ML18096A320

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Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1991 for Salem 1
ML18096A320
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 09/30/1991
From: Fest J, Shedlock M
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9110220118
Download: ML18096A320 (15)


Text

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.O*PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT SALEM NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-272 October 15, 1991 In compliance with Section 6.9.1.6, Reporting Requirements for the Salem Technical Specifications, the original copy of the monthly operating reports for the month of September 1991 are being sent to you.

RH:pc Average Daily Unit Power Level Operating Data Report Unit Shutdowns and Power Reductions Safety Related Maintenance 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Operating Summary Refueling Information Challenges to Safety Valves cc:

Mr. Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator USNRC Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19046 Enclosures 8-1-7.R4 The Energy People

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~RAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LE~

Docket No.:

50-272 Unit Name:

Salem #1 Date:

10/10/91 Completed by:

Mark Shedlock Telephone:

339-2122 Month September 1991 Day Average Daily Power Level Day Average Daily Power Level (MWe-NET)

(MWe-NET) 1 1096 17 0

2 1080 18 0

3 1089 19 0

4 1090 20 0

5 1001 21 0

6 1066 22 0

7 1086 23 0

8 1102 24 0

9 1085 25 0

10 1094 26 0

11 1086 27 370 12 1082 28 1047 13 1111 29 1066 14 1106 30 1116 15 1076 31 16 455 P. 8.1-7 R1

e OPERATING DATA REPORT e Docket No:

50-272 Date:

10/10/91 Completed by:

Mark Shedlock Telephone:

339-2122 Operating Status

1.

Unit Name Salem No. 1 Notes

2.

Reporting Period September 1991

3.

Licensed Thermal Power (MWt) 3411

4.

Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe) 1170

5.

Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe) 1115

6.

Maximum Dependable Capacity(Gross MWe) 1149

7.

Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe) 1106

8.

If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (items 3 through 7) since Last Report, Give Reason N A

9.

Power Level to Which Restricted, if any (Net MWe)

~~N~/~A=--~~~~~~~

10. Reasons for Restrictions, if any ~=N~A=--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

This Month Year to Date Cumulative

11. Hours in Reporting Period 720 6551 124944
12. No. of Hrs. Rx. was Critical 499.9 4427.8 81391. 3

' 13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hrs.

0 0

0

14. Hours Generator On-Line 459.0 4271.4 78838.9
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 0

0 0

16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH) 1535817.6 14077653.6 248140038.8
17. Gross Elec. Energy Generated (MWH) 508630 4643230 82355870
18. Net Elec. Energy Gen.

(MWH) 481192 4421665 78390337

.19. Unit Service Factor 63.7 65.2 63.1

20. Unit Availability Factor 63.7 65.2 63.1
21. Unit Capacity Factor (using MDC Net) 60.4
61. 0 56.7
22. Unit Capacity Factor (using DER Net) 59.9 60.5 56.3
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 16.5 6.3 21.8
24. Shutdowns scheduled over next 6 months (type, date and duration of each)

NONE

25. If shutdown at end of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup:

NA 8-l-7.R2

NO.

DATE 0057 09/16/91 0058 09/20/91 1

2 F:

Forced S:

Scheduled DURATION TYPE1 (HOURS)

REASON2 F

90.6 s

170.4 Reason A-Equipment Failure (explain)

B-Maintenance or Test C-Refuel ing D-Requlatory Restriction A

B UNIT SHUTDOWN AND POWER REDUCTIONS REPORT MONTH SEPTEMBER 1991 METHOD OF SHUTTING DOWN REACTOR 1

4 3

LICENSE EVENT REPORT #

Method:

1-Manual 2-Manual Scram SYSTEM CODE4 cc CJ E-Operator Training & License Examination F-Administrative 3-Automatic Scram 4-Continuation of Previous Outage 5-Load Reduction 9-0ther G-Operational Error (Explain)

H-Other (Explain) 4 DOCKET NO.

