ML18100A563

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Proposed Tech Specs 4.8.2.3.2 Re Enforcement Discretion
ML18100A563
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 08/24/1993
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML18100A562 List:
References
NUDOCS 9309010082
Download: ML18100A563 (30)


Text

/

NLR-N93142 ATTACHMENT A I.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.8.2.3.2 (B)

( 1)

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3,4 Surveillance requires that:

At least once per 92 days verify that the voltage of each connected cell is greater than or equal to 2.13 volts under float charge and has not decreased more*

than 0.27 volts from the value observed during the original acceptance test.

II.

SUMMARY

OF CURRENT SITUATION The specified quarterly surveillance was conducted on August 19, 1993.

At that time, one cell (no.47) of a sixty cell battery had a voltage below the required value of 2.13 volts.

The associated battery was declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS) was entered.

The affected cell was placed on an individual charger (as specified in plant procedures) to restore cell voltage.

Approximately (4) hours later, the individual cell charger was removed and the cell was placed on float charge.

The cell voltage was verified greater than 2.13 volts and the TSAS was terminated.

PSE&G consulted the battery vendor (C&D) to discuss this situation.

The vendor concluded that one cell could have a degraded charge and recommended that we continue with the individual cell charge for a period of several days.

The individual cell charger was reinstalled and hourly cell voltage readings were taken.

Plant personnel continued to evaluate the cell and battery status with respect to Technical Specification operability.

Battery design capability with the remaining 59 cells was confirmed and documented in an Engineering Evaluation (Attachment B).

However, there was concern with Technical Specification compliance regarding the statement that all connected cells remain at or above 2.13 volts.

Jumpering out the degraded cell would have resolved the problem, however, this action requires disconnecting the entire battery from the bus/battery charger while completing the single cell jumpering.

During this period when the battery charger is supplying the DC bus without the normal battery load, a loss of battery charger or excessive output fluctuations (charger is not designed to operate independent of the battery) could result in a plant trip.

~-------------

9309010082 930824 PDR ADOCK 05000272 P

PDR

I 2

fluctuations (charger is not designed to operate independent of the battery) could result in a plant trip.

A conference call was conducted on August 23, to discuss PSE&G actions and the possibility of requesting Enforcement Discretion should the individual cell voltage drop below 2.13 volts.

PSE&G had disconnected the individual cell charger and increased float voltage to 135 volts (allowable range is 132-135 volts).

This action was maintaining cell voltage above 2.13 volts while on the float charge.

Affected cell voltage readings were recorded through the night.

At 7:04 AM on August 24, the affected cell voltage dropped below the 2.13 volt limit and the associated TSAS was entered.

Since the arrival of the new replacement cell was imminent, jumpering the degraded cell could result in a plant trip, and compliance with the existing TSAS would require a plant shutdown, a decision was made to seek Enforcement Discretion.

PSE&G conducted a conference call with NRC Regional and NRR representatives to formally request Enforcement Discretion for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period beginning at 9:04 AM on August 24, 1993.

III. JUSTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REQUEST PSE&G evaluated whether the remaining 59 cells could meet the design limits of the 125 volt battery.

Assuming that the remaining lC 125 VDC battery cells meet the specific gravity and cell voltage requirements, with a normal float voltage of 2.13 volts per cell, 2.13 times 59 cells yields 125.67 volts which meets the Technical Specifications requirements for the overall battery.

The minimum voltage required at vital equipment terminals for a design basis 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> discharge rate is 105 volts.

When the full battery design (60 cells) is considered, 4 loads do not pass the 105 volt criteria.

These loads have been previously justified and accepted through Engineering Evaluations.

For a lC 125 VDC loading of 749 amps (0-1 minute) and 337 amps (1-120 minutes), the minimum battery terminal voltage at the end of the battery load cycle will be 1.88 volts per cell.

Therefore, voltage drop calculations were analyzed at 110.92 volts (l.88 volts per cell x 59 cells).

When 59 cells are considered, three additional loads fall below the 105 volt criteria.

Two of these loads are non-lE (500 KV circuit switcher 1T60 and the oscillograph).

The third load is the solenoids associated with 11 & 12 feedwater control and feedwater control bypass valves.

These feedwater solenoid valves are not required to be energized during an accident response.

l,

2.

fluctuations (charger is not designed to operate independent of the battery) could result in a plant trip.

A conference call was conducted on August 23, to discuss PSE&G actions and the possibility of requesting Enforcement Discretion should the individual cell voltage drop below 2.13 volts.

PSE&G had disconnected t~e individual cell charger and increased float voltage to 135 volts (allowable range is 132-135 volts).

This action was maintaining cell voltage above 2.13 volts while on the float charge.

Affected cell voltage readings were recorded through the night.

At 7:04 AM on August 24, the affected cell voltage dropped below the 2.13 volt limit and the associated TSAS was entered.

Since the arrival of the new replacement cell was imminent, jumpering the degraded cell could result in a plant trip, and compliance with the existing TSAS would require a plant shutdown, a decision was made to seek Enforcement Discretion.

PSE&G conducted a conference call with NRC Regional and NRR representatives to formally request Enforcement Discretion for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period beginning at 9:04 AM on August 24, 1993.

III. JUSTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REQUEST PSE&G evaluated whether the remaining 59 cells could meet the design limits of the 125 volt battery.

Assuming that the remaining lC 125 VDC battery cells meet the specific gravity and cell voltage requirements, with a normal float voltage of 2.13 volts per cell, 2.13 times 59 cells yields 125.67 volts which meets the Technical Specifications requirements for the overall battery.

The minimum voltage required at vital equipment terminals for a design basis 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> discharge rate is 105 volts.

When the full battery design (60 cells) is considered, 4 loads do not pass the 105 volt criteria.

These loads have been previously justified and accepted through Engineering Evaluations.

For a lC 125 VDC loading of 749 amps (0-1 minute) and 337 amps (1-120 minutes), the minimum battery terminal voltage at the end of the battery load cycle will be 1.88 volts per cell.

Therefore, voltage drop calculations were analyzed at 110.92 volts (1.88 volts per cell x 59 cells).

