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NRC FORM 366 (6-89)
J U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 TITLE (4)
EXPIRES:A/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3) o 1 s I o r o I o 13 I 11 1 1 loFI 0 14 T/S 3.0.3 Entries; More Than One Inoperable Analog Rod Position Indicator Per Bank.
EVENT DATE (5)
LEA NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY VEAR VEAR :JJ sez~~~~~AL Jt ~~~~~~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERIS)
Salem Unit 1 o 1s1 o Io Io 12 17 12 o I 6 2 I 9 9 3 9 b ~ ol 1 I o - o I 1 o 1 s 21 6 9 I 3 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE RlQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Chock one or more of th* following) (11)
MODE (9) 2 1----'-.----'-~---I 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(1)(2)(iv)
POWER I 20.40&(1)(1)(i)
L~~~L Q 1 01 0 -
20.405(1)(1)(ii) 11111\\111~111~
20.406(1)(1 )(jjl) 20.40&(1)(1)(iv) 20.405(1)(1 )(v) x 60.38(c)(1) 50.36(c)(21 50.73(1)(2)(i) 60,73(1)(2)(il) 50.73(1)(2)(iil)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA (12)
NAME M. J. Pastva, Jr. - LER Coordinator 50.73(1)(2)(v) 50.7l(1)(2)(vii) 50,73(1)(2)(viii)(A) 60.73(1)(2)(viii)(B) 60.73(1)(2)(x)
AREA CODE 73.71(b) 73.71(c)
OTHER (Spt1cify in Abstr*ct below *nd in Text, NRC Form 366A)
TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 1019 31319 1 rs 1 11615 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT I
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MANUFAC-TURER I
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
--i YES (If yes, comp/eta EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!
~NO ABSTRACT (Limir to 1400 spaces, i.e.. approximtJtBly fifteen single-space typewritten Jines) (16)
SYSTEM COMPONENT I
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I MANUFAC-TUR EA I
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I I. I MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 1151 I
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This LER addresses 3 Technical Specification (T/S) 3.0.3 entries due to inoperability of more than one control rod Analog Rod Position Indication (ARPI) per control rod bank.
On 6/29/93, at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 T/S 3.0.3 was entered for rods 1B2, 2Bl, and 2B4.
At 1255 hours0.0145 days <br />0.349 hours <br />0.00208 weeks <br />4.775275e-4 months <br />, reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with T/S 3.0.3.
At 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br />, the shutdown was terminated and T/S 3.0.3 was exited after control rods 2B4 and 2Bl ARPis were restored to specification.
At 1410 hours0.0163 days <br />0.392 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.36505e-4 months <br />, the T/S Action Statement was exited after rod 1B2 was restored to specification.
On 6/30/93, at 0217 hours0.00251 days <br />0.0603 hours <br />3.587963e-4 weeks <br />8.25685e-5 months <br />, Unit 2 T/S 3.0.3 was entered for rods 1SB2 and 1SB4.
At 0259 hours0.003 days <br />0.0719 hours <br />4.282407e-4 weeks <br />9.85495e-5 months <br />, T/S 3.0.3 was exited when 1SB4 returned to specification due to thermal soak.
At 0304 hours0.00352 days <br />0.0844 hours <br />5.026455e-4 weeks <br />1.15672e-4 months <br />, the T/S Action Statement was exited when 1SB2 was adjusted to specification.
On 7/16/90, at 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br />, Unit 1 T/S 3.0.3 was entered for rods 103, 201, 203, 204 and 205.
At 2350 hours0.0272 days <br />0.653 hours <br />0.00389 weeks <br />8.94175e-4 months <br />, reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with T/S 3.0.3~
On 7/17/93, at 0330 hours0.00382 days <br />0.0917 hours <br />5.456349e-4 weeks <br />1.25565e-4 months <br />, the shutdown was terminated and T/S 3.0.3 was exited after rods 201, 203, 204, and* 205 were restored to specification. The root cause of these events is system design.
The ARP! System electronic settings experience drift due to temperature susceptibility of the system coil stacks.
The signal conditioning modules of the affected rods were adjusted.
System
.Engineering has developed an ARP! trending data base to identify problem electronic modules.
The industry Rod Control User's Group has recognized an industry-wide.problem with ARPI System drift.
Recommendations from this group and the vendors will be used to develop appropriate action.