UNIT NAME DATE COMPLETED BY TELEPHONE 50-272 Salem #1 10/10/91 Mark Shedlock 339-2122 COMPONENT CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION CODE5 TO PREVENT RECURRENCE PIPEXX HYDRAULIC FLUID LEAK VAL VEX PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE Exhibit G - Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report CLER) File (NUREG-0161) 5 Exhibit 1 - Same Source

SAFETY RELATED MAINTENANCE MONTH: -

SEPTEMBER 1991 DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

50-272 SALEM 1 WO NO UNIT 910321134 1

910731166 1

910801189 1

910905187 1

910921094 1

910921095 1

910929090 1

931221002 1

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

TELEPHONE:

OCTOBER 10, 1991 J. FEST (609)339-2904 EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION 12 NUCLEAR CHILLER SUPPLY HEADER SPOOL 1-SW-298 FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

SPOOL 1-SW-298 LEAKS -

REPAIR 15 CFCU SERVICE WATER OUTLET TEMPERATURE INDICATION FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

15 CFCU SERVICE WATER OUTLET TEMPERATURE INDICATION READS 0 -

INVESTIGATE 15 SERVICE WATER PUMP FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

15 SERVICE WATER PUMP CASING THROUGH WALL LEAK -

REPLACE lA SEC FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

lA SEC AUTO TEST FAULT ALARM IN -

TROUBLESHOOT & CORRECT VALVE 1CV278 FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE 1CV278 HAS NO OPEN/CLOSED INDICATION -

INVESTIGATE VALVE 1CV131 FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE 1CV131 HAS NO OPEN/CLOSED INDICATION -

INVESTIGATE VALVE 1SS33 FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

VALVE 1SS33 NOT INDICATING CLOSED INVESTIGATE 11 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

11 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP -

REPLACE PUMP SEALS

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: -

SEPTEMBER 1991 DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

TELEPHONE:

50-272 SALEM 1 OCTOBER 10, 1991 J. FEST (609)339-2904 The following items were evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFRS0.59.

The Station Operations Review Committee has reviewed and concurs with these evaluations.

ITEM A.

Design Change Packages DCP # lEC-3104 Pkg. 1 DCP # SEC-3028 Pkg. 1

SUMMARY

"Security System Upgrade" -

Package 1 proposes installing a new video capture and microprocessor based switcher system in the Nuclear Security Department Central Alarm Station.

The new video capture system will be used to replace five of the six existing video cassette recorders which are currently used to record selected video inputs for playback in the event of an alarm.

All changes being implemented by this DCP are limited to the perimeter monitoring portion of the Salem Security System.

The new video capture and switcher system equipment will be physically isolated from all normal plant systems.

all remote connections required to link the control boards and video monitors in the Secondary Alarm Station with the new equipment in the Central Alarm Station will be made via existing cable and raceway supports.

Therefore, Seismic Category I and II/I design considerations are not applicable.

This modification does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

This modification also does not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

(SORC 91-086)

"Security System Upgrade" -

Package 1 of this modification proposes upgrading the security system by utilizing towers with microwave units spaced from the ground elevation to the top of the tower to provide coverage of the sides of the buildings and across the roofs.

The Security System is not a primary plant system and is classified as non-safety related.

As such, the Security System is neither capable of nor required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis transient condition.

The primary functions of the security System are to secure, monitor and block the entry of unauthorized personnel into the protected area.

(SORC 91-086)

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: -

SEPTEMBER 1991 (Cont'd)

ITEM DCP # lEA-1021 Pkg. 1 DCP # lEC-3094 Pkg. 1 DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

TELEPHONE:

SUMMARY

50-272 SALEM 1 OCTOBER 10, 1991 J. FEST (609)339-2904 "12 RHR Pump Motor Vibration Dampers" - This design change incorporates Temporary modification STD 89-005 which added vibration dampers to No. 12 RHR pump motor.

This was required to alleviate a high vibration condition that existed on the pump, due to a harmonic response created in the motor support steel.

The design modification consists of adding weights to the motor lifting lugs.

There is no impact on the ability of No. 12 RHR pump and motor to function in a seismic event, the vibration is within the manufacturer's specifications and the cause of the vibration was not internal to the pump or motor.