When 59 cells are considered, three additional loads fall below the 105 volt criteria.

Two of these loads are non-lE (500 KV circuit switcher 1T60 and the oscillograph).

The third load is the solenoids associated with 11 & 12 feedwater control and feedwater control bypass valves.

These feedwater solenoid valves are not required to be energized during an accident response.

3 A telephone conference was conducted with the battery manufacturer (C&D) to determine any detrimental affects on the overall battery with this degraded cell remaining in the circuit.

The vendor stated that the 125 VDC system is capable of supporting an emergency discharge with the degraded cell still in place, and that it is not detrimental to the system.

Although degraded, the cell will still contribute to battery output and will not degrade to the point of b~ing a load during the time in question (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period).

PSE&G intends to parallel the new replacement cell prior to disconnecting the degraded cell.

This action maintains the battery as a load on the installed charger and minimizes the probability of bus loss during the maintenance evolution.

The battery room area has been pre-staged to support the cell changeout and minimize the time required to complete the changeout.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS The 125 VDC battery can accomplish all of its design functions with the remaining 59 cells.

Leaving the degraded cell connected to the battery will not impact the ability of the remaining 59 cells to accomplish the overall battery design function.

since the battery can still accomplish its design function, PSE&G does not consider this a significant safety issue that would adversely affect the public health and safety.

Additionally, all accident requirements are met such that postulated offsite releases and other environmental consequences are not adversely affected.

Based on the information presented above, PSE&G believes that we have met all the requirements for Enforcement Discretion.

ATTACHMENT B

Engineering Evaluation For Salem Unit 1 lC Vital 125 VDC Battery Continued Operation Alo.

S - I - 12 5 - E~£ - o "iii,;~

1. 0. SCOPE:

This evaluation will analyze the 1c Vital 125 voe Batteries for continued use with only fifty nine (59) battery cells meeting technical specification in reguards to cell voltage measurements (one cell registering lower than tech spec float voltage). Battery voltage, system voltage drop, and battery capacity are key elements for the analysis in meeting design basis operation.

2.0 PURPOSE

To insure all vital loads fed from the lC 125 VOC Battery System are operable with a reduced battery voltage (with out taking credit of voltage contribution from the degraded cell).

3.0 REFERENCES

Salem Unit 1 Tech. Specification; Sections 3.8.2.3 & 4.8.2.3.1 Calculation ES-4.003 PSBP 309448-e & O Battery Operation Manual

4.0 EVALUATION

Salem Vital 1e 125 voe Battery systems must meet the following Technical Specification 4.8.2.3.2 (b-1) for a

quarterly surveillance:

f The voltage of each connected cell is ~ 2.13 volts under float charge.

However, cell no. 47 showed voltage degradation and didn't meet the 2.13 volt criteria.

Also, the lC 125 voe Battery system at a reduced cell count of fifty nine cells must maintain proper voltage at the vital load terminals at a design basis discharge rate:

f minimum voltage at vital equipment terminals ~ 105 volts for a design basis discharge rate of 2 hrs Assuminq that the remaining lC 125 voe battery cells (e&o LC-33 type) meet the specific gravity and cell voltage requirements, the remaining areas require analysis; overall battery voltage, voltage drop.

lC 125 VDC Battery Overall Voltage:

Normal float voltage for lC batteries is 2.13 volts per cell.

Therefore, 2.13 volts/cell x 59 cells = 125.67 volts, which will meet technical specifications.

1c 125 voe Voltage Drop:

For lC 125 voe loading of 749 Amps (0-1 minute) and 337 Amps (1-120 minutes) the minimum battery terminal voltage at end of battery load cycle will be 1.88 volts/cell. Therefore, voltage drop calculation are analyzed at 110.92 volts (1.88 volts/cell x 59 cells). In accordance with Attachment No. 1, all lC loads pass the 105 volt criteria except the following:

PANEL CIRCUIT lCDC 5

lCDC 34 lCDC 35-lCDC 42 lCCDC 24 lCCDC 32 lCCDC 36 DESCRIPTION 500 KV CB 20X & 21X CONTROL & PROTECTION TRANSIENT DATA REC.

500 KV CIRCUIT SWITCHER 1T60 OSCILLOGRAPH RELAY ROOM 11,12 SCFW CTL &

BYPASS VALVE lC DG CTL & FIELD EXCITATION lC DG ALARMS JUSTIFICATION S-C-125-EEE-0275 (ATTACHMENT 2 )

S-C-125-EEE-0275 ATTACHMENT 2 NON-lE, MANUAL OPERATION AVAIL.

NON-lE, NOT REQ.

FOR OPERATION IN DESIGN BAS. EVENT I & C EVALUATION ATTACHMENT 3 S-C-125-EEE-0275 ATTACHMENT 2 s-c~125-EEE-0275 ATTACHMENT 2 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH BATTERY MANUFACTURER:

c & D, the battery manufacture, stated that the 125 voe system is capable of supporting an emergency discharge with the degraded cell still inplace and it will not be a detrimental to the system.

COMPENSATORY MEASURES:

Degraded cell voltage shall be monitored Degraded cell shall be replaced at the earliest time frame to correct this situation SAFETY EVALUATION:

The above evaluation on the lC 125 VDC Battery System confirms that all system required for plant operation will perform as intended.

This reduced voltage battery operation does not create the possibility of any potential safety hazard.

7-2l-'i1

e 4777+c/i~f7-f.lr - i PSE&G SALEM NGS UNIT N0.1 1C*125VDC BATTERY SYSTEM VOLTAGE PROFILE CALCULATION

SUMMARY

1C - 125 voe BUS" 74 Conductor T~rature (Deg. C) 1 Min 1 Min 1 Min 120 Min 120 Min 120 Min Notes 125 Load Rated Voltage CV)

Sending Cable Receiving Sending cable Receiving and 110.92 Battery Terminal Voltage CV>

End Current End End current End C011111ents Voltage Voltage Voltage Voltage Item No.

