuit 13A,1 & 2 Boron Injection Recirculation to Boric Acid Tanks.Caused by Excessive Heating of Heat Tracing Tape ML18136A463
References
LER-79-035-03X, LER-79-35-3X, NUDOCS 8002070297
Download: ML18136A466 (2)

LER-1979-035, Routine Surveillance Revealed Failure of Heat Tracing Circuit 2B,Unit 1 Suction Piping to Boric Acid Transfer Pump.Caused by Water Damage to Heat Tracing Circuit

Event date:
Report date:
2801979035R03 - NRC Website

text

NRC FORM 366 (7-l_?j U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

~ UPDATED REPORT PRiVI s* REPORT DATE 12 CONTROL BLOCK: J I

J I JG)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMAT10Ji9 lL.__.L _

_,___~~---'----'6

~

I V I A I s I p I s I 1 101 0 I O I - I O I O I O I O I O 1-IO I O 1014 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 I G)I I I 0 7

8 9

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 CON'T [ill]

7 8

~:~~~ W© I o I s I o I o I o I 2 I s I o 101'---"'1__._J ---=--1.--=-..___,_

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 1 ! 21 71 zl glG)I J I 21 21 ] I zl Q I@

EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

LDuring normal ooeration, routine surveillance revea]Pd the fail11re af beat traciuo-0 circuit 2B (Panel 8), Unit f!1 suction piping to Boric Acid Transfer Pump, j-CH-P-2A.

~

This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5, and is repartah]P as CQm I per T. S. 6. 6. 2. b. (2).

Since the temperature of the affected lines was maintained as c::§::))J I required, the redundant circuit was operable and two flow paths far boric acid ta the reactor were available, the heal th and safety of the public were not affected.

[]JI]

7 8 9 [ill]

7 8

SYSTEM CODE Is IHI@

9 10 LEA/RO [:VENT YE.A.A REPORT I 71 9 I NUMBER 21 22

CAUSE

CAUSE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE Li@ uJ@ I H l El A 1 T 1 E I R !@

11 12 13 18 SEQUENTIAL OCCUR REN CE REPORT NO.

CODE 1 o I 3 I s J l / I I ol 3 I 23 24 26 27 28 29 COMP.

VALVE SUBCODE SUBCODE LI@ uj@

19 20 REPORT TYPE LlJ L=1 30 31 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN

(:;:;\\

ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 FORM :SUB.

PRIME COMP.

SUPPLIER REVISION NO.

llJ 32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 80 Cj 2j 61 Sj~

TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS ~ SUBMITTED

~@~@ ~@ ~ I 0101 °1 °1 LU@

33 34 35 36 37 40 41

~CB W@

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @

42 43 44 47 JA review of the heat tracing circuit showed that failure was caused by water damage to [I]JJ j the heat tracing circuit.

The corrective action implemented was to replace the heat [I]J] j tape and initiate a maintenance request: to repair the water leak.

[ITI]

7 8

9 FACILITY STATUS

% POWER OTHER STATUS o=ill l.J@ IO I O I O 1@1..... ~-~A-----

7 8

9 10 12 11 44 ACTIVITY CONTENT

~

RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY~

~

W@ WG........ I --n'-, -----

7 8

9 10 11 44 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES Q

BO METHOD OF r:;-:;,.

DISCOVERY DISCOVERY D.ESCRIPTION l_J@)._j 0*pw;e"'it""'jEt""t~a.,.t.-+O.;ab,..,.:"!+'l'e...,i::""v.t-,a"l-+t-i-i....,a.,.,ur-------------1 45 46 80 LOCATION OF RELEASE@

L-...,ll.,1,A---------------J

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NUMBER

(:;:;\\ TYPE DESCRIPTION~

0TIJ I o I o I o lL~@L----NA---------------------

7 8

9 11 12 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES

~

80 NUMBER DESCRIPTION~

~

I o I o Io l@l __ ~.~.,l.---------------------------1 7

8 9

11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY '4JI TYP~

DESCRIPTION

~

Q]2J ~@)L--~'l..---~-~---------~~--------------'

7 8

9 10 so PUBLICITY C\\

0 ~ Q 7 NRC USE ONLY ISSUEDQ DESCRIPTION~

§ 0 0 2 07' 0,C.. f ITliJ Wo I I I I I I I 1.1 I I I I !

a a'

"-10--'.""....,------'-'----~---------------------'68 69 so-;;;

NAME OF PRE PAR ER __

W_._L_._S_t_e_i_va_r_t _________ _

PHONE: ~('"""8_0_4"-) 3.::...c5;....;7_-_3_1_3_4 ___ _

0 G.

e ATTACHMENT (PAGE 1 OF 1)

SURRY P01i'ER STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO:

50-280 REPORT NO:

79-035/03X-l EVENT DATE:

11/27/79 (UPDATE REPORT)

TITLE OF REPORT:

Low Current On Heat Tracing

1.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

With the unit in normal operation at rated power, operator surveillance found that Heat Tracing Circuit 2B (Panel 8) was operating at less than the current specified in the surveillance document.

Low tem~erature alarms were indicated.

• • • • w** ~-=-~...... ".... --.. -,,-~ inve-stiga tion *for** faulty** heat *tracing** tape was "ini*ttated --on --*the-- affected "_...... '...,..,....

• circuit.

Faults were found on Circuit 2B (Panel 8)

"2A" Boric Acid

2.

3.

Transfer Pump suction and were identified as being the result of water penetration of the tape.

The tape was replaced.

The circuit current was then verified to be within specs. of the surveillance document, and a maintenance report was submitted to repair the leak.

This is a degraded mode of is reportable in accordance operation permitted by T.S.

with Technical Specification PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUTS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:

3.3.B.5 and 6.6.2.b.(2).

At all times during the event, the temperature of the affected lines was maintained as required.

The redundant circuit was operable.

There were at all times two operable flow paths for boric acid to the reactor.

There-

fore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

CAUSE

The reduced currents were due to water penetration damage to. the heat tracing tape on the affected circuit.

4.

nfMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The problem was corrected immediately and no further action is required.

6.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Continuous surveillance is maintained on the Heat Tracing System.

No additional action is considered necessary.

A task force has been assembled to investigate the replacement of existing tape with water resistant tape.

This investigation is in

7.

GENERIC nfPLICATIONS:

In view of the number of failures a

task force has been established system and determine corrective action.

progress.

of to this heat examine the tracing heat

tape, tracing