Therefore, there is no increase in the probability of malfunction of No. 12 RHR pump and motor, and therefore no increase in the consequences of a malfunction of the pump or motor.

Since there is no impact on the function of No. 12 RHR pump and motor, no impact on the function of the RHR system and negligible impact to the stress analysis, there is no increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.

(SORC 91-089)

"Permanent Power to the Service Water Fab Shop" This package provides for the installation of permanent power to the Service Water Fab Shop (former biocide building) which will allow the removal of the power feed connected to breaker 1E5D installed under Temporary Modification STD 88-005.

The proposal does not change any procedures described in the FSAR or involve a test or experiment not described in the FSAR.

However, it does change the facility as described in the FSAR since Dwg. 203001-A-8789 will be affected by this modification.

Most of the work to be performed per this change package will be in the yard and there is no involvement with safety related equipment.

The provision of permanent power to the Service Water Fab Shop does not affect any safety function.

(SORC 91-089)

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: -

SEPTEMBER 1991 (Cont'd)

ITEM DCP # lEC-3098 Pkg. 1 DCP # lEC-3029 Pkg. 1 DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

TELEPHONE:

SUMMARY

50-272 SALEM 1 OCTOBER 10, 1991 J. FEST (609)339-2904 "Containment Fan Coil Unit Solenoid Valve -

Appendix R" - This package modifies the tubing and control wiring to the Containment Fan Coil Units (CFCU's) solenoid valves so that service water flow to the CFCU's will not be cut off due to an Appendix "R" fire.

This proposal eliminates a failure mode which would result in the loss of one or more CFCU's while not increasing the probability or consequence of an accident or equipment malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR.

It therefore does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

(SORC 91-089)

"12 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Backwash" -

This package will eliminate the backwash function at Nos. 12A & B component cooling heat exchanger (CCHX) by replacing and reconfiguring the 14" polyethelene lined carbon steel service water pipe with 6% molybdenum stainless steel.

The new configuration is simplified due to the elimination of the backflush piping and valves.

Provisions have been made in the package to monitor/alarm differential pressure across the heat exchangers.

The DP alarm setpoint was conservatively established to ensure sufficient flow through the heat exchangers at increased differential pressures.

The system will function identically to the previous forward flow mode.

This design change does not increase the probability of an accident nor the consequences of an event previously analyzed.

( SORC 91-091)

B.

Temporary Modification Requests (TMRs)

TMR # 91-071 "Document removal of 11SW928" - This modification documents the prior removal of 11SW928, a 3/4" drain valve on the Service Water outlet header upstream of 11SW79, from the system.

UFSAR Section 9.2.1 "Service Water System" and the Salem Piping Specification S-C-MPOO-MGS-001 were reviewed.

The removal of 11SW928 represented a change in the piping configuration only.

The probability or consequences of an accident are not affected by this change.

(SORC 91-083)

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: -

SEPTEMBER 1991 (Cont'd)

ITEM TMR # 91-079 DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

TELEPHONE:

SUMMARY

50-272 SALEM 1 OCTOBER 10, 1991 J. FEST (609)339-2904 "12 Component Cooling System Heat Exchanger" -

The purpose of this modification is to install blank flanges on the inlet piping of 12A Component Cooling Heat Exchanger (CCHX) to facilitate repair of spool 1-SW-P-1102.

While the blank flanges are installed this portion of

. the heat exchanger will be unavailable.

The blank was sized in accordance with ANSI B31.7 1969 Edition 1970 Addenda paragraph 1-704.5.5 "Pressure *Design of Permanent Blanks".

This is the original design fabrication code of the Service Water system.

Therefore, while the installation of the blanks is a modification to the present piping configuration, it does meet the original design code.

This change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.

It does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR.

The operation of the plant using only one half of 12 CCHX was evaluated in safety evaluation S-C-N210-MSE-0317 Rev~ 1 and found to be acceptable.

The blank flanges will serve the same function as valves 12SW385 and 12SW387, the isolation valves for 12 CCHX.

(SORC 91-090)

C.