Load/Cable Description (VOLTS)

CAMPS)

(VOLTS)

(VOLTS)

CAMPS)

(VOLTS) 00 Battery Internal Resistance 110. 92 648. 195 110.92 110.92 283.218 110.92 0

Battery 1"C Cable 110. 92 648.195 110.20 110.92 283.218 110.61 1

  1. 11&12 STA ESSENTIAL CTL INVTR 110.20 125.300 109.53 110.61 0.000 110.61 2

SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 3

  1. 1C VITAL INST INVTR (10 KVA) 110.20 124.698 109.00 110.61 0.000 110.61 4

ALT SHUTDCNN DIST PNL 1ASDS 110.20 123.824 109.49 110.61 0.018 110.61 5

  1. 1C1 BATTERY CHARGER 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 6
  1. 1C2 BATTERY CHARGER 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 7

FUTURE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 8

FUTURE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 9

SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 10 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 o.ooo 110.61 11

  1. 13 EMERG LTG INV TR CS KVA) 110.20 49.252 109.94 110.61 49.432 110.34 12 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 13 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 14 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 15 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 16 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 119.61 0.000 110.61 17 GROUND DETECTION 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 18 UV RELAY & VOLTM 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 19 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 20 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 21 1CCDC*125VDC DISTR CAB 110.20 74.531 107.62 110.61 28.394 109.62 I 22 1CDCDG*125VDC DISTR CAB*EMER 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 23 GROUND DETECTION 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 24 SPARE 110.20 o.ooo 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 25 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 26 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 27 1COC*125VDC OISTR CAB 110.20 49.651 109.58 110.61 192.077 108.20 I 28 (1DDC DISTRIBUTION CAB
  • EMER) 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 29 SPARE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 30 SPARE 110.20 o.ooo 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 31 SPDS COMPUTER INTRF RACK C 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 32 1C-4160V VITAL BUS 110.20 49.155 108.56 110.61 7.011 110.31 I 33 SPAii 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 34 FU'Aa 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 35 FU'nlll-110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 36 runm 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 37 1C*460V VITAL BUI'.

110.20

51. 784 108.19 110.61 6.286 110.36 I 38 FUTURE 110.20 0.000 110.20 110.61 0.000 110.61 I NOTES: SEE PAGE 1.

EBASCO I JRG I VDS1C125.WIC1 CAL~~lAllQll S*C*EOOO*EDC-0129*0, ATTACHMENT 1C*1

e PSE&G SALEM NGS UNIT N0.1 1C*125VOC BATTERY SYSTEM VOLTAGE PROFILE CALCULATION

SUMMARY

1CDC-125VOC DISTR.CAB 74 Conductor T~rature <Deg. C) 1 Min 1 Min 1 Min 120 Min 120 Min 120 Min I Notes 125 Load Rated Voltage (V) sending Cable Receiving Sending Cable Receiving I and 110.92 Battery Terminal Voltage (V)

End Current End End Current End I Co11111ents Voltage Voltage Voltage Voltage I Item No.

Load/Cable Description (VOLTS)

(AMPS)

(VOLTS)

(VOLTS)

(AMPS)

(VOLTS) I 1CDC*125VDC DISTR CAB 110.20 49.651 109.58 110.61 192.077 108.20 I 1

SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 I 2

SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 I 3

CARRIER EQUIP 500KV SWYD 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 loK Ao~

4 SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 5

500KV CB 20X & 21X CTL & PROT 109.58 10.545 107.52 108.20 25.733

~

' 9, 11 6

SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 7

REG RELAY PANEL, DC TEST 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 8

SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 9

4KV SWGR INSP BOX 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20

. 0.000 108.20 10 11X BKR CTL REG,RMTE TRIP XMTR 109.58 6.354 108.65 108.20 14.194 106. 12 11

  1. 11 13/4KV MULTI TRIP 109.58 0.044 109.54 108.20 0.000 108.20 12
  1. 1 GEN OVERALL DIFF (REG) 109.58 0.515 109.13 108.20 0.466 107.80 13
  1. 12 13/4icv MULTI TRIP 109.58 0.044 109.54 108.20 0.000 108.20 14
  1. 1 GEN MAIN XFMR COOLING 109.58 0.044 109.54 108.20 0.000 108.20.

15 REMOTE CTL CAB AUX

  • 109.58 10.215 106.40 108.20 10.086 105.06 16 1G 4KV GRP BUS BKR FAIL 12GSD 109.58 0.044 109.55 108.20 0.000 108.20 17
  1. 11 SGFP, TURB, & EO PP CTL 109.58 0~898 108.95 108.20 0.156 108.09 18 1G 4KV GRP BUS BKR FAIL 1BGGD 109.58 0.044 109.55 108.20 0.000 108.20 19 DEMIN MAKE-UP SYS ANNUNCIATORS 109.58 1.181 108.53 108.20
1. 166 107.16 20 STATOR COOLING WATER PUMP CTL 109.58 0.175 109.49 108.20 0.156 108.12 21 SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 22 SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 23 SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 24 SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 25 SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 26 SPAR!:

109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 27 SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 28 SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 29 SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 30 11A-15C LPFW HTR INLET VLVS 109.58

2. 195 108.02 108.20 1.500 107. 14 31 SPARE 109.58 o.ooo 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 32 11A-15C LPFW HTRS BYPASS VLVS 109.58 0.489 109.24 108.20 0.268 108.01
r.

t{.._

33

  1. 1 STA PWR XFMR DIFF RELAY 109.58 0.044 109.57 108.20 0.043 108.19 :"IK \\)1 34 TRANSIENT DATA RECCllDER 109.58 9.681

~

108.20 9.559

.99.57 I l 8, 9 35 500KV CIRCUIT SWITCHER 1T60 109.58 0.158 109.58 108.20 122.890 9 11

~ 1,tf--2-G-~.