NRC Form 366 (6-89) 9309030251 930826 1~j PDR ADOCK 05000311
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qUPPLEMENTAL LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse
- - Pressurized Water Reactor LER NUMBER 93-010-01 PAGE 2 of 4 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entries; More Than One Inoperable Analog Rod Position Indicator Per Bank Unit 2 Event Dates:
6/29/93 and 6/30/93 Unit 1 Event Date: 7/16/93 Supplement Report Date:
8/26/93 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.93-283, 93~284, and 93-311.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Unit 2 - refueling/maintenance outage completed; startup in progress; Physics testing had been completed prior to the 6/29/93 event validating control rod positions.
6/29/93:
Mode 2 6/30/93:
Mode 2 Reactor Power 0%
Reactor Power 2%
Unit 1 - startup in progress (following a 7/11/93 Reactor Trip) 7/16/93:
Mode 2 Reactor Power 1.5%
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCES:
This LER addresses two (2) Technical Specification (T/S) 3.0.3 entries on Unit 2 and one (1) T/S 3.0.3 entry on Unit 1 due to inoperability of more than one control rod Analog Rod Position Indication (ARPI) per control rod bank {AA} (see Analysis of Occurrence).
On June 29, 1993, at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 T/S 3.0.3 was entered when ARP! for rods 1B2, 2Bl, and 2B4 indicated greater than a +/- 12 step deviation from their group demand counters.
At 1255 hours0.0145 days <br />0.349 hours <br />0.00208 weeks <br />4.775275e-4 months <br />, reactor shutdown was*initiated in accordance with T/S 3.0.3.
At 1314 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />4.99977e-4 months <br />, the Nuclear Regulator Commission (NRC) was notified of the reactor shutdown initiation, in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.72(b) (1) (i) (A).
At 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br />, the Unit 2 shutdown was terminated and T/S 3.0.3 was exited after control rods 2B4 and 2Bl ARPis were restored to specification.
At 1410 hours0.0163 days <br />0.392 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.36505e-4 months <br />, T/S 3.1.3.2.l Action "a" was exited after the ARP! of rod 1B2 was restored to specification.
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SUPPLEMENTAL LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER} TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCES: (cont'd)
LER NUMBER 93-010-01 PAGE 3 of 4 On June 30, 1993, at 0217 hours0.00251 days <br />0.0603 hours <br />3.587963e-4 weeks <br />8.25685e-5 months <br />, Unit 2 T/S 3.0.3 was entered when ARPI for rods 1SB2 and 1SB4 indicated greater than a +/- 12 step deviation from their group demand counter.
At 0259 hours0.003 days <br />0.0719 hours <br />4.282407e-4 weeks <br />9.85495e-5 months <br />, T/S 3.0.3 was exited when 1SB4 returned to specification due to thermal soak.
At 0304 hours0.00352 days <br />0.0844 hours <br />5.026455e-4 weeks <br />1.15672e-4 months <br />, T/S 3.1.3.2.1 Action "a" was exited when 1SB2 was adjusted to specification.
on July 16, 1993, at 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br />, Unit 1 T/S 3.0.3 was entered when ARPI for rods 1D3, 2D1, 2D3, 2D4 and 2D5 indicated greater than a+/- 12 step deviation from their group demand counter.
- At 2350 hours0.0272 days <br />0.653 hours <br />0.00389 weeks <br />8.94175e-4 months <br />, reactor shutdown ~as initi~ted in accordance with T/S 3.0.3.
A flux map was completed verifying control rod position for the affected rods.
At 0330 hours0.00382 days <br />0.0917 hours <br />5.456349e-4 weeks <br />1.25565e-4 months <br /> on July 17, 1993, the Unit 1 shutdown was terminated.and T/S 3.0.3 was exited after the ARPI of rods 2D"i, 2D3, 204, and 205 were restored to specification.
The -NRC. was notified of the reactor shutdown initiation, at 0023 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> on July 17, 1993, in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.72(b} (1) (i} (A}.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCES:
The root cause of these events (both Units} is "Design, Manufacturing, Construction/Installation", per NUREG-1022.
ARPI system electronic settings, associated with the Westinghouse Signal Condition Module and Control Rod coil stack on both units have a history of drift due to the analog coil stacks' susceptibility to temperature changes.
During each event, actual rod positions (per group demand} were verified correct, in accordance with the Reactor Engineering Manual.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCES:
ARPI operability is required to determine individual control rod position.