Deficiency Reports (DRs) -

"Use-As-Is" DR #

SMD 91-336 This evaluation is for the return of the No. 1 Service Water Bay sump pump with the discharge check valve (11BD68) having no internal parts.

This is essentially eliminating the valve.

UFSAR Section 9.2.1.2, Service Water CBD Section 3.0.2, and SER Section 9.6 were reviewed.

The capacity of the Service Water Sump Pump is 125 gpm.

In order to pump the sump down the pump must run approximately 1.25 minutes.

The liquid return due to the missing check valve will cause the pump to run more frequently, however, it will not affect the pump capacity or function.

Additionally, the service Water Sump high level alarm will be unaffected.

(SORC 91-082)

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: -

SEPTEMBER 1991 (Cont'd)

ITEM DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

TELEPHONE:

SUMMARY

50-272 SALEM 1 OCTOBER 10, 1991 J. FEST (609)339-2904 D.

Procedures and Revisions (Proc)

S1.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)

NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0052(Q)

NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0004(Q)

"Flooding" Rev. 0 -

The purpose of this procedure is to provide direction for internal plant flooding in structures that contain safety related equipment (except Containment).

PSE&G committed to having a procedure for internal flooding in response to SOER 85-05, recommendation 4.

The performance of this procedure will help mitigate an accident not previously described in the SAR and prevent the malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR.

(SORC 91-082)

"Water Chemistry Control Program" -

Rev. 0 -

This procedure describes the methods to be used to minimize the harmful effects of chemical impurities in plant systems that shall: 1)

Support the long term reliability of plant equipment; 2) Minimize plant radiation fields;

3) Minimize fuel defects, and 4) Identify adverse water quality conditions and correct them as soon as practical.

This procedure also delineates the requirements for ensuring the water chemistry programs for Artificial Island's nuclear power plants are developed and maintained in accordance with vendor and industry guidelines and station Technical Specifications.

( SORC 91-089)

"Station Operations Review Committee" Rev. 2 -

Revision 2 of this procedure changes the membership requirements to agree exactly with the membership composition specified in the Technical Specifications (Section 6.5.1.2).

Also, reference to a form has been changed and a clarifying statement added to ensure correct management approval is obtained when an educational waiver for an individual's qualifications is made in accordance with ANSI/ANS 3.1-1981, Section 4.1.

It also allows a member and his alternate to vote at the same meeting but not on the same issue.

This change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.

(SORC 91-091)

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: -

SEPTEMBER 1991 (Cont'd)

ITEM E.

Safety Evaluations (SE)

UFSAR CHANGE 91-25 UFSAR CHANGE 91-30 UFSAR CHANGE 91-24 DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

TELEPHONE:

SUMMARY

50-272 SALEM 1 OCTOBER 10, 1991 J. FEST (609)339-2904 "UFSAR Section 3.1.2, Criterion 4" -

The purpose of this change is to add the 20,000 bbl fuel oil storage tank (1DFE013) for the diesel generator fuel oil system to the shared components listed on UFSAR section 3.1.2, Criterion 4.

The proposal will not physically change the tank in any form, fit or function.

Thus, the proposal or UFSAR text change will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR (see Section 9.5.4 and Chapter 15 of the UFSAR).

(SORC 91-083)

This proposed change revises UFSAR Section 6.2.4.4, Table 6.2-10 (Section 6.2.4.3), Figure 6.2-23.and 6.2.24 (Section 6.2.4.2).

The proposed changes involve addition, deletion or clarification to the UFSAR concerning the containment isolation valves.

This proposal does not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the UFSAR.

Based on a review of the accident analysis as described in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR, the probability of malfunction of Component Cooling System equipment which is important to safety has not been discussed.

Also, this proposal does not involve any hardware changes, and therefore, does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR.

(SORC 91-083)

This proposed change reflects the current vendor and industry secondary water chemistry guidelines for controlling PWR secondary water chemistry.

This change corrects information currently identified in the UFSAR.

These secondary chemistry guidelines increase the margin of safety because they limit the chemistry impurities into the steam generators.

The intended function to maintain steam generator integrity remains unchanged.