36 MISC RESIN VALVES;c 109.58 0.770 108.21 108.20 0.558 101.21 I '

-!W\\~ _s<>11TGll 37 16A*16C HPFW INLlt"IYPASS VLV 109.58 0.245 109.41 108.20 0.029 108.1a I o.,cn.JL11)A 38 SAMPLING VALVES 109.58 1.183 107.14 108.20 0.759 106.64 I 39 STAND PIPE SUP & SEAL LICOFF VLV 109.58 0.271 109.39 108.20 0.059 108.16 I 40 UNDER VOLTAGE ALARM RELAY 109.58 0.158 109.58 108.20 0.156 108.20 }~

'\\

41 SPARE 109.58 0.000 109.58 108.20 0.000 108.20 r'

('/'f.

42 OSCILLOGRAPH RELAY ROOM 109.58 4.355

. t04.70 108.20 4.301 mr::m~.)

NOTES: See Page 1.

EBASCO I JRG I VDS1C125.WIC1 CALC\\JLATIOlll S*C*EOOO*EDC-0129*0, ATTACHMENT 1C*1

PSE&G SALEM NGS UNIT N0.1 lCCDC DISTRIBUTION CABINET 74 Conductor T~rature (Deg. C) 125 Load Rated Voltage CV) 110.92 Battery Terminal Voltage CV)

Item No.

Load/Cable Description 1CCOC DISTRIBUTION CABINET 1

AUX BLOG VENT#11 SUPPLY UNIT 2

POST LOCA SAMP SYS ISOL VLVS 3

TRAIN A & B SEC BLOCK 4

SPARE 5

AUX BLO VENT EXH FLTR DAMP CTL 6

SPARE 7

FH AREA VT EXH FLTR DAMP CTL B

DAMPER CTL IN 11,12&13 SW !NTK 9

CONT PRES VAC RLF INS VLV CTL 10 CHARGING ISO VLV 1CV79 TO RCS 11 ST VNT VLV & TEMP ALMS CNES) 12

  1. 13 FAN COIL UNIT FLTR DAMP CTL 13 MISC VLVS 14

'#13 FAN COIL WTR VLV CTL 15 MISC VLVS 16

  1. 15 FAN COIL FLTR OMP CTL 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 VLVS 13SJ93,-58,-27,-57 & -20
  1. 15 FAN COIL UNIT WTR VLV CTL SPARE VLVS 1SJ19,-79,-30,-40, & -69, SPARE SPARE
  1. 13 AUX FEED PUMP CONTROL
  1. 11, 12 SGFW IN CTL & BYPASS VLV
  1. 12 CH PP LO COOL IN CTL VLV
  1. 11-14 SG MAIN ST STOP VLVS
  1. 12,SI PP LO COOL IN CTL VLV
  1. 11&12 SG MAIN ST DRAIN VLVS HIGH RADIATION ALARMS
  1. 11 SGFP & TURBINE CTL 230V VITAL BUS 1C CTL 1C DG CTL & FIELD EXC
  1. 11-14 SG BLOY>Clll ISO VLV 1C DIESEL GEN UlllT TRIPS STEAM DUMP VLVS 1C DG ALARMS RAD MONT #11&12 CTt,.. VLV CONTROL RCDI DAMPD
  1. 13 MAIN ST SVLV HYD PP

!SOL VLV 1SJ67 INDICATION

  1. 14 MAIN STEAM SVLV PUMP UNDER VOLTAGE ALARM RELAY NOTES: See Page 1.

EBASCO I JRG I VOS1C125.WIC1 1C-125VDC BATTERY SYSTEM VOLTAGE PROFILE CALCULATION

SUMMARY

1 Min 1 Min 1 Min 120 Min 120 Min 120 Min Notes Sending Cable Receiving Sending Cable Receiving and End current End End Current End Corrments Voltage (VOLTS)

CAMPS) 110.20 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 74.531 0.418 2.181 0.592 0.000 1.625 0.000 0.447 0.630 0.430 0.241 0.856 0.499 1.676 1.240 0.849 0.706 0.806 1.240 0.000 0.542 0.000 0.000 0.892 1.032 0.215 2.387 0.215 2.581 1.229 2.721 1.080 32.983 0.695 0.503 3.740 4.543 1.483 1.579 0.798 0.060 0.798 0.017 Voltage (VOLTS)

Voltage Voltage (VOLTS)

(AMPS)

(VOLTS) 107.62 106.76 106.06 107.18 107.62 106.92 107.62 107.43 106.46 107.44 107.62 106.97 107.61 110.61 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 106.89 109.62 107.60 109.62 107.25 109.62 107.61 109.62 107.16 107.60 107.62 107.61 107.62 107.62 107.24

~;9t,.

107.53 106.58 107.53 106.49 106.68 105.96 107.10

~*

107.32 106.60 106.01

~

106.56 106.66 107.27 107.58 107.27 107.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 28.394 0.218 1.554 0.559 0.000 0.987 0.000 0.219 0.218 0.202 0.026 0.663 0.403 1.152 0.815 0.569 0.403 0.394 0.815 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.595 0.639 0.000 2.010 0.000 2.423 0.655 2.132 1.100 0.000 0.490 0.469

  • 1.924 3.116 0.881 1.142 0.604 0.061 0.604 0.018 109.62 109.17 108.51 109.21 109.62 109.20 109.62 109.53 109.22 109.54 109.62 109.12 109.62 109.12 109.6't 109.37 109.62 109.40 109.61 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62

~__.

109.37 t ~~ )

107.94'. J' 8 /*'

109.62~

108.75 I 109.62 I 108.57 I 109. 12 I 108.32 I 109. 10 I 109.62 10~ 6'~

109.41 I 108.67 I

~

108.80 I

~rf' I IA j",/ (JI*

  • 11JI*t 01. 9 108.99 I 1os.93 I 109.36 I 109.58 I 109.36 I 109.62 I CALC\\AATIOll S*C*EOOO-EDC-0129-0, ATTACHMENT 1C-1

PSE&G SALEM NGS UNIT N0.1 1CDCDG DISTRIBUTION CABINET 74 Conductor T~rature (Deg. C) 125 Load Rated Voltage (V) 110.92 Battery Terminal Voltage CV)

Item No.