This ensures compliance with control-rod alignment and insertion limits assumed in the accident analyses.
T/S 3.1. 3.-2.1 addresses the operability requirement of the "Reactivity Control System's" {AA} position indicating systems.
The indicators are determined operable by verifying that the rod position indication syst-em agrees within twelve ( 12} steps of the group demand counters.
Respectively, on June-29 and June 30 (Unit 2) and July 17 (Unit 1),
when more than one ARPI per bank became inoperable, T/S 3.1.3.2.1 Limiting Condition For Operation was exceeded and T/S 3.0.3 applied.
With entry into T/S 3.0.3, these events are reportable to the NRC per Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B).
T/S 3.0.3 states:
"When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within one hour
SUPPLEMENTAL LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 LER NUMBER 93-010-01 PAGE 4 of 4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCES: (cont'd) action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the.specif1cation does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:
- 1.
At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,
- 2.
At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and
- 3.
At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition of Operation.
Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications.".
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:
These events requiring T/S 3.0.3 entry, due to ARP! control rod equipment and design concerns, have occurred previously on both Salem Units.
The most recent Unit 1 event occurred on February 26, 1993 (reference LER 272/93-007-00) and the most recent Unit 2 event occurred on November 14, 1992 (reference LER 311/92-016-00.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
T/S required actions were met for both events.
Also, control rod position was correct with only ARP! indication having drifted greater than +/- 12 steps; therefore, these events did not affect the health or safety of the public.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
The signal conditioning modules of the affected rods.were adjusted.
System Engineering has developed an ARP! trending data base to identify problem electronic modules.
The industry Rod Control User's Group has recognized an industry-wide problem with ARP! System drift.
Recommendations from this group and the ven.dors will be used to develop appropriate action.
MJPJ:pc SORC Mtg.
93~081 General Manager -
Salem Ope~ations
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| 05000311/LER-1993-001-01, :on 921209,under-frequency Protection for 2H 4 Kv Group Bus Unknowingly Inoperable Due to Mispositioned Test Switch.Caused by Personnel Error.Group UV & Uf Monthly Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 921209,under-frequency Protection for 2H 4 Kv Group Bus Unknowingly Inoperable Due to Mispositioned Test Switch.Caused by Personnel Error.Group UV & Uf Monthly Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1993-001, :on 930111,TS 3.0.3 Intentionally Entered Twice Due to Removal of Main & Auxiliary 115-volt Power Supply Fuses.Caused by Equipment Failure.Design Change Will Be Installed to Relocate Flange |
- on 930111,TS 3.0.3 Intentionally Entered Twice Due to Removal of Main & Auxiliary 115-volt Power Supply Fuses.Caused by Equipment Failure.Design Change Will Be Installed to Relocate Flange
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-002, :on 920116,manual Reactor Trip Initiated When 12 SGFP Tripped Due to Turbine Trip FW Isolation Signal. Caused by Equipment Failure.Faulty Turbine Bypass Sys Components Replaced |
- on 920116,manual Reactor Trip Initiated When 12 SGFP Tripped Due to Turbine Trip FW Isolation Signal. Caused by Equipment Failure.Faulty Turbine Bypass Sys Components Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-002-01, :on 930128,pumps Tripped on Low Suction Pressure.Caused by Equipment Failure.Loose SGFP Master Controller Test Jack Repaired & Other Jacks in SGFP Speed Control Loop Inspected & Repaired as Required |
- on 930128,pumps Tripped on Low Suction Pressure.Caused by Equipment Failure.Loose SGFP Master Controller Test Jack Repaired & Other Jacks in SGFP Speed Control Loop Inspected & Repaired as Required
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(ii) | | 05000311/LER-1993-003-01, :on 930131,level Indicator of 21 Bast Declared Inoperable Due to False High Level Indications.Caused by Design Construction/Installation.Design Change Will Be Developed to Reduce Bast Boron Concentration |
- on 930131,level Indicator of 21 Bast Declared Inoperable Due to False High Level Indications.Caused by Design Construction/Installation.Design Change Will Be Developed to Reduce Bast Boron Concentration