This change does not increase the probability of an accident or a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

(SORC 91-089)

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: -

SEPTEMBER 1991 (Cont'd)

ITEM UFSAR CHANGE 91-36 UFSAR CHANGE 91-31 DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

TELEPHONE:

SUMMARY

50-272 SALEM 1 OCTOBER 10, 1991 J. FEST (609)339-2904 This proposed change revises UFSAR Section 9.2.2.6 to state that the set pressure of the component cooling surge tank relief valve is equal to the design pressure of the tank.

This proposal corrects the statement in the UFSAR Section 9.2.2.6 to reflect the as-built condition.

Engineering Evaluation S-C-CC-MEE-0605 evaluates the as-built condition to be acceptable.

Therefore, this proposal does not increase the probability of a malfunction of the component cooling system.

This proposal does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the UFSAR.

( SORC 91-089)

This proposed SAR change revises the Component Cooling System minimum flow requirements listed in Table 9.2-3 of the UFSAR, in accordance with as-built conditions as described in Table T-5 and other pertinent sections of the Component Cooling System CBD DE-CB.CC-0023(Q).

Based on a review of the accident analysis as described in the UFSAR, Chapter 15, the proposed revisions to UFSAR Table 9.2-3 do not create a new situation requiring additional accident analyses.

Sufficient component cooling system heat removal capability exists to provide adequate cooling water to the equipment and components that must be cooled to mitigate the consequences of the events discussed.

(SORC 91-094)

SALEM UNIT NO. 1 SALEM GENERATING STATION MONTHLY OPERATING

SUMMARY

UNIT 1 SEPTEMBER 1991 The Unit began the period operating at full power and continued to operate at essentially full power until September 5, 1991, when power was reduced to 50% due to a failure of lA Safeguards Equipment Cabinet (SEC).

The SEC chassis was replaced and the Unit restored to full power on September 6, 1991.

The Unit continued to operate at full power until September 16, l991, when it was shutdown to repair an unisolable leak on the electrohydraulic control system (EHC) and to replace a temperature detector in reactor coolant system.

A pressurizer spray valve bonnet leak was discovered during the containment inspection.

Main steam isolation valve stroke testing failures also required repairs during the shutdown period.

The necessary repairs were completed and the Unit was restored to full power on September 27, 1991.

The Unit continued to operate at essentially full power throughout the remainder of the period.

REFUELING INFORMATION MONTH: -

SEPTEMBER 1991 MONTH SEPTEMBER 1991 DOCKET NO:

UNIT NAME:

DATE:

COMPLETED BY:

TELEPHONE:

1.

Refueling information has changed from last month:

YES X

NO

2.

Scheduled date for next refueling:

APRIL 4, 1992 50-272 SALEM 1 OCTOBER 10, 1991 J. FEST

{609)339-2904

3.

Scheduled date for restart following refueling:

JUNE 9, 1992

4.

a}

Will Technical Specification changes or other license amendments be required?:

YES NO NOT DETERMINED TO DATE x

b}

Has the reload fuel design been reviewed by the Station Operating Review Committee?:

YES NO X

If no, when is it scheduled?:

5.

Scheduled date{s} for submitting proposed licensing action:

N/A

6.

Important licensing considerations associated with refueling:

7.

Number of Fuel Assemblies:

a.

Incore 193

b.

In Spent Fuel Storage 588

8.

Present licensed spent fuel storage capacity:

1170 Future spent fuel storage capacity:

1170

9.

Date of last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity:

September 2001 8-1-7.R4

CHALLENGES TO PORVs OR SAFETY VALVES Salem Unit 1 In accordance with the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.6, the following recent challenges to PORVs or Safety Valves are being reported:

09/20/91 -

On September 20, 1991, with Salem Unit 1 in Mode 4, during the performance of Operations Procedure OP-II-2.3.4, "Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Operability Checking and Arming of 1PR1 and 1PR2", both PR1 and PR2 failed to open.

Subsequent investigation showed the diaphragms to be leaking.

Upon completion of repairs the valves tested satisfactorily.