Load/Cable Description 1C-125VDC BATTERY SYSTEM VOLTAGE PROFILE CALCULATION

SUMMARY

1 Min Sending End Voltage (VOLTS) 1 Min Cable current CAMPS) 1 Min Receiving End Voltage (VOLTS) 120 Min 120 Min 120 Min I Notes Sending Cable Receiving I and End Current End I Conments Voltage Voltage I (VOLTS)

CAMPS)

(VOLTS) I 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 1CDCDG DISTRIBUTION CABINET STANDBY POWER ON 1A DG UNIT TRIP & BKR FAIL PROT 1A DG CTL & EXCITATION 1A DG CTL & ALARM 1B DG CTL & EXCITATION 1B DG UNIT TRIP & BKR FAIL PROT 1C DG CTL & ALARM 1B DG CTL & ALARM 1C DG CTL & EXCITATION 1C DG UNIT TRIP & BKR FAIL PROT NOTES: See Page 1.

EBASCO I JRG I VDS1C125.WK1 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 110.61 1 110.61 1 110.61 1 110.61 1 110.61 I 110.61 I 110.61 I 110.61 1 110.61 I 110.61 1 110.61 I CALOJlATION S-C-EOOO-EDC-0129-0, ATTACHMENT 1C-1

PSE&G SALEM NGS UNIT N0.1 1C-125VDC BATTERY SYSTEM VOLTAGE PROFILE CALCULATION

SUMMARY

ALT SHUTDOWN DIST PNt 1ASDS 74 Conductor T~rature (Deg. C) 1 Min 1 Min 1 Min 12D Min 120 Min 120 Min I Notes 125 Load Rated Voltage CV)

Sending Cable Receiving Sending Cable Receiving I and 110.92 Battery Terminal Voltage CV)

End Current End End Current End I Conmen ts Voltage Voltage Voltage Voltage I Item No.

Load/Cable Description (VOLTS)

CAMPS)

(VOLTS)

(VOLTS)

CAMPS)

(VOLTS) I ALT SHUTDOWN DIST PNL 1ASOS 110.20 123.824 109.49 110.61 0.018 110.61 I 1ASDS 15KVA INVERTER 109.49 123.807 108.22 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 2

SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 I 3

1ASDS 125V UV ALARM 109.49 0.018 109.49 110.61 0.018 110.61 I 4

SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110. 61 I 5

SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 6

SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 7

SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 8

SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 9

SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 10 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 11 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 12 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 13 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 14 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.6t 15 SPARE "109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 16 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 17 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 NOTES: SEE PAGE 1.

NOTES: See Page 1.

EBASCO I JRG I VDS1C125.WIC1 CA*:*_, a* :cm S*C*E000-EDC*0129~0, ATTACHMENT 1C*1

PS Ii<!

S-C-125-E~E-0275-C

]9L

~a~~a;~ 2-L 198'.1 4fr,4.q+ - z

=

TITLE: uc,~U m~G EVALUATION OF THE SAFETY-RELATED 125 VDC ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS WITH UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITIONS FOR SALEM GENERATING STATION 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this Enqineering Evaluation is to assess the safety significance of the identified undervoltage conditions persistinq in certain 125 VDC circuits as documented in calculation no. S-C-EOOO-EDC-0129-0, dated 12/19/88 for Salem Generating Station -

Units 1 & 2.

This undervoltage condition was realized durinq 0-1 and 1-120 Minutes followinq a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurrinq concurrently with a loss of Offsite Power (Loop) and a loss ot essential power supplies to all battery chargers.

2.0 SCOPE The scope of this evaluation is limited to a few discrepant circuits identified in Attachment 1, across which the voltage is reported to be below the minimum acceptable* operating voltage (ie 105 volts) of the components.

Where appropriate, each circuit is analyzed qualitatively to assess the effects of a transient and/or sustained undervoltage conditions persisting during the two time frames (ie, 0-1 Min. & 1-120 Min).

Resolutions with disposition notes are provided for each discrepant circuit.

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1 NRC Inspection No. 50-272/87-351 50-311/87-35 conducted on Nov. 30 to December 4, 1987.

3.2 Calcuation No.

S-C-EOOO-EDC-0129-0~ dated 12/19/88, "125VDC System Study."

3.3 Memorandum No. ELE-88-0243, dated July 25, 1988 from V~ J. Polizzi to M. Metcalf.

3.4 IEEE std. 141-1976, IEEE Recommended Practice for Electrical Power Distribution for Industrial Plants.

3.5 ANSI/IEEE std. 242-1986:

IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection andCoordination of Industrial and Commerical Power Systems.

3.6 Salem Generating Station UFSAR, Revision 6: February 15, 1987: Section 15.3.

EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81

s..:t;-125-EEE-0275- _::

191 Paqe 2 ')f ;_.:

Date:

January 24, 1989 4i0 DISCUSSION NN :srg 4.1 Calculation Basis The referenced calculation (Ref. 3.2) was performed on the assumption and quidelines listed below:

4.1.1 No emergency interties exist between 125VDC Systems 4.1.2 Concurrent Events are:

Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)

Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)

Loss of AC Power for atleast two (2) hours such that no battery chargers are available (ie, a multiple contingency failure)

  • 4.1.3 For a voltage profile calculation, cable resistance is calculated for an ambient temperature of 40°C and a cable temperature as specified below for all battery ci~cuits:

lA -

66°C 18 -

74°C lC -

74°C 2A -

67°C 28 -

70°C 2C -

71°C For a short circuit calculation~ a cable resistance at 25°C is considered.

4.1.4 All existing data on the drawings, in the documents identified in Section 5 and Attachments lA-4, 18-4, lC-4, 2A-4, 28-4 and 2C-4 of Ref. 3.2, have been verified by PSE&G procedures.

4.1.5 For the battery loading calculated, the voltage at the terminals of each cell, one minute, and two hours after the inception of the postulated event is taken equal to l.89V for battery lA, 1.aav for batteries. 18 and lC.