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-003, :on 930123 & 27,both Basts Declared Inoperable Due to Respective False High Level Indication.Cause by Bubbler Tube Blockage.Number 11 Bast Level Indicator Bubbler Tube Blown Down to Remove Blockage |
- on 930123 & 27,both Basts Declared Inoperable Due to Respective False High Level Indication.Cause by Bubbler Tube Blockage.Number 11 Bast Level Indicator Bubbler Tube Blown Down to Remove Blockage
| 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(v) 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(vii) 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(i) | | 05000311/LER-1993-004, :on 930206,both Main Turbine first-stage Impulse Pressure Indication Channels Indicated False Readings.Caused by Inadequate Sensing Line Protection. Failed Heat Tracing Will Be Repaired |
- on 930206,both Main Turbine first-stage Impulse Pressure Indication Channels Indicated False Readings.Caused by Inadequate Sensing Line Protection. Failed Heat Tracing Will Be Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-004-01, :on 930216,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Overtemperature Delta Temp Signal.Caused by Equipment Failure.Module Output Gain Selector Switch 1QM411B Cleaned & Exercised & Capacitors Replaced |
- on 930216,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Overtemperature Delta Temp Signal.Caused by Equipment Failure.Module Output Gain Selector Switch 1QM411B Cleaned & Exercised & Capacitors Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-005, :on 930218,experienced Reactor Protection Sys Reactor Trip/Turbine Trip Signal,When 12 SG Level Decreased. Caused by Personnel Error.Event Will Be Reviewed for Incorporation in Applicable Training Program |
- on 930218,experienced Reactor Protection Sys Reactor Trip/Turbine Trip Signal,When 12 SG Level Decreased. Caused by Personnel Error.Event Will Be Reviewed for Incorporation in Applicable Training Program
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-005-01, :on 930316,reactor Trip Occurred on 24 SG low-low Level.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Heater Drain Sys Level Control Booster Will Be Replaced |
- on 930316,reactor Trip Occurred on 24 SG low-low Level.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Heater Drain Sys Level Control Booster Will Be Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-006-01, :on 930415,unexpected Train a SI Sys Signal Occurred Due to Steam Line Differential Pressure.Caused by Operating Characteristics of Error Inhibit Switch.Procedures Re Manipulation of Switches Reviewed |
- on 930415,unexpected Train a SI Sys Signal Occurred Due to Steam Line Differential Pressure.Caused by Operating Characteristics of Error Inhibit Switch.Procedures Re Manipulation of Switches Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-006, :on 930221,station Power Transformers 12 & 22 Deenergized Due to Tripping of Common 13 Kv Ring Bus Section 4 Breakers & 500 Kv Section 1 Breakers.Caused by Inadequate Communication.Caution Tags Hung on Breakers |
- on 930221,station Power Transformers 12 & 22 Deenergized Due to Tripping of Common 13 Kv Ring Bus Section 4 Breakers & 500 Kv Section 1 Breakers.Caused by Inadequate Communication.Caution Tags Hung on Breakers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1993-007, :on 930225,initial Investigation Indicated High Resistance Readings at Coil Stacks Resulting to TS 3.0.3 Entry.Caused by Sys Design.Review of Event in Progress & C/A Will Be Implemented Based on Results |
- on 930225,initial Investigation Indicated High Resistance Readings at Coil Stacks Resulting to TS 3.0.3 Entry.Caused by Sys Design.Review of Event in Progress & C/A Will Be Implemented Based on Results
| | | 05000311/LER-1993-007-01, :on 930528,all Four Rods of Control Rod Bank C, Group 1 Unexpectedly Dropped Fully Into Reactor Core.Caused by Degraded Signal from Regulation Board.Card Replaced & Firing Circuit Satisfactorily Tested |
- on 930528,all Four Rods of Control Rod Bank C, Group 1 Unexpectedly Dropped Fully Into Reactor Core.Caused by Degraded Signal from Regulation Board.Card Replaced & Firing Circuit Satisfactorily Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-008-01, :on 930527,determined That Postulated Single Failure Concern Existed Where Failure of One Rod Control Sys Slave Cycler Decoder Card,In Conjunction W/Rod Motion Command Signal May Cause Rcca Withdrawal |
- on 930527,determined That Postulated Single Failure Concern Existed Where Failure of One Rod Control Sys Slave Cycler Decoder Card,In Conjunction W/Rod Motion Command Signal May Cause Rcca Withdrawal
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(i)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1993-008, :on 930304,determined That Design of Control Air Sys Containment Outboard Isolation air-operated Valves Inconsistent W/Description in Updated Fsar.Caused by Design/ Mfg Defect.Documentation Will Be Revised |