These values are the lower of the two voltage/cell values obtained for the two time periods of interest.

e5/525 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81

S -C ~ 1 2 5 *- EE E _.: 0 2 7 5- 0 NN :srg Date:

Januarv 24, 1989 4.1.6 For the battery loadinq calculated, the voltaqe at the ter~inals of each cell, one minute and two hours after the inception of the postulated event is taken equal to l.89V, l.88V, l.88V for batteries 2A, 28 and 2C respectively.

These values are the lower of the two volts/cell values obtained for the two time periods of interest.

4.1.7 The voltaqe drop, due to wiring connecting circuit components located outside the distribution cabinets or switchqear is negligible *.

4.1.8 All the various relays and other devices that obtain power from the 125 volt de batteries, are rated for 125 volts and have a common minimum operating voltage equal to 84 percent of rated voltage (105V).

4.1.9 For the purposes of determining load, where the identity of a particular relay was indeterminable but the function was established, the relay was taken to be identical to relays identified elsewhere in the system having the same function.

4.1.10 Where a circuit contained many unidentifiable relays, lights and other unknown circuit components, the load to this circuit was taken to be 80 percent of the rating of the breaker supplying the cir~uit.

4.1.11 Wherever a relay was found whose operation was indeterminable, it was taken to be energized for the entire two hours.

4.1.12 For more specific assumptions relating to the load profile calculation see Ref. 3.2, Section 3.1.

4.1.13 The vital buses are energized by* the diesel generators within 10 seconds and then the Vital Instrument Inverter Loads are sequenced back onto their vital AC bus.

e5/525 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81 -

'7S*-C 0-l2S-EEE.-027S-o -

January 24, 1989 Date:

NN :srg 4.2 DC Load Evaluation Criteria There are six (6) 125 VDC batteries associated with the Salem Nuclear Generatinq Station.

Batteries lA, lB and lC provide the necessary DC power to Unit 1 and batteries, 2A, 28 and 2C deliver this power to Unit 2~

It is the purpose of REf. 3.2 to determine the load each of these six batteries must supply to safely shutdown their respective units followinq the worst case postulated accident.

An enqineerinq assessment of the load for each of the batteries is to be made based primarily upon a review of the drawings associated with each of the various circuits connected to the batteries.

For this purpose, the tallowing accident scenario has been chosen; a unit undergoes a coincident loss of offsite power (LOOP), and a large break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) while both of the battery chargers associated with each battery are out of service for two hours.

It is assumed that at the inception of the accident, the batteries are fully charged.

According to the statement made in SGS-UFSAR, Rev.

6, 2/15/87 Section no. 5.3.2.2, page no. 8.3-12 (last paragraph), the PSE&G commitment is to size batteries in support of a loss of AC power (ie. loss of offsite power for two consecutive hours).

However, all other analyzed design scenarios described in Chapter 15 of SGS-UFSAR will be mitigated by the active support of all three diesel generators beyond one minute including a single active failure for one vital battery system.

This study in Ref. 3.2 is conducted to establish, conservatively, all possible loads that might be supported from the vital buses under an unlikely concurrent event of a LOOP, a LOCA and loss of all battery chargers (uncommitted operating condition)

_for tw hours.

e5/525 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 lOSEPf81

NN :srg e

Date:

Januar-y 24, 1989 The two hour-time per-iod is divided into two segments.

The first segment is the time between inception of the postulated accident and the first minute (0-1 minute).

This time period is critical since many automatic systems will respond to the accident situation.

The second time interval (1-120 minutes) identifies the time to safely shutdown the Plant.

During the 1-120 minute time interval for the purpose of this calculation, a return of offsite power is anticipated allowing the operator, as required, to restore power manually to the group buses.

4.2.1 first Minute Time -

Sequence Analysis During the first minute of this postulated LOOP/LOCA accident, certain automatic operations are initiated.

The group bus main circuit breakers are tripped.

The breakers connecting the Reactor Coolant Pumps to these four buses are tripped.

This happens within 30 seconds following the event.

The main circuit breakers to the vital buses are tripped and most of the feeder breakers from thes~ vital buses are tripped.

On examining the circuit breaker control schematics, it was discovered that this action was initiated by the Loss of AC power on the buses monitored by an undervoltage relay (Device 27).

Fourteen rules were followed to evaluate circuits.

For details refer to section 3.0 of the study (Ref. 3.2).

4.2.2 (1-120 Minutes) Time Sequence Analysis During the second time period (1-120 minutes), most loads on the 125V batteries are the resultant of the actions and operations initiated during the first minute of the accident.

In this calculation, any circuits which are activated by system parameters are assumed activated during the first minute (Rule 7) 1-and these loads are conservatively assumed to remain as loads on the 125V batteries for the entire two hour period.

e5/525 The connected relay loads are subdivided into seven categories and are integrated with the actual battery loads (Ref. 3.2, Section 3.1 IV).

EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81

~s---.c~--l-2_5, ___ E_w-~-E-~0-2_7_5 ___ c~...,*1111~-~~~~~~~~~~~~---

Paqe 6

~f :J NN:srg Date:

January 24, 1989 4.3 Load.Identification The fourteen circuits across which the voltaqe is identified to be lower than the minimum acceptable operating voltaqe (i.e. 105 volts) of the components are listed, reviewed and dispositioned in Attachment A. -The detailed discussions regarding the various dispositions are provided in 4.3.1.

4.3.1 Disposition Notes:

Note 1.0 These circuits are non-essential and are not required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis event.

So its unavailability is insiqnificant from the point of aystera safety and these loads may even be manually or automatically shed selectively or categorically on receipt of the following simultaneous signals:

0 0

0 Loss of offsite power (LOOP) ie the trip of generator breakers and breakers supplying station power transformers

. (SPTs) coincident with turbine trip.

Safety Injection Signal (SIS) indicating that a LOCA has occurred.

All 125VDC battery chargers are unavailable (even though diesels are running) due to a loss of vital power supplies (an unanalyzed event) to the chargers.

Not* 2.0 The actual output voltage at the input terminals of DG unit trip, DG breaker failure protection and generator field including DG voltage regulator & exciter controls is 104.19 volts which is below 105 volts by 0.77 percent.

This value of 105 volt is achieved on the basis of the m1n1mum operatinq voltage requirements of certain electromechanical relays.

e5/525 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81

S _.. ~.:_ l 2 S - EE E - 0 2 7 5 - O,.,

1 Paqe 7 'Jt iO NN :srg e5/525 Date:

Janual'."y 24, 1989 However, most of the excitel'."-requlatol'." is equipped with externally mounted automatic voltage adjust rheostat which can be used to vary the generator voltage over its adjustment range.

These exciter circuits are equipped with motor operated potentiometer, motor-operated auto-transformer, saturable transformers (T51, T52 and T53), current transformers (CTl, CT2, and CT3), Linear reactors (LSl, L52, L53), three-phase full-wave rectifier bridge (CRSO throuqh CR55), a field flashinq diode (CR56), and a surge arrestor (CR57).

Diode CR56 serves as a blocking diode to prevent current from tlowing oacK into the tield tlashing source during build-up.

The calculation also additionally considers field flashing amperes to flow for full one minute whlle the field flashing actually sustains for a maximum period of 10 seconds (normally less than 2 seconds).

The manual-automatic switch, S60 when in

  • automatic position regulates the generator voltage maintaining it at a constant value and varies the voltage over the output range of the regulator with rheostat R60.

So this slight droop in voltage during the first minute is not going to pose any significant concern for the voltage regulatqr - exciter control circuits.

The field flashing current is conservatively estimated to be 40 amps.

Actually this current will be lower than 40 amps because the available open circuit field flashing source voltage of 105 volts at the FO and F -

terminals when divided by the equivalent resistance of R53 -

R60 in series with the cable and the generator field including the blocking diode will yield much less current.

EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 lOSEPTBl

s_,_c*-l/.S-EEE-0275-G e Note 3.0 NN :srg e5/525 Date:

January 24, 1989 Additionally, when the diesel generators a~e tested periodically accordinq to the test schedule noted in Technical Specification Table 4.8-1, qenerator field will be left with sufficient residual magnetism to assist rapid build-up of the generator voltage thereby reducinq the maqnitude of the field flashinq current and its required duration.

The input voltaqe at the diesel generator local annunciator panel is 100.89 volts -

lU4~U8 volts except tor 28 diesel generator having 96.20 volts and 104.2 volts during 1st and 120 minutes respectively.

The nominal acceptable source voltage requirement for RIS MICROLARM Modem AN-3196 self contained LED annunciator is 105V to 140VDC at 240 MA maximum.

The transient or temporary loss of annunciator if occurs at all will pose no threat to or compromise with the safety of the DG system or the plant as the voltage profile is improved in the second time frame after a minute.

Additionally, no manual action is permisible during this period prior to the lapse of 10 minutes into the accident.

The subsequent restoration of voltage beyond a minute will enable the operator, when and as permitted by the procedures to take appropriate manual actions in mitigating the consequences of an event.

There are also additional instruments in the control boards that provide visual indication of various parametric status to display the system condition.

However, from the system point of view the postulated accident scenario is unrealistically over - conservative and undefined.

This situation will not occur within the defined operating constraints and the present licensing latitudes of the plant.

EDD-7 FORM l REV 0 10SEPT81

S --C _: l 2 s* - EE E - 0 2 I 5 - 0 e e

NN: srg Oat e :

January 2 4, 1 9 8 9 Note 4.0.

It is understood that no safety-related portable equipment is presently plugqed in these receptacles.

These receptacles are located at 100 feet elevation of the counting room.

The first minute terminal voltage at receptacles is 102.47 volts.

Following a minute into the accident the diesel qenerators would be available to battery chargers instead of being locking out of the vital power supplies.

This insignificant voltage degradation is a direct result of the occurrence of concurrent events listed below:

Note 5.0 Note 6.0 e5/525 0

0 0

Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)

Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)

A simultaneous loss of vital AC sources to all battery chargers coincident with continuously energized relay loads to compensate for any estimation errors.

(ref. sec. 4.1.11).

The above accident scenario is undefined, unanalyzed and considers mechanistic failures of components and systems that is overly conserative within the latitudes of the present licensing commitments.

The input terminal voltage available at the breaker "B" control point is 103.31 volts which is greater than 90 & 70 volts required for closing and tripping coils respectively.

This is not a violation with respect to the suitable voltage requirement for the operating coils (Ref. 3.2, Attachment G).

Lockout relays utilized have a minimum operating voltage of 70 volts.

So, the value of 104.46 volts is acceptable for the successful operation of these relays.

(Ref.

3.2, Attachment G).

EDD-7 FORM l REV 0 10SEPT81

s~G-125-EEE-0275-0 I

~--~,l

~ _**1

<..1

-<I\\;..;

Date:

January 24, 1989 s~o CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION The circuits in Attachment No. 1 across which the voltage is reported to be below the minimum acceptable threshold of operatinq limits (ie, 105 volts) of components, have been rev~ewed and dispositioned appropriately.

No modification is required for this condition of operation with present licensing requirements.