- on 930304,determined That Design of Control Air Sys Containment Outboard Isolation air-operated Valves Inconsistent W/Description in Updated Fsar.Caused by Design/ Mfg Defect.Documentation Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1993-008, :on 930527,control Rod 1SA3 Withdrew to Approx 15 Steps from Fully Inserted in Response to Manual Insertion Command Due to Failure of Integrated Circuit Chips.Emergency License Amend Requested on 930617 |
- on 930527,control Rod 1SA3 Withdrew to Approx 15 Steps from Fully Inserted in Response to Manual Insertion Command Due to Failure of Integrated Circuit Chips.Emergency License Amend Requested on 930617
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | | 05000311/LER-1993-009-01, :on 930629,automatic Start of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency. Troubleshooting Procedures Developed |
- on 930629,automatic Start of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency. Troubleshooting Procedures Developed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-010-01, :on 930629,reactor Shutdown Initiated Per TS 3.0.3 Due to Inoperability of More than One Control Rod Analog Rod Position Indication Per Control Bank.Signal Conditioning Modules of Affected Rods Adjusted |
- on 930629,reactor Shutdown Initiated Per TS 3.0.3 Due to Inoperability of More than One Control Rod Analog Rod Position Indication Per Control Bank.Signal Conditioning Modules of Affected Rods Adjusted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-010, :on 930407,determined That Svc Water Flow Through DG Jacket Water & Lube Oil Coolers Less than Design Requirement of 700 Gpm.Caused by Design/Mfg Deficiency. Proper Setpoint Developed & Verified |
- on 930407,determined That Svc Water Flow Through DG Jacket Water & Lube Oil Coolers Less than Design Requirement of 700 Gpm.Caused by Design/Mfg Deficiency. Proper Setpoint Developed & Verified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000311/LER-1993-010, :on 930629 & 30,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to More than One Inoperable Analog Rod Position Indicator Per Bank. Caused by Sys Design.Signal Conditioning Modules of Affected Rods Adjusted |
- on 930629 & 30,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to More than One Inoperable Analog Rod Position Indicator Per Bank. Caused by Sys Design.Signal Conditioning Modules of Affected Rods Adjusted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1993-011, :on 931019,RMS Channels 2R13 A,B,C Were Inoperable Due to Efficiency Being Adjusted to Reduced Level.Implemented Design Changes & 2R13 A,B, & C Were Calibrated & Returned to Service |
- on 931019,RMS Channels 2R13 A,B,C Were Inoperable Due to Efficiency Being Adjusted to Reduced Level.Implemented Design Changes & 2R13 A,B, & C Were Calibrated & Returned to Service
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1993-011-01, :on 931019,inoperability of Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitors Discovered Due to Use of Incorrect Source Decay Tables Values.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Channels 2R19A,B,C & D Recalibrated |
- on 931019,inoperability of Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitors Discovered Due to Use of Incorrect Source Decay Tables Values.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Channels 2R19A,B,C & D Recalibrated
| | | 05000272/LER-1993-011, :on 930608,automatic Reactor Trip from 85% Power Occurred Due to Main Turbine Trip from Low Condenser Vacuum & P-9 Trip Permissive.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency. Circulating Water Intake Structure Dredged |
- on 930608,automatic Reactor Trip from 85% Power Occurred Due to Main Turbine Trip from Low Condenser Vacuum & P-9 Trip Permissive.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency. Circulating Water Intake Structure Dredged
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-012-01, :on 931030,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperability of 21 Bast Level Indication While 22 Bast Out of Svc.Caused by Design Deficiency.Design Change Installed |
- on 931030,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperability of 21 Bast Level Indication While 22 Bast Out of Svc.Caused by Design Deficiency.Design Change Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-012, :on 930609,vital Bus 1C Sensed Undervoltage Condition,Resulting in Automatic Start & Blackout Loading of DG 1C.Caused by Inattention to Detail on Part of Personnel. Positive Disciplinary Action Completed |
- on 930609,vital Bus 1C Sensed Undervoltage Condition,Resulting in Automatic Start & Blackout Loading of DG 1C.Caused by Inattention to Detail on Part of Personnel. Positive Disciplinary Action Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-013, :on 930711,experienced Reactor/Turbine Trip Signal Due to Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch.Caused by Inattention to Detail.Operations Personnel Disciplined |
- on 930711,experienced Reactor/Turbine Trip Signal Due to Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch.Caused by Inattention to Detail.Operations Personnel Disciplined
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1993-013-01, :on 931202,DG 2C Declared Inoperable Due to Cracking in 3R Cylinder Liner.All Cylinder Liners Installed in 2C & 1B DGs Inspected & Previously Installed Canadian Allied Diesel Liners Replaced W/Alco Liners |
- on 931202,DG 2C Declared Inoperable Due to Cracking in 3R Cylinder Liner.All Cylinder Liners Installed in 2C & 1B DGs Inspected & Previously Installed Canadian Allied Diesel Liners Replaced W/Alco Liners
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000272/LER-1993-014-01, :on 930722,concern Raised Re 4 Kv Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage Protection Dropout Setpoint Due to Design,Mfg,Const/Installation.Analysis of Event Continuing. Suppl LER Will Be Submitted |
- on 930722,concern Raised Re 4 Kv Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage Protection Dropout Setpoint Due to Design,Mfg,Const/Installation.Analysis of Event Continuing. Suppl LER Will Be Submitted
| | | 05000272/LER-1993-014, :on 930722,determine 4 Kv Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage Protection Dropout Setpoint Would Not Protect Motors.Detailed Study Showed Motors Would Have Performed Intended Safety Functions |
- on 930722,determine 4 Kv Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage Protection Dropout Setpoint Would Not Protect Motors.Detailed Study Showed Motors Would Have Performed Intended Safety Functions
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000311/LER-1993-014-01, :on 931228,ESF Actuation & Resultant & Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Sys Channel 1 Actuation Occurred.Caused by Defective Procedure.Slave Relay Surveillance Procedures Revised |
- on 931228,ESF Actuation & Resultant & Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Sys Channel 1 Actuation Occurred.Caused by Defective Procedure.Slave Relay Surveillance Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-015, :on 930913 & 16,BAST 12 Level Indicator Declared Inoperable Due to False Level Indications.Caused by Design of Bast Level Indication Sys.Design Change to Reduce Boron Concentration Will Be Implemented |
- on 930913 & 16,BAST 12 Level Indicator Declared Inoperable Due to False Level Indications.Caused by Design of Bast Level Indication Sys.Design Change to Reduce Boron Concentration Will Be Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-016, :on 931021,ESF Actuation Occurred Due to Electrical Short within 4 Kv Switchgear.Caused by Personnel Error Associated W/Ongoing Relay Maint Activities.Imposed Vital Bus & Switchyard Work Standdown |
- on 931021,ESF Actuation Occurred Due to Electrical Short within 4 Kv Switchgear.Caused by Personnel Error Associated W/Ongoing Relay Maint Activities.Imposed Vital Bus & Switchyard Work Standdown
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-017, :on 931106,infeed Breaker 13BSD from Station Power Transformer (Spt) 13 Failed to Close Due to Personnel Error.Discipline in Accordance W/Util Positive Discipline Program Conducted |
- on 931106,infeed Breaker 13BSD from Station Power Transformer (Spt) 13 Failed to Close Due to Personnel Error.Discipline in Accordance W/Util Positive Discipline Program Conducted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-018, :on 931203,determined That Monthly Testing of Ssps Containment Pressure Hi Hi Input Channels Did Not Verify That Ssps Input Circuit Path Reclosed.Applicable Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 931203,determined That Monthly Testing of Ssps Containment Pressure Hi Hi Input Channels Did Not Verify That Ssps Input Circuit Path Reclosed.Applicable Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1993-019, :on 931203,TS Action Statement Entered Due to Waste Gas Holdup Sys Oxygen Concentration Being Greater than 2% for More than 48 H.Oxygen Concentration within Waste Gas Sys Reduced to Less than 2% on 931212 |
- on 931203,TS Action Statement Entered Due to Waste Gas Holdup Sys Oxygen Concentration Being Greater than 2% for More than 48 H.Oxygen Concentration within Waste Gas Sys Reduced to Less than 2% on 931212
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-020, :on 931223,RCS Accumulator Upper Range Level Indication Inaccuracies Affecting Units 1 & 2 Identified. Caused by Use of Incorrect Original Scaling Factors. Accumulators on Both Units Correctly Rescaled |
- on 931223,RCS Accumulator Upper Range Level Indication Inaccuracies Affecting Units 1 & 2 Identified. Caused by Use of Incorrect Original Scaling Factors. Accumulators on Both Units Correctly Rescaled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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