6.0 SIGNATURES ORIGINATOR I.tJ~ I I

~~~Lai-/J&

ENGINEERING MANAGER I

I I NN :srg eS/525 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 lOSEPTRl

ATTACHMENT I:

~AGE I

~r ""'

LIST OF 125VOC DISCREPANT CIRCUITS I

DISTRIBUTION PANEL ACTUAL W!R !NG BATTERY NO. I& ITS SAFETY CIRCUIT ffi CIRCUIT DEFICIENCY VOLTAGE D!AG./ SCH. DISPOSITION NO.:

CLASS!F!CAT!ONl ITEM NO.

DESCR r PT r ON NOTE NO.

(VOLTS> D!AG.

NOTES 1A-125VOC IA CNON-1El 22 13KV GR. A PNL. BO.

9 94.91 219436 1

lAAOC CCLASS-1El 24 1 A CG CO NTL. & EXC IT.

8 104.19 221408 2

223680 lAAOC CCLASS-1El 28 IA CG ALARMS 8

101.40 221408 3

223693 1B-125VOC !BOC (NON-IE) 34 GAS ANALYZER PANEL 8

103.63 221409 1

203682, 86 lBBOC CCLASS-IEl 5

18 DG CONTL & FIELD EXC!T.

8 103.82 221409 2

252500

!DOC CCLASS-1El 10 COUNTING ROOM 204 8/9 102.47/ 203098 4

RECEPTACLE.

102.86 221415 1C-l 25VOC ICOC CNON-IEJ 5

500 CB 20X & 21X CONTL &

104. 91 203097/

1 PROT.

9/11 208632,34

& 208679

!CDC CNON-IEl 34 TRANS I ENT DATA RECORDER 8/9 102.55/ 203097/

I 101.25 211086 lCCOC CC LASS 1 El 32 ICDG CONTL. & FIELD EXC!T.

8 104.82 221410/

2 223692 3

ICCOC CC LASS IE) 36

!COO ALARMS 8

100.89 223695 2A-125VOC 2AOC ( NON-1 El 14 TURB. GLAND SEAL STEAM &

LEAKOFF 8

104.76 220808/

1 236371 2AOC C NON-I El 30 12 GEN. EXC!T. VR CLOSE 8/9 86.09/

220808/

86.99 601036,37 I

2AAOC CC LASS 1 El 24 2AOO CONTL & EXC!T.

8 103.63 221417/

2 223677,78, 80 2AAOC CC LASS 1 El 28 2AOO UN IT ALARMS 8/9 104.08 221417/

3 223678, 79,

93.

HnCHl-4:::-i: ! :

L!S7 JF 12~VOC :15.:;::::=l*,-

I I

I I

I I

I I

I DI 5 TR I BUT I ON PANEL ACTUAL IW IR I NG I

BATTER:Y NO; I& ITS SAFETY CIRCUIT CA CIRCUIT I DEF IC I ENCY VOLTAGE DIAG./ SCH.,DISPOSITIJ~

NO.:

CLASSIFICATION>

ITEM NO.

DESCRIPTION NOTE NO.

(VOLTS) D!AG.

1NOTC:S 2B-125VOC 2B (CLASS !El 13 28 4160 VOLT BUS CONTL.

9/11 104.71 222791/

1 2BOC C NON-I El 34 GAS ANAL YlER PANEL 8

103.09 220809/

1 203682 2BBDC CCLASS IEl 5

2BDG CONTL & F!ELD EXCIT.

8 102.97 221418/

2 223686 2BBDC <CLASS IE) 9 28 DG CONTROLS & ALARMS 8/9 96.20/ 221418/

2&3 104.21

223684, 233694 2BBDC CC LASS IE) 21 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER B 8

103.31 221418/

5 203614 2BBDC CC LASS IE>

36 230 VOLT VITAL BUS CONTROL 8

104.46 221418/

6 203651 2C-l 25VOC 2CDC ( NON-1 E>

34 TRANS!ENT DATA RECORDER 8/9 103.38 220810/

I 101.19 219419 2CCDC <CLASS IE) 32 2CDG CONTROL & FIELD EXCIT 8

104.32 221419/

223692 2

2CCDC (CLASS 1 E>

36 2CDG ALARMS 8

100.48 221419/

3

223690, 223695 DISCREPANCY NOTES:
a.

The receiving end voltage at the end of the first minute Is less than the mlnlmum operating voltage of the relays

9.

The receiving end voltage at the end of the second hour Is less than the minimum operating voltage of the relays.

11. The circuit voltage proflle meets the mlnl~m voltage criteria tor the 1-120 minute time-period when the voltage/eel I for the 1-120 minute time period (Instead of the lowest volt/eel I value over both time periods) was used In the calculatlon.

For Notes 1 though 7 and' Note 8 refer to Attachments tA-t, IB-1, lC-1, 2A-t, 28-1, end 2C-I of the reference 3.2.

CER~IF!CAT:ON FOR DESIGN VER!FICAT:ON Reference No.

$-C-l25'-EEE.-02'1'5-0

SUMMARY

STATEMENT The undersigned hereby certifies that the design verification for the subject packaqe has been completed and all comments have been adequately addressed.

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L.,J~ 1/z1/rl
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APPROVAL, Rrmll'Iaf. ?l'C. ~my SPu u tm? ---

DE-AP.ZZ-0010 Exhibit 3 Rev.a Page 2 of 2

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FEEDW ATER CONTROL, BYPASS, AND ISOLATION SOLENOID VAL VE FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION THIS DISCUSSION IS PROVIDED TO DESCRIBE THE FUNCTION OF THE SOLENOID VALVES SHOWN ON DRAWING 203366, FOR DETERMINATION WHETHER OPERATION OF THE SOLENOID VALVES WILL BE AFFECTED BY REDUCED 125VDC SYSTEM VOLT AGES DURING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT.

SOLENOID VALVES SV543, 544 CONTROL THE 11BF19 FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVES. SOLENOID VALVES SV541, AND SV542 CONTROL THE 11BF40 FEEDWATERBYPASS VALVES. SOLENOID VALVES SV547 AND SV548 CONTROL THE 12BF19 CONTROL VALVES. SOLENOID VALVES SV545 AND SV546 CONTROL THE 12BF40 CONTROL VALVES.

THESE FEEDWATER SYSTEM VAL YES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO OPERATE IN THE EVENT OF A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. UPON THE RECEIPT OF AN ACCIDENT SIGNAL, THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM RELAYS ACT TO DE-ENERGIZE THE SOLENOID VALVES, THEREBY CAUSING THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM VALVES TO FAIL TO THE.CLOSED POSITION. ENERGIZATION OF THE SOLENOID VAL YES JS NOT REQUIRED DURING AN ACCIDENT.

SOLENOID VALVES SV1491 AND SV1492 ARE USED TO DIRECT CONTROL AIR TO VAL VE POSITIONING DEVICES FOR THE 11BF40 AND 12 BF40 FEED WATER BYPASS VALVES, FOR USE DURING STARTUP/LOW POWER EVOLUTIONS. ENERGIZATION OF THE SOLENOID VALVES IS NOT REQUIRED DURING AN ACCIDENT.